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This thesis aims to address a vital gap that has emerged in the digital identity regulatory 
discourse: how can the legal regulation of digital identity mirror the global nature of digital 
identity and be compatible with national local difference?  
 
 
Digital identity, or the digital representation of an individual, is a complex concept, which 
manifests in myriad forms (e.g. authenticators, claims, data or information, identifiers, 
presence, relationship representations and reputation) and natures. As such, it engages a 
gamut of legal domains ranging from criminal law, constitutional law, human rights law, law 
of identity schemes, contract law, intellectual property law, tort law and data protection law. 
 
 
Digital identity is global and local in its nature, influence and effects. Yet, the digital identity 
regulatory discourse has primarily developed in and focussed on the digitally advanced 
West, leaving out countries like India which are developing strong digital presences, with 
their own digital identity perceptions and needs. This situation is adverse to the sustained 
future of digital identity. Thus, the contribution of this thesis lies in filling this gap and 
preparing the ground for a dialogue between different countries with different national 
agendas through building international and local awareness of how similarities and 
differences operate in respect of digital identity, its regulation and providing a modest 




To this end, the thesis carried out comparative legal research on the legal regulation of 
digital identity using the UK and India as base jurisdictions. The original hypothesis was that 
that immense differences in the legal regulation of digital identity between the comparator 
countries would emerge. Yet, though differences were evident, considerable degrees of 
similarity also emerged, not just on the superficial level of mere identity of rules, but also in 
legal practice, in large part attributable to India’s penchant for legal transplants.  
 
 
While the transplantation of Western law did not result in a full-scale rejection of the 
transplanted laws in relation to digital identity in India, there are indications of anomalies 
caused by the imposition of Western cultural norms through law on an Indian society ill 
prepared for it. Thus there has resulted a tension between the local and the global, the 
indigenous and the externally imposed. The challenge is thus to resolve this, taking into 
account, on the one hand the need to maintain the global nature and relevance of digital 
identity and the other, the need to accommodate and be responsive to local differences. 
 
 
The thesis proposes a tentative solution called the tri-elemental framework (TeF) which 
draws from the Indian philosophical and legal concept of dharma (and its elements of Sad 
Achara, Vyavahāra and Prayaschitta) and learns from the most universally relevant digital 
identity proposal, De Hert’s right to identity. The solution provides one way in which the law 
regulating digital identity, whatever its nature, can be made sense of and acquire cultural 
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1. Introduction  
 
“There are so many different viewpoints and that’s why it’s so difficult to create a 
rigorous model for digital identity.”  
 -David Birch1 
1.1. Overview 
 
Digital identity2 (defined as the digital representation of a digital identity subject3 in 
tangible or intangible form, self-created, externally assigned or consequentially 
generated) is a pervasive, omnipresent and dynamic phenomenon of contemporary 
society with significant personal,4 social, economic5 and legal ramifications.6  
 
There have been significant developments in the past decade (2000-2010) in relation 
to digital identity and identity management technologies, the law regulating such 
technologies and allied research in the digitally advanced West (digitally advanced 
Europe, the USA, Canada and Australia7). This is particularly evident in the growth 
of the identity management industry, legal regulation and the rise of digital identity 
initiatives like FIDIS,8 the Identity Trail9 and the Identity Commons.10  
                                                 
1 David Birch, ‘Issues and Concerns,’ in Jane Adams and David Birch (eds), The Digital Identity 
Reader 2007 (Mastodon Press, London 2007), 47 
2 For extensive coverage of the concept, see Ch 2.  
3 Digital identity, in the scope of this thesis, is largely restricted to that of human beings.  
4 An individual’s life has become identity centric with individuals becoming, as Solove explains, 
creatures of “electronic collages” or “digital dossiers” that are used to identify and determine 
personhood. DJ Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age (NYUP,  
NY 2006), 2 
5 See H Abelson and L Lessig, ‘Digital Identity in Cyberspace,’ White Paper submitted for 6.805/Law 
of Cyberspace: Social Protocols (10 December 1998) 
6 See ITU, ‘Internet Report 2006: Digital.life,’ Chapter Four (Geneva, 2006) 93-120 
<http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/publications/digitalife/docs/digital-life-web.pdf>; Solove (2006) n4; J 
Madelin and L Razzell, ‘Towards an Identity Society,’ White Paper, 
<http://www.identitysociety.org/files/identitysociety.pdf>; RA Bartle, Designing Virtual Worlds 
(Pearson Professional Education, NJ 2003), 159  
7 See R Clarke, ‘Just Another Piece of Plastic for Your Wallet: The 'Australia Card' Scheme,’ (1988) 
18 (1) Computers & Society; GW Greenleaf and J Nolan, ‘The Deceptive History of the Australia 
Card’ (1986) 58 (4) Aust Qtly, 407-425; R Clarke, ‘The Proposed Australian Implementation of the 
OECD Privacy Guidelines,’ Working Paper (January 1987). See also C Sullivan, ‘Digital Identity: An 
Emergent Legal Concept: An Analysis of the Role and Legal Nature of Digital Identity in a 
Transactional Context’ (PhD Thesis, University of Adelaide 2009). Sullivan’s thesis examines the law 
on ID Cards in the UK and Australia and shows that the two are similar in respect of their relationship 
with digital identity.  
8 The FIDIS Network of Excellence, a consortium of partners of industry and academia in Europe, 
was set up to explore the consequences of identity vis a vis privacy, security and trust. Its vision was 
to help Europe “develop a deeper understanding of how appropriate identification and ID management 
can progress the way to a fairer European information society.” <http://www.fidis.net/> 
9 The Identity Trail, based in Canada, was a project involving North American and European 
researchers that explored three primary streams: the nature and value of anonymity, identity & 
authentication; the constitutional, legal and policy aspects and the development of technologies of 
identification, anonymisation and authentication. <http://www.idtrail.org> 
10 The US based Identity Commons is a community of working groups like the Identity Gang, the 
Internet Identity Workshop, Newbies for Newbies and Photogroup which aims “to support, facilitate, 
and promote the creation of an open identity layer for the Internet; one that maximizes control, 
convenience and privacy for the individual while encouraging the development of healthy, 
interoperable communities. <http://wiki.idcommons.net/Identity_Commons> 
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But digital identity is a phenomenon extending far beyond the digitally advanced 
West. Like identity, digital identity is fragmented, socially variable and despite its 
propensity to be a global technical construct,11 is influenced by local conditionality, 
particularly in its legal regulation. Yet, there is very little in existing literature12 on 
digital identity and its regulation beyond the digitally advanced West, in jurisdictions 
like India13 which are emerging as significant markets for digital identity 
technologies like identity schemes,14 the Internet,15 mobiles 16 and RFID.17  
 
At the wider international level, there is only one organisation with a noteworthy 
global thrust on digital identity: the ITU’s Focus Group on Identity Management (FG 
IdM),18 established in December 2006 (together with its allied initiatives the Joint 
Coordination Activity on Identity Management (JCA-IdM)19 and the Global 
Standards Initiative for Identity Management (GSI-IdM)),20 to “facilitate the 
development of a generic Identity Management framework, by fostering participation 
of all telecommunications and ICT experts on Identity Management.”21 Under the 
                                                 
11 Digital identity technologies are universal in nature, unless specifically restricted. For example, a 
social networking profile in UK generally has the same technical features as a social networking 
profile in India. A biometric profile is universally relevant. 
12 As reviewed upto 2010. 
13 There are a few exceptions to this e.g. Costa Rica.  
14 India’s UID project market itself is estimated at over Rupees 100 crore. See MB Chatterjee, ‘Nine 
Submit Bids for UID Tender,’ The Hindu Business Line (22 June 2010) 
<http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2010/06/22/stories/2010062251760800.htm>; Brian 
Robertson, ‘Indian ID Market Geared for Growth,’ (2005) 17 (2) Card Technology Today, 11 
15 See Budde.Com, ‘India - Internet Market,’ Report, (05 July 2010) 
<http://www.budde.com.au/Research/India-Internet-Market.html>; IAMAI, ‘Mobile Internet in India,’ 
Report (December 2009) <http://www.iamai.in/Upload/Research/MobileInternetinIndia_39.pdf>; 
IAMAI & IMRB, ‘Internet in India,’ Report, (2007) <http://www.iamai.in/Upload/Research/I-Cube-
2007-Summary-Report-final.pdf> 
16 India is one of the biggest and fastest growing mobile phone markets. IAMAI, ‘Report on Mobile 
VAS in India,’ (July 2010), 
<http://www.iamai.in/Upload/Research/Report_on_MVAS_(2010)_submittal_42.pdf>; ‘The Next 
Billion Geeks: How the Mobile Internet Will Transform the BRICI Countries,’ The Economist (Dadri, 
2 September 2010) <http://www.economist.com/node/16944020?story_id=16944020&fsrc=rss>; R 
Blakely, ‘When Prison is Just a Phone Call Away’ The Times (India, 6 April 2009) 




21 ITU-T, Focus Group on Identity Management, <http://www.itu.int/ITU-
T/studygroups/com17/fgidm/> 
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auspices of the ITU, digital identity in jurisdictions like India has been explored 
either too broadly22 or too technically.23 This is a serious deficiency.  
 
There are digital identity needs and regulatory interests beyond the Western digitally 
advanced world. Individuals in India, digital identity subjects like their Western 
counterparts, bring their life contexts to their experience and use of digital identity 
and are faced with the challenges of digital identity management and regulation, 
particularly in the light of the proliferation of digital identity technologies. But to 
date, there is no specific research exclusively exploring digital identity and its legal 
regulation in India and its consequent relation to and significance for global digital 
identity regulatory developments. 24 This situation is adverse to the regulatory future 
of digital identity, and the original contribution of this thesis lies in filling this gap. 
 
This leads us to ask the central question of this thesis: “how can the legal regulation 
of digital identity mirror the global nature of digital identity and be compatible with 
national local difference?” The thesis aims to answer this question through a 
comparative study of the law regulating digital identity using the UK25 and India26 as 
base jurisdictions.27 The UK is a prime example of a Western digitally advanced 
country and India is an example of a digitally advancing country. Both countries are 
                                                 
22 See the manner of coverage of digital identity issues in India in the ITU primary document on 
digital identity. ITU Internet Report (2006) n6 
23 See R Ramamurthy, ‘Data Theft and Identity Theft: A Review,’ ITU Telecom World Geneva, 5-9 
October 2009 <http://www.itu.int/tlc/WORLD2009/forum/entries/participant.148030.html> 
24 Existing research is patchwork and sectoral, focused on areas like outsourcing (mostly in relation to 
rights of data subjects of outsourced data), ID cards and not comprehensive enough to enable a 
holistic understanding of the complexity of legal and social issues involved.  
25 The UK comprises of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It is a constitutional 
monarchy with a parliamentary system of governance and a member of the EC since 1973. England 
and Wales follow the common law system, while Scotland has a mixed legal system (combination of 
common and civil law). Scots Law shares a number of statutory provisions with English law but its 
civil law is largely based on Scots common law rather than statute and has some Roman Dutch law 
elements. See HL MacQueen, ‘Scots Law’ in JM Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative 
Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 2006), 642-652; WDH Sellar, ‘Scots Law: Mixed From 
the Very Beginning? A Tale of Two Receptions,’ (2000) 4 EdinLR 3 
26 India is a federal republic of twenty eight states and seven union territories. Traditionally classified 
as an English Common Law System, it manifests the following distinctions: a written Constitution, 
separate personal law codes applicable to religious communities, no distinction between common law 
and equity and the tailoring of precedents to facts of the case.  
27 The thesis is novel in this respect. The only other comparative research into digital identity was 
carried out by Clare Sullivan in relation to transactional digital identity in the UK and Australia. See 
Sullivan (2009) n7 
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socio-culturally diverse28 and ascribe different values to identity.29 They are both 
very contrastive, yet digitally significant jurisdictions that struggle with issues of 
digital identity and its regulation. 
 
1.2. Rationale and importance  
 
Carrying out comparative legal research on the regulation of digital identity is a 
difficult task due to the high degree by which thinking about identity is culturally 
mediated.30 Unlike technical aspects of law (e.g. corporate liability or investment 
fraud), identity touches upon the very manner one thinks about oneself, one’s pre-
theoretical and pre-legal, implicit and taken-for-granted assumptions of who one is 
and what it means to identify oneself as something or someone.  
 
Indeed, on a meta-level one can query if asking these questions does not already bias 
the discussion towards a Western-centric approach where the existence of such a 
thing as the ‘I’ is much less controversial than in many Asian schools of thought.  
Contrast Descartes’ self-confident ‘Je pense, donc je suis’ that grounds knowledge of 
what he identified as the one base free of error, our notion of a thinking, indivisible 
self,31 with the Buddhist notion of the empty, illusory and mis-identificatory self.32 
 
                                                 
28 The UK is generally characterised as an individualist country and India as a collectivist country. See 
Geert Hofstede, Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-related Values (Sage, CA 
1980); Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations, Software of the Mind: Intercultural Cooperation 
and its Importance for Survival (Profile Books, London 1994),13-15; Charles Hampden-Turner and 
Fons Trompenaars, Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Diversity in Global Business 
(McGraw-Hill, NY 1997) 
29 See Nadia Tazi (ed), Keywords Identity: For a Different Kind of Globalisation (Other Press, NY 
2004) (contrasting Europe and India); S Guha, ‘The Politics of Identity and Enumeration in India c. 
1600–1990,’ (2003) 45 (1) Comp Studies in Society and History,148-167; Agehananda Bharati, ‘The 
Self in Hindu Thought and Action,’ in AJ Marsella, G DeVos and FL Hsu (eds), Culture and Self: 
Asian and Western Perspectives (Tavistock, London 1985), 185–230; B Cohn, “The Census, Social 
Structure and Objectification in South Asia” in B Cohn (ed),  An Anthropologist Among the 
Historians and Other Essays (OUP, Delhi 1987), 224-254; Bidyut Chakrabarty (ed), Communal 
Identity in India: its Construction and Articulation in the Twentieth Century (OUP, New Delhi 2005) 
30 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books, NY 1973); A Swidler, ‘Culture in 
Action: Symbols and Strategies,’(1986) 51 Am Soc Rev, 273-286; JE Cote & CG Levine, Identity 
Formation, Agency and Culture: A Social Psychological Synthesis (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, NJ 
2002)  
31 René Descartes Discours de la Méthode (1861) 
32 See The Great Discourse on the Anattalakkhana Sutta, (U Min Swe 1983); Paul Carus, Gospel of 
Buddha (Kessinger Publishing Co, Kila 2003); Martin Southwold, Buddhism in Life (Manchester 
University Press, Manchester 1983), 87 
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Nonetheless, we argue that comparative legal research that takes the cultural 
embeddedness of law seriously is a necessary, if difficult, pre-requisite for the 
sustained global regulation of digital lives.33  
 
Two important international declarations accentuate the need for this thesis: the UN 
Millennium Declaration34 and the WSIS Geneva Declaration of Principles for the 
Information Society. 35   
 
The UN Millennium Declaration recognises the need  
…through broad and sustained efforts to create a shared future, based upon 
our common humanity in all its diversity... These efforts must include 
policies and measures, at the global level, which correspond to the needs of 
developing countries and economies in transition and are formulated and 
implemented with their effective participation.36 
 
This thesis, in explicitly highlighting and recognising the similarities and differences 
prevalent in the legal regulation of digital identity between countries, falls neatly 
within the framework of the Millennium Declaration and is a modest attempt to 
contribute to some of its goals.  
 
The WSIS Geneva Declaration of Principles commits “to build a people-centred, 
inclusive and development-oriented Information Society.”37 It calls for raising 
awareness of the uneven distribution in “the benefits of the information technology 
revolution between the developed and developing countries and within societies,”38 
“digital solidarity,”39 for stimulating respect for the “cultural identity, cultural and 
linguistic diversity, traditions and religions and fostering dialogue among cultures 
and civilizations.”40 For legal regulation to rise to this task, comparative legal 
                                                 
33 G Wilson, ‘Comparative Legal Scholarship’ in Michael McConville, Wing Hong Chui (eds), 
Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2007), 87-103, 89 
34 UNGA Res 55/2 of 8 September 2000. UN Doc A/55/49 (2000) 
35 WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E (2003), Geneva (12 December 2003) 
<http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/dop.html> 
36 I.5 
37 Principle 1 
38 Principle 10 
39 Principle 17 
40 Principle 52  
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analysis that is cognisant of the wider socio-cultural factors that influence and shape 
our understanding of law, as provided in the thesis is required.  
 
The need to revitalise the digital identity discourse through the scrutiny of alternative 
societies like India (rather than those dominating the discourse like the UK) also 
finds grounding in the works of Melisarris,41 Menski42 and Zittrain.43 Melisarris and 
Menski both highlight the importance of studying how cultures can create alternative 
perceptions of the world and how this “framing” influences legal responses. This 
then translates for them into the need to allow different cultures to inform and 
advance the law in the global legal debate. Zittrain applies this theme directly to 
Internet governance, calling for the preservation of local understandings as key to 
successful Internet governance.44  
 
This thesis subscribes deeply to these principles and goals and aims to fulfil their 
vision in preparing the ground for a dialogue between different countries with 
different national agendas through building international and local awareness of how 
similarities and differences operate in respect of digital identity and its regulation and 
providing a modest solution that will help preserve both the global and local 
dimensions of digital identity and its regulation. 
 
1.3. Nature, method and scope  
 
The research for this thesis originally set out with the hypothesis that immense 
differences in the legal regulation of digital identity between the comparator 
countries (UK and India) would emerge, and that the adoption of Western legal 
concepts thus far dominating the legal response in India would fail at the 
implementation level or create highly visible anomalies and efficiency loss. 
 
                                                 
41 E Melissaris, ‘The More The Merrier? A New Take On Legal Pluralism,’(2004) 13(1) Soc Leg 
Studies, 57-79, 76 
42 W Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context (CUP, Cambridge 2006), 32  
43 Jonathan Zittrain, ‘Be Careful What You Ask For: Reconciling a Global Internet and Local Law,’ 




Since the cultural differences between the UK and India are arguably more deep-
seated than those between European countries, and the issue of identity and its legal 
regulation more closely linked to non-legal cultural factors, one would expect a 
fortiori an even greater struggle for Indian society to live with regulations that 
express a value system and an approach to law in general, that is fundamentally 
alien. One therefore expected to find either that local solutions to identity regulation 
were emerging, or where this was not the case, imposed western-centric regulation 
was displaying systematic anomalies that needed addressing, with the indicators of 
such problems being: the non-application or inconsistent application of a law by the 
courts; failure to use available legal remedies by people who suffered harm due to 
ignorance or misunderstanding of the legal regime; failure in the uptake of 
technologies due to the fear of risks even where legal protection was available; 
systematic and widespread non-compliance with a law and an inability to adjust the 
legal regime flexibly to changing circumstances.45 Indeed, a literature review reveals 
how this is the case in the inability of Asian countries to accommodate Western 
notions of rights.46 
 
The analysis of law regulating digital identity in the thesis47 reveals a slightly 
different picture, which is considerably more nuanced. While little in terms of 
indigenous legal solutions was found though differences were evident,48 considerable 
degrees of similarity also emerged, not just on the superficial level of mere identity 
of rules, but also in legal practice, the “law in action.”49 Indian law is not perfect, but 
‘muddling through’ by and large works.  Noted comparatist Alan Watson’s notion of 
                                                 
45 This goes back to Legrand’s concept of laws as “problem solving heuristics” which are 
impoverished when external transplants replace local legal problem solving methodologies. The 
recipient legal system in this case can follow blindly the new legal rules but lacks the deeper 
understanding to use them creatively to generate new legal concepts and solutions. See in particular, 
Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code (1997) 60 MLR, 44- 63 (hereinafter (1997a). To use 
an analogy, it is easier for native speakers to develop language creatively by playing around with its 
rules than for a second language speaker who tends to adhere to them more rigidly.    
46 See eg, Russell Menyhart, ‘Changing Identities and Changing Law: Possibilities for a Global Legal 
Culture,’ (2003) 10 (2) Indiana J of Global Legal Studies, 157-199; RP Peerenboom, ‘What's Wrong 
with Chinese Rights? Towards a Theory of Rights with Chinese Characteristics,’(1993) 29 (6)  Harv 
Hum Rts J,  39-47; Sompong Sucharitkul, ‘Thai Law and Buddhist Law,’(1998) 46 Am J Comp L, 69-
72, 78; CM Cerna, ‘Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human 
Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts,’ (1994) 16 HRQ, 740-752 
47 Chs 5, 6 
48 Chs 5, 6 
49 For the distinction see eg, Esin Örücü, ‘A Project: Comparative Law in Action,’ in E Örücü and D 
Nelkin (eds), Comparative Law: A Handbook (Hart, Oxford 2007), 435-499 
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legal transplants50 accounts for much of this: India and the UK share a legal and 
political history and India adopted common law “as a block,”51 just as Europe did 
with Roman law.52  
 
Legal regulation (particularly in India) follows this trend by borrowing and adopting 
laws53 in endeavouring to become compatible with international norms54 or trade 
obligations55 primarily those of the dominant countries, be it historically colonial 
powers like the UK or the US as leading force on the Internet. 
 
However, Watson downplays the limitations of legal transplants, especially when 
enforced from above. Comparative legal research teaches us that top-down models of 
regulation are alien to the ‘spirit of the people’ (or the Volksgeist of Savigny) and 
problematic.’56 When such models are adopted, legal enforcement and compliance 
suffer, efficiency is low and the legitimacy of the rules can be called into question - 
                                                 
50 Defined by Watson as “the moving of a rule or system of law from one country to another or from 
one people to another.” See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 
(Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh 1974), 21. For more on legal transplants, see Alan Watson, 
Comparative Law: Law, Reality and Society (Vandeplas Publishing, FL 2008); Alan Watson, 
‘Comparative Law and Legal Change,’(1978) 37 CLJ, 313-336; Alan Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and 
Law Reform’ (1976) 92 LQR, 79-84 
51 Block reception, per Watson, is the main driving force behind legal change, and a common feature 
of legal development. 
52 Alan Watson, The Making of the Civil Law (HUP, MA 1981) 
53 This is particularly true of intellectual property and information technology law.  
54 This is evident in the case of the amendments to the IT Act 2000 by the IT Amendment Act 2008. 
Here, attempts have been made (rather carelessly, as it will later be shown) to transplant some 
elements of European data protection law like “sensitive personal data,” 
55 For instance as in the case of the TRIPS Agreement. India amended her intellectual property law in 
1999, 2002, 2003 and 2005 to meet TRIPS obligations. Dr. KD Raju, ‘WTO-TRIPS Obligations and 
Patent Amendments in India: A Critical Stocktaking’ (2004) 9 JIPR, 242-259 
56 This term Volksgeist was coined by GW Friedrich Hegel. Savigny introduced this concept into law. 
Abraham Hayward (tr), Friedrich Karl von Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and 
Jurisprudence (Arno Press, NY 1975). Per this doctrine, law must come from custom and popular 
faith, then by judicial decisions and not by the arbitrary wills of lawmakers. This Volksgeist is 
differentiated from Montesquieu’s espirit de la nation as an “active, creative but unconscious force 
that moulds a people’s history and destiny.” Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Blackwell 
Publishers, Oxford 1992), 212. In India, Tilak recognised the need and importance of the Volksgeist in 
cautioning against the incautious adoption of law divorced from the historical and social context it 
operates in. JN Sharma, The Political Thought of Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak (Concept 
Publishing, New Delhi 2009), 97; VP Varma, Modern Indian Political Thought (Lakshmi Narain 
Agarwal, India 1971), 171 
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resulting in ‘grey’ jurisdictions that work their way around official state law.57 This 
is typical of the Indian digital identity regulatory scenario.  
 
Much of India’s law regulating digital identity either has an imposed58 or borrowed 
nature to it.59 This often creates a mismatch between law on one hand and local 
needs, social value perceptions and practices on the other.60 However, while the 
‘transplantation’ of Western law did not result in an ‘allergic reaction’ in India, or a 
full-scale rejection of the transplant that the Legrandian approach predicts, there are 
indicators, if more nuanced ones that are indicative of anomalies caused by the 
imposition of Western cultural norms through law on Indian society ill prepared for 
it.61  
 
In the case of digital identity, the tension between the local and the global, the 
indigenous and the externally imposed, is particularly poignant. This is illustrated by 
what we term the paradox of Internet regulation: On an abstract level, the Internet is 
simply a communication protocol. Communication works ideally when all 
communicating parties speak the same language. The introduction of dialects or 
idiolects makes communication difficult. Yet, simultaneously, communication 
requires the communication of different things or it becomes meaningless. Only in 
sharing differences can community really emerge. This in turn means that the 
efficient regulation of the Internet must be flexible and accommodating to local 
differences to give people an incentive to communicate, to make them feel secure 
and “at home.” Any attempt at Internet regulation must balance the competing, 
equally meritorious and reasonable demands of the global and the local. The 
regulation of digital identity brings this tension to the fore. Digital identity 
technologies as global media ignore, to some extent, local peculiarities in the need to 
enable global access and communication. 
                                                 
57 P Dalal, ‘ICT Strategy of India Needs Rejuvenation,’ (25 May 2007) 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN029840.pdf>; D Rodrik, 
‘World Too Complex for One-Size-Fits-All Models,’ (2007) 44 Post-Autistic Economics Review, 73-
74. See also Ch 6 
58 eg, the Indian Penal Code 1860, enacted during the British colonial period. 
59 A prime example is the Indian Constitution.  
60 Ch 6 
61 Ch 6 
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Here lies the problem. Not just for India but for all those countries facing a similar 
legal conundrum. The challenge lies in resolving this situation with a means that will 
take into account the need to maintain the global nature and relevance of digital 
identity as well as the need to accommodate and be responsive to local differences. 
Comparative law, where methodologically guided, can help find this balance. As 
indicated above, in comparative law, the tension between these two requirements is 
evident in the works of Watson62 and Legrand.63 
 
Watson who opines that “legal rules are equally at home in many places,”64 
emphasises the possibility and inevitability of legal transplants. Borrowing, per 
Watson, is common in law, vital to legal development and a means of perpetuating 
change in a legal system65 to achieve legal harmonisation where this is politically and 
economically required.  
 
Legrand denies the possibility of cross cultural legal fertilisation, given the 
differences in the underlying social fabric, philosophy and ways of life that are 
reflected in law.66 He argues that “a crucial element of the ruleness of the rule - its 
meaning - does not survive the journey from one legal culture to another.”67 This is 
because law is embedded in the “legal mentalité” of a particular system.68 This legal 
mentalité refers to underlying legal culture and epistemological assumptions of the 
system, the “way to see things.”69 For a Westerner, the sale of a cow may be a legal 
transaction identical to the sale of a pig, for a Hindu whose religious system sets 
cows apart from other animals; this equivalence is far from straightforward. Calling 
                                                 
62 Watson (2008) n50; Watson (1978) n50; Watson (1976) n50; Watson (1974) n50 
63 Pierre Legrand, ‘On the Singularity of Law,’ (2006) 47 Harv Intl LJ 517-530; Pierre Legrand, ‘The 
Same and the Different,’ in P Legrand and R Munday (eds) Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions 
and Transitions (CUP, Cambridge 2003), 240–311; Pierre Legrand, ‘What “Legal Transplants?’ in 
David Nelken and Johannes Feest (eds) Adapting Legal Cultures (Hart Publishing, UK 2001), 55-68; 
Legrand (1997a) n45; Pierre Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants,”’(1997) 4 Maastricht 
J Eur & Comp L, 111-124 (hereinafter 1997b); Pierre Legrand, ‘How to Compare Now’ (1995) 16 LS 
232 
64 Alan Watson, Society and Legal Change (Scottish Academic Press, Scotland 1977), 130 
65 Alan Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and European Private Law,’ (2000) 44 (2) EJCL 
<http://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/44/44-2.html> 
66 In similar vein, see Bernhard Grossfeld, The Strength and Weakness of Comparative Law, 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 1990), 43 
67 Legrand (1997b) n63, 117  
68 Legrand (1995) n63 
69 Legrand (2006) n63, 522-25; Legrand (1997b) n63; Legrand (2001) n63, 55 
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both transactions a contract is simply glossing over the underlying conceptual 
differences, and differences in understanding, conceptualising and evaluating the 
situation.70 Any legal conceptualisation of law opposed to life world experience is un 
grande hazarde,71 and per Legrand, doomed to failure.72  
 
The examination of legal regulation of digital identity in India in the thesis is proof 
that Legrand's belief is somewhat exaggerated. Many of India’s laws are borrowed73 
and do seem to work more or less well despite her overwhelming non-western local 
culture.74 At the same time, the thesis also illustrates how Watson's analysis is over 
optimistic, with serious problems becoming evident in the application and 
enforcement of the western approaches to law and digital identity regulation.75 
This thesis endeavours to develop a middle ground; a nuanced approach between 
these two positions.  It recognises that to address India's needs in the legal regulation 
digital identity, western legal influences are unavoidable, but at the same time 
presents a framework whereby these influences can be assimilated in the light of 
local difference. The thesis proposes a tentative solution for the regulatory future of 
digital identity that is on the one hand, very abstract and capable of universal 
application if required and on the other hand, anchored in the Volksgeist.  
 
                                                 
70 See also on this point Burkhard Schafer, Zenon Bankowski, ‘Mistaken Identities: The Integrative 
Force of Private Law’ in Mark Van Hoecke and Francois Ost (eds), The Harmonisation of European 
Private Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2000), 21-47 
71 As Montesquieu put it, “Les lois politiques et civiles de chaque nation . . . doivent être tellement 
propres au people pour lequel elles sont faites, que c’est un grand hazard si celles d’une nation 
peuvent convener à une autre.” Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, Book I, Chap. 3 (1758) 
72 Legrand (1997b) n63, 114; Also Tahirih V Lee, ‘Risky Business: Courts, Culture and the 
Marketplace,’ (1993) 47 U Miami L Rev, 1335-1414, 1335, 1338; Marcus Radetzki, ‘From 
Communism to Capitalism in Laos: The Legal Dimension,’ (1994) 34 (9) Asian Survey, 799-806, 
799, 802  
73 The Indian Constitution is the best example of borrowed law in India. It borrowed from the UK 
(Parliamentary and cabinet form of governance, rule of law, concept of single citizenship, prerogative 
writs and bicameralism), the USA (fundamental rights, independent judiciary, judicial review, 
procedure for presidential impeachment, removal of SC judges etc), the Republic of Ireland (the 
Directive Principles of State Policy), Canada (its federal structure, advisory/review of the SC), Japan 
(procedures established by law), Australia (the Concurrent List and Freedom of Trade), the erstwhile 
USSR (the Preamble and fundamental duties) and Germany (emergency provisions). 
74 See Ch 5  
75 Substantiated in Ch 6. 
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This novel solution, called the tri-elemental framework (TeF), learns from De Hert’s 
right to identity76  and inherits from it a reliance on ‘rights’ as a key concept of legal 
regulation. This might be seen as Western centric in itself, but rights are identified 
here as the global “communication protocol of law,” in the same way as ‘http’ is the 
communication protocol for the Internet.  
 
De Hert’s solution is more amenable to incorporate non-Western legal notions and 
concepts than other competing rights based approaches to identity regulation77 which 
are more privacy centric, based on the individual autonomy and individual rights 
concepts which do not find social or cultural basis in jurisdictions like India.  
 
Taking the right to identity as a starting point, the thesis develops the TeF, drawing 
from Indian philosophy and law, specifically the concept of dharma.78 Thus, is 
provided one way in which the law regulating digital identity, whether of borrowed 
nature or not, can be made sense of and acquire cultural meaning appropriate to local 
contexts. It does in this sense not so much provide new legal mechanisms per se, but 
develops a conceptual framework that would make it easier for digital identity 
stakeholders to make sense of global legal concepts of digital regulation through the 
prism of their local lives and lived experiences. In the language of computing, the 
TeF acts as a compiler - a translation tool that translates one language into another, 
providing as a result the cultural embedding that legal transplants need to function at 
their best. On the more pragmatic level, it indicates teaching and communication 
avenues that can and should be used by the Indian authorities to explain and motivate 
regulation to their citizens and actors of the legal system. 
 
                                                 
76 Paul De Hert, ‘Right to Identity to Face the Internet of Things,’ (2007) 
<http://portal.unesco.org/ci/fr/files/25857/12021328273de_Hert-Paul.pdf/de%2BHert-Paul.pdf>  
77 Ch 8 
78 Dharma has both a legal and religious connotation. Religion is chosen as a source for conceptual 
inspiration because it provides a way of thinking about law more broadly than as a systems of state-
based rules and institutions as Watson does, or a rational alternative to religious rites and ancestral 
customs. In the words of Davis, law, especially Hindu law, can itself be understood as a “theology of 
ordinary life.” DR Davis, The Spirit of Hindu Law (CUP, Cambridge 2010). The solution proposed 




Certain points must be clarified at this stage. The first relates to the position of the 
author vis a vis protective privacy standards. At various parts in the thesis, privacy is 
analysed from different perspectives (ie technical, legal). While this thesis presents 
privacy standards in relation to digital identity in a largely negative light (taking into 
account the cross-cultural dimensions, recognising that privacy is not contrary to 
popular belief a universal good), this is not to negate the importance of established 
standards in protecting digital identity,79 only a call to be intuitive and responsive to 
local needs in relation to digital identity which manifests both global and local 
natures. The position adopted here is specifically not aimed to be reductionist.80  
 
1.4. Structure  
 
The thesis adopts the following structure: at the outset, it studies digital identity, 
local difference and digital identity management. This is followed by a meticulous 
examination of the law regulating digital identity. To bring out the complexities in 
the operation of this law, the application of the law is next analysed with the help of 
case studies. Then, key legal solutions proposed in respect of regulating digital 
identity are considered. This comparative analysis presents us with the main 
arguments of the thesis – of the inequality of global digital identity regulation and the 
need to find a middle path for the future.  Finally, an attempt is made to present a 
way forward through a tri-elemental framework to guide the regulatory future of 
digital identity.  
 
Chapter 2 focuses on digital identity. It examines the conceptualisation of digital 
identity, its multiple forms, presents its multivariate features and examines its 
relationship to the individual.  
 
                                                 
79 Western (particularly European) technical and legal privacy standards are well established and 
generally work rather well to protect individuals from harms to their digital identity. There is scope in 
many respects for improvement but that debate is outwith the scope of this thesis. 
80 For instance, William L Prosser, ‘Privacy,’ (1960) 48 (3) California L Rev, 383-423; JJ Thomson, 
‘The Right to Privacy,’ (1975) 4 Phil & Pub Affairs, 295-314; RA Posner, ‘The Economics of 
Privacy,’ The American Economic Review, 71 (2), Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Third 
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May 1981), 405-409 
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Because digital identity, is connected to the individual (or the digital identity 
subject), it is affected and influenced local difference (a combination of digital 
developmental and social factors), which is examined in Chapter 3. The significance 
of this local difference has not been duly recognised or accounted for in the Western 
dominated digital identity discourse (regulatory or otherwise). This chapter aims to 
fill that gap by examining local difference in key digital identity contexts.  
 
Identity management emerged as technical solution in the West to facilitate the 
creation, control and management of digital identities. Chapter 4 charts the 
development and growth of the identity management in the private and public sector 
from centralised models of identity management to user centric models. Key issues 
highlighted in this chapter are the effectiveness of identity management as a 
technical regulator of digital identity. Also vitally examined is whether identity 
management takes into account the local peculiarities influencing digital identity. 
 
Chapter 5 presents how the law regulates digital identity in the UK and India.81  
It presents and examines the different regulatory spaces occupied by digital identity 
and endeavours to elicit the nature of this regulation, given that while digital identity 
might have global natures, it is affected by local peculiarities. This is important 
because the legal literature in the West is largely concentrated upon issues of privacy 
and data protection in relation to digital identity and this chapter goes beyond this 
and makes a broader overview of the law. 
 
Next, with the help of specially designed case studies, Chapter 6 comparatively 
analyses the actual operation of the law in respect of key digital identity issues like  
privacy, sharing, reputation, anonymity, pseudonymity, access to Internet resources 
and control of personal data. This chapter aims to highlight the differences, if any 
that are evident in the actual operation of the law regulating digital identity, and what 
these differences mean for the global and national regulation of digital identity, 
particularly given local difference and the Volksgeist. 
                                                 
81 While attempts have been made to comprehensively cover all law applicable to digital identities, it 
is noted that due to the evolving nature of digital identity there might be further scope for application 
of other areas of law to it, such as are not evident from the current state of the art.  
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Chapter 7 examines various legal solutions proposed in connection with digital 
identity: the constitutional right to virtual personality, the tort based right to identity, 
the right to database identity and De Hert’s right to identity. This chapter critically 
analyses these solutions and their applicability in the light of how digital identity and 
its regulation is conditioned by local difference. 
 
Finally, Chapter 8 develops the TeF learning from De Hert’s right to identity and 
inspired by dharma; accepting that while global influences are inevitable in digital 
identity regulation, there is a means, particularly for India to find local relevance in 
digital identity regulation. 82 Here, we come across another mainstay of the thesis: the 
advocacy for a move from a ‘rights’ based discussion of the legal regulation of 
digital identity to a more ‘duty’ based one that not only is in accord with the needs of 
countries like India but is also in accord with more recent European initiatives 
bringing back the focus on duties. 
 
1.5. Contribution  
 
This thesis contributes at many levels. First, through creating international awareness 
of both the similarities and the differences in respect of digital identity and its 
regulation, it will help boost international respect and cooperation83 in regulating 
digital identity.  
 
Second, it departs from the critiqued traditional comparative law approach of not 
recognising the role of socio-cultural context of law.84 In conducting a deeper 
analysis of the socio-cultural contexts of the international differences evident in the 
legal regulation of digital identity, it goes beyond being a superficial analysis of the 
                                                 
82 This corrects the deficiency in the international digital identity regulatory discourse of countries 
apart from the digitally advanced West not being able to make a significant and purposeful 
contribution. 
83 Roger Cotterrell, ‘Seeking Similarity, Appreciating Difference: Comparative Law and 
Communities,’ in Esin Örücü and A Harding (eds) Comparative Law in the Twenty-First Century 
(Kluwer, The Hague 2002), 35-54. 
84 Pierre Legrand, Fragments on Law as Culture (WEJ Tjeenk Willink, 1999) 6, 8 
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law regulating digital identity85  and becomes more than a mere traditional legal 
comparative exercise. 
 
Third, it will make local legislators, particularly in India, conscious of how 
borrowing and adopting laws to meet international obligations and new situations86 
without adapting them87 to local conditionality might lead to their frustration.  
 
Finally, in presenting a framework for the regulating digital identity capable of 
universal and simultaneous local application, it represents significant boost to the 
regulatory future of digital identity, particularly in terms of what countries like India, 
that have thus far operated on the periphery of the digital identity regulatory scenario 















                                                 
85 One of the drawbacks of traditional comparative law identified is its propensity to skim surfaces. 
Lawrence Friedman ‘Some Thoughts on Comparative Legal Cultures,’ in DS Clark (ed), Comparative 
and Private International Law: Essays in Honour of JH Merryman on his Seventieth Birthday 
(Duncker and Humblot, Berlin1990), 49-57, 52; Legrand (1999) n84, 8 
86 Alan Watson, Legal Origins and Legal Change (CIP Group, London1990), 94; Lawrence Friedman, 
‘Some Comments on Cotterrell and Legal Transplants,’ in David Nelken and Johannes Feest (eds), 
Adapting Legal Cultures (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001), 93-99 
87 Efforts to adapt laws are limited. See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Vera Gowlland-Debbas 
(eds), The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality, Liber Amicorum Georges 
Abi-Saab, (Martinus Nijhoff, Netherlands 2001), 415 
 25 
2. Digital Identity: Definition and examination of forms and nature 
 
 
The search for identity is the ongoing struggle to arrest or slow down the flow, to 
solidify the fluid, to give form to the formless . . . Yet far from slowing the flow, let 
alone stopping it, identities are more like the spots of crust hardening time and again 
on the top of volcanic lava which melt and dissolve again before they have time to 
cool and set. 
                                      -Z Bauman88 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
In the ‘Sound of Music’ Maria sang, “Let’s start at the very beginning, a very good 
place to start.”89 This chapter introduces digital identity, presents its forms, outlines it 
nature and the relationship with the individual (or the digital identity subject in the 
context of this thesis). This will help effectively negotiate the digital identity 
regulatory maze, which at the best of times can be highly complex and mystifying. 
 
2.2. Identity  
 
 
The English word ‘identity’ originated from the Latin root idem meaning ‘the same.’  
It is defined as: a quality or condition of being the same, oneness, an instance of 
sameness, sameness of persons or entities in all circumstances, individuality, 
personality, personal or individual existence, or the ‘self same thing.’90 By definition, 
identity can thus be understood in different contexts and has different qualities like 
sameness, equality, recurrence, individuality, distinctiveness or existence.  
 
Unlike the English definition, Indian languages do not have one comprehensive 
umbrella term that equates with the term “identity,” though some languages like 
Hindi, Konkani and Marathi have adopted the Sanskrit root asmita, denoting identity, 
into their usage.91 For example, Hindi, the official language of India, has various 
words denoting identity: abhigyan (recognition), tatsmaka (identity), pehchan 
                                                 
88 Z Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Polity Press, Cambridge 2000), 82–83. 
89 Lyrics of Do-Re-Mi, in the Sound of Music by R Rodgers and O Hammerstein (1959) 
90 Oxford English Dictionary, 
<http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50111220?query_type=word&queryword=+identity&first=1&ma
x_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=1&search_id=wr0i-HJbXtV-1860&hilite=50111220> 
91 See N Jayaram, ‘Identity: A Semantic Exploration in India’s Society and Culture,’ in N Tazi (ed) 
Keywords: Identity: For a Different Kind of Globalization (Sage, Chennai 2004), 125-147,134  
 26 
(identity, distinction or identification), vyastitva (identity), shinakth (identification) 
samanta (accordance or similarity), sarupta (identity or resemblance), sarvsmik and 
tadatmay (identity). In Konkani, there are a number of words in relation to identity 
e.g. sar (identity), sama (identical), sama (equal) sarko (similar) and yekats (one 
thing or identicality).92 Marathi has the terms parakh (identification), zasa (similar), 
manyata (recognition or identification), fark (distinction, difference) and 
ekadhyasarka (alike). 
 
But identity is not just a word; it is an ancient and contemporary fundamental human 
trait and the basis of human and individual existence and survival. By nature, it is 
complex and characteristic of many natures and elements like biography, biology, 
choices, genealogy, geography, interests, occupation, relationships, reputation, 
technology and transactions.93 Identity is thus dependant and composite of many 
variables and factors. Though it may seem to have universality, it is highly globally 










                                                 
92 See AFX Maffei, English to Konkani Dictionary (Asian Educational Services, 2007), 240 
93 A Cavoukian, ‘Privacy in the Clouds, A White Paper on Privacy and Digital Identity: Implications 
for the Internet,’ 28 May 2008 <http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/privacyintheclouds.pdf> 
94 Jean-Louis Nabki and Martine Ecolasse-Beilecki, ‘Variants and Non-variants of Psychological 
Identity in Employed Females in Different Life Environments,’ in Jose MariaPiero and others (eds), 
Work and Organisational Psychology: European Contributions of the Nineties (Taylor and Francis, 
Hove 1995), 47-60 (psychological global variance); MB Brewer and M Yuki, ‘Culture and Social 
Identity,’ in S Kitayama and D Cohen (eds), Handbook of Cultural Psychology (Guilford 
Publications, NY 2007), 307-322, 307 
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Identity has been studied in many disciplines: anthropology,95 economics,96 law,97  
political science,98 psychology,99 and sociology.100  All of these demonstrate the 
complicated, contextual, dynamic, evolutionary, multi-dimensional and variant 
nature of identity, which is affected by cultural, economic, social, legal, political, 
psychological and spatial factors. As such, identity is a mercurial concept the law 
struggles to regulate.101 
 
2.3. Digital identity: definition, examples and relationship with identity 
 
 
Digital identity102 is a conceptually complex term. It has been defined and interpreted 
in the different manners and contexts; as meaning one, some or a number of different 
things. This thesis defines digital identity as “the digital representation of an entity, 
                                                 
95 A Cohen, Self-Consciousness: An Alternative Anthropology of Identity (Routledge, London 1994); 
For an interesting array of issues see M Sokefeld, ‘Debating Self, Identity and Culture in 
Anthropology,’ (1999) 40 (4) Current Anthropology 417-447. 
96 Ryan Patrick (ed), Adam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Penguin Books, London 2010); 
GA Akerlof & RE Kranton, ‘Economics and Identity,’ (2000) 115 Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
715; GA Akerlof & RE Kranton, ‘Identity and the Economics of Organizations’ (2005) 19 Journal of  
Economic Perspectives, 9; H Bodenhorn and CS Ruebeck, ‘The Economics of Identity and the 
Endogeneity of Race,’ NBER Working Paper Series 9962 (2003); R Bénabou and J Tirole, ‘Identity, 
Dignity and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets,’ IZA Discussion Paper Series (2007), 2583; P Chatterjee and S 
Sarangi, ‘Social Identity and Group Lending,’ Louisiana State University Departmental Working 
Papers, 2004-01 (examining the interaction between economics and identity in microfinance 
programs) (2004) 
97 Dan Danielsen and Karen Engle (eds), After Identity: A Reader in Law and Culture (Routledge, NY 
1995); CL Cates  & WV McIntosh, Law and the Web of Society (Georgetown University Press, 
Washington 2001), 129-152; J Marshall, Personal Freedom Through Human Rights Law?Autonomy, 
Identity and Integrity under the European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 
98Amy Gutman, Identity in Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2003); J Caplan & J Torpey (eds), 
Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World (Princeton 
University Press, 2001); Laura Dudley Jenkins, Identity and Identification in India: Defining the 
Disadvantaged (Routledge, London 2002) 
99 William James, Principles of Psychology: Vol I  (Henry Holt, New York 1890); S Freud, ‘The Ego 
and the Id,’ in J Strachey and ors (eds), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud (SE) Vol. XIX,(1923-1925) (Hogart Press, London 1974); MR Leary and JP Tangney, 
(eds), Handbook of Self and Identity (Guilford Press, NY 2003); TR Tyler, RM Kramer and OP John, 
(eds), The Psychology of the Social Self (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, NJ 1999); MA Hogg and J 
Cooper (eds), The Sage Handbook of Social Psychology (Sage, London 2003). See also journal Self 
and Identity, Psychology Press, London. 
100 E Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Doubleday, NY 1959); H Tajfel, Human 
Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology (CUP, Cambridge 1981). For an 
overview of identity in the social sciences, see Anthony Elliot, Handbook of Identity Studies (Taylor 
& Francis, London 2011) 
101 Questions have been raised about the law’s suitability and capacity to regulate identity: Eniko 
Horvath, Mandating Identity: Citizenship, Kinship Laws and Plural Nationality in the European 
Union (Kluwer Law International, Zuidpoolsingel 2008), 206; Carl Stychin, Law's Desire: 
Sexuality and the Limits Of Justice (Routledge, London 1995) 
102 Used in the thesis in both singular and plural senses. 
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in tangible or intangible form, self-created, externally assigned or consequentially 
generated.”103 
 
Digital identity is an identity mediated or experienced through the involvement and 
use of computer technology or digital communications like digital media or the 
Internet.  It comes in various shapes:104 account names,105 Artificial Intelligence,106  
biometric data,107 blogger ids, chat room ids, cookies, credentials, digital certificates, 
CCTV images,108 digital images, digital/electronic signatures, DNA profiles, domain 
names, email ids, 109 e-portfolios,110 geotags,111 globally unique identifiers 
(GUIDs),112 identity cards or tokens, instant messaging (IM) handles, InfoCards,113 
digital information, IP addresses, mobile identity114 (e.g. IMSI number), passwords, 
                                                 
103 This definition is resilient in its expression of digital identity as a representation. It is precise and 
dynamic enough to cover the different forms, account for the complex nature of digital identity and 
flexible to be adapted to future forms of digital identity. 
104 This list is not comprehensive. Digital identity has many other forms and is a constantly evolving 
creature. 
105 A series of letters and digits which uniquely identifies an account on a computer or on a network 
e.g. Login ID, User ID, or User Name. 
106 See D Cole, ‘Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity,’ (1991) 88 (3) Synthese, 399-417; WJ 
Rapaport, ‘Computer Processes and Virtual Persons: Comments on Cole's “Artificial Intelligence and 
Personal Identity,” Technical Report 90-13 (Buffalo Dept. of Computer Science, May 1990). 
107 Biometric identity can be sub-categorised into: physical biometric identity or what we are, 
(fingerprints, facial recognition, hand geometry, iris scan, retinal scan, vascular patterns, DNA, neural 
wave analysis) and behavioural biometric identity that rely on the manner we do things (voice 
recognition, signature, foot dynamics and keystroke behaviour). E Mordini, and S Massari, ‘Body, 
Biometrics and Identity,’ (2008) 22 (9) Bioethics, 488-498, 488, 495; David Lyon, ‘Biometrics, 
Identification and Surveillance,’(2008) 22 (9) Bioethics, 499-508 
108 M Carroll-Mayer, B Fairweather and BC Stahl, ‘CCTV Identity Management and Implications for 
Criminal Justice: Some Considerations,’ (2008) 5 (1) Surveillance and Society, 33-50 
<http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles5(1)/identity.pdf> 
109 Email id is the baseline digital identity. See Norton Online Living Report 2009, 
<http://www.nortononlineliving.com/documents/NOLR_Report_09.pdf> 
110 An e-portfolio is a compilation of items like Web based text, electronic files, images, multimedia, 
blog entries and hyperlinks. Mhairi McAlpine, ‘E-portfolios and Digital Identity: Some Issues for 
Discussion,’(2005) 2(4), E-Learning and Digital Media, 378-387; G Roberts and ors, ‘Reflective 
Learning, Future Thinking: Digital Repositories, E-portfolios, Informal Learning and Ubiquitous 
Computing,’ White Paper (2005) 
<http://www.alt.ac.uk/docs/ALT_SURF_ILTA_white_paper_2005.pdf> 
111 Geotags are geographical identification metadata added to various media like photographs, video, 
websites, or RSS feeds. FP Miller, AF Vandome and J McBrewster, Geotagging (VDM Publishing 
House Ltd, Beau Bassin 2009) 
112 A special type of identifier used in software applications to provide a unique reference number. 
113 Digital identities that individuals can use online and as implemented in Windows CardSpace, 
DigitalMe or Higgins Identity Selector. See Ch 4 (4.5.3.1) 
114 Referring here to “a message or set of linked messages derived from mobile computing devices and 
constituting claims about mobility, location or other characteristics which are assumed to represent a 
data subject.” Els Soenens, “Mobile Identity and Location Based Services” in WP11, D11.4: 
Workshop on Mobility and Identity 20 April 2006, 
<http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp11-del11.4.workshop_on_MIDM.pdf> 
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personal data, personal profiles, public key certificates, reputation, RFID,115 role-
playing game (RPG) identities,116 smart cards,117 virtual identities like avatars,118 wi-
fi network names119 etc. Some of these are often classed as sub-sets of digital 
identity, parts of, or composite digital identity. They can each exist in isolation, 
conjunction with and interact and intermingle across digital and non-digital 
worlds.120 
 
At this point, it is highly useful to understand the relationship between digital 
identity and identity in general. The relationship between identity and digital identity 
cannot be understood in a single correct sense. Identity and digital identity have both 
simple and complex relationships, given that they are both complex concepts. In the 
simple sense, identity may be said to encompass digital identity, as depicted below: 
 
 
Fig 1: Identity encompasses digital identity 
 
Identity is made up of more elements than just digital identity like body, values and 
beliefs, relations, social practices and habits, affiliations, interests, creations and 
                                                 
115 RFID is a form of remote sensing technology that works through using radio waves to identify 
specific objects. RFID technologies are used to represent identity and facilitate identification, 
implemented in public transport cards, ID cards, passports, office identity tokens, loyalty cards, other 
access tokens, medical bracelets, tracking people, subcutaneous implants etc. 
116 As in Neverwinter Nights, Final Fantasy, WoW and Dungeons and Dragons.  Hilde G 
Corneliussen, Jill Walker Rettberg (eds), Digital Culture, Play, and Identity: A World of Warcraft® 
Reader (MIT, USA 2008) 
117 Smart cards have strong identity content. They may be used for data storage, authentication, or 
identification. Examples of smart cards in the UK are the National ID card, London’s Oyster card. In 
India, commonly used smart cards are Mumbai’s BEST smart card, Gujarat’s driving licence smart 
cards. More universal examples are payment cards e.g. MasterCard, Visa, American Express and 
Chase. 
118 See Ralph Schroeder (ed), The Social Life of Avatars: Presence and Interaction in Shared Virtual 
Environments (Springer, London 2001); Bruce Damer, Avatars! Exploring and Building Virtual 
Worlds on the Internet (Peachpit Press, 1998) 
119 D Boyd, M Chang and E Goodman, ‘Representations of Digital Identity,’ CSCW Workshop (6 
November 2004) Chicago <http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~dmb/cscw2004-
identity/IdentityWorkshopSubmission.pdf> 
120 D Greenwood, ‘The Context for Identity Management Architectures and Trust Models,’ 
Proceedings of the OECD Workshop on Digital Identity Management, Norway (2007) 
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choices, which may or may not influence or have bearing upon digital identity. The 
nature of the influence may vary. However, in some form or manner, it is inevitable 
that identity will influence digital identity. To substantiate, what one is or is not has a 
bearing on the digital identities one chooses to (or not to) express. 121 
 
Digital identity is a dynamic component of identity. It may form an essential part of 
it or a non-essential part. Digital identity, expressed in the above illustration as a 
single part, may itself comprise of different digital identities,122 again all of which 
may have different relationships with identity that vary across time and space.  
 
The complexity of the relationship between digital identity and identity thus becomes 
evident. What generates further difficulty is that digital identity is not an equal or 
stable part of identity, particularly in how it interacts with the other elements of 
identity.  
 
Particularly, in the context of this thesis, it is extremely relevant to note international 
differences in this respect. While digital identity has become enmeshed with identity 
in Europe 123 in countries like India there are still fault lines evident in the 
relationship between digital identity and identity, which will become clearer as the 
thesis progresses. This is because the relationship between digital identity and 
                                                 
121 These often seep into digital identity, as highlighted by Dahlberg. Ie, the content of online posts 
reveals information about the poster’s affiliations, values, relationships, culture, gender and even 
geographical location. L Dahlberg, ‘The Habermasian Public Sphere Encounters Cyber-Reality,’ 
(2001) 8 (3) The Public, 83-96, 89 
122 As evidenced in: PJ Windley, Digital Identity (O’Reilly, USA 2005), 12; Jackie Marsh, Popular 
Culture, New Media and Digital Literacy in Early Childhood (Routledge, Falmer 2006), 126-143. The 
multiplicity of digital identities is also recognised throughout in DW Birch, Digital Identity 
Management: Technological, Business and Social Implications (Gower Publishing, England 2007); 
Ted Fair, Michael Nordfelt, Sandra Ring and Eric Cole, Cyberspying: Tracking Your Family’s 
(Sometimes) Secret Online Lives (Syngress, MA 2005), 24, 296, 299; JRVacca, Computer and 
Information Security Handbook (Elsevier Science & Technology, MA 2009), 270, 271; Commission 
of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying Document to 
the Communication From the Commission to the European, Parliament, The Council, The European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Future Networks and the Internet 
and Early Challenges Regarding the “Internet Of Things” Brussels, 29 September 2008, SEC (2008) 
2516, para 3.2.4 
123 See Recommendation (a), European Parliament Recommendation of 26 March 2009 to the Council 




identity in India functions differently as compared to the relationship between 
identity and digital identity in Europe.124 
 
2.4. Forms of digital identity 
 
An examination of the literature and the state of the art reveals the following forms 
of digital identity: authenticators, claims, data or information, identifiers, presence, 
relationship representations and reputation. These are now analysed respectively. 
 
 
2.4.1. Authenticators  
 
One of the most important forms of digital identity is an authenticator.125 An 
authenticator is a token of authentication (or a credential) used to confirm or support 
identity. 
 
The best example of an authenticator digital identity is biometric data.126 Biometric 
data is defined as, “biological properties, physiological characteristics, living traits or 
repeatable actions where those features and/or actions are both unique to that 
individual and measurable, even if the patterns used in practice to technically 
measure them involve a certain degree of probability.”127 It includes fingerprints, 
retinal patterns, facial structure, voice prints, hand geometry, vein patterns, deeply 
ingrained skill or other behavioural characteristics (like handwritten signature, 
keystrokes,128 and movement and speech mannerisms).  
 
                                                 
124 Further developed in Ch 3 
125 Windley (2005) n122, 50;  John Mallery and ors, Hardening Network Security (McGraw-Hill 
Education, Europe 2004), 88;  Economist Intelligence Unit, Digital Identity Authentication in E-
commerce, The Economist (March 2007) 
<http://graphics.eiu.com/ebf/PDFs/IdenTrust_digital_authentication_Web_PDF_final.pdf> 
126 B Miller, ‘Vital Signs of Identity,’  (1994) 31 (2) IEEE Spectrum, 22 - 30  
127 Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data, Adopted on 20 June 2007, 01248/07/EN, WP 
136 
128 R Joyce and G Gupta, ‘User Authentication Based On Keystroke Latencies’; Technical Report 5, 
Department of Computer Science, James Cook University, Australia (1969); J Leggett, G Williams 
and D Umphress, ‘Verification of User Identity via Keyboard Characteristics,’ in JM Carey (ed), 
Human Factors in Management Information Systems (Ablex Publishing, NJ 1988) 29-42; D 
Umphress and G Williams, ‘Identity Verification Through Keyboard Characteristics,’ (1965) 2 (1) Int 
J Man-Machine Studies, 263-273 
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Another example of an authenticator is an electronic signature. Electronic signatures 
are, “data in an electronic form in, affixed to or logically associated with, a data 
message, which may be used to identify the signatory in relation to the data message 
and indicate the signatory’s approval of information contained in the data 
message.”129 Electronic signatures validate and substantiate the identity of the 
signatory. They work like handwritten signatures and provide assurance and 
connectivity between a person and an object (generally a data message).   
 
Other examples of authenticators are cookies, IDs and passwords, digital certificates 
and smart cards. 
 
2.4.2. Claims  
 
Digital identity may also take the form of claims. A claim is an assertion, a 
declaration or affirmation of a right to something. In law, a claim primarily signifies 
“the assertion of a right.”130 A claims based definition of digital identity is advanced 
in Cameron’s ‘Laws of Identity.’131 Here, digital identity is defined as, “… a set of 
claims made by one digital subject about itself or another digital subject.”132 A claim 
is defined as the “an assertion of the truth of something, typically one which is 
disputed or in doubt,”133 and a digital subject as “a person or thing represented or 
existing in the digital realm which is being described or dealt with,”134 or in simple 
terms, the claimant.  
 
The advantages of viewing digital identity as claims are elaborated thus by 
Cameron:135 
1. It takes into account all identity systems and permits the conceptual 
unification of the “rational elements” of the patchwork. 
                                                 
129 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures 2001, Art 2 (a) 
130 S Bone (ed), Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary (Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), 82 
131 K Cameron, ‘The Laws of Identity,’ Microsoft Corp (2005), 4 
<http://www.identityblog.com/stories/2005/05/13/TheLawsOfIdentity.pdf> The Laws of Identity are a 
set of seven principles, developed by Microsoft’s Kim Cameron and advanced through blogosphere 
discussions with different stakeholders to guide the development of Internet identity architectures and 
tools. The Laws are further discussed in Ch 4. 
132 Cameron (2005) n131, 4 
133 Cameron (2005) n131, 5  
134 Cameron (2005) n131, 5 
135 Cameron (2005) n131 
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2. It permits the definition of, “digital identity for a metasystem embracing 
multiple implementations and ways of doing things.136  
3. It allows for the assertion of “things about another digital subject without 
using any unique identifier,” by the subject. 
 
However, Cameron acknowledges that the claims based definition does not bode 
well with the argument about the uniqueness of identities (i.e. in any given situation, 
identities are unique), which he refutes by advancing that the uniqueness of identities 
does not apply to all situations.137 Cameron also opines that the definition “leaves the 
evaluation of the usefulness (or the truthfulness or the trustworthiness) of the claim 
to the relying party.”138 If the party evaluating the claim accepts it, then that decision 
simply is representative of a further claim in regards to the subject.139 
 
The OECD also supports a claims based characterisation of digital identity.140 It 
adopts the definition used by the Identity Gang:141 “a digital representation of a set 
of claims made by one party about itself or another data subject.”142 Digital identity 
is also viewed as claims by the Liberty Alliance143 and Okita who defines digital 
identity as a “collection of claims attached to a digital subject (about which 
assertions can then be made).”144  
 
                                                 
136 Italics supplied 
137 Cameron (2005) n131 
138 ibid  
139 Id 
140 OECD, ‘At a Crossroads:  “Personhood” and Digital Identity in the Information Society,’ STI 
Working Paper, 2007/7, Information and Communication Technologies, DSTI/DOC (2007) 7. 
141 The Identity Gang, a Working Group of the Identity Commons aims to “support the ongoing 
conversation about what is needed for a user-centric identity “metasystem” that supports the whole 
marketplace, especially individuals.” See Charter 
<http://wiki.idcommons.net/Identity_Gang_Charter> 
142  The definition can also be found in the Identity Gang’s Lexicon 
<http://identitygang.org/moin.cgi/Digital_Identity>. The OECD paper however, went a step further 
and stated that this form of digital identity was a “thing,” a man-made thing (an “artifact”) that refers 
to a person, and that is different from such person. OECD (2007) n140 
143 Liberty Alliance Project, Liberty Alliance Project Whitepaper: Personal Identity  
(23 March 2006) 
<www.projectliberty.org/liberty/content/download/395/2744/file/Personal_Identity.pdf> 
144 C Okita, ‘(Digital) Identity 2.0,’ (October 2007) <http://www.usenix.com/publications/login/2007-
10/pdfs/okita.pdf> 
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The identity as claims concept was explored in relation to Facebook by Zhao, 
Grasmuck and Martin.145 They conclude that identity construction on Facebook 
follows a pattern of claims made by individuals or identity subjects, ranging from the 
implicit to the explicit. Implicit claims were connected to visual cues like photos and 
wall posts. Explicit claims were those connected to the verbal and narrated 
descriptions of the self.146 
 
Though digital identity presents as claims very neatly, viewing digital identity 
solely as a claims or a set of claims is highly contentious and problematic because it 
makes some challenging presuppositions: one, that individuals are able to exert that 
claim; two, that individuals choose to make that assertion, and three, that 
individuals are able to support and substantiate that assertion (in case of a conflict, 
as claims are conflicting by nature and success of claims is also dependent on trust).  
 
2.4.3. Data or information 
 
The most basic and primary view of digital identity is that digital identity is 
representative of digital data147 relating to an individual. Turkle states that digital 
identity is a “collection of fragments of either pre-existing or new data about an 
individual.”148 That digital identity is representative of digital data is also expressed 
by Windley149 who defines digital identity as,  
 … containing data that uniquely describes a person or thing (called the 
subject or entity in the language of digital identity) but also contains 
information about a subject’s relationships to other entities150  
 
This data includes attributes,151 preferences and traits of the subject or entity. 
Attributes include facts like medical history, purchasing behaviour, banking 
                                                 
145 S Zhao, S Grasmuck and J Martin, ‘Identity Construction on Facebook: Digital Empowerment in 
Anchored Relationships,’ (2008) 24 (5), Computers in Human Behavior, 1816-1836 
146 Zhao (2008) n145, 1824-25 
147 For definition see IC Pyle & V Illingworth (eds), The Oxford Dictionary of Computing (OUP, 
Oxford 1997), 118 
148 S Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet (Simon & Schuster, NY 1995) 
149 Windley (2005) n122 
150 Windley (2005) n122, 8 
151 Lessig conceptualised digital identity in terms of attributes, which are broadly “all the facts about 
you… that are true” that are known when communicated, revealed or asserted. L Lessig, Code: 
Version 2.0 (Basic Books, NY 2006), 39-40. Pfitzmann and Hansen too define digital identity as “any 
subset of attributes of an individual person which sufficiently identifies this individual person within 
 35 
information etc. Preferences are indicative of the subject or entity’s desires like meal 
or dress choices. Traits relate to the inherent features of the subject or entity.152 This 
definition of digital identity can be applied across most contexts and schemes of 
identity and can relate to human beings and well as other entities.153  
 
There are also other definitions that fit within this category. Kobelius defines digital 
identity as “the set of digital information - including user IDs, passwords, access 
control lists, public-key certificates, and voiceprint patterns - that is associated with a 
particular individual…”154 Loncke defines digital identity in similar manner. 
According to him, digital identity is “digital information that creates the image of an 
individually identifiable person.”155 Both these definitions present digital identity as 
digital information connected to individuals. 
 
‘Digital identity is data or information associated with an individual’ is the 
predominant view in the Western digital identity discourse and also mirrored in how 
the law conceptualises digital identity in Europe in privacy, data protection culture 
and regulation.  Digital identity has become rooted in the legal concept of personal 
data. Personal data is defined by the EU Data Protection Directive,156 as “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.”157 An identified 
or identifiable natural person is who “can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
                                                                                                                                          
any set of persons.” A Pfitzmann and M Hansen, ‘Anonymity, Unlinkability, Undetectability, 
Unobservability, Pseudonymity, and Identity Management: A Consolidated Proposal for 
Terminology,’ v0.31, 15 February 2008 <http://dud.inf.tu-
dresden.de/literatur/Anon_Terminology_v0.31.pdf> 
152 Windley (2005) n122, 9 
153 Though the scope of the thesis is limited to studying digital identity in relation to the individual, 
digital identity also applies in the context of non-human entities like animals (Birch 2007 n122, xviii), 
machines or programs (Windley 2005 n122, 9), software agents, things, websites (JND Gupta, SK 
Sharma, MA Rashid, Handbook of Research on Enterprise Systems (IGI Global, 2009) and can be 
used to represent them. 
154 J Kobelius, quoted by D Costa, ‘Identity Crisis,’ PC Magazine, 15 October 2002, 
<http://www.pcmag.com/print_article2/0,1217,a=31229,00.asp>  
155 M Loncke, ‘Identity: A Legal Perspective,’ FIDIS WP2 Workshop, 2-3 December 2003. 
156 Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (The Data Protection Directive), OJ L 281, 23 
November 1995, 0031 - 0050 
157 Article 2 (a) 
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particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific 
to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.” 158   
 
The Article 29 Working Party paper on personal data,159 based on national Europe 
wide practices of data protection authorities, sheds light on what constitutes personal 
data.160 It elaborates that the concept of personal data under the Data Protection 
Directive is a broad one and providing all requirements are met includes,  
information available in whatever form, be it alphabetical, numerical, 
graphical, photographical or acoustic, for example. It includes information 
kept on paper, as well as information stored in a computer memory by means 
of binary code, or on a videotape, for instance.161 
 
Examples of personal data are: sound or image data, taped recordings of customer’s 
banking instructions, recognizable CCTV images of people, data in RFID chipped 
passports and IP addresses.162  
 
In the UK, the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 1998), Part I, section 1 defines 
“personal data” as data relating to a living individual who can be identified (a) from 
those data, or (b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, 
or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller, and includes any 
expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the intentions of the 
data controller or any other person in respect of the individual.163  
 
But, unlike the EU and UK regimes, there is no established concept of digital identity 
as an individual’s personal data in India, even though the concepts of data, 
                                                 
158 Article 2 (a) 
159 Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data. Adopted on 20 June 2007, 01248/07/EN, WP 
136 
160 The objective of the above opinion was “to come to a common understanding of the concept of 
personal data, the situations in which national data protection legislation should be applied, and the 
way it should be applied.” 
161 Opinion 4/2007, n159 
162 For an analysis of personal data, see S Booth and others, ‘What are ‘Personal Data’? A Study 
Conducted for the UK Information Commissioner,’ 2004, 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/corporate/research_and_reports/executive_summar
y.pdf> 
163 For guidance on what constitutes personal data under the DPA1998, see ICO,  




information and sensitive personal data are embodied in the Information Technology 
Act 2000 (ITA 2000) as amended by the Information Technology Amendment Act 
2008 (ITAA 2008) and are representative of digital identity. Data is defined by the 
Act, Chapter I, section 2 (o) as,  
a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts or instructions 
which are being prepared or have been prepared in a formalized manner, and 
is intended to be processed, is being processed or has been processed in a 
computer system or computer network, and may be in any form (including 
computer printouts magnetic or optical storage media, punched cards, 
punched tapes) or stored internally in the memory of the computer 
 
Information, according to the Act, Chapter I, section 2(v), includes, “data, message, 
text, images, sound, voice, codes, computer programmes, software and databases or 
micro film or computer generated micro fiche.” Sensitive personal data, is not 
specifically defined but simply clarified in Section 43A (iii) as referring to “such 
personal information as may be prescribed by the Central Government in 
consultation with such professional bodies or associations as it may deem fit.” Here 
we see the contrast in the UK and Indian positions on personal data. 
 
 
2.4.4. Identifiers  
 
Digital identity may also present itself in the form of identifiers. An identifier is a 
sign, token, value or symbol that represents identity. An identifier points to a person 
or entity164 or singles that person or entity out from another.  
 
The most universal and common example of an identifier is a name. Names165 are the 
most important aspects, sources and heralders of identity, both digital and non-
digital. Even the law recognises this position.166 Names are crucial aspects of and 
mandatory on most legal documents like passports, ID cards, residence certificates, 
contracts, wage slips, bank statements and other like documents. Names are much 
                                                 
164 OECD (2007) n140 
165 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the “individual designation by which a particular 
person or thing is known, referred to, or addressed.”  
166 Names are also a much litigated subject in the ECtHR. See Burghartz v Switzerland (1994) 18 
EHRR 101; Stjerna v Finland 24 EHRR 195 (1994); Case of L v Lithuania ECtHR, App 27527/03, 
(11 September 2007); Daróczy v Hungary ECtHR, App 44378/05 (1 July 2008) 
 38 
favoured options in identifying people as opposed to number based identification (an 
approach that was even favoured by the UNCRC Human Rights Committee who 
stated in their comments that “providing for the right to have a name is of special 
importance.”167 Names, personal and non-personal, are a significant digital identifier 
and serve a two fold purpose: communication and identification.168 In the digital 
identity context, one could be automatically assigned a name, create a name or 
assume a name.  
 
But names are not the only form of digital identifiers. Numbers, codes, digital tags 
and tokens are other examples of digital identifiers. The DPA 1998 mentions 
identifiers in relation to personal data. A general identifier is defined as any identifier 
(e.g., a number or a code that is used for identification purposes) that relates to an 
individual and forms a part of a set of similar identifiers which is of general 
application.169 For instance, a tag on a photo that names and distinguishes the 
individuals in the photo is an identifier. 
 
Identifiers may work by themselves or in conjunction with other identifiers to 
identify an individual. There may also be more than one or multiple identifiers for a 
single individual. While this can be advantageous, it also is perceived to be 
problematic from the management and regulatory perspectives. 
 
2.4.5. Presence  
 
Digital presence, particularly in respect of behaviour and location is another potent 
form of digital identity.  
 
An individual’s digital behaviour is representative of digital identity. David Berlind 
states, “everything you put on the Internet is an expression of your identity.”170 This 
statement though extremely wide, to a large extent holds true. Even in the non-digital 
                                                 
167 In reference to children born out of wedlock.  UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 
17, 1989, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, 133 
168 S Bechtold, ‘Governance in Namespaces,’ (2003) 36 Loyola of LA L Rev, 1248; RJ Anderson, 
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems (Wiley, NY 2001), 125 
169 Sch 1, Part II, 4 (2) 
170 Quoted by Andy Oram, ‘The Long View of Identity,’ O’Reilly, 29 June 2006, 
<http://onlamp.com/pub/a/onlamp/2006/06/29/the-long-view-of-identity.html?page=1> 
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context, the relationship between behaviour and identity is well established.171 For 
instance, behaving kindly would lead a person to be identified as a kind or charitable 
person. Similarly, stealing would lead to a person being branded a thief.  
 
Digital identity is, moreover, tied to digital behaviour. One’s digital identity may 
manifest as a chat room sexual fantasist, environmentalist Tweeter, a sword wielding 
Avatar or a Farmer on Farmville.172 Digital behaviour, as digital identity has social 
and legal consequences and is employed for various purposes like profiling,173 
behavioural targeting174 and marketing. 
 
In a wide sense, every action taken by a digital subject in the digital world is 
indicative of a digital identity subject’s behaviour and consequently leads to a 
development and pinning down of that subject’s identity. Depending on what one 
does, the websites one visits, the items one purchases, with whom one banks, where 
holidays are taken, search terms are used, a comprehensive personality (or profile) of 
the individual can be built up. An example is the profiling of online consumer 
behaviour.175  
 
Another aspect of digital presence is location. Digital identity also manifests itself in 
the form of location data. Location data are data capable of indicating the 
geographical position of a device or person.176 Location based digital identities are 
                                                 
171 S Stryker, ‘Identity Salience and Role Performance: The Importance of Symbolic Interaction 
Theory for Family Research,’ (1968) 30 J Marriage and the Family, 558–564; S Stryker, Symbolic 
Interactionism: A Social Structural Version (Blackburn Press, West Caldwell 2002); CJ Armitage and 
M Conner, The Theory of Planned Behaviour: Assessment of Predictive Validity and Perceived 
Control,’ (1999) 38 Brit J of Soc Psych, 35–54; PL Callero, JA Howard and JA Piliavin, ‘Role 
Identity and Reasoned Action in the Prediction of Repeated Behaviour,’ (1987) 50 Soc Psych Q, 247–
256; 
172<http://www.farmville.com/> 
173 M Hildebrandt, ‘Profiling and the Identity of the European Citizen’ in M Hildebrandt, S Gutwirth 
(eds), Profiling the European Citizen: Cross-disciplinary Perspectives, (Springer, Netherlands 2008), 
303-344 
174 Alice Klever, Behavioural Targeting: An Online Analysis for Efficient Media Planning? 
(Diplomica Verlag GmbH, Hamburg 2009) 
175 S Karas, ‘Privacy, Identity, Databases,’ (2002) 52 Am U L Rev, 394-445, 426-427 
176 Location data is defined in The Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009, s 2 (d) 
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perpetuated by location-based devices like mobiles and PDA’s.177 These digital 
identities are becoming increasingly popular and socially and legally significant.178 
Take for instance the growth of geotagging.179 
 
2.4.6. Relationship representations 
 
Identity is a representation of relationships.180 Relationships constitute identity and 
give it its meaning. For instance, I am who my family is. I am who my friends are. I 
am who I work for. I am who I communicate and associate with. The relationships of 
digital identity subject enable the building of digital profiles, sociological or 
otherwise of the subject. Conversely, they also affect adversely the creation and 
enjoyment of digital identity. This is an identity aspect of great significance in 
relation to India. 
 
In the digital context, relationship based identity is best illustrated by the Friend of a 
Friend (FoAF) concept; defined as the Resource Description Framework (RDF) 
vocabulary a digital identity subject uses to make statements about itself and its 
digital identity.181 It permits the building of web of acquaintances.182 This is 
evidenced in Typepad183 and LiveJournal.184 
 
 
                                                 
177 E Paulos and E Goodman, ‘The Familiar Stranger: Anxiety, Comfort and Play in Public Places,’ 
Proceedings of the Conference on Human Factors and Computing Systems, CHI 2004, Vienna, 24-29 
April 2004. 
178 R Clarke and M Wigan,‘You are Where You’ve Been: Location Technologies’ Deep Privacy 
Impact,’ in K Michael & MG Michael (eds), Australia and the New Technologies: Evidence Based 
Policy in Public Administration (University of Wollongong, 2008), 100-113 
179 See Gene Smith, Tagging: People-Powered Metadata for the Social Web (New Riders, Berkeley 
2008),111; ‘Foursquare Roads to 3 Million Users,’ ABH News, 31 August 2010 <http://abh-
news.com/foursquare-roads-to-3-million-users-4049.html> 
180 S Chen, HC Boucher and MW Kraus, ‘The Relational Self: Emerging Theory and Evidence,’ in 
VLVignoles, S Schwartz and K Luyckx (eds), Handbook of Identity Theory and Research (Springer, 
NY 2011); SM Andersen, S Chen and R Miranda, ‘Significant Others and the Self, (2001) 1 Self & 
Identity,159-168 
181 Erle Schuyler, Rich Gibson and Jo Walsh, Mapping Hacks: Tips and Tools for Electronic 
Cartography (O'Reilly Media, CA 2005), 503 
182 Kieron O’Hara and Nigel Shadbolt, ‘Knowledge Technologies and the Semantic Web,’ in R 
Mansell and BS Collins (eds), Trust and Crime in Information Societies (Edward Elgar, UK 2007), 
113-164, 134 
183 <www.typepad.com> 




Digital identity may also take the form of reputation. Reputation is a key component 
of identity and identity is often the summed up in terms of reputation. This kind of 
identity is particularly important in close knit communal and collective cultures like 
India.185 
 
Reputation is a vital and significant digital identity component. It is important not 
just in the online context but also in the offline context. The Internet through search 
engines enables the aggregation and assimilation of an individual’s reputation, as do 
digital databases used to collate personal information and build profiles.  
 
Reputation is the “overall quality or character as seen or judged by people in 
general,” or the “recognition by other people of some characteristic or ability.”186 
Reputation can be positive or negative. Negative reputation can be developed by 
telling or posting true or false stories or allegations about individuals.187 For instance, 
posting defamatory messages in newsgroups188 or indulging in name-calling on 
message boards.189 There are specialist reputation building sites like Rotten 
Neighbour,190 (permits the posting of information about good and bad neighbours), 
RateMyTeachers,191 (site for rating teachers) etc. A disreputable digital identity can 
have serious consequences. For instance, non-consideration for employment. Such 
problems have resulted in the growth of reputation management services.192  
 
                                                 
185 In India, often classified as a high context culture, reputation plays a significant role particularly 
given close knit nature of interpersonal bonds. Brian Black, The Character of the Self in Ancient 
India: Priests, Kings, and Women in the Early Upanisads (SUNY, Albany 2007), 83 (losing 
reputation is a terrible consequence); MV Sidhpuria, Retail Franchising (Tata McGraw Hill: New 
Delhi 2009), 120 (high reliance placed on reputations in transactions); Mattison Mines, Public Faces, 
Private Voices: Community and Individuality in South India (University of California Press, 
California 1994), 6, 32 (reputation as crucial in life negotiation) 
186 See Merriam Webster Inc, The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Merriam Webster, Springfield MA 
2005) 
187 See ‘Business Rival Makes Highest Ever Online Libel Payout,’ Out-LAW News, 3 April 2008, 
<http://www.out-law.com/page-9011> 




192 For instance, Garlik. <www.garlik.com> 
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Reputation systems too, have proliferated on the Internet.193  Dellarocas states the 
Internet based reputation systems differ from non-Internet based in the following 
three aspects: their unprecedented scale;194 the ability of their designers to precisely 
control and monitor their operation through automated feedback mediators; and the 
new challenges introduced by the unique properties of online interaction, like the 
volatile nature of online identities195 and the near complete absence of contextual 
cues.196  
 
On EBay, buyers and sellers rate one another. Transactions occur on the basis of the 
reputational identities of the participants. In virtual world games like WoW, 
reputation is central to being able to undertake quests and make purchases as 
required in the game.197 
 
Reputation is also constructed on offline databases by the aggregation of digitally 
compiled data about a digital identity subject. This reputation is constructed and 
develops as a result of data collection and storage, and use in private and government 
databases. For example, in the UK this is evident in Police National Computer 
(PNC)198 (convicted offenders), Youth Offender Information System (YOIS) 
system199 and the National Pupil Database.200 In India, it is evident in the National 
Skills Registry.201  
 
                                                 
193 P Resnick, R Zeckhauser, E Friedman and K Kuwabara, ‘Reputation Systems,’ (2000) 43 (12) 
Communications of the ACM, 45-48 
194 Internet reputation transcends geographical boundaries. Edwards refers to this as the bounced or 
exploding out effect. L Edwards, ‘Defamation and the Internet: Name Calling in Cyberspace,’ in L 
Edwards and C Waelde (eds), Law and the Internet: Regulating Cyberspace (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
1997), 183-198 
195 E Friedman and P Resnick, ‘The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms,’ (2001) 10 (1) J Eco and Mgt 
Strategy, 173-199.  
196 C Dellarocas, ‘The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback 
Mechanisms,’ (2003) 49 (10) Management Science, 1407-1424 
197 <http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/basics/reputation.html> 
198 NPIA Police National Computer, <http://www.npia.police.uk/en/10508.htm> 
199 <http://www.socialsoftware.co.uk/Development/172.asp> 
200 This database stores information on pupils’ behaviour, attendance records, and talents. 
201 <https://nationalskillsregistry.com>. The National Skills Registry, a NASSCOM initiative, aims at 
facilitating the development of credible, permanent and accessible information about registered 
persons from the IT industry. 
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The above examination reveals how digital identity can assume different forms: 
authenticators, claims, data or information, identifiers, presence, representation of 
relationships or reputation. Any or all of these singly or in combinations of various 
sorts could represent a digital identity subject’s identity. These may vary according 
to context and across domains.  
 
2.5. Nature of digital identity 
 
This section now explores the nature of digital identity. Given that digital identity is 
represented in various forms, the character of digital identity is now explored.202  
 
2.5.1. Unitary or multiple  
I am one. I am many. 
A digital identity can be of unitary or multiple nature. A unitary digital identity is an 
identity that stands by itself. The post-modern203 era is characterised by focus on the 
multiplicity of identities.204 But multiple identities are not a new occurrence specific 
to the development and proliferation of digital technologies, as highlighted by the 
works of Goffman,205 Gergen,206 Kendall207 and Poster.208 
                                                 
202 The properties of identity were also explored in OECD (2007) n140.  
203 Postmodernism is defined as “a set of critical, strategic and rhetorical practices employing concepts 
such as difference, repetition, the trace, the simulacrum, and hyper reality to destabilize other concepts 
such as presence, identity, historical progress, epistemic certainty and the univocity of meaning.” Gary 
Aylesworth, ‘Postmodernism,’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (2005), 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/postmodernism/>.The postmodern is embodied in the works of G 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (trs), JF Lyotard: The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge, (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1984); Richard Howard (tr), Michel 
Foucault:Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (Random House, NY 
1965); Robert Hurley (tr), Michel Foucault: The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, Vol Two 
(Random House NY 1985); Hugh Tomlinson (tr), Nietzsche and Philosophy: Gilles Deleuze 
(Columbia University Press, NY 1983); GC Spivak (tr), Jacques Derrida of Grammatology (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1974); IH Grant (tr), Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and 
Death (Sage, London 1993); JR Snyder (tr), Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity: Nihilism and 
Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1988); Christopher 
Woodall (tr), Mario Perniola, Enigmas: The Egyptian Moment in Society and Art (Verso, London 
1995) 
204 Eg Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference (Routledge, NY 1989), p 
98, 99; M Rosenthal, ‘What was Postmodernism,’ (1992) 22 (3) Soc Rev, 83-105, 96 
205 Goffman (1959) n100; Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity 
(Simon and Schuster, NY 1963) 
206 KJ Gergen, The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life (Basic Books, NY 
1991) 
207 L Kendall, ‘Recontextualizing ‘Cyberspace: Methodological Considerations for On-Line 
Research,’ in S Jones (ed), Doing Internet Research: Critical Issues and Methods for Examining the 
Net (Sage, California 1999), 57-74, 61 
208 M Poster, The Mode of Information: Post-Structuralism and Social Context (Polity Press, 
Cambridge 1990), 6 
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Individuals may adopt any number of digital identities, technology and law 
permitting.209 They have, as Turkle suggests, “the chance to express multiple and 
often unexplored aspects of the self, to play with their identity and to try out new 
ones.”210 Individuals can have and express a myriad of digital identities across 
technical platforms like the computer, Internet, mobile phones. They can use these 
identities to work across contexts and enter and exit different worlds 
simultaneously.211  
 
Turkle makes the case that digital identity subjects view their identity as multiple and 
incorporated at the same time.212 This is supported by Kendall’s research and her 
conclusion that “people persist in seeking essentialised groundings” and “continually 
work to reincorporate their experiences of themselves and of other selves into 
integrated, consistent wholes.”213 
 
Even in the non-digital context, people have and assume different identities – 
constantly moving in and out of them as a matter of routine. In similar vein to 
Turkle, Waskul and Douglas conclude that multiple digital identities are influenced 
by the Internet’s potential of dislocating and disembodying identities, and “exposing 
the hyper fluidity of self-enactment.”214 Stone, another post-modern theorist, talks 
about the how the “mode of computer nets” suggests “fragmentation and multiplicity 
as an integral part of social identity.”215   
 
The multiplicity of identities is a key feature of virtual worlds216 (including 
MMORPGs and MMORLGs). The use of services from multiple web providers (for 
                                                 
209 H Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier (Addison Wesley: 
Mass 1993), 147 (MUD personas) 
210 Turkle (1995) n148, 12  
211 Turkle (1995) n148, 13 
212 S Turkle, ‘Computational Technologies and Images of the Self,’ (1997) 64 (3) Social Research, 
1094-1111, 1103-1105 
213 Kendall (1999) n207, 62 
214 D Waskul and M Douglas, ‘Cyberself: The Emergence of the Self in On-line Chat,’ (1997) 13(4) 
The Information Society, 375-397, 394 
215 A Stone, ‘Virtual Systems,’ in J Crary and SK Winter (eds) Zone 6: Incorporations (MIT Press, 
Mass 1992), 609-621, 611 
216 DT Nguyen and J Alexander, ‘The Coming of Cyberspacetime and the End of Reality,’ in R 
Shields (ed), Cultures of the Internet: Virtual Spaces, Real Histories, Living Bodies (Sage, London 
1996), 99-124 
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different purposes) also results in multiple identities. A Security Report on Online 
Identity Theft reports that a single person could legitimately have around 15-20 
digital identities for different purposes and in different contexts.217 For instance, a 
person might have three email accounts, four social networking profiles, one PayPal 
account, an Amazon account and three avatars in three different domains. 
 
The multiplicity of digital identities has been viewed of as a problem by identity 
technologists and law. Identity technologists developed identity management 
solutions (outlined in Chapter 4) to help control and manage multiple identities. 
Multiple digital identities are also perceived as a legal regulatory challenge. This is 
due to the belief that multiple digital identities enable individuals expressing them to 
escape accountability by moving and hiding between identities,218 their complex 
nature and security challenges. They are often associated with criminality. Thus, the 
law seeks to regulate their exercise. For instance, sex offenders in the State of New 
York, if legal measures were successfully enacted, would have to register all their 
digital identities with the police as conditions of their probation or parole. 219 
 
To control multiple identities, the law often resorts to bolstering the concept of ‘one 
true identity’ by rolling out unique identity based governance systems, as was the 
case in the UK220 and is in India, 221 revealing a trend disfavouring multiple 
identities. But the vitality of the multiplicity is still recognised in many circles.222  
 
                                                 
217 BT, ‘Security Report: Online Identity Theft,’ February 2006, 
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218 T Nabeth, ‘Privacy in the Context of Digital Social Environments: A Cyber-Sociological 
Perspective,’ INSEAD CALT-FIDIS Working Paper, (2005); danah Boyd, ‘Sexing the Internet: 
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February 2008), <http://www.out-law.com/page-8870> 
220 See House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, ‘Identity Card Technologies: 
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Home Office, ‘Legislation on Identity Cards: A Consultation,’ CM 6178, (TSO, UK 2004) 
221 Sebastian Pt, ‘The Card Trick,’ Outlook Business (3 May 2008), 32-34, 34 
222 G Roussos, D Peterson and U Patel, ‘Mobile Identity Management: An Enacted View,’ (2003) 8 
Intl J Elec Commerce, 81-100. In the Indian context, attempts to reduce identity to a singular form 
have been criticised. See D Anand, ‘Security Bites: Political Violence and Identity Construction in 
India,’ International Studies Association Annual Conference (Hawaii, March 2005); M Kishwar, 
‘Who Am I? Living Identities vs. Acquired Ones,’ Revised Version of Keynote Address, UNHCR and 
AIW Conference on ‘Women in Search of Identity’ (March 1996) 
<http://www.infinityfoundation.com/mandala/s_es/s_es_kishw_who_frameset.htm>; R Wilton, 
‘Racingsnake, The Blog of Future Identity: Is Privacy only for the Rich?’ Blogpost (11 March 2009) 
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2.5.2. Same or different  
I am ‘that’ one. I am not ‘that’ one. 
A digital identity may or may not relate to its digital identity subject. This means a 
digital identity might embody the characteristics of the digital identity subject, 223 or 
alternately, it may take on different characteristics in comparison with the 
characteristics of the digital identity subject. 224  
 
For instance, X X is X X on Facebook. However, X Y is X Z on LiveJournal. A 
middle aged male psychiatrist might pose as a disabled woman.225  A man may 
present himself as a woman. A 45 year old might pretend to be a 16 year old. A 
survey of 9,529 Second Lifers, showed how 45 percent of respondents gave their 
avatars more attractive bodies than they actually had, 37 percent made themselves 
younger and 23 percent chose a different race. 226 
 
2.5.3. Fixed or flexible 
I am unchanging. I am dynamic. 
Digital identity may be fixed or flexible in nature. The fixed nature of digital identity 
manifests itself in its embodiment in rigid, unchangeable form due to its own, 
technical, legal or other constraints. Flexible digital identity is dynamic and non-
resistant to alteration. 227 
 
One example of a fixed digital identity is a biometric identifier like a digital 
fingerprint. A digital fingerprint relates to an individual and generally remains the 
same over time and place for that individual. Another example is a permanent 
lifelong ID token issued by an authority intended to represent a digital identity 
subject e.g. the UK national insurance card and the Indian UID card. Fixed digital 
                                                 
223 See MG Kirschenbaum, ‘Why I Blog Under My Own Name (and a Modest Proposal),’ (9 July 
2005) <http://www.otal.umd.edu/~mgk/blog/archives/000813.html> 
224 Goffman (1963) n205 
225 See AR Stone, ‘Will the Real Body Please Stand Up? Boundary Stories about Virtual Cultures,” in 
D Bell, BM Kennedy (eds), The Cybercultures Reader (Routledge, London 2000), 504-528, 506 
226 JH Burnett, MiamiHerald  <http://www.weblo.com/mediacenter/media/More-People-are-Leading-
Virtual-Lives_Miami-Herald.pdf> 
227 For flexibility of identity in communication networks see: Lee Sproull and Sara Kiesler, ‘Reducing 
Social Context Cues: Electronic Mail in Organizational Communication,’ (1986) 32 Management 
Science, 1492-1512; Lindsay Van Gelder, ‘The Strange Case of the Electronic Lover,’ in Gary 
Gumpert and SL Fish (eds), Talking to Strangers: Mediated Therapeutic Communication (Ablex, 
Norwood 1990), 128-142 
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identities fixate the identity of the digital identity subject. The digital identity subject 
might or might not have a say in such a fixation, particularly in cases where such 
identities are not created or subject to the operative control of the digital identity 
subject.  
 
Fixed identities are subject to the problems and issues like inertia, redundancy, 
inaccuracy development, irrelevance, irreversibility and ease and susceptibility to 
compromise and abuse.228  
 
Flexibility of digital identity manifests in the ability of a digital identity subject to 
play with their identity.229 Some digital identities lend well to moulding and 
adaptation in different manners, as in the case of Avatars.230 Subject to the terms of 
the operating platform, an Avatar is free to assume any form (i.e. animal, human, part 
human, part animal, male, female, abstract or concrete). Avatars can change between 
forms and appearances at will.231 
 
2.5.4. Local or universal 
I am here. I am everywhere. 
Digital identity may be local, universal or simultaneously both.  In relation to the 
Internet, Buchanan states that one may be “simultaneously everywhere and 
nowhere.”232 In similar light, Poster comments, 
… we are being changed from “arborial” beings, rooted in time and space, to 
“rhizomic” nomads who daily wander at will (whose will remains a question) 
across the globe, and even beyond it through communications satellites, 
                                                 
228 This emerges particularly in the arguments against genetic biobanks. See SB Haga and LM 
Beskow, ‘Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of Biobanks for Genetics Research,’ (2008) 60 
Advances in Genetics, 505-544; JH Solbakk, S Holm and B Hofmann, The Ethics of Research 
Biobanking (Springer Verlag, NY 2009) 
229 SL Calvert, ‘Identity Construction on the Internet’ in SL Calvert, AB Jordan and RR Cocking (eds) 
Children in the Digital Age: Influences of Electronic Media on Development (Praeger, Westport 
2002), 57-70 
230 JA Bryant and Anna Akerman, ‘Finding Mii: Virtual Social Identity and the Young Consumer,’ in 
NT Wood and MR Solomon (eds), Virtual Social Identity and Consumer Behavior (ME Sharp Inc, 
USA 2009) 
231 M Fowle, ‘Interdentity: Belonging, Behaviour and Identity Online,’ Proceedings of the Advanced 
International Conference on Telecommunications and International Conference on Internet and Web 
Applications and Services (19-25 February 2006) 
232 J Buchanan, ‘Beyond East and West: Postmodern Democracy in a Mode of Information,’ in R 
Bontekoe & M Stephaniants (eds), Justice and Democracy: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (University 
of Honolulu Press, Honolulu 1997), 423 
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without necessarily moving our bodies at all. The body then is no longer an 
effective limit of the subject’s position.233 
 
Poster further poses the question, “then where am I and who am I?” and concludes 
with the rejoinder that “I am disrupted, subverted and dispersed across social 
space.”234 Contemporary digital space and identity thus, knows few geographical 
boundaries.  
 
Digital identity has both local and universal dimensions.  A simple example 
illustrates this. Shanta accesses the Internet through a computer in a cybercafé in 
Trivandrum, India. She has a Facebook profile, which is available to her locally as 
well as available to her friends all over the world. Thus her profile, is local and yet 
universal in nature. Another example is of a biometric passport. A biometric passport 
may issued by the government of India and yet valid in other countries across the 
world.  
 
Yet, though the technologies of identity seem to have the capacity to enable both 
local and universal expression of digital identity, they are constrained by local 
differences in the use, experience235 and regulation of these technologies. 236 
 
2.5.5. Authentic or fictitious  
I am true. I am false. 
A digital identity may be authentic or fictitious. Authentic digital identities are digital 
identities that are established or confirmed as true in relation to a digital identity 
subject. Fictitious digital identities are the opposite. 
 
Digital identities have a propensity for fictitiousness.237 Raab states that, “in a post-
modern world, it is no longer clear that any one identity is real.”238 Fictitiousness 
                                                 
233 Poster (1990) n208, 1-16 
234 Poster (1990) n208, 15-16; Also M Poster, The Second Media Age (Polity Press, Cambridge 1995), 
59 
235 Substantiated in Ch 3  
236 Comprehensively addressed in Chs 4 & 5. 
237 A Vasalou and AN Joinson, ‘Me, Myself and I: The Role of Interactional Context on Self-
Presentation Through Avatars,’ (2009) 25 (2), Comput Hum Behav, 510-520 
238 Charles Raab, Keynote Address, Proceedings of the Life of Mobile Data, University of Surrey, 
Guildford (April 2004) 
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might manifest in digital identities that seem fake or unreal. In virtual worlds there is 
a wide-ranging possibility to enact fantasy 239 and create fantasial or fictitious 
identities.  
 
Identities may fictionalised for any number of reasons: to express oneself (especially 
in terms of breaking offline restrictive boundaries),240 for privacy or anonymity.241 A 
blogger may adopt a fictitious identity to voice concern over politically sensitive 
issues. A Twitter user may adopt a fictitious identity and lurk on Twitter to follow 
issues relating to medical conditions. A twelve year old might adopt a fake adult 
identity and log onto adult websites.  
 
Authenticity of digital identity can be established or confirmed by determining 
whether a digital identity in relation to a digital identity subject is what it is, claims to 
be, or is connected or related to the digital identity subject in some form or manner. 
If it is not, then it is fictitious. Fictitious digital identities create law enforcement 
problems, as they are difficult to control, particularly if they cannot be traced back to 
a digital identity subject.242 While fictitious identities are not illegal in themselves, 
their use for illegal purposes is generally proscribed by law. 
 
2.5.6. Possessed or owned  
I am mine, but not my own. I am my own. 
Digital identity might be subject to possession or ownership by a digital identity 
subject. Alternately, a digital identity subject might have both possession and 
ownership. If a digital identity subject only possesses a digital identity, ownership 
might lie elsewhere (e.g. in the case of an issued identity token, with the identity 
provider). 
                                                 
239 Turkle (1995) n148; see also HJ Schau & MC Gilly, ‘We Are What We Post? Self-Presentation in 
Personal Web Space,’ (2003) 30 (3) J Cons Res, 385-414 
240 JP Gee, What Video Games Have to Teach Us About Learning and Literacy (Palgrave Macmillan, 
NY 2003) 
241 Dorian Wiszniewski and Richard Coyne, ‘Mask and Identity: The Hermeneutics of Self-
Construction in the Information Age,’ in KA Renninger and Wesley Shumar (eds) Building Virtual 
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242 DJ Solove, M Rotenberg and PM Schwartz, Privacy, Information and Technology (Aspen 
Publishers, NY 2008); GP Schneider, Electronic Commerce (Course Technology, Canada 2009); LE 
Bone, DL Kurtz, Contemporary Business (Wiley, 2003) 
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Digital identity is contentious in relation to who “owns” it.243 Here is an example to 
illustrate this: Tom has an email account with Moyi, an email provider.  Though Tom 
has actual possession of his email id (with access to its use with a username and 
password), Tom does not own his digital identity, even though it relates to him and 
he is the sole user of his email account.  
 
There are many more examples of this kind. For instance, while one may control 
one’s Yahoo id!, one cannot “reproduce, duplicate, copy, sell, trade, resell or exploit 
for any commercial purposes, any portion or use of, or access to, the Yahoo! Services 
(including Content, advertisements, Software and your Yahoo! ID).”244 Where 
ownership lies, clearly vests in the clause that states “You agree that your Yahoo! 
account is non-transferable and any rights to your Yahoo! ID or contents within your 
account terminate upon your death. Upon receipt of a copy of a death certificate, 
your account may be terminated and all contents therein permanently deleted.”245 
Many other digital identity services have similar terms and conditions that vest 
ownership of digital identity with the identity provider.246  Even in OpenId,247 a free 
platform that enables the use of a single digital identity across the Internet, the core 
identity, though relating to and possessed by the digital identity subject, is not owned 
by it. Similarly, WoW characters are owned by Blizzard, not players.248  
 
It is thus evident that while a digital identity may relate, identify or pertain to an 
identity subject, the identity in question may not belong to the identity subject. The 
identity subject may not have ownership in the very identity he identifies with, 
relates to or inhabits.  
                                                 
243 Halstead-Nussloch highlights international differences in attitudes in this respect, contrasting 
practice in the US where “possession is nine-tenths of the law with respect to digital identity and data 
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Government,’ in Clare-Marie Karat, JO Blom and J Karat (eds), Designing Personalized User 
Experiences in E-Commerce (Springer-Verlag, NY 2004), 161-184, 176 
244 Yahoo! Terms of Service, 12 <http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-173.html>  
245 ibid, 27 
246 See Google Terms of Service for Orkut < http://www.orkut.com/html/en-
US/additionalterms.orkut.html> 
247 <http://openid.net/> 
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2.5.7. Assigned or assumed  
I am what I am given. I am what I choose to be. 
Identity is often a product of what is given to or associated with us by other 
individuals, groups or entities. For example, names and identity numbers. Identity 
may also be something that an individual chooses for oneself. For instance, 
profession, place of residence, memberships of associations and clubs etc. In similar 
fashion, digital identities may be assigned identities or assumed identities. 
 
A large segment of digital identities are assigned identities; identities that are given 
to digital identity subjects by other entities. For example, smart cards and user 
account identities. But there are also digital identities that an individual may itself 
assume – like a particular Avatar form or specific profile picture. Assigned and 
assumed digital identities may not always function exclusively of each other. Many a 
times, they increasingly interact and interpose upon one another. 
 
2.5.8. Fragmented or cohesive  
I am dispersed. I am integrated. 
Digital identity may be fragmented or cohesive.  
 
The very nature of the Internet and condition of digital technology lends well to the 
fragmentation of digital identities. A digital identity subject can have numerous 
coordinated or uncoordinated digital identities all representing elements and 
narratives of itself, both online and offline. These are piecemeal and can even be 
incoherent narratives of an individual.   
 
There is increasing evidence of resistance of identity fragmentation. Identity 
fragmentation and proliferation are visualised as problems, particularly in regards to 
identity management and regulation.249 For instance, fragmentation of digital 
identities is often associated with the falsification of identities.250 SSO and Federated 
                                                 
249 Fragmented identities, like multiple identities, are associated with confusion, discontinuity, 
conflict, management problems. See Ch 4 (4.2) 
250 ITU Internet Report 2006, ‘Digital.Life,’ Chapter 4, 
<http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/publications/digitalife/docs/digital.life-chapter4.pdf> 
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Identity Management251 are evidence to a certain extent of the fact that fragmented 
identities were perceived as a regulatory difficulty.  
 
Digital identity may also be cohesive or integrated. Cohesive identities are an 
amalgamation of the identities of a digital identity subject. Here, a single platform 
embodies multiple identity elements of a digital identity subject. Social networking 
profiles to some extent are examples of cohesive or integrated identity. These 
profiles are an amalgamation of personal, professional and social identity.  
 
2.5.9. Public or private  
I am public. I am private. 
Digital identity may be public or private. Public digital identities are digital identities 
that are within the public realm. Private digital identities are digital identities that are 
largely within the private sphere. 
 
Public digital identities are open and shared digital identities. The digital identity in 
this case is one that is widely, easily and freely available to anyone who wishes to 
avail of it or access it. Examples of public digital identity are publicly available 
digital information (like names), public profiles, domain names, digital images or 
reputation. 
 
Private digital identity relates to digital identity that is limited in terms of its access. 
These identities are actively subject to measures that limit them from being exposed 
to the public realm. The access and knowledge of these identities is limited to the 
identity subject, the identity provider and/or the service provider, or by agreement 
between a limited number of entities who share specific relationships. Some 
examples of private digital identities might be passwords, financial data, medical or 
biometric data.  
 
Digital identity subjects can sometimes make a choice (as per their expectations and 
requirements) as to whether they wish their digital identities to be public or private. 
                                                 
251 See Ch 4  
 53 
This is evident in the mediation of digital identity on social networking websites. 
These sites allow digital identity subjects to restrict access to their digital identity 
with specific tools designed for the purpose. For instance, a Facebook user may 
chose who has access to their profile, block people from accessing their profile and 
determine what parts of their profile are open and what parts are closed. 
 
2.5.10. Anonymous or pseudonymous  
I am …. I am X. 
Anonymity refers to the condition of being unable to ascertain or determine identity 
or origin. A digital identity is anonymous when it cannot be linked to an entity or its 
user.252 Clarke defines an anonymous identity as one that “cannot be associated with 
a particular individual, either from the data itself, or by combining the transaction 
with other data.”253  
 
A pseudonymous identity254 is “one that cannot, in the normal course of events, be 
associated with a particular individual.”255 It represents an identity that is in between 
anonymity and complete identification. A digital identity is pseudonymous256 if it 
can be linked to its entity or user if certain other conditions are fulfilled (e.g. user 
generated public keys). 
 
Contemporary digital identities are not, contrary to popular belief, anonymous. A 
person may seek to shield or hide their digital identity (by use of platforms like 
Anonymizer.com,257 The Cloak,258 Tor259 and Privoxy260 and services like 
anonymous attribute certificates and signatures), but it can be easily revealed261 or 
                                                 
252 This form of identity is extinct. 
253 R Clarke, ‘Identified, Anonymous and Pseudonymous Transactions: The Spectrum of Choice,’ 
User Identification & Privacy Protection Conference, Stockholm (14-15 June 1999) 
254 For overview of pseudonymous identity, see M Mowbray, ‘Implementing Pseudonymity’ (2006) 3 
(1) SCRIPTed 34 <http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol3-1/mowbray.asp  
255 Clarke (1999) n253 





261 Katherine Walker, ‘It’s Difficult to Hide It”: The Presentation of Self on Internet Home Pages,’ 
(2000) 23 (1) Qualitative Sociology, 99-120 
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discovered,262 though it might not be able to be conclusively traced back to the 
digital identity subject. Identity management systems, though they aim to facilitate 
anonymity and pseudonymity, through permitting surveillance,263 symbolise the 
obsoleteness of the Internet where nobody knows you are a dog.264  
 
Anonymous digital identities (and to some extent pseudonymous digital identities to 
the extent they obscure identity) have become associated with illegal acts like 
paedophilia, spam, identity crime, defamation, intellectual property theft (e.g. illegal 
file sharing, copyright infringement) and the commission of other crime and terrorist 
activities.265 They are thus resisted, resulting in moves towards enhanced 
identification of the digital identity subject. 
 
In the digitally advanced West, anonymity and pseudonymity are widely accepted for 
their liberative potential to an individual’s existence,266 and this explains the 
development, growth and support for privacy enhancing technologies (PETs). In 
India however, this is not the perception or case. Culture267 and legal policy268 has 
ensured that digital anonymity and pseudonymity is the exception rather than the 
rule. 
 
2.5.11. Temporary or permanent  
I am fleeting. I am forever. 
Digital identities may be temporary or permanent. Transactional digital identities 
may be temporary i.e. they may be created or last for a session, or couple of sessions. 
Other digital identities may be longer lasting or permanent, subject to use and re-use. 
Some digital identities may be time restricted and expire after a certain period 
                                                 
262 Jacob Van Kokswijk, Digital Ego: Social and Legal Aspects of Virtual Identity (Eburon, 
Eindhoven 2007), 221 
263 Further outlined in Ch 3. 
264 ‘On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Dog,’ The New Yorker, 69 (20), (1993), reprint 
<http://www.unc.edu/depts/jomc/academics/dri/idog.html> 
265 This is not to negate occurrence of actual harm but to draw attention to the disproportionate nature 
of the association.  
266 See CEA Karnow, ‘The Encrypted Self: Fleshing out the rights of Electronic Personalities,’ (1994) 
13 JCIL 1 
267 Ch 3 (3.2.2.6) 
268 Ch 6 (6.3.4) & (6.3.5) 
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(automatic lapsing) others may be such that they are permanent subject to active 
revocation or destruction.  
 
It is often very difficult for a digital identity subject to appreciate whether the digital 
identity or identities in play are temporary or permanent, though the answer to this 
question would definitely make a difference in the manner they are perceived and 
dealt with.  
 
Digital identities are quite partial to ‘everything lasts forever.’ 269 For instance, a 
person may delete their photo from a blog or social networking site but this may be 
saved in cache or on another computer. They thus have a propensity to seem 
temporary, though inherently capable of being permanent in nature. Digital 
technologies have facilitated and promoted preservation on an unprecedented and 
even inexpensive scale. This is not always a good thing, particularly for the digital 
identity subject, because it has serious consequences. 270 This is particularly 
highlighted by Mayer-Schöenberger who calls for a revival of the social capacity to 
forget.271  
 
2.5.12. Visible or invisible 
I am seen. I am unseen. 
Digital identities may be visible or invisible in form. Examples of visible digital 
identities are email ids, avatars, domain names, social networking profiles, chat room 
handle etc. Examples of invisible digital identities are cookies, digital certificates and 
embedded identifiers.   
 
A digital identity could also have both characteristics (visibility and invisibility). For 
instance, reputation could take on both visible and invisible characteristics, to the 
extent that it is known and unknown (such that the identity subject is not aware it 
                                                 
269Andy Oram, ‘What Sociologist Erving Goffman Could Tell Us About Social Networking 
and Internet Identity,’ O’Reilly Radar (26 October 2009) 
<http://radar.oreilly.com/2009/10/what-sociologist-erving-goffma.html> (identities as 
“presented to the entire world for all time”) 
270 DJ Solove, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor and Privacy on the Internet (Yale University 
Press, Newhaven 2007), 33, 94, 165 
271 V Mayer-Schoenberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age (Princeton University 
Press, NJ 2009) 
 56 
exists). Even an IP address can be a visible or invisible form of identity depending of 
the identity subject’s knowledge or lack of its existence. 
 
Thus, digital identity has different natures which might exist in isolation, 
combination to each other. These natures add another layer of complexity to digital 
identity. 
 
2.6. Digital identity and its relationship to the individual  
 
 
At the heart of the digital identity lies the digital identity subject - the individual or 
natural person to whom the digital identity relates to, associates with or represents. 
This section now examines the relationship of digital identity to the individual. 
 
The relationship of digital identity to an individual can be explained with the help of 
the Johari window, a graphic model of interpersonal awareness, created by Luft and 
Ingham.272 The model gives good insight into the complexity and layers of digital 
identity.  
 
Fig 2: The Johari Window 
The Johari window has four aspects to it:  
- Known to Self and Known to Others (Arena) 
                                                 
272 Joseph Luft and Harry Ingham, ‘The Johari Window, A Graphic Model of Interpersonal 
Awareness,’ Proceedings of the Western Training Laboratory in Group Development, UCLA, LA 
(1955) 
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- Known to Self, Not Known to Others (Façade)  
- Known to Others, Not known to self (Blind Spot)  
- Not known to self and not known to others (Unknown) 
 
Applying this model to digital identity, we find an individual may have none, one or 
several digital identities. Some of these digital identities are known to the individual 
and his associates; these identities fall into the Arena category. These digital 
identities are generally visible and public in nature.  For instance, the individual and 
his friends who he communicates with are aware of the individuals email id, his chat 
room/IM handle and social networking profile. 
 
An individual also has digital identities that he himself knows about but his digital 
associates or other persons or entities know nothing about. This may be because the 
individual needs to keep these secret for security reasons (e.g. passwords, banking id, 
PayPal id) or it may just be that the individual does not want them to know for 
reasons like fear of exposure (MMORPG ids), trust betrayal, embarrassment, stigma 
(e.g. a male creates a female avatar) or for no reason at all. These identities fall into 
the Façade category. More problematic façade identities are fictitious digital 
identities.  
 
In the Blind Spot category are digital identities that others are aware of and the 
individual is not aware of. For instance, cookies placed on a machine, IP addresses 
(many users are not aware of their IP address is), DNA profile on a database 
(uploaded without consent or knowledge). These types of digital identities are 
problematic in terms of how these digital identity subjects can exercise control over 
them. 
 
The Unknown relates to the collective ignorance of the presence or absence of 
digital identities. This relates to digital identities that covertly exist but have not yet 
surfaced - these may be futuristic applications of digital identity.  
 
Different individuals have different relationships with digital identity. As with 
identity, this relationship is highly subjective. Digital identity subjects bring to their 
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digital identity their personal, social conditioning and life contexts; specifically in 
how they use, experience and manage digital identity.273 This is an important factor 
to be taken into consideration not just in the context of this thesis but for the 
regulatory future of digital identity.  
 
In the digitally advanced countries like the UK, individuals to a great extent 
experience digital identities as crucial and at times inseparable parts of their selves 
(evident in the disappearance of the distinction between the ‘real’ and digital 
identities).274 This is supported by the European Parliament’s Recommendation on 
the Strengthening Security and Fundamental Freedoms on the Internet which has 
recognised that digital identity is increasingly becoming an integral part of the 
self.”275 Digital identity has become a normalised and routine part of life without 
which life is unthinkable. It is an asset of value276 to the individual and “people view 
their personal information to be as valuable as their own cash.”277 
 
However, in countries like India the position is completely different.278 There are still 
distinct fault lines between identity and digital identity and identity and the self, 
though in some cases identity and digital identity become inevitably connected, 
either through requirements of the system, policy, law or culture, which influence 





                                                 
273 See Ch 3 
274 Birch (2007) n122. Birch believes that the boundary between the non-digital (which he terms as 
the “real”) and the digital is unclear and at the same time fascinating for what it means for the 
emergent concepts of digital identity. And yet, it was important in that people did feel a strong sense 
of connection between their digital and non-digital identities. 
275 Text adopted on 26 March 2009, 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2009-
0194> 
276 eg, Kable, ‘Identity Management in the UK Public Sector to 2011,’ Research Report (July 2007) 
277 M Sparkes, ‘Europeans Value Personal Data as Highly as Cash,’ (12 October 2007), 
<http://www.macuser.co.uk/news/129476/europeans-value-personal-data-as-highly-as-cash.html>  
278 R Rodrigues, ‘Digital Identity and Anonymity: Desi Manifestations and Regulation,’ in S Fischer-





Digital identity, the digital representation of an individual comes in various shapes 
and sizes, and in various forms: authenticators, claims, data or information, 
identifiers, presence, relationship representations and reputation. It may have any or 
many natures (singular, multiple, same, different, fixed, flexible, authentic, fictitious, 
assumed, assigned, fragmented, cohesive, public, private, anonymous, 
pseudonymous, temporary, permanent, visible or invisible) which add to its 
complexity. Given all this, digital identity operates primarily in the context of 

























3. Local Difference: Framing the local context of digital identity 
 
because it is within cultures that we decide what is valuable and what is not. 
-Enrico Coiera279 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
Local difference is an important influence on digital identity, its experience, use and 
regulation. However, the place of local difference280 thus far has been ignored in the 
international digital identity regulatory discourse. This chapter shows how local 
difference is evident and the critical part it plays in the context of the UK and India.  
 
What is local difference?  Difference manifests in the non-equality or the non-
conformity of two elements or objects to one another. Local difference, here, refers 
to the factors that represent a variance between two compared entities. There may be 
elements or factors in one jurisdiction that cause digital identity to be either 
experienced or regulated differently as compared to another jurisdiction.281 Thus, 
while the same digital identity might subsist in one or more jurisdiction, it is subject 
to dissimilar experiences according to local conditions.282  
 
                                                 
279 Enrico Coiera, ‘The Impact of Culture on Technology: How Do We Create a Clinical Culture of 
Innovation?’ Editorial, (1999) 171 MJA, 508-509 
280 The significance of local difference resonates in: M Castells, JL Qiu, M Fernández-Ardèvol  & A 
Sey, Mobile Communication and Society: A Global Perspective (MIT Press, Cambridge 2007); Simon 
Rogerson, ‘The Virtual World: A Tension between Global Reach and Local Sensitivity,’ (2004) 2 
(11/2004) Intl J of Information Ethics, 1-7; David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 1739 (OUP, 
Oxford 1978); David Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (HUP, MA 1969); Edna Ullmann-
Margalit, The Emergence of Norms (OUP, Oxford 1977); SJ Simon, ‘The Impact of Culture and 
Gender on Websites: An Empirical Study,’ (2000) 32 (1) SIGMIS Database, 18-37; G8, Digital 
Opportunities for All: Meeting the Challenge: Report of the Digital Opportunity Task Force (DOT 
Force) Including a Proposal for a Genoa Plan of Action, May 2001, 
<http://www.dotforce.org/reports/>; AA Erumban, SB Jong, ‘Cross-country Differences in ICT 
Adoption: A Consequence of Culture?’ (2006) 41 J World Bus, 302–314. Near similar studies were 
conducted by EM Meijer and R Ling, ‘The Adoption and Use of ICT Services in Europe: Potential 
Acceptance of Mobile Broadband Services,’ EURESCOM P903 (2006), 
<www.eurescom.de/~ftproot/web-deliverables/public/P900-series/P903/ICT_use_ ante.pdf>; SM Lee 
and SJ Peterson, ‘Culture, Entrepreneurial Orientation, and Global Competitiveness,’ (2000) 35 J 
World Bus, 401-416; Y Everdingen and E Waarts, ‘The Effect of National Culture on the Adoption of 
Innovations,’ (2004) 14 (3) Marketing Letters, 217–232 
281 In line with De Cruz’s reasoning that “norms and patterns of behaviour which one society may 
deem natural and legal may be characterised as reprehensible and unacceptable in another.” Peter De 
Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (Cavendish Publishing, London 1999), 17 
282 This resonates in Legrand’s comments on the subject that “there exists a socio-cultural dimension 
which, although it is largely concealed, remains inherent to rules. Legrand (1996) n45 
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In the instant case, local difference is represented by the factors affecting digital 
identity that distinguish the UK from India. These factors peculiarly influence and 
affect its nature, its relationship with the individual, its management and regulation 
and are examined below. 
 
3.2. Key points of difference  
 
Our research has identified two key areas of difference relevant to digital identity 
between the UK and India: state of digital technology and the influence of culture. 
The state of digital technology is explored in relation to operating conditions, 
penetration, access and use of digital technologies. The influence of culture 
(attitudes, social values, norms and practices) is explored in relation to important 
digital identity concepts like privacy, information sharing, communal use of personal 
information, authentication and verification, openness and transparency and 
anonymity and pseudonymity. 
 
3.2.1. State of digital technology  
 
The UK is a highly advanced digital country.283 India, on the contrary, is a digitally 
advancing country.  
 
The Digital Britain Report 2009 highlights the place of digital technology in the 
UK.284 It states, 
Digital technology - and particularly the Internet - is the common backbone 
for numerous services and devices that most people now take for granted, 
including MP3 players, web-enabled mobile phones, online gaming, social 
networking, multi-channel television, digital radio and podcasts. But it is 
much more than that. Digital technology is no longer simply desirable. It is 
                                                 
283See OECD, OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, United Kingdom: Challenges at the Cutting 
Edge (OECD, France 2002), 39-40 (categorised as Europe’s Internet leader); Nicoletta Corrocher, 
‘The Internet Services Industry: Country Specific Trends in the UK, Italy and Sweden,’ in Charles 
Edquist (ed), The Internet and Mobile Telecommunications System of Innovation: Developments in 
Equipment, Access and Content (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 2003), 210-235, 215; HM 
Government, A Better Deal for Consumers: Delivering Real Help Now and Change for the Future, 
(OPSI, Surrey 2009), 50 (European leader in Internet shopping); BBC News, ‘UK Consumers Enjoy 
'Advanced' Digital Communications’ (17 December 2009) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8417521.stm> 
284 Department for Culture, Media and Sport and Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
‘Digital Britain,’ Final Report, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media 
and Sport and the Minister for Communications, Technology and Broadcasting (June 2009) 
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rapidly becoming an essential facility for citizens and consumers in a modern 
society.285 
 
Digital technology is a basic necessity and has permeated every aspect of life, 
characterised by pervasiveness and omnipresence. 
 
On the other hand, the situation in India is very contrastive. Digital technologies, 
though advancing rapidly, have not had a similar impact.286 This is evident in the 
following observations:  
India’s digital consumption marketplace has clear divisions among urban-
rural, rich-poor, and old-young lines. Online content is accessible 
predominantly to India’s young, wealthy and urban populations…India has 
the highest PC costs and the lowest PC availability287…Internet cafes are 
major venues for Internet access…Mobile Internet has grown faster than 
fixed-line broadband…288 
 
Thus, on one hand, we have a jurisdiction where digital technology is an essential 
and basic part of life - the UK – and where digital identity is thus fairly well 
established. On the other, we have India, where digital technology, though 
progressing at a rapid rate, is still unevenly distributed, affecting the nature of digital 
identity. 
 
3.2.1.1.Operating Conditions  
 
Digital technologies do not operate in vacuum and they are affected in their 
development and expansion by local conditions like the nature of society, economy 
and culture. In Europe and the UK, the nature of society, economy and culture boosts 
the development and progress of digital technologies.289 Yet, though India is a hub of 
                                                 
285 Supported by research from the Communications Consumer Panel which found that 70% of people 
in the UK thought that home broadband was essential. 
286 S Borbora and MK Dutta, ‘ICT in Regional Development,’ in S Marshall, W Taylor, X Huo Yu 
(eds), Encyclopedia of Developing Regional Communities with Information and Communication 
Technology (Idea Group, UK 2006), 387-392, 387; UNCTAD, Information Economy Report 2007-
2008 (UN, Geneva 2007), Chapter 2 
287 As compared to Brazil, Russia, China and Indonesia. 
288 Marcos Aguiar and ors, ‘The Internet’s New Billion: Digital Consumers in Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and Indonesia,’ (September 2010) <http://www.bcg.com/documents/file58645.pdf> 
289 EC, The Economy of Culture in Europe, Study Prepared by the European Commission (October 
2006), 32; José Manuel Barroso, ‘Europe: Art or Science,’ Speech, Delft University of Technology, 
(13 January 2006) 
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digital technologies, the development and progress of these in India is often hindered 
by the nature of its society, economy and culture.290 
 
The UK is amongst the top digital economies. This is supported by the Digital 
Economy Rankings 2010291 aimed at assessing “the quality of a country’s ICT 
infrastructure and the ability of its consumers, businesses and governments to use 
ICT to their benefit.” The UK ranked 14th, while India came 58th.  The categories on 
which countries were judged were: connectivity and technology infrastructure,292 
business environment,293 social and cultural environment,294 legal environment,295 
government policy and vision296 and consumer and business adoption.297 Here is how 
































 20% 15% 15% 10% 15% 25% 
UK 7.89 7.65 7.40 7.73 8.10 8.55 8.00 
India 4.11 2.15 6.27 4.67 5.60 5.10 2.88 
 
Fig 3: Economist Intelligence Unit Digital Economy Rankings 2010 
                                                 
290 Extensively covered in RK Bagga, K Keniston and RR Mathur, The State, IT and Development 
(Sage, New Delhi 2005). 
291 Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Digital Economy Rankings 2010: Beyond E-readiness,’ White Paper, 
2010 <http://graphics.eiu.com/upload/EIU_Digital_economy_rankings_2010_FINAL_WEB.pdf> 
292 This category measures the extent and ability of individual and business access to the Internet and 
mobile networks.  
293 Covers strength of the economy, political stability, taxation, competition policy, the labour market, 
and openness to trade and investment. 
294 Covers educational levels (measured by school life expectancy, gross enrolment in education and 
enrolment in tertiary education); Internet literacy; degree of entrepreneurship; technical skills of 
workforce; degree of innovation (measured by the generation of patents and trademarks, as well as 
R&D spending). 
295 Reflecting legal frameworks with a direct impact on the use of digital technology and measures the 
effectiveness of traditional legal framework, Internet laws, censorship levels, ease of registering a new 
business and electronic ID. 
296 Covers government spend on ICT as a proportion of GDP, digital development strategy, e-
government strategy, online procurement, availability of online public services for citizens and 
businesses and e-participation. 
297 Includes consumer spending on ICT per head, level of e-business development, use of Internet by 
consumers, assessing both the range of Internet features used by individuals and their online 
purchasing activity, use of online public services by citizens and businesses. 
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From the data, vast differences are apparent between the two countries in regards to 
the conditions under which digital identity technologies operate. The UK performs 
far better than India – it has superior connectivity, a marginally finer business 
environment and a highly conducive social, cultural and legal environment, as 
compared to India. It also has a government policy and vision that is more conducive 
to the growth of digital technologies and a high level of business and consumer 
adoption of digital technologies.  
 
3.2.1.2.Penetration of Digital Technologies  
 
According to data from the ITU,298 in 2006, for every 100 people in the UK, there 
were 80 personal computers;299 while in India there were only 2.79 personal 
computers for every hundred people.300 Variance shows in respect of the number of 
Internet users too. In 2008, UK had 76 Internet users per 100 people while India had 
only 4.54.301  
 
Though the penetration of digital technologies, particularly mobile phones has 
substantially increased and is constantly improving in India, it leaves much to be 
desired in terms of universality. The penetration of digital technologies is highly 
uneven,302 and on international comparison, abysmal.303 Narayan highlights this in 
terms of what he calls the “yawning gap between individuals, households, businesses 





                                                 
298 See World Development Indicators, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CMP.PCMP.P2> 
299 Defined as “self-contained computers designed to be used by a single individual.” 
300 Reported to have increased to 3.29 in 2007. 
301 See World Development Indicators, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CMP.PCMP.P2> and 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2/countries/latest?display=default> 
302 O Manzar and SS Kazi, ‘.in India,’ in S Akhtar and P Arinto (eds), Digital Review of Asia Pacific 
2009-2010 (Sage, New Delhi 2009), 192-200, 192 
303 Borbora (2006) n286, 387-392, 387 
304 Jayaprakash Narayan, ‘Governance: Virtual to Real,’ in RK Bagga, K Keniston and RR Mathur 
(eds), The State, IT and Development (Sage, New Delhi 2005), 43-67, 48 
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3.2.1.3.Access to digital technologies 
 
A denial or lack of access to digital technologies affects the enjoyment of digital 
identity.305 Access to digital technologies is also at enhanced levels in the UK as 
compared to India. This is particularly evident in the widespread access to and use of 
the Internet306 and mobile services307 (two key digital identity platforms) which 
borders on the near universal, shaped by policy that promotes this.308 Access to 
digital technologies in India is poor. Even in urban areas in India where digital 
technology generally flourishes, it only works to serve the needs of a “fraction of the 
population.”309 
 
Exposure and access to digital technologies in India is hampered by a number of 
factors. First, the vast majority of India’s population lives in rural settlements,310 
where digital infrastructure has not effectively permeated. Computer and Internet 
penetration is low (though several initiatives have been launched to correct this).311 
This restricts access of individuals to these technologies and affects the mediation of 
their identity. Additionally, other socio-economic conditions (like wealth, education, 
gender,312 caste or class based discrimination in access to and use of technologies)313 
contribute to furthering the access divide. 314  
                                                 
305 C Murroni and N Irvine, Access Matters (IPPR, London 1998) 
306 Ronald Deibert, JG Palfrey, R Rohozinski, J Zittrain (eds), Access Controlled: The Shaping of 
Power, Rights and Rule in Cyberspace (MIT Press, Cambridge 2010), 358 
307 Deibert (2010) n306, 76 
308 See Digital Britain (2009) n284; Allen Booz and Hamilton, ‘Achieving Universal Access,’ A 
Report for the Prime Minister's Policy Unit (2000); Tony Blair’s full speech, The Guardian (7 March 
2000) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2000/mar/07/internet.uknews> 
309 Jonathan Fildes, ‘India’s Vision for a Digital Billion,’ BBC News (6 February 2007) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/6322027.stm> 
310 Mark Warschauer, Technology and Social Inclusion:Rethinking the Digital Divide (MIT Press, 
2004), 61 
311 See P Gupta and RK Bagga (eds), Compendium of E-Governance Initiatives in India (Universities 
Press, India 2008) 
312 Sarita Seshagiri, Sagar Aman and Dhaval Joshi, ‘Connecting the “Bottom of the Pyramid”: An 
Exploratory Case Study of India’s Rural Communication Environment,’ in Proceedings of the 16th 
International Conference on the World Wide Web (ACM Press, NY 2007), 855-862. The study shows 
men enjoy a powerful status in a village as decision makers and controllers of digital technologies like 
mobile phones. See also Rekha Pande, ‘Digital Bridge or Digital Divide: Assessing Gender Equations 
and the Indian Experience in Information and Communication Technologies,’ Paper Presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada (17 March 2004).  
313 Robert Jensen, ‘The Digital Provide: Information (Technology), Market Performance and Welfare 
in the South Indian Fisheries Sector,’ (2007) 122 (3) Q J Econ, 879-924  
314 For an in-depth discussion of connective issues see Kenneth Keniston & Deepak Kumar (eds), IT 
Experience in India: Bridging the Digital Divide (Sage, India 2004) 
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3.2.1.4.Use of digital technologies  
 
While there are general parallels in the use of digital technologies across the world, 
and the UK and India, there are also vast differences in use of these technologies. 
This is examined below in the context of computers, the Internet and mobile phones.  
A single individual in the UK often owns a multiplicity of digital devices; and these 
devices, like computers, laptops, PDA’s and mobile phones315 are perceived, 
characterised and used as personal objects. Conditions like the wide, easy availability 
and affordability of these devices in the UK facilitates and promotes this culture and 
practice. On the other hand, in India, computers, laptops and even mobile phones are 
not as widely or easily available, affordable or used as ‘personal’ objects. This makes 
them more exposed to being shared316 (though this is not the only motivation behind 
shared use of digital technologies). Three studies support this contention. 
 
The first is Miller’s study on computer and Internet usage in a village in South 
India.317 The study highlights how several residents of an area visit an electrician’s 
home and use his computer to send emails, surf the web, download material and 
entertain themselves. The electrician functions as a digital service provider who 
shares his digital resources with his fellow villagers who are not as fortunate in 
having access to the digital resources available to him. The computer functions as a 
communal resource that enables many individuals to use digital technology and 
express their digital identities.  
 
The second study is that of Seshagiri, Aman and Joshi, conducted in a village in the 
Chamrajanagar district of Karnataka, India.318  The study aimed to “understand the 
rural communication environment and villagers’ communication preferences” in 
relation to mobile phones.  It found that where mobiles and landlines were limited in 
                                                 
315 Even if these technologies are shared, this would be very limited in comparison to the practice in 
India. The mobile phone is particular is viewed as a highly personal means of private communication 
between individuals. See Maren Hartmann, P Rössler and JR Höflich, After the Mobile Phone? Social 
Changes and the Development of Mobile Communication (Frank and Timme, Berlin 2008), 35 
316 A Pentland, R Fletcher and A Hasson, ‘Dak Net: Rethinking Connectivity in Developing Nations,’ 
IEEE Computer Society, (January 2004), 78 – 83; Rekha Jain, ‘The Telecoms Sector: India 
Infrastructure Report 2001,’ <http://www.iitk.ac.in/3inetwork/html/reports/IIR2001/iir8.pdf> 
317 Eric Miller, ‘Wireless Internet Access in Rural South India’ (December 2000) 
<http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/~emiller/report.html> 
318 Seshagiri (2007) n312, 855-862 
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availability due to their costs, they became shared devices. The sharing occurred 
between family members, close friends and even acquaintances.319 
 
The third study, conducted by Chittamuru,320  was a qualitative study on the use of 
mobile phones by children in the villages of Kanaar and Gulab Kheda, in Uttar 
Pradesh, India. A number of key observations were made,321 one of which was in 
respect of the shared use of digital technologies. A mobile given for the exclusive use 
of a female child was taken away by her brother and used by him for his own ends 
(he even put his own name on it). Her phone functioned as a communal 
communication instrument.”322  In cases where the female child objected to such use, 
she was asked by her family to defer to her brother’s wishes. Here, a social norm 
affects the female child’s ability to effectively experience and enjoy her digital 
identity. That the sharing of digital identity devices like mobile phones is common in 
India323 and affected by social norms is also supported by Konkka’s research on 
mobile usability in Mumbai.324 This study distinguishes Indian mobile phone use 
from Western phone use and outlines how mobile use in India is commonly 
characterised by the sharing of devices and calls.  
 
Thus, there is evidence of local difference in the experience and use of digital 
identity technologies between the UK and India. These are crucial to and have far 
reaching implications for digital identity, its management and regulation.  
 
 
                                                 
319 It was reported that there were only 7 mobile phones in the village with 160 households.  
320 Deepti Chittamuru, ‘Millee: Social Dynamics Of Mobile Phone Use By Children In Rural India,’ 
Capstone Project Paper (Spring 2009), 
<http://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/files/student_projects/MILLEE-
_SOCIAL_DYNAMICS_OF_MOBILE_PHONE_USE.pdf> 
321 For full details, see study. 
322 Manuel Castells, M Fernandez-Ardevol, JL Qiu and A Sey, Mobile Communication and Society: A 
Global Perspective (MIT Press, Cambridge 2007), 64 
323 See AL Chavan, ‘A Dramatic Day in the Life of a Shared Indian Mobile Phone,’ in NM Aykin 
(ed), Usability and Internationalization: HCI and Culture, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
4559/2007, (Springer 2007, New York), 19-26 
324 K Konkka, ‘Indian Needs: Cultural End-user Research in Mombai,’ in C Lindhom, T Keinonen,  & 
H Kiljander, (eds), Mobile Usability: How Nokia Changed the Face of the Mobile Phone (McGraw-
Hill, New York 2003), 97-112 
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3.2.2. The influence of culture: Attitudes, Social Values, Norms and 
Practices  
 
The UK and India are culturally distinct when compared to one another. Though both 
have sub-cultures (for instance, UK has English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish, and India 
has a vast diversity manifest in varied customs, traditions, social practices, languages 
etc), they each have overall core national cultures325 that set them apart from each 
other. This is proved extensively in the studies of Hofstede326 and Trompenaars and 
Hampden Turner.327 
 
Hofstede328 classified national cultures according to four dimensions: power 
distance,329 uncertainty avoidance,330 individualism331 and masculinity.332  
Hofstede’s study333 revealed that India has high levels of power distance (indicative 
of high levels of inequality of power and wealth inequalities), very low levels of 
uncertainty avoidance, low levels of individualism and high levels of masculinity. 
Comparatively, the UK was found to have low power distance, nearly equal levels of 
uncertainty avoidance, extremely high levels of individualism and low levels of 
                                                 
325 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Signet Press, Calcutta 1946);  R Ramanathan, 
‘Globalisation, Values and Democracy,’ (February 2004) 
<http://www.indiatogether.org/2004/feb/opi-values.htm> 
326 Hofstede (1980) n28; Hofstede (1994) n28, 13-15 
327 Hampden-Turner (1997) n28 
328 Hofstede (1980) n28 
329 Denoting “the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the 
family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally.” 
330 Denoting “society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity; it ultimately refers to man's search for 
Truth.” 
331 Characterised by loose individual ties in society. 
332 Meaning gender based role distribution.  
333 Hofstede has his critics. See L Goodstein, ‘Do American Theories Apply Abroad: American 
Business Values and Cultural Imperialism,’ Commentary, (Summer1981), Organizational Dynamics, 
49-54;  J Hunt, ‘Do American Theories Apply Abroad: Applying American Behavioural Science, 
Some Cross Cultural Problems,’ (Summer 1981) Organizational Dynamics, 55-62; K Roberts and N 
Boyacigiller, ‘Cross-national Organizational Research: The Grasp of the Blind Men,’ (1984) 6 
Research in Organizational Behaviour, 423-475; DR Fernandez, DS Carlson, LP Stepina, and JD 
Nicholson, ‘Hofstede’s Country Classification 25 Years Later,’ (1997) 137 (1) The Journal of Social 
Psychology, 43-54. Yet, his findings are still internationally relevant, accepted and used in 
international multi-disciplinary research. Schuman in particular cites several reasons for the wide 
acceptance of his work: profound empirical foundation, theoretical foundation and external validity, 
its external validity in different disciplines. JH Schumann, The Impact of Culture on Relationship 
Marketing in International Services:A Target Group-Specific Analysis in the Context of Banking 
Services (Deustche Nationalbibliothek, Munchen 2009), 58;  Wolfgang Messner, A Hendel, F Thun, 
‘Rightshore,’ in Wolfgang Messner (ed), Intercultural Aspects of Project Management in India 
(Springer, Berlin 2008), 101-120; Aaron Marcus, ‘Global and Intercultural User Interface Design,’ in 
JA Jacko and A Sears (eds), The Human Computer Interaction Handbook (LEA Publishers, NJ 2003), 
441-463 
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masculinity. The UK is, thus, a society in which “ties between individuals are 
loose.”334 India on the other hand, is a society in which the ties between individuals 
are strong, cohesive, integrative and lifelong.335 
 
Cultural differences between the UK and India were also identified by Trompenaars 
and Hamden Turner336 in relation to various dimensions: universalism and 
particularism (rules and relationships), communitarianism and individualism, 
affectivity and neutrality (displaying and concealing emotions), specificity and 
diffusion (connected to Hall’s low and high context), 337 achievement and ascription 
(what one does and who one is), inner and outer direction and sequential and 
synchronic time. Their study demonstrated that the UK is a highly universalist and 
individualist national culture – one where there is a greater tendency to focus on 
rules and perceive the group interests largely in terms of achieving their own 
individual interests. India was found to be a particularist and communitarian culture 
which meant a tendency to focus more on relationships and view individual interests 
as largely allied or dependent on group interests. 
 
In addition to this, other research argues and demonstrates that there is significant 
cultural difference between the UK and India. For instance, Dumont,338 Cohn,339 
Triandis 340 and Kakar.341 Despite, all this, this chapter does not take these for a 
given. In keeping with Capurro’s exhortation, to not just  
… compare similar or dissimilar concepts by juxtaposing them, or to look for 
a conceptual or even moral consensus – but to become aware of our mutual 
                                                 
334 Hofstede (1994) n28, 51 
335 Hofstede (1994) n28, 51 
336 Hampden-Turner (1997) n28 
337 ET Hall, Beyond Culture (Bantam Doubleday, NY 1997) 
338 See L Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and its Implications (U Chicago Press, US 
1970), 8-9 
339 BS Cohn, ‘The Census, Social Structure and Objectification in South Asia,’ in BS Cohn, An 
Anthropologist Among Historians and Other Essays (OUP, New Delhi 1987), 224-254. 
340 HC Triandis, R Bontempo, MJ Villareal, M Asai, N Lucca, ‘Individualism and Collectivism: 
Cross-cultural Perspectives on Self-ingroup Relationships,’ (1988) 54 (2) Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 323-338 
341 S Kakar, The Inner World: A Psycho-Analytic Study of Childhood and Society in India (OUP, 
Delhi 1981), 37; BK Ramanujam, ‘Toward Maturity: Problems of Identity Seen in the Indian Clinical 
Setting,’ in S Kakar (ed.) Identity and Adulthood (OUP, 1979), 37-55, 54 
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biases on the basis of a nuanced understanding of similarities and 
dissimilarities beyond the simple dichotomy between ‘‘East’’ and ‘‘West,’’342 
 
it examines for itself how local difference manifests in the cultural context in 
principal digital identity contexts like privacy, information sharing, communal use of 
personal information, authentication and verification, openness and transparency and 
anonymity and pseudonymity.  
3.2.2.1.Privacy: Expectations, architecture and norms 
 
Privacy is as much a cultural concept (it is generally recognised as having western 
roots) as it is a legal one.343 It is interpreted differently in different countries and 
assumes different connotations.344 For instance, there are fundamental differences in 
the philosophy of privacy of the United States and the European Union.345 Whitman 
cites as an example the public disclosures in the Monica Lewinsky scandal that 
confounded European privacy sensibilities.346 Even within these major blocks there 
are internal differences.347 Privacy for individuals in the UK connotes something 
different from what it would for individuals in India. 348  It is stated that the British 
(and particularly the English), “are very reserved, private people for the most 
part.”349 The converse is stated of Indians.350 Even the conception of what is private 
and what constitutes private space has much conceptual and practical distinction in 
the two countries.  
 
                                                 
342 R Capurro, ‘Privacy: An Intercultural Perspective,’ (2005) 7 Ethics and Information Technology, 
37-47. 
343 David Lyon, Surveillance Studies: An Overview (Polity Press, US 2007) 
344 RC Post, ‘Three Concepts of Privacy’ (2001) 89 Geo. LJ, 2087   
345 D Heisenberg and M-H Fandel, ‘Projecting EU Regimes Abroad: The EU Data Protection 
Directive as Global Standard,’ Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts (28 August 2002) 
<http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65517_index.html> 
346 See JQ Whitman, ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,” (2004) 113 
Yale Law Journal 1151, citing ‘Le Recours à l'Intimité est de Règle aux Etats-Unis, Le Monde (22 
Avril 2002); Jacques Lassaussois, ‘Procès Clinton : Où va la Justice Américaine? Gazette du Palais, 
(18-19 March 1998) 
347 Reiterated in JA Cannataci, ‘Privacy, Technology Law and Religions Across Cultures,’ 2009 (1) 
JILT,  <http://go.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/2009_1/cannataci> 
348 This is substantiated by Westin’s comments in regard to the differential nature of national cultures 
of privacy. He stated that England was characterised by “a greater personal reserve between 
Englishmen, high personal privacy in home and private associations, and a faith in government that 
bestows major areas of privacy for government operations. AF Westin, Privacy and Freedom 
(Atheneum Press, NY 1967), 26-27 
349 Kevin Myers, ‘English Character and Identity,’ in Gary Taylor and Steve Spencer (eds), Social 
Identities: Multidisciplinary Approaches (Routledge, Oxon 2004), 129-144, 131; J Oakland, British 
Civilization: An Introduction, (Routledge, London 1998), 66; AM Sabath, International Business 
Etiquette: Europe (Career Press, USA 2005), 63  
350 Wolfgang Messner, Working with India (Springer-Verlag, Berlin 2008), 118; Craig Storti, Bridging 
the Communication Gap When Working with Indians (Intercultural Press, USA 2007), 20 
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Privacy differences in the two countries are comparatively analysed next in respect 
of expectations, living architecture and norms. This is particularly relevant to 
holistically understand local difference as recommended by the report prepared for 
the Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for Justice, 
Freedom and Security.351  
 
3.2.2.1.1. Expectations  
 
Privacy differs in the expectations people of different countries have of it.352 This is 
confirmed by Nouwt, de Vries and Loermans,353 and is not unusual given the 
subjective nature of privacy. In this light, privacy expectations in the UK would 
demonstrate variance from privacy expectations in the India.  
 
While there is no empirical research comparing the UK and India in respect of 
privacy expectations, there is research showing that Indian privacy perceptions differ 
from those in the digitally advanced West. Kumaraguru, Cranor and Newton’s 
interview study on privacy perceptions investigated the differences in privacy 
perceptions between the US and India.354 The Indian respondents in the study 
visualised privacy primarily in terms of personal space while the US respondents 
visualised privacy more in terms of their personal information. 61 percent of the US 
respondents made a connection between privacy and personal information control 
while only 14 percent of the Indian respondents made a similar connection. 48 per 
cent of the Indian respondents connected privacy to their physical, home and living 
space. Correspondingly, only 18 percent of US respondents related privacy to these. 
The study thus affirms that privacy expectations between countries vary. 
 
                                                 
351 CRID (University of Namur), First Analysis of the Personal Data protection Law in India, Report 
delivered in the Framework of Contract JLS/C4/2005/15 between CRID and the Directorate General 
Justice, Freedom and Security 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/studies/final_report_india_en.pdf> 
352 A point also made by DJ Solove, Understanding Privacy (HUP, Cambridge 2008), 75; Sandra S 
Petronio, Boundaries of Privacy: Dialectics of Disclosure (SUNY Press: Albany 2002), 223  
353 Sjaak Nouwt, BR de Vries and R Loermans, ‘Analysis of the Country Reports,’ in Sjaak Nouwt, 
BR de Vries & C Prins (eds), Reasonable Expectations of Privacy? Eleven Country Reports on 
Camera Surveillance and Workplace Privacy (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2005), 352  
354 P Kumaraguru, L Cranor and E Newton, ‘Privacy Perceptions in India and the United States: An 
Interview Study,’ 33rd Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy, The 
National Center for Technology and Law, George Mason University School of Law, USA, (23 -25 




Life in general constructs the norms of privacy. The life environment of an 
individual has significant impact on privacy, and how it manifests itself.  
 
Though the UK is one of the most densely populated countries in Europe, in 
comparison to India, which at the time of writing is the second largest populated 
country in the world, physical living conditions in the UK are highly advantageous to 
privacy. On average, people in the UK occupy 44 square metres of dwelling space,355 
with 2.3 persons per dwelling.356 There are a high number of single person 
households,357 with only 7 percent of households in the UK comprising of more than 
four persons.358 Individuals live in conditions that favour the exercise of personal 
privacy as against other individuals or the rest of the world by default. 
 
On the other hand, living conditions in India on the whole are unfavourable to 
privacy, particularly personal privacy.359 In 2008, the NSSO survey reported that 
around 32 percent of houses in urban areas were 258 square feet or less in area, with 
an average household size of 4.3 persons. 39 percent of rural houses were 312 square 
feet or under with an average household size 4.8 persons. Individuals live in cramped 
quarters which they share with many others and this affects how they live, sleep, eat, 
and conduct other social activities.360  
 
It is not just household space that makes privacy difficult to exercise. In villages, 
houses are often built in close proximity, with materials like mud or thatch that do 
not afford effective separation from the community. This is in vast contrast to the 
                                                 
355 For owner occupied homes, 46m2 and social housing, 36m2. Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 
‘English House Condition Survey, 2001: Building the Picture,’ (ODPM, London 2003). 
356 See 2001 Census. 
357 Office for National Statistics, Social Trends 34: National Statistics (The Stationery Office, London 
2004) 
358 Katie Williams, ‘Space Per Person in the UK: A Review of Densities, Trends, Experiences and 
Optimum Levels,’ Review, (2009), 26S Land Use Policy, S83–S92, S85 
359 CAK Yesudian, Health Services Utilisation in Urban India: A Study (Mittal Publications, Delhi 
1988), 94; M Soundarapandian, Literacy Campaign in India (Discovery Publications, New Delhi 
2000), 119; Kathleen Gough, Rural Society in South East India (CUP, UK 1981), 159, 282; AC 
Mayer, Caste and Kinship in Central India (University of California Press, Berkeley 1960), 16 
360 See Atul Thakur, ‘33% of Indians Live in Less Space than US Prisoners,’ The Economic Times,  
(25 November 2008) <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/PoliticsNation/33-of-Indians-live-
in-less-space-than-US-prisoners/articleshow/3754519.cms> 
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UK, and means that individuals in India do not generally have an established 
privilege of exercising personal privacy against other individuals or the rest of the 
world by default.  
 
Despite nuclear families becoming fashionable in India, joint families are 
widespread.361 In joint families, “members of a unilineal descent group (a group in 
which descent through either the female or the male line is emphasized) live together 
with their spouses and offspring in one homestead and under the authority of one of 
the members.”362  Even outwith the joint family system, a large number of people 
live in crowded family clusters. Particularly in rural areas large families are 
prevalent. These offer little to encourage privacy, as expressed in Adiga’s White 
Tiger: “I shake my brother Kishan’s legs off my tummy, move my cousin Pappu’s 
palm out of my hair, and extricate myself from the sleepers.”363 
 
Now place the use of digital identity technologies in the context of these 
architectures. Let’s take the case of a home computer, shared by many individuals 
living under the same roof. The home computer is accessed in full public view of 
one’s family, perhaps with someone looking constantly over one’s shoulder. The 
computer might even be accessed by two or more members of the family at the same 
time, 364 as depicted below: 
 
Fig 4: Shared computer access365 
                                                 
361 Raghuvir Sinha, Dynamics of Change in the Modern Hindu Family (AKMC, New Delhi 1993), 22 
362 Encyclopædia Britannica, ‘Joint family,’ 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/305637/joint-family> 
363 A Adiga, The White Tiger (Atlantic Books, London 2008), 21  
364 Ann Hsieh, Todd Hausman and Nerija Titus, ‘Influencers and Their Barriers to Technology,’ in 
Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on World Wide Web (WWW '08) (ACM, NY 2008), 
1103-1104 
365 Image courtesy: Outlook India, <http://www.outlookindia.com/images/computer_20080505.jpg> 
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Thus, the architectures of living in India do not augur well for the privacy of digital 
identity, as compared to the UK. 
 
3.2.2.1.3. Norms  
 
Privacy, though expressed restrictively, as a norm, is not entirely absent in India. It is 
a well established principle in relation to the human body and certain acts in relation 
to it.  
 
The human body (particularly the female) is considered sacred and worthy of 
privacy.366 Violation of bodily privacy particularly in respect of the intimate zones is 
frowned upon and draws social censure. For instance, as demonstrated by the 
Soman-Sapre incident. Models Madhu Sapre and Milind Soman posed nude in an 
advertisement for Tuff shoes wearing only a python between them. Extensive 
protests followed and charges were levelled against them for obscenity and indecent 
representation of women.367 The exposure of the intimate parts of the human body 
was considered a violation of the privacy interest in the body and contrary to social 
norms. 
 
Privacy is also established in terms of protecting the honour and dignity of 
women.368 Many women in India (particularly Hindu and Muslim) wear a veil to 
shield themselves from the public gaze, particularly outside their intimate family or 
kinship circles. Women are careful about exposing cleavage and upper legs.369 
Women wear saris (ankle length) with its pallu (part that drapes over shoulders and 
can be used to cover head), salwar-kameez’s with a dupatta that covers the bosom 
and head, lehngas in Rajasthan (again ankle length) with an odhni (long scarf). 
Clothing, here, functions as a privacy norm enabler. In cases where this norm is 
                                                 
366 There is some religious basis for this. Hinduism, for instance, reveres bodily sanctity and privacy. 
This is evident in the account of Goddess Parvathi taking active steps to protect her bodily privacy in 
Shiva Purana, Rudra 13.15-37, 17.3-59. See Carl Olson, The Many Colours of Hinduism (Rutgers 
University Press, NJ 2007), 225  
367 Nitasha Natu, ‘Tuff Shoes Case: Madhu, Milind Plead Not Guilty,’ Times of India (29 October 
2004) <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/903786.cms> 
368 This cultural concern is also reflected in law. See Chs 5 (5.2.2.1.2)  & 6 ( 6.3.1.2) 
369 There are exceptions to this rule, particularly in urban areas where Western fashion has made an 
impact and attitudes are more liberal. Other exceptions can be found in tribal areas where social norms 
permit such trends. 
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disregarded, consequences result (e.g. harassment of women who wear skimpy 
clothing).370 
 
Another aspect where privacy norms strongly apply in India, are public displays of 
affection between the sexes.371 Such displays are considered part of the private 
realm.372 For instance, kissing in public (between a male and female) is considered 
alien to culture, “western” and “against sanskar.”373 When actor Richard Gere 
publicly kissed actress Shilpa Shetty at an AIDS awareness rally, it resulted in public 
outrage and criminal complaints being filed against him.374 Though this practice is 
gaining acceptance, it remains largely restricted by social censure,375 as evident in 
the following statement: 
In our customs, we are an open society and holding hands is no problem, but 
kissing in public we do not entertain at all.376 
 
This is despite the Supreme Court of India377  and other courts378 ruling that public 
kissing by a married couple does not amount to an obscenity. Even in India’s popular 
movie culture, kissing scenes were prohibited from depiction until around 2000- 
based on unwritten rules of traditional culture,379 a world where kissing, “belongs to 
the realm of the private.”380  
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So, though there are norms of privacy in Indian culture, they are expressed in what 
might be termed from the Western point of view, a highly conservative 
conceptualisation of privacy (though the Indian digital identity subject would not see 
it thus). An Indian digital identity subject would be bound by principle and more 
likely to protect privacy in the terms of the norms he or she is familiar with (e.g. 
protection of bodily privacy and female modesty) and not those he or she is 
unfamiliar with, in particular not as an aggressive assertion of a right towards other 
community members.  
 
There is strong culture and practice of privacy in the UK. People are generally aware, 
conscious and act upon their privacy interests. On the other hand, in India there is no 
parallel awareness, consciousness and action upon similar privacy interests. Privacy 
has rather a limited connotation here, and this then feeds into how Indian digital 
identity subjects relate to their digital identity. It might be the reason why the 
digitally advanced West perceives privacy as a key aspect of digital identity and the 
why this is not the case in India where digital identity subjects seem relatively lax 
about the privacy of their digital identity. 
 
The above analysis shows that there are clear differences in privacy expectations, 
architecture and norms between the UK and India which ultimately feed into an 
individual’s relationship with his digital identity and how digital identity is 
experienced, used and regulated. 
 
3.2.2.2.Information sharing  
 
Culture also affects attitudes and treatment of personal information.381 Therefore, 
attitudes to and the treatment of personal information vary from society to society. 
Here we take as a given that different cultures conceptualise what constitutes 
personal information differently.  
 
                                                 
381 See DL Stone and EF Stone-Romero, The Influence of Culture on Human Resource Processes and 
Management (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah 2007) 
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This is highly significant for the study of the legal regulation of digital identity 
because it then teaches us about why different societies differently relate, deal and 
regulate such personal information.  It also advances our information of how digital 
identity subjects relate to and deal with their personal information. Let’s therefore 
examine how local difference in culture affects personal information.  
 
In some societies, large amounts of personal information ordinarily reside in the 
private sphere, unless it is by necessity or consent thrust into the public sphere. 
Personal information here could refer to name, address and telephone number, sex, 
age, occupation, salary, nationality, photographs, or records (e.g. medical, financial). 
There is a general acknowledgement and respect for the privacy of such personal 
information which is fostered by the manner in which such a society is structured and 
operates. As a general rule, people are cautious about whether, with who and what 
personal information (or personal data) is shared.382 Active steps are generally taken 
to protect and safeguard it. Society, in its different elements, encourages such a norm 
through purely social, technical, legal (e.g. privacy and data protection law) or a 
blend of different measures. The UK is an example of a society where personal 
information and personal data and is largely resident in the private sphere and is 
consequently discriminately distributed.383 Thus personal information and data 
attains ‘gated’ or ‘walled’ dimensions. 
 
On the other hand, there are other societies like India, where by default, and as 
demonstrated before, large amounts of personal information ordinarily resides in the 
shared or public sphere,384 as opposed to being ‘walled’ or ‘gated’ within the private 
sphere. Information or data is generally freely, widely accessible and viewed as part 
of the collective commons. Individuals in the social and cultural context are not 
generally viewed as having autonomy over any information or data that relates to, 
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<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/icm_res
earch_into_personal_information_feb08.pdf> 
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identifies, authenticates or verifies them. Personal information is not viewed and 
does not manifest itself as the personal property of an individual, rather more often as 
a shared communal resource, that only has relevance in this context.  
The architecture of life, particularly in villages in India which are close knit 
communities, facilitates the sharing of personal information. The following quote 
from R K Narayan’s, The Man Eater of Malgudi sets the context: 
Our postman, Thanappa, whom we had known as children, old enough to 
have retired twice over but somehow still in service, was my first visitor for 
the day… At his favourite corners, he spread out his letters and bags and 
packets and sat down to a full discussion of family and social matters; he 
served as a live link between several families, carrying information from 
house to house...385 
 
Villagers often resort to the use of common facilities like the village playing field, 
pond, grazing grounds, religious places, schools and sheltered spaces under trees to 
share information of all kinds (including information of highly personal and sensitive 
nature). Even family courtyards and balconies are spaces that facilitate the casual and 
routine sharing of personal information.  
 
This trend is reflected in the behaviour of Indian digital identity subjects online, 
particularly on social networking sites386 and even other digital information systems. 
For example, as happened when the VoiKiosk387 was tested in an agricultural village 
called Juvvala Palam in South India.388 Even though personal information and data 
sharing or social networking was not the primary use of the VoiKiosk, villagers used 
the VoiKiosk for precisely for these purposes: An eight grade student introduced 
himself and shared his mobile number. A man uploaded his personal profile so he 
could find a wife. Both instances demonstrate how open and unperturbed people are 
about sharing their personal data or information.389 
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Personal information also has a wider circle of coverage in relation to who is privy to 
it in India, than in the UK. The dynamic Indian joint family tradition and close knit 
social structure contributes to this. This is highlighted by Kumaraguru and Cranor, 
who reveal how the dynamic and Indian joint family tradition and social structure 
“results in more routine sharing of personal information among a wider group of 
people” and “information that might typically be disclosed only to one’s spouse or 
parents in the US is more frequently shared among uncles, aunts, and cousins in 
India.”390  
 
Even sensitive personal information like medical information is treated differently. In 
the UK, the privacy of medical information is a given and respected as such; not so 
in India. For instance, if a person falls sick in India, that fact becomes public 
information as it gets communicated from family to kin, friends, acquaintances and 
even the wider community with or without the consent of the concerned individual. 
Even if one wants to shield this information, it is practically impossible, due to the 
nature and manner of social relations. In fact, the hiding or shielding of such 
information could lead to breakdown of social relations (e.g. ties between two 
families could break where one conceals information from the other). This is 
symbolic of the collectivist nature of Indian society that places a high premium on 
sharing personal information within and between groups.  
 
In the UK, according to established social norms, the individual to whom the medical 
information relates has a choice of disclosing the information, and is aided by social 
rules that facilitate this. Even where the sharing of information relating to such 
medical conditions occurs, it is often based upon consent of the individual to whom 
the information relates.  
 
Let’s explore this further in the context of medical data. In the UK, there is a general 
recognition that a person attending a medical facility has an expectation of privacy in 
their medical data.391 The main findings of research conducted by the NHS 
                                                 
390 Kumaraguru (2005) n354 
391 See the DH/IPU/Patient Confidentiality, ‘NHS Confidentiality Code of Practice,’ (November 
2003) § 10, 
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Information Authority support this contention.392 People trusted the NHS to protect 
the privacy of their personal data. They expressed concern about who was entitled to 
use their data and whether it would be anonymised before further use. They also 
expressed that any information released beyond the base necessary requirement 
(release and sharing with GP’s, hospital doctors and emergency personnel) should 
only be on a need-to-know basis.393  
 
The current norms in respect of medical data (prompted by need and law of data 
protection), in the UK favour a “cautious approach towards the use and disclosure of 
patient data.”394 This is evident in a number of places. 
 
The NHS Confidentiality Code of Practice395 sets out a confidentiality model to be 
followed in respect of patients’ identifiable information.396 The Model advocates the 
following: the protection of a patient’s information, ensuring that patients are aware 
of how their information is used, allowing patients the ability to decide whether their 
information can be disclosed or used in particular manners, and the need to improve 
on ways to protect, inform and provide choice. 
 
The General Medical Council (GMC) guidance on Confidentiality397 is another 
example. The Guidance, amongst other things, advises personal information may be 
disclosed only if (a) it is required by law, (b) the patient consents – either implicitly 
for the sake of their own care or expressly for other purposes and (c) it is justified in 
                                                                                                                                          
<http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/d
h_4069254.pdf>; B Gross, ‘Information Sharing Within and Outwith the NHS,’ CSAGS Secretariat, 
(30 November 2000) § 1 <http://www.csags.scot.nhs.uk/Meeting%20Papers/CSAGS%202000-
03.PDF> 
392 NHS Information Authority, The Consumers’ Association and Health Which, ‘Share with Care: 
People’s Views on Consent and Confidentiality of Patient Information,’ Final Report (October 2002) 
<http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/resources/archive/share_with_care.pdf> 
393 Ibid, 10 
394 ICO, ‘Use and Disclosure of Health Data: Guidance on the Application of the Data Protection Act 
1998’ (May 2002) 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/practical_application/health_data_-
_use_and_disclosure001.pdf> 
395 DH/IPU/Patient Confidentiality (2003) n391 
396 This includes: patient’s name, address, full post code, date of birth; pictures, photographs, videos, 
audio-tapes or other images of patients; NHS number and local patient identifiable codes; and 
anything else that may be used to identify a patient directly or indirectly.  
397 GMC, ‘Confidentiality, Guidance for Doctors,’ (12 October 2009) <http://www.gmc-
uk.org/static/documents/content/Confidentiality_core_2009.pdf> 
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the public interest.398 It further maintains that if information about a patient is 
disclosed, then it must be anonymised or coded.399 Doctors must ensure that the 
patient is aware that their personal information might be disclosed and is given a 
chance to object.400 If identifiable information is to be disclosed for purposes other 
than a patient’s care or local clinical audit, then unless the disclosure is required by 
law or can be justified in the public interest, the patient must have expressly 
consented to such disclosure and the disclosure is required to be kept to the minimum 
necessary.401  
 
Further, the Guidance provides that doctors must ensure that patients’ personal 
information held or controlled by them is “effectively protected at all times against 
improper disclosure.”402 Also, expressly cautioned against is the sharing of 
identifiable information about patients where doctors may be overheard (e.g. in 
public places or Internet chat forums), sharing of passwords, leaving unattended 
patients’ records (on or off screen) where they may be seen by other patients, 
unauthorised healthcare staff, or the public.403 
 
More importantly, the Guidance also advocates the privacy of medical data and 
information in respect of it being shared with a patient’s partner, carers, relatives or 
friends. Principle 64 provides that doctors must “establish with the patient what 
information they want you to share, who with, and in what circumstances,” to ensure 
that a patient’s need to keep their medical data and information private is assured. 
This establishes and confirms a default culture of non-sharing of information of 
highly sensitive nature – in this case medical data. 
 
In the case of India, the situation is entirely different. There is routine, discriminate 
sharing of personal medical information and data in both public and private hospitals. 
Nagral recounts how in  
                                                 
398 Principle 8 
399 Principle 9 (a) 
400 Principle 9 (b) 
401 Principle 9 (d) 
402 Principle 12  
403 Principle 13 
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outpatient departments and operation theatres patients are forced to share all 
their unpleasant personal details not only with the doctor interviewing them 
but also with other doctors sitting across the table and other patients being 
interviewed by other doctors.404 
 
Patients’ personal information is indiscriminately used in public academic meetings 
and published in academic journals. Also shown is how, at medical meetings in 
Mumbai, doctors often in discussions of sensitive medical conditions like AIDS, 
photos of identifiable individuals are shown with no attempts to shield identity.405  
There is also no privacy for patients in respect of their personal information being 
released to their partners, carers, relatives or friends (in sharp contrast to UK 
practice). 
 
Thus, it is evident that there are differences in the norms and conditions affecting the 
sharing of personal information (sensitive or otherwise) between the UK and India. 
 
3.2.2.3.Communal use of personal information 
 
It has been shown that privacy in terms of personal information exists very limitedly 
in India, and that personal information is habitually shared in manners far removed 
from the UK. In addition to this, there is another norm relevant to this research. This 
is the habitual communal use of personal information. The following examples 
illustrate this in the digital context.  
 
The first is Hansdehar, India’s first online knowledge village.406 The village website 
functions as a “web interface for all stakeholders involved in the development and 
upliftment of the village.” It has a comprehensive citizens’ directory, a list of voters 
and a pensioners list. The village itself is not connected to the Internet and the 
villagers cannot browse the Internet or access the website. Yet, their personal data 
(name, date of birth, age, occupation, sex) is openly accessible and available on the 
                                                 
404 A Nagral, ‘Privacy in Public Hospitals’ (1995) 3 (1) Indian Journal of Medical Ethics 
405 This despite the Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 
2002, s 7.14 which states that a registered medical practitioner shall not disclose the secrets of a 
patient learnt in the exercise of professional duties except in a court of law under orders of the 
Presiding Judge, in circumstances where there is a serious and identified risk to a specific person and / 
or community and notifiable diseases. See Gazette of India, Part III, s 4 (6 April 2002). 
406 See <http://www.smartvillages.org/hansdehar/people.htm> 
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website. The goal in putting this information online was the collective good of the 
village - identified in this case, as the progress of the village and development of its 
infrastructure. 
 
Here, the villagers have attained digital identities through their personal information 
being put online, in the interests of the collective good of the community. It is not 
known whether these villagers consented to the use of their personal information, 
though it is highly unlikely. Also, the question of consent might not arise because the 
information might not be viewed as ‘personal’ information in the strict sense of the 
term, as much of it exists in the public domain.  
 
The next is the On Line Reservation Chart Display System implemented in 
Vadodara.407 The system displays, on LCD screens at the Vadodara train station, 
online passenger reservation for a particular train. The screens broadcast passenger 
details – i.e., who is travelling, the status of their reservation, and the class of the 
train they will be travelling in. This is in keeping with the established trend of 
passengers’ personal information (names, age, gender, boarding station, destination, 
seat number, and passenger-name record number) being published as a matter of 
routine policy at train stations and outside the train compartments. Passengers in 
India surveyed on this practice were found to have very low levels of concern about 
such practices.408 Only 17 percent of Indian respondents expressed extreme concern 
over the posting, 23 percent were somewhat concerned, while the rest were either not 
very concerned (34 percent) or not concerned at all (26 percent). 
 
The On Line Reservation Chart Display System is evidence of how habitually 
personal information is subject to public display by private or public entities 
providing services to individuals in India. Such uses of personal information have (as 
in the instant case) and will increasingly become part of the public domain in India. 
                                                 
407 Express News Service, ‘Computerised Chart Display System Arrives at Vadodara Railway 
Station,’ (23 February 2009) <http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/computerised-chart-display-
system-arrives-at-vadodara-railway-station/426910/> 
408 P Kumaraguru & L Cranor, ‘Privacy in India : Attitudes and Awareness” in G Danezis and D 
Martin (eds), Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 5th International Workshop, PET 2005, Cavtat 
Croatia (Springer, 2006) 
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This is very much evident in the case of the widespread availability of personal 
information of Indian voters online, in electoral voters lists published by State 
Commissions, fuelled by the need to publicise voter identities in the interests of 
ensuring the accuracy of voter identities and dissuading bogus voting.409 
 
3.2.2.4.Attitudes to authentication and verification  
 
Culture also impacts attitudes towards authentication and verification. This was 
substantiated in the context of biometric technology by Riley, Buckner, Johnson and 
Benyon.410 In this study,411 three countries were analysed: India, UK and South 
Africa.412  There were two key research questions: first, to determine how biometrics 
was perceived in Western and developing cultures and second, to investigate the 
concerns of people in developing countries towards biometrics. The survey 
categories related to: knowledge of biometrics, the usability and reliability 
perceptions of biometrics, the acceptability of biometrics, fears or concerns about the 
technology and demographic questions.  
 
The results were as follows. The Indian respondents led in their knowledge of 
biometrics, with South African respondents ranking second and the UK respondents 
ranking third. In relation to the perception of biometrics as a personal authentication 
mechanism (with regards to the use, speed of use and security of biometric 
technology), the Indian respondents gave biometrics the most positive rating while 
the British respondents gave it the least positive rating.413 The Indian respondents 
expressed greater willingness to use biometrics as a means of personal authentication 
as compared to their British counterparts who found the idea less acceptable than 
other forms of authentication (e.g. authentication by password).414 In regards to the 
                                                 
409 JK Chopra, Politics of Election Reforms in India (Mittal Publications, Delhi 1989), 160  
410 Chris Riley, K Buckner, G Johnson and D Benyon, ‘Culture & Biometrics: Regional Differences in 
the Perception of Biometric Authentication Technologies,’ (2009) 24 (3) AI & Soc, 295–306 
411 The study makes a relation to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.  
412 India was chosen as an Asian example with huge market potential for biometrics, South Africa for 
its cultural and geographical divergence to India and the UK as an example of a ‘developed European 
country.’  
413 Riley (2009) n410, 299 
414 Riley (2009) n410, 300 
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security of biometric information, the Indian and South African respondents were 
less concerned than the British.   
 
The study thus demonstrates differences across cultures in attitudes to biometrics. 
The Indian respondents generally displayed a more favourable attitude to biometrics 
as compared respondents from the UK (with the least favourable view). While a third 
of the Indian respondents were largely unconcerned about the use of biometric 
systems, the British respondents were highly concerned about how biometric systems 
would be used and what their privacy impact would be.415 In fact, privacy was a 
major concern of the British respondents in comparison to their Indian counterparts. 
The study broadly concluded that cultural differences had to be taken into account in 
the design and implementation of biometric systems. The results of this study are 
some evidence that local difference does affect how digital identity subjects relate to, 
experience and protect their digital identities - in this case their biometric identity.  
 
Culture also influences attitudes towards other types of digital identity like smart 
cards. Though there are no UK-India specific comparative studies, there are other 
international studies that support this contention. For example, Hsu, Davison and 
Stares416 and Bailey and Caidi.417 Bailey and Caidi analysed attitudes to smart cards 
in two different cultures: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the 
People’s Republic of China and Ontario, Canada. They concluded that cultural and 
lifestyle norms like the non-prevalence of anonymity in Hong Kong and the open and 
transparent relationship between the public and the government led to positive 
attitudes in Hong Kong, as opposed to the negative attitude to smart cards in 
Ontario.418 
 
The role of culture in the acceptance or rejection of means of identity authentication 
and verification is also evident in the comments made by the Privacy Commissioner 
                                                 
415 This was a major concern of the British respondents. Riley (2009) n410, 303.  
416 Carol Hsu, R Davison and S Stares, ‘Cultural Influences on Attitudes Towards Hong Kong's Smart 
Identity Card,’ PACIS 2004 Proceedings, (2004), <http://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2004/20> 
417 SGM Bailey and N Caidi, ‘How Much Is Too Little? Privacy and Smart Cards in Hong Kong and 
Ontario,’ (2005) 31 J of Info Sci, 354-364 
418 Bailey and Caidi (2005) n417, 356 
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of Italy in respect of identity cards and biometric identifiers. According to him, while 
identity cards were a part of Italian culture, but fingerprints as biometric identifier 
were not.419 Thus, a form of identification, authentication and verification well 
received in one country might not be in another due to local cultural rejection of it. 
 
There are of course at least two different manners in which the above findings could 
be understood. In the first interpretation, Western users are simply more aware of the 
inherent dangers of the abuse of their digital identity, more informed about the 
technology and its risks and hence more willing to pay a premium for its protection. 
Contrarily, Indian users may need education, awareness and ‘protection for their own 
good’ through technology or legal mechanisms, even if they currently experience this 
as protection of values they do not rate highly.  
 
In the second interpretation, Europe and India display here a true divergence in 
ranking contingent social values, with both rankings just as valid. In much of the 
previous debate on digital identity regulation, the first interpretation dominated. 
Technological solutions such as identity management systems and legal mechanisms 
like privacy rights were promoted as universal goods and western-driven initiatives 
to support developing countries exported them globally. The interpretation proposed 
here is more nuanced, and while it does not subscribe to a radical form of value 
relativism (impossible for a global communication medium), it tries to give 
differences in value rankings a stronger voice.  
 
3.2.2.5.Openness and transparency  
 
Culture also determines to a fair extent openness and transparency in relation to 
digital identity. This is particularly evident in respect of digital identity mediated on 
social networking websites. This is substantiated by a survey conducted on 
international differences in the use of social networking websites by university 
                                                 
419 See Communication by the Italian Privacy Commissioner in House of Commons Canada, ‘A 
National Identity Card for Canada?’ Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and 
Immigration (October 2003), 22 <http://oipc.bc.ca/pdfs/public/cimmrp06-e.pdf> 
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students in India and the United States.420 Some of the findings are particularly 
telling and supportive of the claim that local difference affects digital identity.421  
 
First, the study found that Indian students differ from their American counterparts in 
respect of the public and private nature of their profiles. 69.5 percent of the Indian 
students kept their profiles publicly visible while only a 28.6 percent (approximately 
a quarter) of American students did likewise. Second, in respect of making friends 
with unknown people (people not met before), it was found that 73.5 percent of the 
Indian students had online friends they had not met previously. In comparison, 77.5 
percent of American students had no online friends they had not met before. Third, 
the Indian students (25.4 percent) were far more communicative on social 
networking sites about health issues as compared to their American counterparts (8.9 
percent). These findings are particularly relevant to demonstrate that there are 
differences in how individuals mediate their digital identities- whether digital 
identities are open and transparent or closed and non-transparent.  
 
3.2.2.6.Anonymity and pseudonymity 
 
Local difference is also evident in digital anonymity and pseudonymity in the UK 
and India.  
 
In the digitally advanced West, anonymity and pseudonymity are generally accepted, 
particularly in the online context, as pillars of privacy and data protection that enable 
digital identity subjects have autonomy over their digital identities.422 In the US, the 
characterisation has been made that “anonymity rules”423 supported by the legal 
system. Fertik and Thompson call it the “culture of anonymity.”424 In the EU too, 
there is strong support for anonymity and pseudonymity as essential to the 
                                                 
420 BA Marshall and ors, ‘Social Networking Websites in India and the United States: A Cross-
National Comparison of Online Privacy And Communication’ (2008) 9 (2) Iss in Info Systems, 87-94 
421 245 Indian and 241 American university students were surveyed about their attitudes to privacy 
and communication patterns on social networking sites. 
422 See Pfitzmann (2008) n151; Stefanos Gritzalis, ‘Privacy Issues in the Digital Era,’ Guest Editorial,  
(2006) 16 (2) Internet Research, 117 
423 Michael Fertik, David Thompson, Wild West 2.0: How to Protect and Restore Your Online 
Reputation on the Untamed Social (Amacom, NY 2010), 61 
424 Fertik (2010) n423, 74 
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advancement of the digital identity subjects rights and the autonomy of the 
individual.425 
 
Anonymity and pseudonymity are often expressed in the digital identity context in 
the use of PETs.426 Though questions have been raised about their effectiveness in 
protecting digital identity,427 their usefulness is still widely accepted in the digitally 
advanced West.428 A survey of European data controllers found that nearly half the 
respondents (52 percent) used PETs in their organisation.429 The UK ICO also 
advocates the use of PETs.430   
 
The culture of privacy and data protection in the UK promotes the expression of 
anonymous and pseudonymous digital identities. The law too, supports the 
                                                 
425 See the Ministerial Declaration of the Ministerial Conference in Bonn on Global Information 
Networks, 6-8 July 1997;  EC Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data, Recommendation 3/97: Anonymity on the Internet, Adopted on 3 
December 1997, XV D /5022/97 final WP 6; Kokswijk (2007) n262, 210 
426 David Chaum, ‘Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses and Digital Pseudonyms,’ (1981) 
24 (2) Communications of the ACM, 84-90; David Chaum, ‘Security Without Identification: 
Transaction Systems to Make Big Brother Obsolete,’ (1985) 28 (10) Communications of the ACM, 
1030-1044; A Pfitzmann, M Waidner, ‘Networks Without User Observability: Design Options,’ in F 
Pichler (ed), Advances in Cryptology, EUROCRYPT '85: Proceedings of a Workshop on the Theory 
and Application of Cryptographic Techniques (Springer, Berlin 1986), 245-253; A Pfitzmann, B 
Pfitzmann and M Waidner, ‘ISDN-mixes: Untraceable Communication With Very Small Bandwidth 
Overhead’ in W Effelsberg, HW Meuer and G Müller (eds), Proceedings of the GI/ITG Conference on 
Communication in Distributed Systems (Springer, Germany 1991), 451-463; DM Goldschlag, MG 
Reed and PF Syverson, ‘Hiding Routing Information,’ in R Anderson (ed), Information Hiding 
(Springer, Berlin 1996), 137-150; J Camenisch and EV Herreweghen, ‘Design and Implementation of 
the idemix Anonymous Credential System,’ in V Atluri (ed), Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference 
on Computer and Communications Security CCS’02 (ACM Press, NY 2002), 21-30;  GW Blarkom,  J 
Borking and J Olk, Handbook of Privacy and Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (College bescherming 
persoonsgegevens, The Hague 2003) 
427 Felix Stalder, ‘The Failure of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) and the Voiding of 
Privacy,’ (2002) 7 (2) Sociological Research Online, 
<http://www.socresonline.org.uk/7/2/stalder.html> 
428 John Borking, ‘The Use and Value of Privacy-enhancing Technologies,’ in Susanne Lace (ed), The 
Glass Consumer: Life in a Surveillance Society (Policy Press, Bristol 2005), 69-98; John Borking and 
C Raab, ‘Laws, PETs and Other Technologies for Privacy Protection,’ 2001 (1) JILT 
<http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/01-1/borking.html; Vanja Senicar, Borka Jerman-Blazic and Tomaz 
Klobucar, ‘Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: Approaches and Development,’ (2003) 25 (2) Computer 
Standards & Interfaces, 147-158 
429 The Gallup Organisation, Data Protection in the EU: Data Controllers’ Perceptions (EC Flash 
Barometer No 226), Brussels (17 April 2008) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_226_en.pdf>. The survey involved 4,835 randomly-
selected data controllers in 27 EU Member States. 




expression of anonymous and pseudonymous digital identities to the extent that no 
illegal acts are committed.431 Digital identity subjects are aware of and use 
anonymous and pseudonymous services. They also employ more traditional means of 
expressing anonymity and pseudonymity like providing incorrect information in 
relation to their identities to shield them from discovery.432 
 
In India, the situation is complex. On the one hand, traditional culture offers robust 
support for anonymity and pseudonymity.433 Folklore and religion are full of 
examples of heroes or deities either intentionally hiding their true self to achieve a 
(more or less) praiseworthy goal, or, in the form of Avatars using different identities 
as a matter of course. Indeed, the most iconic expression of digital identity, the 
Avatar, is rooted in Hinduism.434 According to the Bhagavata Purana, the Lord 
Vishnu's Avatars are innumerable,435 and while the term is mostly used with relation 
to him, other deities like Ganesha436 and Shakti also have Avatars.437 
 
However, in the context of digital identity little recourse seems to be made to this 
religious archetype.  What seems more influential is the traditional tenet of ‘Self as 
Consciousness’ embodied in Book III, Part 1 of the Mundaka Upanishad438 which 
states,439  
By truthfulness,  
By restraint,  
Right knowledge, 
Austerity, 
                                                 
431 See First Report on the implementation of the Data Protection Directive, COM (2003) 265(01), (15 
May 2003), <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com2003_0265en01.pdf>; WP 37 
of the Article 29 Working Party, ‘Privacy on the Internet - An Integrated EU Approach to On-line 
Data Protection,’ (November 2000) 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/workingroup/wp2000/wpdocs00_en.htm> 
432 Ronald Leenes and Isabelle Oomen, ‘The Role of Citizens: What Can Dutch, Flemish and English 
Students Teach Us About Privacy,’ in S Gutwirth and ors (eds), Reinventing Data Protection 
(Springer Verlag, NY 2009), 149 
433 Rodrigues (2008) n278 
434 First used in the online context by Neal Stephenson in his novel Snow Crash (drawn from the 
Sanskrit Avatāra meaning an incarnation of a deity). 
435 G Somany, Vishnu and His Avatars, (Bookwise, India 2004) 
436 JA Grimes, Ganapati: Song of the Self (SUNY Press, Albany1995), 105 
437 Geoff Teece, Hinduism, (Franklin Watts, London 2003), 8 
438 The Upanishads are a key element of Vedic philosophy and the Mundaka Upanishad is one of the 
primary Upanishads derived from the Atharvaveda. 
439 Per A Jacobs, The Principal Upanishads: The Essential Philosophical Foundation of Hinduism 
(Watkins Publishing, London 2008), 162.  
 90 
The recognition of one’s own  
Self as Consciousness,  
Awareness and Love 
is gained, 
‘That’ which pure… 
 
According to this passage, an individual attains the highest level of fulfilment when 
the Self is consciously recognised. There is need for oneness with the Self, in the 
forms it manifests. Thus this leaves no scope for falsehoods, such as might be 
manifest in anonymity and pseudonymity.440 In the case that falsehoods are made, 
they are sign of individuality which would lead to the non-achievement of the 
Atman441 or the higher purpose of existence in Hinduism. 
 
This might be a factor that leads digital identity subjects in India to exercise 
anonymity and pseudonymity in digital identities, exceptionally and in a limited 
manner. It might also account for the general governance policy that does not 
advocate or promote the achievement of anonymity442 and pseudonymity443 in digital 
contexts-exemplified in the resistance to technologies that enhance these.444 For 
instance, the legal restrictions applicable in respect of cryptography,445 and the 
attempts by the Indian government to get Blackberry to enable access to its encrypted 
BlackBerry Enterprise Server email service.446  
 
                                                 
440 This is because falsehood fosters individuality or “ego centric personality.” See Swami 
Krishnananda, The Mundaka Upanishad, (Divine Life Society, Sivananda Ashram), 2 
<http://www.sankaracharya.org/library/mundaka.pdf> 
441 In Hindu philosophy, Atman refers to the true self. See Anmol Publications, The Encyclopedia of 
Hinduism (Anmol Publications, New Delhi 2000), 94 
442 Ch 6 (6.3.4.2) 
443 Ch 6 (6.3.5.2) 
444 N Shah, ‘Subject to Technology: Internet Pornography, Cyber-Terrorism and the Indian State,’ 
(2007) 8 (3) Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 349-366 
445 Nehaluddin Ahmad, ‘Restrictions on Cryptography in India: A Case Study of Encryption and 
Privacy’ (2009) 25 (2) CLSR, 173-180 
446 ‘India Gives BlackBerry More Time,’ The Telegraph (31 Aug 2010) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/blackberry/7972926/India-gives-BlackBerry-more-
time.html>. The government of India has also attempted similar moves with Google and Skype. S 
Sahu and R Guha, ‘India Wants to See Google, Skype Data,’ The Wall Street Journal (2 September 
2010). 
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The dichotomy between the two religious narratives447 allows us to exemplify the 
main argument of this thesis. Some legitimate identity concerns in India could be 
addressed by a more permissive use of avatars as multiple, pseudonymous online 
identities.448 This is presently ‘blocked’ also by the “self-as-consciousness” narrative 
cited above, and the more mundane power interests of the State that uses them.  Our 
approach can get traction, match local understandings and thus support, if it is 
embedded in the competing narrative of divine avatars that is suggested here as a 
tool to be pushed to rebalance risk allocation in digital interactions.  
 
However, these avatars are not a one-to-one translation of their popular MMORPG 
counterparts. Indeed, Stephenson’s use of the term has only superficial similarity 
with the meaning of the concept in Hinduism. Rather than an arbitrary collection of 
otherwise unconnected identities, avatars and their substratum are in a radical sense 
identical – manifestations of an underlying oneness rather than totally independent 
incarnations and diversity449  which therefore, in more pragmatic legal terms, can 
always be traced back to its underlying reality.  
 
Avatars in their religious origin are also ‘function specific.’ A central passage from 
the Bhagvadgita describes the typical role of an Avatar of Vishnu as bringer of 
dharma or righteousness back to a disturbed social order: 
Whenever righteousness wanes and unrighteousness increases I send myself 
forth. For the protection of the good and for the destruction of evil, and for 
the establishment of righteousness, I come into being age after age.450  
 
This moral imperative in the very definition of an Avatar bridges the gap between the 
more permissive use of avatars advocated here, and the moral ideal expressed in the 
Mundaka Upanishad. Avatars are only legitimate if embedded in a system of rightful 
                                                 
447The free expression of identities in Avatars and the ‘Self as Consciousness’ in the Mundaka 
Upanishad. 
448 By using the traditional religious concept of the Avatar as something designed to be moral, a 
legitimate use of pseudonymity can be found grounded in culture.  This use would carry limits and be 
grounded in the “collective interest” and hence subject to appropriate social and legal restrictions.  
449 Freda Matchett, Krsna: Lord or Avatara? The Relationship between Krsna and Vishnu (Curzon 
Press, Surrey 2001). In Christianity, the (heretical) doctrine of docetism comes closer to the meaning 
than a translation as incarnation. See EG Parrinder, Avatar and Incarnation (Oneworld Publications, 
London 1997), Ch 17, 240-250 
450 The Bhagvadgita, 4, 7–8 
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behaviour, their use is not an unfettered right, but coordinated with a complex set of 
duties and expectations. In chapter 8, this approach will be generalised further in a 
duty-centric notion for digital identities. What we can see in the Avatars example is 
how this can play out in protecting Indian identity subjects against threats to their 
digital identity while at the same time staying true to a well understood system of 




This chapter set forth the local context of digital identity, in two main respects: state 
of digital technology and culture.  
 
In the context of digital technology, there are vast differences between the UK and 
India in respect of the operating conditions, penetration, access and use. This, as will 
become evident as the thesis progresses, is highly relevant to how digital identities 
are managed and regulated. Regulation that works well in an environment of high 
penetration and high access is not necessarily suitable, and can even be 
counterproductive, in an environment marked by limited access, low penetration and 
infrequent use.  
 
In the context of culture, it is clear that culture (in the shape of attitudes, social 
values, norms and practices) influences how individuals relate to, express, use and 
protect their digital identities.451 This was demonstrated in various contexts (like 
privacy, information sharing, communal use of personal information, authentication 
and verification, openness and transparency, anonymity and pseudonymity) with 
suitable digital examples that show sharp contrasts between the UK and India 
 
 
                                                 
451 A view supported by Kendall who postulated that culture, amongst other things is a prominent 
factor in the formation of digital relationships. L Kendall, ‘Meaning and Identity in “Cyberspace”: 
The Performance of Gender, Class, and Race Online,’ (1998) 21 Symbolic Interaction, 129-53. 
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4. Digital identity management: The technical regulation of digital identity 
 
The Gileadites captured the fords of the Jordan leading to Ephraim, and whenever a 
survivor of Ephraim said, “Let me cross over,” the men of Gilead asked him, “Are 
you an Ephraimite?” If he replied, “No,” they said, “All right, say ‘Shibboleth.’” He 
said, “Sibboleth,” because he could not pronounce the word correctly, they seized 
him and killed him at the fords of the Jordan. Forty-two thousand Ephraimites were 
killed at that time. 
-Judges 12:5-6452 
 
Since the adorable sun-god, wind-god, the four quarters and even so the moon-god, 
as also the deity presiding over the day-time and the twilights and the night and the 
earth and even others know me to be endowed with good conduct, so let the fire-god 
protect me. Thus speaking, Seetha walking around the fire-god, with her mind free 
from hesitation, entered the blazing fire. Then, the fire-god, the witness of the whole 
world, spoke to Rama as follows "Here is your Seetha. No sin exists in her." "This 
auspicious lady, whose character has been good, has never been unfaithful to you 
who are endowed with strength of character either by word or by mind or even by 
intellect or by her glances." "Take back Seetha, who is sinless, with a pure character.  





In the opening quotes of the chapter, two different instances of identity management 
are evident. In the first, the Gileadites use pronunciation abilities as a means of 
authenticating identity and ensuring border control. In the second, Seetha verifies her 
identity as a pure and virtuous woman by taking the fire test. Both are examples of 
different forms of identity management, which demonstrate that there can be many 
contexts of identity management.  
 
Identity management, a regular life occurrence, takes places in different contexts and 
conditions. There are numerous examples of identity management: Wearing a 
wedding band or mangalsutra454 to signify marital status.  Parents introduce their 
children to their friends. Artists sign their paintings. Writers use pseudonyms. 
Robbers or bandits wear masks. Makeup is worn to hide age lines. Code names are 
used in love letters. Fingerprints are used to verify identity. Changing one’s name or 
                                                 
452 Zondervan Publishing, The Bible:New International Version (Zondervan Publishing, Grand Rapids 
2003) 
453 Chapters 116 and 118 of the Ramayana. Translation by KMK Murthy.  At 
<http://www.valmikiramayan.net/> 
454 A sacred thread worn as a signifier of Hindu and Syrian Christian marriage in India.  
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sex. The list is inexhaustible. From these instances, it is evident that identity 
management has many elements: identity creation, classification, affiliation, 
authentication, verification, privacy, anonymity, pseudonymity, security and identity 
destruction. 
 
This chapter examines digital identity management, the technical regulation of digital 
identity, which emerged particularly in the digitally advanced West as an industry 
self-regulatory solution for the creation, control and management of digital identities. 
It is globally marketed as a means that will enable digital identity subjects control 
their digital identities. But, does digital identity management measure up as an 
effective regulator of digital identity? More crucially, does it take into account the 
global and simultaneously local contexts of digital identity?  
 
 
4.2. Digital identity management: Its development 
 
The Internet, as originally conceived and built, was not equipped for identity 
management. It had no identity layers; as Peter Steiner put it, “On the Internet, 
nobody knows you’re a dog.”455 With the increasing uptake, commercialisation and 
globalisation of the Internet, this state of affairs was no longer found to be 
satisfactory for a number of reasons, key amongst which were: trust, the challenge of 
multiple digital identities,456 fraud, security, privacy and data protection concerns. 
 
The trust issue was a key basis on which initial identity management technologies 
were pushed forward. Trust is a key feature of digital identity transactions.457 Identity 
subjects need to be able to trust their identity providers or other digital identity 
subjects and vice versa. Service providers needed to be able to trust their digital 
identity subjects. At all levels, a need was felt to ‘know the identity’ to be able to 
deal with or conduct a successful transaction with the identity.458 
                                                 
455 P Steiner, The New Yorker (5 July 1993) 69 (20) 
456 See Ch 2 (2.5.1) 
457 Piotr Cofta, Trust, Complexity and Control: Confidence in a Converged World (John Wiley, 
Chichester 2007) 
458 Mary Rundle and B Laurie, ‘Identity Management as a Cybersecurity Case Study,’ OII Conference 
on Safety and Security in a Networked World: Balancing Cyber-Rights and Responsibilities, Research 




Another thrust to identity management was the need to control and manage multiple 
identities459 as they created problems of accountability, accuracy, authentication and 
trust,460 dispersion, interoperability461 and management. 462 Hence, solutions were put 
forth to deal with these problems. 
 
Fraud and security concerns also contributed to the advancement of digital identity 
management. As digital identities became popular and widespread across domains 
and their social and civil significance increased, they gained significant economic 
and non-economic value, particularly in the digitally advanced West.463 This made 
digital identity the new crime frontier.464 Digital identities became increasingly 
susceptible to fraud (e.g. impersonation, deception, usurpation and phishing465), 
social engineering and hacking.  Therefore, a need was felt to manage and secure 
digital identities against threats to and from them, through their proper 
administration, authentication, and security.466 
 
Privacy and data protection were other key factors that stimulated, boosted and 
continue to propel the development and uptake of digital identity management, 
                                                 
459 Ahto Buldas, P Laud and H Lipmaa, ‘Accountable Certificate Management Using Undeniable 
Attestations,’ in Pierangela Samarati (ed), Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security (ACM, NY 2000), 9-17; DA Buell & R Sandhu, ‘Identity Management,’ 
(2003) 7 (6) IEEE Internet Computing, 26-28; E Damiani, S. De Capitani di Vimercati, P Samarati, 
‘Managing Multiple and Dependable Identities,’ (2003) 7 (6) IEEE Internet Computing, 29–37. 
460 S Xu, R Sandhu and E Bertino, ‘TIUPAM: A Framework for Trustworthiness-Centric Information 
Sharing,’ in Elena Ferrari and ors (eds), Trust Management III, IFIP AICT 300 (Springer, Germany 
2009), 164-175, 170 
461 Windley (2005) n122, 118  
462 Birch (2007), n122, 110, 183  
463 Corien Prins, ‘Property and Privacy: European Perspectives and the Commodification of Our 
Identity,’ in L Guibault and PB Hugenholtz (eds), The Future of the Public Domain (Kluwer Law 
International, The Netherlands 2006), 223–257 (personal data as commercially valuable asset); J 
Litman, ‘Information Privacy/Information Property,’ (2000) 52 Stan LR, 1283-1313, 1290; KC 
Laudon, ‘Markets and Privacy,’ (1996) 39 Communications of the ACM, 93, 103; A Bartow, ‘Our 
Data, Ourselves: Privacy, Propertization, and Gender,’ (2000) 34 U San Francisco LR, 633-704, 695 
464 See US Federal Trade Commission, Identity Theft Survey Report, 7 (2003); CIFAS, Fraud Trends, 
2006-2010 <http://www.cifas.org.uk/default.asp?edit_id=562-57>; CIFAS, ‘The Anonymous 
Attacker: A Special Report on Identity Fraud and Account Takeover,’ (2009), 
<http://www.cifas.org.uk/download/The_Anonymous_Attacker_CIFAS_Special_Report.pdf>; 
WenJie Wang, Yufei Yuan, Norm Archer, ‘A Contextual Framework for Combating Identity Theft,’ 
(2006) 4 (2) IEEE Security & Privacy, 30-38 
465 Francois Paget, ‘Identity Theft,’ Technical White Paper No 1, (McAfee, 2007)  
466 Rundle (2005) n458 
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particularly in the digitally advanced West.467 The need of identity subjects468 to 
“determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others,”469 bolstered the development of identity management 
solutions with a strong and overt focus on privacy and data protection. For example, 
PETs.470 
 
The Internet advanced from a “no one knows” Internet, as Lessig termed it,471 to an 
all-knowing Internet, to enable greater security (that was the primary rationale). 
Identity got layered into the Internet in the form of IP addresses, cookies, encryption, 
amongst other things.472 All this was done to enable greater transparency, 
accountability and responsibility (TAR) in relation to digital identities. This TAR 
movement gave rise to distinct entities called identity providers or entities that issue 
and/or authenticate digital identities.  
 
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party highlighted the expansion of digital 
authentication services as a factor that changed the digital landscape, particularly in 
regards to its implications for digital identity subjects, who were now expected to 
register, identify and authenticate themselves to access and use services.473  In effect, 
                                                 
467 See Elisa Bertino and Jason Crampton, ‘Security for Distributed Systems: Foundations of Access 
Control,’ in Yi Qian, D Tipper, P Krishnamurthy and J Joshi (eds), Information Assurance: 
Dependability and Security in Networked Systems (Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San Francisco 
2008), 74 (strong links between privacy and identity management); J Dumortier and C Goemans, 
‘Privacy Protection and Identity Management,’ in B Jerman-Blažič, W Schneider and T Klobučar 
(eds), Security and Privacy in Advanced Networking Technologies (IOS Press, Netherlands 2004), 
191-212 (privacy legislation as driver for IM); Ronald Leenes, J Schallaböck and M Hansen (eds), 
‘Privacy and Identity Management for Europe,’ PRIME Whitepaper, Ver. 2, (June 2007) 
<www.prime-project.eu/ prime_products/whitepaper> 
468 Oliver Berthold and Martin Kohntopp, ‘Identity Management Based on P3P,’ in Hannes Federrath 
(ed), Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies: Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability 
(Springer, Berlin 2001), 141-160, 142. Also Kokswijk (2007) n262, 164   
469 Westin (1967) n348 
470 A Bhargav-Spantzel, AC Squicciarini, M Young and E Bertino, ‘Privacy Requirements in Identity 
Management Solutions,’ in MJ Smith and G Salvendy (eds) Human Interface and the Management of 
Information: Interacting in Information Environments Part II (Springer, Berlin 2007), 694-702; 
Simone Fischer-Hübner, Penny Duquenoy, Albin Zuccato & Leonardo Martucci (eds), The Future of 
Identity in the Information Society (Springer, USA 2008) 
471 Lessig (2006) n151, 35 
472 Lessig (2006) n151 
473 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Working Document on On-line Authentication 
Services,’ Adopted on 29 January 2003, Brussels, 10054/03/EN, WP 68 
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the development of identity management began in earnest with cryptographic tools 
like digital signatures and digital certificates.  
 
4.2.1. Digital Signatures  
 
Digital signatures,474 an expression of public key cryptography or asymmetric 
cryptography, are digital codes attached to electronically transmitted documents to 
verify their contents and the sender's identity.475 The concept of digital signatures 
was proposed by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 to support authentication in ecommerce 
- as a safeguard to prevent disputes between transacting entities.476  
 
Traditional cryptographic systems work on the basis of shared key management (also 
called secret key or symmetric cryptography). In this case, the sender and receiver of 
a message use a like key at both ends to encrypt or decrypt messages. Asymmetric or 
public key cryptography works differently to traditional or symmetric cryptography. 
In public key cryptography, both the sender and the receiver of a message get a pair 
of keys - a secret private key and a public key, both of which are linked to one 
another mathematically.477  
 
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman built on the Diffie-Hellman concept and developed the 
RSA algorithm.478 Along with the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), the RSA 
algorithm remains the most widely adopted. The DSA was specified as the Digital 
Signature Standard by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST)479 and envisaged as suitable in a variety of applications like electronic funds 
                                                 
474 For a detailed technical overview of digital signatures see Jonathan Katz, Digital Signatures 
(Springer, NY 2010), Stephen Paine and Mohan Atreya, Digital Signatures (McGraw Hill/Osborne, 
USA 2002).  
475 These are sometimes used to implement electronic signatures. 
476 W Diffie and ME Hellman, ‘New Directions in Cryptography,’ (1976) IT-22 (6) IEEE 
Transactions on Information Theory, 644-654  
477 For further details of how public key cryptosystems and digital signatures work, see RSA Labs, 
‘Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS),’ Chapter 2, 
<http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2165> 
478 RL Rivest, A Shamir and L Adleman, ‘A Method For Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key 
Cryptosystems,’ (1978) 21 (2) Communications of the ACM, 120–126 
479 Fact Sheet On Digital Signature Standard (May 1994) 
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transfer systems, Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), distribution of software, and 
guaranteeing database integrity.  
 
Digital signatures work as follows: first, they verify the genuineness of the origin of 
the message and second, they corroborate the validity of the data message. While 
digital signatures were perceived and created as digital equivalents of their paper 
counterparts, they differ. While a paper based signature is visible instantly on its 
medium (the paper), digital signatures are not. Digital signatures only become 
apparent when presented on a computer screen or printout.480 
 
4.2.2. Digital Certificates  
 
Digital certificates481 proliferated as means of boosting trust in digital transactions. 
They are electronic documents utilised to identify individuals, servers, companies or 
entities and to associate that identity with a public key.482 They are issued by 
independent trusted parties called Certification Authorities (CA’s) to certify the true 
identity of an entity. Before a CA can issue a digital certificate to any party, it must 
validate the identity of the party making the request for the certificate according to its 
own policy, which it must publish so that a person relying on that certificate is aware 
of the certification procedures and can make a judgment about accepting or rejecting 
the digital certificate.483 
 
The manner in which a digital certificate works is simple: When one tries to connect 
to a website through Internet Explorer, that website’s digital certificate is activated. 
Internet Explorer checks the certificate for any trust and security issues and if any are 
found, rejects the connection. If no issues are found and the certificate is approved, 
                                                 
480 Audun Jøsang, D Povey and A Ho, ‘What You See is Not Always What You Sign,’ Proceedings of 
the Australian Unix User Group Symposium, Melbourne (September 2002), 
<http://persons.unik.no/josang/papers/JPH2002-AUUG.pdf> 
481 For detailed analysis, see Jahal Feghhi, Peter Williams, Jalil Feghhi, Digital Certificates: Applied 
Internet Security (Pearson Education Limited, Harlow 1998); SA Brands, Rethinking Public Key 
Infrastructures and Digital Certificates: Building in Privacy (The MIT Press, 2000) 
482 As defined by Sun Microsystems Inc, Sun Java System Access Manager 7.1 Federation and SAML 
Administration Guide (Sun Microsystems, Santa Clara 2007), 274 
483 A Torrubia, FJ Mora, L Marti, ‘Cryptography Regulations for E-commerce and Digital Rights 
Management,’ (2001) 20 (8) Computers & Security, 724-738 
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the connection is made. Thus digital certificates are a guarantee and means of 
determining the legitimacy of digital identity.  
 
All these developments explain the push towards digital identity management. To a 
great extent though, the continued sustenance of digital identity management, lies in 
the privacy and data protection thrust of the digitally advanced West which provided 
the impetus and is constantly employed as the primary marketing strategy for 
developing and promoting identity management solutions, 484 not just in the digitally 
advanced West but all across the world.485 
 
  
4.3. Digital identity management: The market  
 
Digital identity management is big business. It was estimated by Forrester Research, 
that the global identity management market (in this context, the identity and access 
management market) is expected to expand from 2.6 billion dollars (£1.65 billion) in 
2006 to 12.3 billion (£7.84 billion) in 2014.486  
 
The OECD Working Paper on Personhood and Identity487 also predicted a growth in 
the demand for digital identity management solutions and envisaged a dramatic 
increase in consumer demand for privacy and protection from identity fraud. It 
declared that there would be a “competitive necessity” that leads businesses to create 
identity management partnerships in the operation of their digital services.  
                                                 
484 PricewaterhouseCoopers and ITGI, Enterprisewide Identity Management: Managing Secure and 
Controllable Access in the Extended Enterprise Environment (ISACA/ITGI, USA 2003), 19, 27 
(identity management strengthens privacy); Jan Camenisch and ors, ‘Privacy and Identity 
Management for Everyone,’ in Proceedings of the Workshop on Digital Identity Management (ACM, 
NY 2005), 20-27; P Guarda and N Zannone, ‘Towards the Development of Privacy-Aware Systems,’ 
(2009) 2 Information and Software Technology, 337-350 
485 Brian Fonseca, ‘New Identity Management Products Abound,’ Infoworld (20 June 2003); M 
Casassa Mont, ‘Dealing with Privacy Obligations: Important Aspects and Technical Approaches,’ in 
Sokratis Katsikas, J Lopez and G Pernul, Trust and Privacy in Digital Business (Springer, Berlin 
2004), 120–131; DM Goldschlag, MG Reed, ‘Onion Routing For Anonymous and Private Internet 
Connections,’ (1999) 42 (2) Communications of the ACM, 84–88 
486 This figure includes revenues from both implementation services and products. A Cser and J Penn, 
‘Identity Management Market Forecast: 2007 To 2014: Provisioning Will Extend its Dominance of 
Market Revenues,’ Forrester Research (6 February 2008) 
<http://www.forrester.com/Research/Document/Excerpt/0,7211,43842,00.html> 
487 OECD (2007) n140 
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Most major international computer and software corporations like EMC (RSA), 
Google, IBM, HP, Microsoft, Novell, Oracle, Sun Microsystems, and Yahoo! are key 
identity management solution providers, either by themselves or as part of massive 
identity associations or conglomerates. Huge investments have been made into the 
digital identity markets and research and development. Global identity alliances (the 
OpenID Foundation, Information Card Foundation488) and mergers have occurred 
(e.g. Yahoo! and Flickr in 2005, Google and YouTube in 2006, LiveJournal and SUP 
in 2007) in an effort to tap the huge potential of the identity markets.489  
 
But digital identity management is not big business just in the private sector. In the 
UK public sector, a Home Office Report490 estimated that for providing identity 
cards to foreign nationals applying to extend their leave in the UK from October 
2009 to October 2019 the cost was estimated at a total of £309 million (including set 
up costs of £28m and operational costs of £281 million).491  
 
The digital identity market has also been visualised as having great potential in 
India.492 The uptake of digital identity management solutions has shown some 
growth in the commercial and non-commercial sectors. But, it is a relatively new 
market and particularly growing in relation to a need and demand for security, rather 
than privacy.493  
 
                                                 
488 Made up of Equifax, Google, Microsoft, Novell, Oracle, PayPal and others. 
489 For instance, Microsoft bought U-Prove. K Cameron, ‘Microsoft to Adopt Stefan Brands’ 
Technology’ (6 March 2008) <http://www.identityblog.com/?p=934>. Oracle has acquired Sun 
Microsystems, see A Clark, ‘Oracle's takeover of Sun Microsystems comes as surprise to software 
industry,’ The Guardian (20 April 2009) < http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/apr/20/sun-
microsystems-oracle-takeover> 
490 Home Office (IPS), ‘National Identity Service Cost Report: October 2009,’ Presented to 
Parliament Pursuant to Section 37 of the Identity Cards Act 2006 
<http://www.ips.gov.uk/cps/files/ips/live/assets/documents/IPS_Cost_report_2009_v5.pdf> 
491 The costs include provision for optimum bias. 
492 Infosecurity, ‘Access and Authentication Market: Ready to Meet Tomorrow’s Critical Needs?’ 
techFocus, InfoSecurity (January 2009) 
<http://fanaticmedia.com/infosecurity/archive/Jan%2009/Authentication%20Market.htm> 
493 Nivedan Prakash, ‘Building a Holistic Security Approach,’ Express Computer (29 March 2010) 
<http://www.expresscomputeronline.com/20100329/20thanniversary07.shtml>; Infosecurity, ‘Access 
and Authentication Market: Ready to Meet Tomorrow’s Critical Needs?’ InfoSecurity (January 2009) 
<http://fanaticmedia.com/infosecurity/archive/Jan%2009/Authentication%20Market.htm> 
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The growth in the commercial identity management sector in India, unlike the 
specific local need based (referring largely here to privacy and data protection) 
development in the UK can also attributed to a ‘keeping the trade’ rationale.494 
Organisations in India, particularly in the outsourcing industry, are implementing 
identity management solutions to comply with expectations of digital identity 
subjects that have their identities outsourced and the laws of the countries 
outsourcing the identities. This is evident in the following statement on the issue:  
Identity management applications enable organisations to provide policy 
based, auditable access to their IT systems. This also helps them in 
complying with several US, Europe and local regulations that require them to 
prove that their businesses are adequately protected. 495  
 
The one context where local need based identity management does manifest itself is 
in the implementation of the UID project, India’s national identity system.496 The 
system aims at providing a unique identity number to Indian residents, collecting and 
managing demographic and biometric information, ensuring non-duplication of 
identity, and offering “anytime, anywhere, anyhow” authentication of identity to 
users and service providers.497  
 
4.4. Digital identity management: Defined and analysed 
 
Digital identity management has been variously defined by technical and academic 
writers. According to Windley, digital identity management is “creating, managing, 
using and eventually destroying records…”498 Rundle and Laurie describe identity 
management as referring to the “administration of authentication, access restrictions, 
passwords, access rights, account profiles, and other points of control for that 
                                                 
494 See statement of T Srinivasan, Country Manager, Software for HP India Sales in relation to the 
uptake of identity management solutions in India, “…India has a track record of adopting global 
trends in software tools and technologies at a fast pace. While no syndicated reports on market size 
exist, trends are available specifically for India; one can expect encouraging growth here.” Reported at 
C Jena, ‘It’s All About Identity,’ Express Computer (19 February 2007) 
<http://www.expresscomputeronline.com/20070219/market02.shtml> 
495 <http://www.expresscomputeronline.com/20070219/market02.shtml> 
496 For details of the UID Scheme, see <http://uidai.gov.in/> 
497 UIDAI, ‘Aadhaar-Communicating to a Billion: An Awareness and Communication Report,’ 
ACSAC (17 May 2010) <http://uid-india.com/Documents/AADHAAR_CommPDF.pdf> 
498 Windley (2005) n122, 8  
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identity.”499 Cavoukian explains identity management (technology based) as being, 
“the administration and design of identity attributes, credentials and privileges.”500  
 
Pato defines identity management as a “set of processes, tools and social contracts 
surrounding the creation, maintenance and termination of a digital identity for people 
or, more generally, for systems and services to enable secure access to an expanding 
set of systems and applications.”501 Hansen defines identity management as, 
“managing various partial identities (usually denoted by pseudonyms) of an 
individual i.e. administration of identity attributes including the development and 
choice of the partial identity and pseudonym to be (re-)used in a specific context or 
role.”502  
 
Though digital identity management has thus been defined in different manners,503  it 
mainly involves the administration of digital identities such that it enables control 
over them.  
 
From the stakeholder perspective, digital identity management can be categorised 
into three non-exclusive504 levels: organisational, governance and individual. 
Organisational and governance based identity management fall into the category of 
other based identity management (management of digital identity by someone other 
                                                 
499 Rundle (2005) n458 
500 A Cavoukian, ‘7 Laws of Identity: The Case for Privacy-Embedded Laws of Identity in the Digital 
Age,’ Whitepaper, Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, (2006) 
<http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/up-7laws_whitepaper.pdf> 
501 J Pato, ‘Identity Management: Setting Context,’ Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security, 
(Summer/Fall 2003) <http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2003/HPL-2003-72.pdf> 
502 Pfitzmann (2008) n151 
503 For more definitions see J Bamford, ‘Identity Management: Achieving Data Protection 
Compliance and Inspiring Public Confidence,’ Position Paper for the Forum on E-Infrastructures for 
Identity Management and Data Sharing, OII, (2007); M Crompton, ‘Proof of ID Required? Getting 
Identity Management Right,’ Australian IT Security Forum (30 March 2004), 1; A Scorer, ‘Identity 
Directories and Databases,’ in DGW Birch (ed) Digital Identity Management: Technological, 
Business and Social Implications (Gower, Hampshire 2007), 41-49, 43; S Brands, ‘Secure Access 
Management: Trends, Drivers and Solutions,’ (2002) 7 (3) Information Security Technical Report, 81-
94, 81; A Jøsang and ors, ‘Trust Requirements in Identity Management,’ in R Buyya and ors (eds) 
Proceedings of the 2005 Australasian Workshop on Grid Computing and E-research:Vol 44 (ACS, 
Australia 2005), 99-108, 99  
504 Non-exclusive as the three categories overlap and mutually co-exist. 
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than the digital identity subject) and individual identity management falls into the 
category of self-management (management by the digital identity subject itself). 505 
 
Organisational digital identity management refers to identity management by an 
organisation in the context of that organisation’s activities. An organisation may 
manage identity for a number of reasons: efficient business management, securing 
access to resources, user/employee account management, reduction of costs, to deter 
fraud, reduce data protection breaches, manage reputation, financial or other risk, or 
to enable profiling for market research. This kind of identity management is carried 
out by identity or service providers.506 
 
Like the Gileadites, States are actively involved in digital identity management. This 
governance based identity management is justified by the argument that it enables 
States effectively govern through knowing their subjects and thus helping regulate 
their behaviour.507 It is also justified on grounds that it enables the State to determine 
the rights and privileges of the people it governs and to maintain national security 
through securing borders and in enforcing border control (this is the area with the 
largest identity management impact). Examples that fit into this category are national 
identity systems and biometric border control systems. 
 
Identity management also occurs at the individual level. Individuals, as digital 
identity subjects often keenly involve themselves in identity management to gain 
control over their digital identities. To this end, various personalised commercial 
identity management solutions like Garlik’s508 DataPatrol and Reputation Defender, 
and non-commercial identity management solutions like ClaimID have been 
developed. 
 
                                                 
505 P Wood, ‘Implementing Identity Management Security: An Ethical Hacker's View,’ (2005) 9 
Network Security, 12-15 
506 See Windley (2005) n122 




Garlik’s DataPatrol509 is an Internet based identity management service that helps 
businesses and individuals manage their digital identities for a fee. DataPatrol aims at 
monitoring and alerting an identity subject if their digital identity information – 
whether it is in the form of a user name, financial data, or email addresses, is at risk 
or has been compromised. 
 
Reputation Defender,510 claiming to be the “world's first comprehensive online 
reputation management and privacy company,” aims at seeking information available 
about digital identity subjects on the Internet and intimating them of the same, 
providing them with assistance to destroy and correct it if required and helping 
digital identity subjects construct their digital profiles. Its other products are: 
MyReputation, MyChild, MyEdge and MyPrivacy. 
 
ClaimID511 is a free identity management tool for individuals to manage their online 
identities. It provides them with an OpenID to log into different websites without 
having to create new user names or passwords for each of them. The digital identity 
subject outlines to ClaimID all its online identities, which then enables the identity 
subject to have an easy means of proving ownership of these identities.512 The digital 
identity subject’s profile uses Microformats513 like the hCard.514 ClaimId also aims at 
helping individuals manage their online identities by making cached information 
available to them in case the original version of the website disappears.  
 
Digital identity management, whatever its form, represents a form of empowerment. 
In the context of organisational digital identity management, it seeks to empower the 
organisation; in governance, it seeks to empower the State in the performance of its 
                                                 
509 <http://www.garlik.com/products.php> 
510 <http://www.reputationdefender.com/company> 
511 <http://claimid.com/>  
512 This is highly debatable as the possession of online identities does not necessarily denote an 
ownership of identities, as demonstrated in Ch 2 (2.5.6) 
513 Microformats are “a set of simple, open data formats built upon existing and widely adopted 
standards.” See <http://microformats.org/> 
514 An hCard is “a simple, open, distributed format for representing people, companies, 
organizations, and places, using a 1:1 representation of vCard (RFC2426) properties and values in 
semantic HTML or XHTML.” <http://microformats.org/wiki/hcard> 
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functions and when used by individuals it seeks to empower them in the control of 
their digital identities.  
 
In addition to the above classification (Organisational, Governance and Individual), 
there are other classifications of identity management systems.515 Prominent is the 
three tier classification proposed by Bauer, Meints and Hansen,516 which classifies 
identity management systems into three types:  
Type 1: Systems for account management, implementing authentication, 
authorisation, and accounting517  
Type 2: Systems for profiling of user data by an organisation, e.g. detailed 
log files or data warehouses which support e.g., personalised services or the 
analysis of customer behaviour518 
Type 3: Systems for user-controlled context-dependent role and pseudonym 
management.519 
 
Type 1 systems are account management systems, used within an organisation 
largely for account and access administration for computers and network services 
(e.g. the Windows-NT-Domain-concept by Microsoft, NIS by SUN). This is similar 
to the organisational classification of digital identity management and includes 
identity management carried out by big identity and service providers. Type 2 
systems involve profiling techniques. While the examples in the classification by 
Bauer, Meints and Hansen are primarily business related, other examples of Type 2 
systems are those used by States in governance - at border control, in the 
determination of rights or entitlements to services, or systems used in the criminal 
                                                 
515 Yi Qian, D Tipper, P Krishnamurthy, J Joshi, Information Assurance: Dependability and Security 
in Networked Systems (Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San Francisco 2007), 72 (classification made in 
terms of identity provider centric frameworks and user centric frameworks); DGW Birch, ‘The 
Identity Vision,’ in DGW Birch (ed), Digital Identity Management: Perspectives on the 
Technological, Business and Social Implications (Gower, Hampshire 2007), 4-5 (classified as 
technology tools). 
516 M Bauer, M Meints and Hansen (eds.), ‘FIDIS Deliverable D3.1: Structured Overview on 






518 Citing <http://www.lumeria.com/what.shtml>, 
<http://www.epic.ca/TechnologyDay/October05_2004/ 
MoreInformation/Presentations/RandallBartsch%20-%20Identity%20Mgmt.pdf> 
519 Citing ICPP, ULD and SNG, Identity Management Systems (IMS): Identification and Comparison 
Study (September 2003) 
<http://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/idmanage/study/ICPP_SNG_IMSStudy.pdf> 
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justice system. Type 3 systems are systems characterised by user control. They are 
decentralised, user and client-orientated, where the data managed are largely 
personal data and of which privacy functions as the unique selling point.520  
 
Thus, digital identity management is about controlling digital identity, in different 
manners, by different entities and at various levels that could be exclusive or 
mutually co-existing.  
 
 
4.5. Models of digital identity management 
 
Based on their development and nature, digital identity management systems can be 
classified into three models: centralised identity systems, federated identity systems 
and user centric identity systems.  
 
4.5.1. Centralised  
 
Centralised identity systems were the initial identity management market offering to 
deal with the problem of multiple identities and promote Internet security. A 
centralised identity system is one where a central identity management system 
provider “acts as a single gateway for the user’s management of identities.”521 
Centralised identity management systems because of their centralised nature are easy 
to administer, convenient and affordable as compared to other options. 
 
How centralised identity management works is simple: one entity acts as the identity 
provider, authenticates identity subjects and issues identity tokens which can then be 
used across pre-authorised organisations.522 Going back to our earlier discussion, 
digital certificates are a key example of centralised identity management in action.  
 
Microsoft Passport or Windows Live ID523 is an example. This system was a 
credential system that permitted digital identity subjects to log in to multiple sites 
                                                 
520 Bauer (2005) n516, 14 
521 ICPP (2003) n519 
522 R Dhamija and L Dusseault, ‘The Seven Flaws of Identity Management: Usability and Security 
Challenges’ (2008) 6 (2) IEEE Security & Privacy, 24-29  
523<https://accountservices.passport.net/ppnetworkhome.srf?vv=900&mkt=EN-GB&lc=2057> 
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and services on the Microsoft Passport Network with a single sign on. A Passport 
user account comprised of several elements like: the PUID,524 a unique 64-bit 
number encrypted and authenticated on request; user profile containing mandatory 
information like the user's e-mail address, telephone number and optional 
information like user’s name, demographic information and credentials (password 
and pin, security questions). The advantages of this system were that it eliminated the 
need for a user to log in multiple times and secured his digital identity in one place - 
on the Passport database. In the process of this management of a user’s identity, 
Passport used cookies to facilitate the conduct of its identity management 
operations.525 
 
Passport came under severe criticism.526 The first ground was that Passport was 
inadequately secured and susceptible to compromise.527 This was compounded by the 
fact that Passport employed user selected passwords as a security measure.528 Other 
criticisms related to its centralised and anti-privacy nature.529 
 
The US FTC launched an investigation into Passport, taking cognizance of a 
complaint by several consumer organisations headed by EPIC.530 Some of the 
charges were that Microsoft, in its Passport services, had falsely promised 
“reasonable and appropriate measures” to safeguard “the privacy and confidentiality 
of consumers’ personal information” and stated that it did not collect any personally 
                                                 
524 Passport User ID 
525 See ‘Windows Live ID,’ Microsoft Passport Network Privacy Statement, (April 2005) 
<https://accountservices.passport.net/PPPrivacyStatement.srf#1> 
526 R Oppliger, ‘Microsoft .NET Passport and Identity Management,’ (2004) 9 (1) Information 
Security Technical Report, 26-34; M Slemko, ‘Microsoft Passport to Trouble’ (5 November 2001) 
<http://www.znep.com/~marcs/passport/>; D Becker, ‘Passport to Nowhere?’ CNET News.com (23 
March 2004); DP Kormann and AD Rubin, ‘Risks of the Passport Single Signon Protocol,’ (2000) 33 
Computer Networks, 51–58 
527 James Snell, Doug Tidwell and Pavel Kulchenko, Programming Web Services with SOAP 
(O'Reilly, USA 2001), 155 
528 Robert Lemos, ‘Password Flaw Cracks Passport Security,’ CNET News.com (8 May 2003) 
529 See Ann Cavoukian and Tyler Hamilton, The Privacy Payoff: How Successful Businesses Build 
Consumer Trust (McGraw Hill, Canada 2002), 190 
530 In the Matter of Microsoft Corp., FTC Docket No. C-4069 (20 Dec. 2002) 
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identifiable information, when it did.531 Even the EU launched a formal investigation 
into Passport for data protection breaches.532 
 
Another example of centralised identity management is the Kerberos Network 
Authentication Service. 533 Kerberos provides a “means of verifying the identities of 
principals, (e.g. a workstation user or a network server) on an open (unprotected) 
network.”534 Using conventional cryptography, it works as a trusted third party 
authentication service. Kerberos (version 5) is implemented in Windows 2000 and 
2003 as the default authentication standard.535 Though Kerberos has its pros, it also 
has its cons. Key among these are implementation and compatibility problems, trust 
and risk issues, and mostly, that it is an all or nothing solution.536 
 
Despite their advantages (ease, convenience and affordability), centralised identity 
management systems, as demonstrated, have significant problems. They are 
hierarchical, prone to implementation and governance issues,537 vulnerable to 
targeted scams and compromises, subject to political or commercial abuse and 
susceptible to system failures.538 These are but some of contributory factors that led 
to their rejection and failure.  
 
 
4.5.2. Federated  
 
Federated identity systems (also called circles of trust)539 developed in response to 
the shortcomings of centralised identity management systems. According to Maler 
and Reed, federated identity management “is a set of technologies and processes that 
let computer systems dynamically distribute identity information and delegate 
                                                 
531 FTC, ‘Microsoft Settles FTC Charges Alleging False Security and Privacy Promises,’ (8 Aug 
2002) <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/08/microsoft.shtm> 
532 Reuters, ‘EU: MS Passport Is Under Investigation,’ (2002) <http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104-
934916.html> ; Seagrumn Smith, ‘Microsoft and the European Union Face Off Over Internet Privacy 
Concerns,’ (2002), Duke L & Tech Rev 0014 
533 J Kohl and B Clifford Neuman, ‘The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (Version 5),’ 
Internet Request for Comments RFC-1510, (Sept 1993) 
534 ibid 
535 <http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc784935(WS.10).aspx> 
536 Red Hat Inc, Kerberos, <http://www.centos.org/docs/5/html/Deployment_Guide-en-US/ch-
kerberos.html> 
537 Windley (2005) n122, 119 
538 Windley, (2005) n122, 120  
539 Terminology made popular by the Liberty Alliance. 
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identity tasks across security domains.”540 Simply stated, federation is a reference to 
“the agreements, standards, and technologies that make identity and entitlements 
portable across autonomous domains.”541 
 
In a federated identity system, different entities work within the “umbrella of 
common policies and mechanisms across disparate local identity systems” in the 
identity management process.542 Federation is beneficial as it enables entities and 
organisations to control, manage and share multiple digital identities effectively, 
efficiently and in cost effective manner.543 In the federated model of identity 
management systems, there is no single entity with overall control. These systems 
support digital identity across multiple providers in a distributed and piece meal 
fashion. OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (OASIS SAML) and Liberty 
Alliance are standards for identity federation, while Shibboleth represents an open 
source implementation of the federated model of identity management.  
 
OASIS SAML, per Cantor and others,  
defines the syntax and processing semantics of assertions made about a 
subject by a system entity. In the course of making, or relying upon such 
assertions, SAML system entities may use other protocols to communicate 
either regarding an assertion itself, or the subject of an assertion. This 
specification defines both the structure of SAML assertions, and an 
associated set of protocols, in addition to the processing rules involved in 
managing a SAML system.544 
 
The Liberty Alliance was set up in 2001 as a global identity consortium between 
around thirty organisations to develop “open technical, business and privacy 
standards for federated identity management.”545 It released the Liberty Federation in 
2002, Liberty Web Services in 2003 and ID-SAFE (Identity Strong Authentication 
                                                 
540 E Maler and D Reed, ‘The Venn of Identity: Options and Issues in Federated Identity 
Management,’ (2008) 6 (2) Security and Privacy: IEEE in Security & Privacy, 16-23 
541 As defined by the Burton Group. See ‘Primer on Federated Identity,’ 
<http://www.sourceid.org/content/primer.cfm> 
542 Windley (2005) n122, 122 
543 D Smith, ‘The Challenge of Federated Identity Management,’ (2008) 4 Network Security, 7-9  
544 S Cantor, J Kemp, R Philpott and E Maler (eds), ‘OASIS: Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0,’ OASIS Standard, Security Services Technical 
Committee (15 March 2005), <http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/> 
545 <http://www.projectliberty.org/> 
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Framework, stated to be the “industry’s first open framework for deploying and 
managing interoperable strong authentication.”)546 
 
Liberty Web Services is made up of the Identity Web Services Framework (ID-WSF) 
and the Identity Service Interface Specifications (ID-SIS), both of which jointly 
enable identity-based services.547 The ID-WSF in its operation, “builds on many 
existing standards for networking and distributed computing, and adds specialized 
capabilities for handling identity-related information.” 548 The following diagram 
illustrates the Liberty Web Services Architecture:549 
 
Fig 5: The Liberty Web Services Architecture 
 
Shibboleth550 is a “standards based, open source software package for web single 
sign-on across or within organizational boundaries.” It is used to facilitate single sign 
on access to a multiplicity of resources within an organisational network. For the 
developers of Shibboleth (Internet2Middleware551 and Middleware Architecture 
Committee for Education),552 the privacy of the digital identity subject was a key 
                                                 
546 <http://www.projectliberty.org/> 
547 C Cahill and ors, ‘Liberty Alliance Web Services Framework: A Technical Overview,’ Vers.1.0, 
(14 Feb 2008) <http://www.projectliberty.org/liberty/content/download/4120/27687/file/idwsf-intro-
v1.0.pdf> 
548 ibid  
549 Cahill (2008) n547, 4 
550 <http://shibboleth.Internet2.edu/> 
551 Internet2 is a US based non-profit advanced networking consortium comprising more than 200 US 
universities collaborating with 70 leading corporations, 45 government agencies, laboratories and 
other higher learning institutions and  50 international partner organizations. See 
<http://www.Internet2.edu/about/> 
552 MACE comprises of a group of US and international higher-education IT architects “formed to 
investigate the creation of a national interoperable identity and access management infra-structure for 
the U.S. research and education community that would fit into a global context.” 
<http://www.Internet2.edu/middleware/about.html> 
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consideration. In fact, it was one of the primary goals of the design of the 
technology.553 
 
A Shibboleth transaction occurs as follows: 
Amy wants to access the University of Edinburgh Legal Research Resources. 
In her attempt to do so she is directed to the WAYF federation, where she 
selects her home institution (her identity provider) from WAYF’s list of 
authorised identity providers. Her identity provider authenticates her, which 
generates a handle or session identifier for Amy’s session that is sent to the 
service provider. The service provider checks this handle out with the identity 
provider and accordingly provides or denies Amy access to the resources. 
 
While Shibboleth has its merits (i.e. it facilitates inter-organisational single sign on 
access), it also has its downsides, as outlined by Harrison and Bramhall: 
(i) The individual can only transfer attributes recorded by the 
organisation which hosts his Shibboleth account, rather than by 
any third party;  
(ii) The individual cannot choose which organisation hosts his 
Shibboleth account and 
(iii) The scheme lacks a business model that would allow different 
service providers to share the costs of secure authentication and 
permissioned attribute transfer.554 
 
There are three types of federated identity management systems per Windley:  ad 
hoc, hub and spoke and identity networks.555 Ad hoc systems support identity 
relationships on an ad hoc basis. Hub and spoke systems are represented by different 
entities being clustered around a rule making strong entity. Identity networks 
(examples cited are Ping Identity and SXIP) are independent entities which primarily 
focus on the “technical and administrative aspects of identity federation.”556 
 
Ping Identity557 provides Internet Identity Security and Single Sign-On (SSO)558 
solutions like PingFederate and PingConnect, which mostly use federated identity 
                                                 
553 <http://www.Internet2.edu/pubs/shibboleth-infosheet.pdf> 
554 J Harrison and P Bramhall, ‘New Approaches to Identity Management and Privacy: A Guide 
Prepared for the Information Commissioner,’ (December 2007) 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/edentity
_hp_idm_paper_for_web.pdf> 
555 Windley (2005) n122, 118-132 
556 Windley (2005) n122, 128 
557 <http://www.pingidentity.com/> 
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standards.559 PingFederate functions as a SSO Service for multiple web 
applications.560 PingConnect is a SaaS (Software as a Service) SSO service aimed at 
working with SAML (or WS-Fed)-enabled SaaS applications.561 
 
SXIP,562 founded by Dick Hardt in 2003, aims at making web interactions more 
simple and convenient through the development of a “secure and open identity 
architecture that enables individuals to easily manage their online digital 
identities.”563 SXIP’s identity solution is Sxipper,564 a free add-on for Firefox which 
enables digital identity subjects to log in securely to different websites. Sxipper 
tracks multiple user ids, passwords and personal data shared on the Web. 
 
Another example of a federated identity management solution is VeriSign® Identity 
Protection (VIP) services made up of the VIP Authentication Service and the Fraud 
Detection Service inter alia.565 VIP Services work on the basis of two-factor 
authentication, self-learning fraud detection and validation infrastructure. The VIP 
Authentication Service, particularly functions in the following manner: it takes 
‘something’ the digital identity subject ‘knows’ (like a user name, password) and 
unifies it with ‘something’ the digital identity subject ‘has’ (e.g. a smartcard, token, 
or mobile phone) and validates it. The VIP Fraud Detection Service processes 
transactions to determine fraud risks based on rules and self-learning. If a risk 
element is found, then higher levels of authentication are imposed.566 Investigations 
can then be quickly carried out and resolved.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
558 SSO is a “mechanism whereby a single action of user authentication and authorisation can permit a 
user to access all computers and systems where he has access permission, without the need to enter 
multiple passwords.” The Open Group, SSO, <http://www.opengroup.org/security/sso/> 
559 <http://www.pingidentity.com/> 
560 For further details see <http://www.pingidentity.com/our-solutions/pingfederate.cfm> 
561 For further details see <http://www.pingidentity.com/our-solutions/pingconnect.cfm> 








Federated identity systems have their own set of problems.567 They frequently are 
piece meal, free for all and complex to manage. They have security and control,568 
and funding and partner relationship issues between the entities.569 They are also 
beset with trust complexities570 and unsolved liability issues.571 Problems are also 
evident in regards to the transfer of data outside clusters (or established circles) and 
have been criticised for being too abstract.572 
 
4.5.3. User centric 
 
The failure of centralised and federated identity management systems to meet 
expectations of industry and digital identity subjects in the digitally advanced West 
led to the development of user-centric identity management (also called Identity 
2.0).573 This form of identity management aims at giving digital identity subjects (in 
this form of identity management generally referred to as users) superior control over 
their digital identities, as compared to the previous two models.   
 
User-centric forms of identity management have two key features, according to 
Hansen: first, its ability to make identity attributes flows more explicit and give users 
more ‘notice and choice’ over their digital identities and second, its ability to be 
privacy enhancing through enabling data minimisation and promoting data 
unlinkability.574 The first instance, Hansen reckons, is a reflection of the right to 
informational self-determination.575 Here is evident the embedding and connection of 
                                                 
567 Windley (2005) n122, 126-127, 132 
568 A point also made by Abhilasha Bhargav-Spantzel, AC Squicciarini & E Bertino, ‘Establishing and 
Protecting Digital Identity in Federation Systems,’ CERIAS Tech Report 2007-18, 
<https://www.cerias.purdue.edu/assets/pdf/bibtex_archive/2007-18.pdf> 
569 Windley (2005) n122, 132 
570 Jøsang (2005) n503 
571 Windley (2005) n122, 132 
572 Dr Earl R Smith II, ‘Can’t We Simplify Digital Identity,’ Guest Article, The Federal Circle (26 
August 2010) 
573 The main role of Identity 2.0 is stated to be “to provide users with full control over their virtual 
identities.” Vacca (2009), n122, 278 
574 M Hansen, ‘Marrying Transparency Tools With User-Controlled Identity Management,’ in S 
Fischer-Hubner and ors, (eds), The Future of Identity in the Information Society, IFIP 262 (Springer,  
Boston 2008), 199-220, 202  
575 The right to informational self determination here taken as referring to “…the capacity of the 
individual to determine in principle the disclosure and use of his/her personal data” as defined in the 
well known Volkszählungsurteil decision by the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) in 1983, BVerfGe 65, 1. Text at <http://www.datenschutz-
berlin.de/gesetze/sonstige/volksz.htm>. The right is defined by Rouvroy and Poullet as “an 
individual’s control over the data and information produced about him is a (necessary but insufficient) 
pre-condition for him to live an existence that may be self-determined.” Antoinette Rouvroy and Yves 
Poullet, ‘The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: 
Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for Democracy,’ in Serge Gutwirth and ors (eds), Reinventing 
Data Protection (Springer, Berlin 2009), 45-76, 51  
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a European legal value into the technology of identity management. User-centric 
identity management is also seen as an indispensable tool for privacy protection.576 
 
The user-centric model is manifest in the Laws of Identity, which state:577  
 
1. User Control and Consent: Technical identity systems must only reveal 
information identifying a user with the user’s consent. 
2. Minimal Disclosure for a Constrained Use: The solution that discloses the 
least amount of identifying information and best limits its use is the most 
stable long-term solution. 
3. Justifiable Parties: Digital identity systems must be designed so the 
disclosure of identifying information is limited to parties having a necessary 
and justifiable place in a given identity relationship. 
4. Directed Identity: A universal identity system must support both “omni-
directional” identifiers for use by public entities and “unidirectional” 
identifiers for use by private entities, thus facilitating discovery while 
preventing unnecessary release of correlation handles 
5. Pluralism of Operators and Technologies: A universal identity system 
must channel and enable the inter-working of multiple identity technologies 
run by multiple identity providers. 
6. Human Integration: The universal identity metasystem must define the 
human user to be a component of the distributed system integrated through 
unambiguous human-machine communication mechanisms offering 
protection against identity attacks 
7. Consistent Experience across Contexts: The unifying identity metasystem 
must guarantee its users a simple, consistent experience while enabling 
separation of contexts through multiple operators and technologies. 
 
All the principles of the Laws seek to fulfil the right of a digital identity subject to its 
digital identity. They aim at giving the digital identity subject control over its digital 
identity through setting limits on the amount of personal identity information given 
out, making disclosures subject to consent, offering choices in identity services and 
facilitating informed and rational decisions by identity subjects about their digital 
identities. 
 
Many of the tenets of the Laws of Identity find basis in Western data protection law 
like the Personal Data Principles embodied in the OECD Guidelines on the 
                                                 
576 RE Leenes, ‘User-Centric Identity Management As An Indispensable Tool For Privacy Protection,’ 
(2008) 2 (4) IJIPM, 345 - 371 
577 Cameron (2005) n131; The Laws of Identity, since their original enunciation, were refined to a 
shorter version which is available at <http://www.identityblog.com/?p=1007> 
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Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,578 the fundamental 
right of an individual in the EU to their personal data as embodied in Article 8 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union579 and the EU Data Protection 
Directive. 
 
The OECD Guidelines aim to help protect privacy and individual liberties in the 
processing of private and public sectors. In Part 2, they contain basic principles in 
respect of data protection like collection limitation, data quality, purpose 
specification, use limitation, security safeguards, openness, individual participation 
and accountability. In many respects the Laws of Identity embody these principles. 
For example, the requirement to reveal information only with consent (relative to 
collection limitation principle), minimal disclosure (use limitation principle), 
justifiable parties (security safeguards) and human integration (individual 
participation principle).  
 
The EU Data Protection Directive embodies the fundamental principles required to 
be followed in the processing of personal data. These principles are reflected in the 
Laws of Identity. For instance, the fair and lawful processing of data580 (embodied in 
principle 1 of the Laws of Identity), purpose limitation581 (principles 2 and 4 of the 
Laws of Identity), data adequacy582 (principle 2 of the Laws of Identity), accuracy of 
data583 and time limitation584 (principle 2 of the Laws of Identity).  
 
The Laws of Identity, though representing a useful technical contribution to 
furthering the user-centric model of identity management, have been subject to 
criticism. Donley analyses each principle (of the shortened version) in part and raises 
                                                 
578 OECD Doc C58 Final (1 October 1981)  
579 The Article states that everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or 
her; that such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of 
the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law and that everyone has the right 
of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. It 
also states that compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority. 
580 Art 6 (1) (a) 
581 Art 6 (1) (b) 
582 Art 6 (1) (c) 
583 Art 6 (1) (d) 
584 Art 6 (1) (d) 
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some serious issues.585 For instance, the difficulty of achieving user control (first 
principle) especially in the online context given free content and the drive to collect 
and share increasing amounts of information. He also finds the third principle (no 
automatic linkability and no single identifiers) hard to accomplish. The Laws are also 
not grounded in the reality of how people use and relate to digital identities and 
associative technologies and might lay digital identity subjects open to new threats 
and dangers.586 This is particularly concerning given our analysis in Chapter 3. 
 
Windows CardSpace implements the Laws of Identity and the user centric paradigm 
of identity management. Other examples of user centric identity management 
initiatives are: OpenId, IBM’s Idemix, Higgins, and PRIME. 
 
4.5.3.1.Windows CardSpace  
 
Windows CardSpace (or InfoCards) is part of .NET Framework 3.0 and is available 
with Windows Vista, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 and Windows 7. 
Windows CardSpace is an identity cards infrastructure, similar to those supporting 
passports or credit cards, aimed at helping users prove their identity in their online 
transactions.  
 
InfoCards are connected to identity information issued by an identity provider (entity 
or organisation like a bank, employer, government or even the digital identity 
subjects themselves). The advantages of the InfoCards are cited as being: flexibility, 
consistency in user experience, greater security (as compared to passwords), and a 
greater ability to accommodate identity queries and requests.587 These InfoCards 
implement the U-Prove588 technology which is hailed as being a good example of 
‘minimal disclosure’ technology.  Minimal disclosure technology facilitates the 
protection of the privacy and anonymity of the digital identity subject and functions 
                                                 




588 Created by S Brands, <http://www.credentica.com/u-prove_sdk.html>. Acquired by Microsoft 
from Credentica. 
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OpenId is an open source and decentralised identity management standard for user 
authentication and access control that allows digital identity subjects to log into and 
access different services with an existing digital identity. It thus eliminates the need 
for multiple authentications.   
 
How OpenId works is simple: A digital identity subject creates an OpenId account 
with an OpenId provider choosing a username, password and authenticating with a 
Captcha.590 Once the OpenId account is created, the digital identity subject can log in 
to any website that permits an OpenId login. The digital identity subject enters 
OpenId login into the websites log in form. The website then directs the digital 
identity subject to the OpenId provider to log in using the OpenId username and 
password. The digital identity subject then indicates to OpenId that the website 
requesting the information can use its identity. Once this is confirmed, the process is 
complete and the digital identity subject is authenticated at the website without 








                                                 
589 See Brands (2000) n481, 32, 91. Microsoft seems to prefer the use of the terms ‘unlinkability’ and 
‘selective disclosure’ rather than ‘anonymity and pseudonymity’ though these seem to be the 
underlying values sought to be promoted.  
590 A Captcha (Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart) is “a 
program that protects websites against bots by generating and grading tests that humans can pass but 
current computer programs cannot.” The term was coined by Luis von Ahn, Manuel Blum, Nicholas 
Hopper and John Langford of Carnegie Mellon University in 2000. <http://www.captcha.net/> 
591 For a full primer on OpenId see screen cast by S Willison, ‘How to Use OpenId,’ (22 December 
2006), <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vq0R1Y1A2rE&feature=player_embedded> 
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4.5.3.3.IBM’s Idemix  
 
IBM’s Idemix,592 developed by researchers at IBM's Zurich Research Laboratory in 
Rüschlikon, Switzerland, is based on the concept of ‘data parsimony’ which supports 
the view that “personal data is best protected if not revealed at all, i.e., if the amount 
of data revealed is kept to a minimum.” This technology endeavours to protect 
individual privacy through concealing personal information.   
 
The Idemix system is an anonymous credential system, as outlined by Camenisch 
and Herreweghen,593 based on the protocols developed by Camenisch and 
Lysyanskaya.594 Per Camenisch and Herreweghen,595 the central feature of Idemix is 
the NymSystem package596 which implements the UserNymSystem, OrgNymSystem  
and De-AnOrgNymSystem components all of which proffer “functionality related to 
the specific cryptographic operations executed by the different entities, as well as 
methods to create a new instance of the entity by generating cryptographic key 
material (user master secret, organization’s public/private key pair, de-anonymising 




Higgins598 is an Eclipse Project599 open source identity software framework,600 
designed through collaboration between developers from Novell, Azigo, IBM, 
                                                 
592 IBM Research, ‘IDEMIX (Identity 
mixing),’<http://www.zurich.ibm.com/pri/projects/idemix.html> 
593 Camenisch (2002) n426 
594 J Camenisch & A Lysyanskaya, ‘Efficient Non-Transferable Anonymous Multi-Show Credential 
System With Optional Anonymity Revocation,’ in B Pfitzmann (ed), Proceedings of the International 
Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology 
(Springer Verlag, London 2001), 93–118 
595 Camenisch (2002) n426 
596 For full details, see M Bove, Key Management, Setup and Implementation of an Anonymous 
Credential System (Master’s Thesis, 2001). 
597 Camenisch (2002) n426 
598 <http://www.eclipse.org/higgins/> 
599 The Eclipse Project was created by IBM in November 2001 and the Eclipse Foundation in January 
2004 as an independent not-for-profit corporation. For list of members see 
<http://www.eclipse.org/membership/showAllMembers.php> 
600 Higgins is a software infrastructure (not protocol) that works with most digital identity protocols 
including WS-Trust, OpenID, SAML, XDI, LDAP, etc. 
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Meristic, Harvard Law Lab and Serena, and previously included people from the 
Intertechnogroup, NCSU, OCLC and Freeshell.601 The aims of Higgins are: 
providing an identity and security layer for the Internet, giving users more control 
over their digital identities,602 enhancing privacy603 and security, providing a simple 
and consistent user experience,604 identity data integration, facilitating cross-platform 
identity selectors and enabling interoperability.605 Higgins enables users through an 
add-on browser (or selector) to log into websites and control the dissemination of 




The PRIME project, funded by the EU’s Sixth Framework Programme and the Swiss 
Federal Office for Education and Science, concentrated on the development of a 
working prototype of a privacy-enhancing identity management system, with the 
collaboration of people from industry, academia and research.606 
 
The PRIME607 architecture on which the PRIME identity management system is 
based is another prolific example of a user centric system. At its heart, is the vision 
to protect individual privacy.608 This comes out acutely in its apparent and persistent 
focus on privacy protection, both in how its goals are expressed and the nature of the 
system itself.609 The PRIME system follows the following principles:610 
       1.  Design must start from maximum privacy. 
       2.  Explicit privacy rules govern system usage. 
                                                 
601 <http://www.eclipse.org/higgins/team-leaders.php> 




605 Higgins Overview 2009, 
<https://dev.eclipse.org/svnroot/technology/org.eclipse.higgins/trunk/doc/org.eclipse.higgins.doc/Hig
gins-Overview-2009.pdf> 
606 The duration of the PRIME project was March 2004-February 2008. 
607 See <https://www.prime-project.eu/> 
608 D Sommer, M Casassa Mont, S Pearson, ‘PRIME Architecture V3,’ Deliverable D14.2.d, (9 July 
2008) <https://www.prime-
project.eu/prime_products/reports/arch/pub_del_D14.2.d_ec_WP14.2_v3_Final.pdf> 
609 See Sommer (2008), § 9.2.2 (Privacy Obligation Aspects), 45  
610 PRIME General Public Tutorial, Vers. 2 (May 2008) <http://blues.inf.tu-
dresden.de/prime/GPTv2/englisch/PRIME_nm.htm> 
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       3.  Privacy rules must be enforced, not just stated. 
       4.  Privacy enforcement must be trustworthy. 
       5.  Users need easy and intuitive abstractions of privacy. 
6. Privacy needs an integrated approach. 
7. Privacy must be integrated with applications. 
 
The PRIME system is to provide the following functions: administration of digital 
partial identities, event logging (history), negotiation of privacy policies, support of 
privacy obligations through appropriate tools and mechanisms, identity and privacy 
centred decision making support, anonymous communication, self-assessment of 
identity services and platforms.611 More technically, the PRIME system  
is a data and metadata processing system supporting entities in making 
decisions by suggesting choices and in using cryptographic methods to 
support their statements and validate those of others. In order to suggest 
choices rules (called policies) and knowledge containing past and present 
facts (called decision context) need to be considered.612 
 
The PRIME system comprises of two segments: the service-side module and the 
user-side module (also called the PRIME Middleware, which runs on the identity 
subject’s computer and facilitates PRIME enabled applications). The Middleware 
features a PRIME management console which gives the identity subject/user the 
power to control (most importantly, this means to withhold the disclosure of) its 
digital identity. The service side of the PRIME system mainly provides access 
control functionalities and handles trust and policy negotiations, as well as data 
disclosure protocols and privacy obligations. These are necessary functionalities for 
the service provider to ensure that users’ decisions concerning their privacy 
preferences are respected. 
 
The PRIME project also manifests in PrimeLife, which carries forth the work of 
PRIME.613 PrimeLife is even more privacy stringent than the PRIME project. This is 
evident in its main objective of enabling sustainable privacy and identity 
management to future networks and services and sub-objectives of understanding 
                                                 
611 ibid  




privacy-enhancing identity management for life, developing web privacy, and 
expanding and propagating tools for privacy friendly identity management.614 
 
User centric models of identity management have their problems. There are 
implementation issues as they require change in organisational and business identity 
set ups and their adoption has been relatively slow.615 
 
Coming out loud and clear in the proposals and development of user centric models 
of identity management is the vision and need to enhance user control and the 
achieve maximum privacy. Most of the user centric models highlighted above seek to 
embody this vision in their design and implementation. But, as cautioned before, this 
is a vision that is highly Western centric, and highly problematic given local 
difference. 
 
4.6. Allied developments: Privacy by Design  
 
‘Privacy by design,’ was developed by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of 
Ontario, Dr. Ann Cavoukian in the nineties, and refers to   
the philosophy and approach of embedding privacy into the design 
specifications of various technologies. This may be achieved by building the 
principles of Fair Information Practices (FIPs)616 into the design, operation 
and management of information processing technologies and systems.617  
 
 
Privacy by design developed in the West and embodies the expectations and needs of 
the digitally advanced societies that place high premiums on the value of privacy of 
                                                 
614 <http://www.primelife.eu/about/factsheet> 
615 Harrison (2007) n554 
616 The FIPs are: Notice/Awareness, Choice/Consent, Access/Participation, Integrity/Security and 
Enforcement/Redress. They were initially developed in the US where they were detailed in the US 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare's 1973 seminal report entitled ‘Records, Computers and 
the Rights of Citizens,’ (1973). See also: The Privacy Protection Study Commission, ‘Personal 
Privacy in an Information Society,’ Report (July 1977) <http://epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report/>; 
Information Infrastructure Task Force, Information Policy Committee, Privacy Working Group, 
‘Privacy and the National Information Infrastructure: Principles for Providing and Using Personal 
Information’ (6 June 1995) <http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/niiprivp.htm>; US Dept. of Commerce, 
‘Privacy and the NII: Safeguarding Telecommunications-Related Personal Information,’ (October 
1995) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/privwhitepaper.html>; CSA, Model Code for the 
Protection of Personal Information: A National Standard of Canada (CSA, Etobicoke 1996)  
617 Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design… Take the Challenge, (Jan 2009), iv, 
<http://www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2010/03/PrivacybyDesignBook.pdf> 
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personal information. This approach envisages privacy as the starting point and 
default in digital identity management618 through the following measures:619 
1. Acknowledgement of the need to address privacy concerns  
2. Application of the basic principles expressing the universal spheres of 
privacy protection  
3. An early alleviation of privacy concerns in the development of any 
technologies  
4. Qualified privacy leadership and/or professional input; and 
5. Adoption and integration of PETs. 
 
Privacy by design speaks of applying the basic principles expressing universal 
spheres of privacy protection. But, there is no such thing as a ‘universal sphere of 
privacy’ or privacy protection, as demonstrated in Chapter 3,620 and will further 
substantiated in Chapters 5621 and 6.622 
 
Privacy by design was applied in relation to Facebook in 2009. Facebook changed its 
privacy and security policies to comply with Canada’s privacy law after discussion 
with the Canadian Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) in line with their 
recommendations.623 Here, the need to address privacy concerns, under the 
assumption that there are universal spheres of privacy protection, led to a change in 
the design of a global identity platform with 250 million global digital identity 
subjects. Action was initiated on the basis of Canadian privacy law that had an effect 
on digital identity subjects who may or may not have similar expectations, privacy 
needs or subscribe to the privacy or personal data protection principles as do 
Canadians. 
 
Thus, privacy by design in the manner it currently manifests fails to take into account 
the simultaneous global and local nature of digital identity and the local contexts of 
digital identity subjects. 
 
                                                 
618 Much like the PRIME system. 




623 M Hartley, ‘Facebook to Tweak Its Privacy, Security Policies To Meet Canadian Law,’ Financial 
Post (17 August 2009) <http://www.financialpost.com/news-
sectors/technology/story.html?id=1901523> 
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4.7. Evaluation of Digital Identity Management  
 
This part now analyses whether digital identity management measures up as an 
effective regulator of digital identity. More importantly it also analyses whether 
digital identity management as currently packaged takes into account the local 
context of digital identity. To this effect, this part first outlines some of the general 
and universal problems of digital identity management;624 then, it specifically shows 
how digital identity management fails to take into account the local context of digital 
identity.625  
 
4.7.1. Mirroring of paper based systems 
 
One of the key criticisms of digital identity management systems is that they mirror 
paper based identity management systems. This was a problem particularly 
highlighted by Jean Camp who states that, “paper-based centuries-old concepts of 
identity are being stapled into the digital age.”626 Jean Camp differentiates between 
paper and digital identity and believes that papers are a different form of technology, 
capable of being “physical self-confirming,” less prone to transactional histories and 
with controllable accessibility and dissemination possibilities.627  Digital identity 
management systems, in their mirroring of paper based identity systems, leave digital 
identity subjects prone to hazards and risks like unmanageable linkage, traceability 
and permanence. These risks and hazards are far more advanced and problematic 
than the risks of paper based systems.  
 
4.7.2. Tools of surveillance 
 
Digital identity management systems have another inherent problematic aspect; they 
can function as tools of surveillance.628  The administration of identity inevitably also 
                                                 
624 4.7.1 - 4.7.5  
625 4.7.6, 4.7.7 
626 L Jean Camp, ‘Digital Identity,’ (2004) 23 (3) IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, 34-41, 39 
627 ibid, 40 
628 Michael Freeman, ‘Counterterrorism and Privacy: The Changing Landscape of Surveillance and 
Civil Liberties,’ in Lee Freeman and Graham Peace (eds), Information Ethics: Privacy and 
Intellectual Property (Information Science Publishing, Hershey 2004), 163-179; O Gandy, ‘The 
Surveillance Society: Information Technology and Bureaucratic Social Control,’(1989) 39 (3) Journal 
of Communication, 61-76 
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results in pinning down and locating digital identities in the context of time and 
space; creating logs of activity from which behavioural patterns can be gauged. 
Identity management creates trails of how and when digital identities were created, 
what they were used for, whether they were rejected, why they were rejected, the 
number of times the identity was used as also where it was used.629  
 
Identity management systems have the propensity to double up as individual or mass 
surveillance systems.630 This is particularly evident in the case of ID cards, national 
identity systems, border management systems and even online identity management 
tools.  
 
The administration and control of identity through ID cards that are linked to 
databases creates immense opportunities for surveillance of the digital identity 
subject, as highlighted by Lyon.631 Such surveillance, Lyon states, “is typically 
centred on data from the human body, is automated, connected with control, 
especially access control and aims at universal coverage within specific 
jurisdictions.”632 
 
The immense potential of identity management systems to function as surveillance 
mechanisms is also illustrated by identity management systems used at borders by 
immigration authorities to establish and authenticate identity on entry and departure 
from a country.633 For instance, the use of facial recognition, iris scanning and 
fingerprinting.  
The surveillance potential of identity management systems is also evident online in 
the context of the Passport and SXIP examples. Passport facilitated surveillance of 
                                                 
629 CJ Bennett, ‘Cookies, Web Bugs, Webcams and Cue Cats: Patterns of Surveillance on the World 
Wide Web,’ (2001) 3 (3) Ethics and Information Technology, 195-208 
630 Great Britain Parliament House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, ‘A Surveillance Society?’ 
5th Report of Session 2007-08, Vol 2, Oral and Written Evidence, House of Commons Papers 58-II 
2007-08, (TSO), 136, 273 
631 Lyon (2009) n507; David Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk, and Digital 
Discrimination (Routledge, London 2003); David Lyon, ‘Identity Cards: Social Sorting by Database,’ 
OII Internet Issue Brief No. 3 (2004), <http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/publications.cfm> 
632 Lyon (2009) n507, 45 
633 K Aas, ‘Getting Ahead of the Game: Border Technologies and the Changing Space of 
Governance,’ in E Zureik and MB Salter (eds) Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, 
Identity (Willan Publishing, Devon 2005), 194-214; S Graham and D Wood, ‘Digitizing Surveillance: 
Categorization, Space, Inequality,’ (2003) 23 (2) Critical Social Policy, 227-48; David Lyon, ‘The 
Border is Everywhere: ID Cards, Surveillance and the Other,’ in E Zuriek & MB Salter (eds) Global 
Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security and Identity (Willan Publishing, Devon 2005), 66-82 
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digital identity subjects through use of cookies and SXIP enables surveillance 
through its ability to keep track of multiple user ids, passwords and personal data 
shared on the web. 
 
4.7.3. Implementation and application difficulties  
 
Digital identity management systems are also susceptible to various problems in their 
implementation and application. Sommer put together a comprehensive list of 
these:634  point of issue failures (i.e. acceptance of erroneous credential or 
unauthorised identity linkages), susceptibility to management failures (e.g. failure or 
compromise of the database/technology validating data against presentation of 
credentials, failure of the database or other technology to grant privileges against 
credentials, failure to adequately handle and address the re-issue of lost credentials, 
passwords/tokens, revocation of obsolete credentials and failure of the system to 
perform as specified).635 
 
Identity management systems may also be subject to general technology 
compromises like data theft, loss or cracking of passwords, token compromises, 
system or terminal hardware compromises, communications eavesdropping, man-in-
the middle attacks and phishing.  
 
4.7.4. Industry based regulatory uncertainty  
 
There are also other concerns that arise in relation to identity management. While 
digital identity management is used to manage digital identities via digital identity 
management architecture (protocols, processes and systems), one source of the 
identity problem, the behaviour of commercial entities involved in the identity 
management industry is largely an unregulated free for all. This is a view supported 
                                                 
634 P Sommer, ‘Identity Management Systems: The Forensic Dimensions,’ The 18th Annual  FIRST 
Conference, Seville (June 2007) <http://www.first.org/conference/2007/papers/sommer-peter-
slides.pdf> 
635 Others include emergency measures lack adequate security, compromise in the access control list 
or validation database, unauthorised or ultra vires access to and release of data, poor system 
protection, external breaches and corruption in management personnel.  
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by Gasser who questions whether “industry-controlled” self-regulatory schemes will 
be effective to ensure that digital identities are sufficiently protected.636 This is 
because identity management practices vary from industry to industry and are subject 
to constant evolution.637 The manner in which these commercial entities – private 
and public – conduct themselves is not transparent, open or accountable. There is 
much progress to be made in making digital identity management more transparent 
and visible to digital identity subjects and setting parameters to measure its 
legitimacy. 
 
4.7.5. Presumptuousness and fallacy of user control  
 
Digital identity management in its contemporary form, aims to provide augmented 
‘user control’ of digital identities. User control refers to the power of the digital 
identity subject to determine and direct how one’s digital identity, its attributes, 
relationships are created, constructed, maintained and decommissioned.  
 
User control is hailed, along with privacy, as a critical factor of identity management; 
particularly in the user centric forms of identity management, which advocate that 
individuals must be placed in greater control over their identities,638 attributes and 
identity relationships.639 It is also hailed as one of the elements that determines the 
success or failure of an identity management system.640  
However, user control is over rated and fraught with a number of problems.641 
Controlling digital identities may not be a primary or equal concern for all digital 
                                                 
636 Urs Gasser, ‘Identity 2.0: Privacy as Code and Policy’  (9 February 2006) 
<http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ugasser/2006/02/09/identity-20-privacy-as-code-and-policy/>  
637 ME Price and SG Verhulst, ‘In Search of the Self: Charting the Course of Self-Regulation on the 
Internet in a Global Environment,’ in CT Marsden (ed), Regulating the Global Information Society 
(Routledge, London 2000), 57-78, 58 
638 This message is particularly evident in the context of the UK. See Great Britain Parliament House 
of Lords Science and Technology Committee, Personal Internet Security, 5th Report of Session 2006-
07, Vol. 2 Evidence, HL papers 165-II 2006-07 (TSO, 2007)  
639 A Bhargav-Spantzel, J Camenisch, T Gross and D Sommer, ‘User Centricity: A Taxonomy and 
Open Issues,’ (2007) 15 (5), J Comp Secur, 493-527. 
640  Cameron (2005) n131 
641 Discussed in detail in R Rodrigues, ‘User Control Problems and Taking User Empowerment 
Further,’ in V Matyáš and ors (eds), The Future of Identity, IFIP AICT 298 (Springer, Germany 
2009), 211-225 
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identity subjects,642 because individuals have a subjective relationship with digital 
identity. Control of digital identity can never be absolute. Also, what a digital 
identity subject expects and receives in the form of control might be two different 
things. Increased user control might also lead to increased user liability (users put in 
control will be expected to know and take responsibility for any acts or omissions 
that result in respect of their digital identity or that of others).643 
 
 
4.7.6. Pre-occupation with privacy and data protection 
 
Much of contemporary digital identity management, particularly solutions developed 
in the digitally advanced West, often begin and conclude with strong privacy and 
data protection arguments. The technologies examined in this Chapter demonstrate 
how the Western concepts of privacy and data protection have become their main 
stay and feature strongly in their design and orientation (as in the case of the Laws of 
Identity and other user centric technologies). This is highly problematic and means 
that digital identity management technologies and systems are not value neutral 
technologies,644 containing and representing widely the privacy and data protection 
values of the digitally advanced West.  
 
But, digital identity management technologies are not one continent, one country 
technologies. These technologies are globally rolled out and adopted. But as 
evidenced in the previous chapter, digital identity subjects in different countries 
experience digital identity divergently. Thus, the presumption made that all digital 
identity subjects are similarly privacy and data protection conscious, want and are 
                                                 
642 ibid, 212  
643 Rodrigues (2009) n641, 217 
644 These technologies have largely developed in the West and Europe and carry within them the 
prevalent values and experience of these countries. Though this is not a reason to reject the validity of 
these technologies outright, it is relevant point to note in negotiating a regulatory future for digital 
identity that has both global dimensions and local relevance. Also, despite the arguments in favour of 
the neutrality of technology, there is a strong argument in this case that identity management 
technologies are non-neutral in their imbibing and carrying largely the values and experience of the 
digitally advanced West. This reasoning is supported in the general context of technology by Enrique 
Gonzalez-Manet, The Hidden War of Information (ABC-CLIO, Westport 1989), 53; Bonnie A Nardi 
and VL O’Day, Information Ecologies: using Technology with Heart (MIT, USA 1999), 60; SV 
Monsma (ed), Responsible Technology (WBE Publishing, Michigan 1986), 25, 31 
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willing and able to protect their digital identity is highly problematic if not irrelevant 
to societies where this is not true. Like India for example where privacy and data 
protection operates at entirely antithetical levels compared to the UK. 
 
As privacy (and the expectation, need and manner of control of digital identity) is 
affected by local difference,645 some identity management technologies might lose 
their relevance and even be subject to rejection. For instance, an identity 
management technology that promotes anonymity through unlinkability might be 
illegal in a jurisdiction where the law mandates norms of traceability and linkability. 
PETs and minimal disclosure technologies might be deemed socially and legally 
unacceptable and thus rejected. These are matters to be addressed, and not lightly 
dismissed, if identity management is to become universally relevant. 
 
4.7.7. Ignorance of the local context of digital identity  
 
Digital identity management, in contemporary form, ignores the local context of 
digital identity. The underlying assumption that identity management technologies 
are universally valid is contentious.646 While taking all local contexts into account in 
the implementation of digital identity management solutions would be impossible, it 
must still be recognised that the dominant digital identity management solutions in 
current form are highly Western ‘expectation, need and value oriented.’ Yet, digital 
identity management solutions are not a one country nor one continent technology.   
 
Digital identity management, as it currently manifests and in its embodiment of the 
expectations and values of the digitally advanced West does not sufficiently 
represent the wider world community interests specially of countries like India with 
different types of identity cultures and needs, and who have not been able to 
                                                 
645 As determined in Ch 3. Further substantiated by Sandra S Petronio, Boundaries of Privacy: 
Dialectics of Disclosure (Suny, Albany 2002), 40-42; JM Gregor and T Gregor, ‘Privacy: A Cultural 
View,’ in JR Pennock and JW Chapman (eds), Privacy Nomos XIII (Atherton Press, NY 1971), 199-
225.  
646 This assumption is manifest in the embedding of high and arbitrary privacy standards into identity 
management technologies.  
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“influence the episteme, or fundamental knowledge, upon which the regime is 
built.”647  
 
For instance in privacy centric and data protection conscious societies648 like Europe 
and the UK in particular, individuals are perceived as desiring to control and manage 
their digital lives and identities.649 They are seen as willing to protect their privacy 
and personal autonomy and taking and supporting measures to manage their 
identity.650 The majority of identity management solutions aim to provide them just 
that,651 as does the law.652  
 
But there are global differences. In jurisdictions like India, identity management does 
not occur at the same level as that in the West. This is because of local difference 
identified in Chapter 3. Individuals bring their local contexts to digital identity, and 
into the need and manner of management of digital identity. Individuals who 
attribute a lower level of importance to privacy would be slow in the use and uptake 
of identity management solutions that promote this feature. Similarly individuals 
accustomed to their identities being part of the collective commons might not 
perceive the need to use identity management solutions that ‘gate’ their digital 
identities. 
                                                 
647 DL Cogburn, ‘Partners or Pawns? Implications for Developing Countries of Elite Decision-Making 
and Epistemic Communities in Global Information Policy on Developing Countries and Transnational 
Civil Society’ (2005) 18 (2) Knowledge Technology and Policy, 52-82 
648 A privacy centric and data protection conscious society is one in which the protection of privacy 
and data ranks reasonably high in terms of desire for it. In such societies established privacy and data 
protection culture and norms of behaviour facilitate privacy and data protection, privacy ranks high on 
the public policy agenda and there is evidence of concerted efforts to protect and safeguard privacy 
and data. See CJ Bennett, The Privacy Advocates: Resisting the Spread of Surveillance (MIT Press,  
USA 2008), xi, xii 
649 Much of the digital identity and digital identity management and regulation literature based in the 
digitally advanced West reflects this. See Drummond Reed and Jerry Kindall, ‘Digital Identity,’ in 
Hossein Bidgoli (ed), The Internet Encyclopedia Volume 1 (John Wiley and Sons Ltd, NY 2004), 493-
504, 493; Hossein Bidgoli, Handbook of Information Security (v. 2): Information Warfare, Social, 
Legal and International Issues and Security (John Wiley and Sons Ltd, NY 2006); Roger Dean, 
‘Identity Management: Back to the User,’ (2006) 12 Network Security, 4-7; Paul De Hert, ‘Identity 
Management of e-ID, Privacy and Security in Europe: A Human Rights View,’ (2008) 13 (2) 
Information Security Technical Report, 71-75; OECD (2007) n140, 22; Camenisch (2005) n484, 20-
27; Cameron (2005) n131 
650 This has fed into the design and development of identity management solutions in the digitally 
advanced West. For instance, the Laws of Identity and user centric identity management.  
651 It is recognised that while people want and are able to take measures to manage their digital 
identities, they may choose not to do so.  




This chapter appraised digital identity management - the movement and the 
technology, which aims at giving digital identity subjects control over their digital 
identities. But, digital identity management as a technical measure, while a positive 
development, is a limited, and by itself, incomplete tool to help individuals control 
their digital identity or identities, which is what it is generally sold as enabling. It is a 
tool that is flawed in the presumptions it makes and its ability to function as the 
ultimate golden or even silver bullet to safeguard digital identity of individuals.  
 
Not just that, it is also flawed in the assumptions it makes about the universal 
relevance of the dominant Western values and interests it currently promotes.653 It 
does not take account of local difference. This is particularly problematic given that 
there are divergent local contexts of digital identity and digital identity subjects as 
individuals from different cultures have different expectations and needs in respect of 
digital identity.  
 
Therefore, we look next, to a more resilient instrument of regulating digital identity: 



















                                                 
653 Robin Wilton, ‘What’s the Value of Your Digital Identity,’ Keynote Address, OTS 2010, Maribor 
(June 2010) <http://www.futureidentity.eu/documents/RW-Maribor.pdf> 
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5. The legal regulation of digital identity: Comparative overview of the law 
regulating digital identity in the UK and India  
 
No civilization would ever have been possible without a framework of stability, to 
provide the wherein for the flux of change. Foremost among the stabilizing factors, 
more enduring than customs, manners and traditions are the legal systems that 
regulate our life in the world and our daily affairs with each other.  
-Hannah Arendt654 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
Law is a significant regulator of digital identity.655 This chapter, an account of the 
law regulating digital identity, investigates the different laws that regulate digital 
identity.656 It makes a comprehensive and contemporary comparative overview of the 
legal regulation of digital identities in the UK and India. This is of great importance 
to the current and future legal scholarship in law, identity management and identity 
regulation, because thus far, particularly in the West, the digital identity regulatory 
literature has been overtly focussed on issues of digital identity from the privacy and 
data protection perspective. Yet, not all digital identity problems are issues of 
privacy and data protection.  
 
Also, given that identity can be a global and simultaneously local phenomenon, what 
is the relationship between law and digital identity from the international 
perspective? Is it universally similar? More specifically, how does the legal 
regulation of digital identity occur in locally diverse jurisdictions like the UK and 
India? These questions form the crux of this chapter. 
 
5.2. The law regulating digital identity  
 
The relationship between law and digital identities is not simple; it is a complex one. 
This is because, just as there are many forms and natures of digital identities, there 
                                                 
654 German-born American political philosopher, (1906-1975) 
655 L Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, NY 1999) 
656 How the law regulates digital identity surfaces to different degrees in the works of Beth Simone 
Noveck (US), The FIDIS Consortium (Europe), Roger Clarke (Australia), Paul De Hert (Brussels), 
Roger Brownsword (UK), Lawrence Lessig (US), P Giordano (US), Susan P Crawford (US), Josh 
Blackman (US), Clare Sullivan (Australia) and Sherry Turkle (US). See bibliography.  
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are also different laws within law,657 with different form, substance and nature that 
affect digital identity.658 This section examines the prevalent legal regulatory regime 
applicable to digital identity in the UK659 and India in the following order: criminal 
law, law of fundamental rights and freedoms (constitutional and human rights law), 
law of national identity schemes, contract law, intellectual property law, tort law and 
data protection law. 
 
5.2.1. Criminal law  
 
Identity related crime660 has by and large traditionally been subject in large part to 
criminal law and criminal law remains one of the significant regulators of digital 
identities in respect of crimes committed in connection to it. Identity related crime 
manifests in activities like identity fraud, phishing,661 account hacking (unauthorised 
access to account), identity piggybacking (whether through account, IP address or 
system), man in the middle attacks,662 pharming,663social engineering664 and Sybil 
attacks.665 
 
But how does criminal law regulate digital identity? At the international level there is 
no criminal framework regulating digital identity crime even though it often has 
trans-national implications. The only international legal instrument providing an 
                                                 
657 Per Burgess, law represents, “a deep and complexly layered constellation of structures, norms, 
interests and authoritative practices.” JP Burgess, ‘Law and Cultural Identity,’ ARENA Working 
Papers, WP 97/14 
658 Laws are largely jurisdictional creatures, with diverse form, substance, nature and enforcement. 
659 In the context of the UK, EU law (whether in the form of legislation or case law) applies to the UK 
by virtue of the European Communities Act 1972 and prevails unless a contrary intent is expressly 
expressed by the UK parliament. See McCarthys Ltd v Smith [1979] 3 All ER 325; Thoburn v 
Sunderland City Council [2002] 3 WLR 247. The final effect of EU law finally depends on the law of 
its member states. See TC Hartley, European Union Law in a Global Context: Text, Cases and 
Material (CUP, Cambridge 2004), 164 
660 Defined by Koops and Leenes as “all punishable activities that have identity as a target or a 
principal tool.” BJ Koops and RE Leenes, ‘ID theft, ID fraud and/or ID-related Crime: Definitions 
Matter,’ (2006) 30 (9) Datenschutz und Datensicherheit, 553–556 
661 Online activity conducted to make the persons disclose personal or secret information. 
662 A situation where a fake website is substituted for a real website. See Birch (2007) n122, 83  
663 Pharming occurs when “a worm controls a PC to reroute a user generated banking URL request to 
an illegal website that looks legitimate and captures user data.” Birch (2007) n122, 82 
664 The use of a variety of techniques to manipulate people into divulging personal or confidential 
information. MT Biegelman, Identity Theft Handbook: Detection, Prevention and Security, (John 
Wiley and Sons, NJ 2009) 
665 A Sybil attack occurs when “a single node presents multiple identities to other nodes in the 
network.” Erdal Cayirci and Chunming Rong, Security in Wireless Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks 
(John Wiley and Sons, Chichester 2009), 115 
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international criminal law framework is the Council of Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime,666 premised on the need to pursue a “common criminal policy” in the 
digital and technologically converged world and concerned with digital criminal 
offences. The Convention highlights the need for States and the private sector to 
cooperate in cybercrime matters667 and makes specific mention of crimes like illegal 
access (Article 2), illegal interception (Article 3), data interference (Article 4), 
system interference (Article 5), device misuse (Article 6), computer related forgery 
(Article 7) fraud (Article 8), child pornography (Article 9) and intellectual property 
offences (Article 10).  
 
Regulating digital identity through criminal law is primarily a national endeavour, 
and there are significant differences in the approaches of different countries.668 An 





The key legislations affecting digital identity under the criminal law framework in 
the UK are the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (CMA 1990)669 and the Fraud Act 
2006.670  
 
The CMA 1990 regulates offences relating to unauthorised computer access for 
identity related crime (though it does not specifically mention identity crime).  It 
deals with offences like unauthorised access to computer material (section 1), 
unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate commission of further 
offences (section 2), unauthorised modification of computer material (section 3) and 
                                                 
666 The Convention was signed by the UK on 23 November 2001 (unratified). It is neither signed nor 
ratified by India.  
667 See Covention Preamble. 
668 Bert-Jaap Koops and ors, ‘A Typology of Identity-Related Crime,’ (2009) 12 (1) Communication 
& Society, 11- 24, 13 
669 The Act followed R v Gold [1988] 2 All ER 186 
670 The Act extends to England, Wales and Northern Ireland and not Scotland (except s 10(1) which 
amends the Companies Act 1985). It repeals the deception offences in ss 15, 15A, 16, and 20(2) of the 
Theft Act 1968; ss 15, 15A, 16 and 19(2) of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969; ss 1 and 2 of the 
Theft Act 1978 and Arts 3 and 4 of the Theft (Northern Ireland) Order 1978. See Explanatory Notes to 
the Act. 
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legal procedure associated with the prosecution of these offences. Any of these acts 
committed in relation to digital identity would be actionable under the Act. 
Before and while the CMA 1990 has been in force, other legal provisions were and 
have been used to deal with computer-related crime and digital identity offences like 
fraud.671 The Fraud Act 2006, which came into force on 15 January 2007, provides 
criminal liability for identity related crime like fraud and the dishonest obtaining of 
services.672 It eliminates the previously established deception offences regime,673 and 
makes fraud a new distinct crime category with a wider scope.674  
 
The Fraud Act 2006 provides criminal liability for fraud and dishonestly obtaining 
services. It covers fraud by false representation, fraud by failing to disclose 
information or fraud by abuse of position.675 Per section 2, fraud by false 
representation occurs when a person dishonestly makes a false representation, and 
intends, by making the representation either to make a gain for himself or another, or 
to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss. All conditions being 
satisfied, this would cover phishing,676 pharming and credit card fraud.677  
 
When digital identity is manipulated and used to commit criminal offences, it is 
punishable under law and is evident in the cases of R v Breakwell678 and R v Scott.679  
Thus, criminal law regulates digital identity in the UK. 
 
 
                                                 
671 Eg, the Theft Acts of 1968 and 1978 and the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981.  
672 This includes offences like phishing, pharming, spoofing, other identity based misrepresentations 
and deceptions. 
673 Specifically, ss 15, 15A, 15B and 16 of the Theft Act 1968 and ss 1 and 2 of the Theft Act 1978. 
The Fraud Act has been criticised for moving the focus from deception to dishonesty, its omission to 
specifically define of key concepts like ‘fraud’, ‘false’ or ‘abuse’ and the shift in the liability 
threshold. See M Johnson and KM Rogers, ‘The Fraud Act 2006: The E-Crime Prosecutor's 
Champion or the Creator of a New Inchoate Offence?’ (2007) 21 (3) IRLCT, 295-304; B Summers, 
‘The Fraud Act 2006: Has it Had Any Impact?’ (2008) 75 Amicus Curiae, <http://sas-
space.sas.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/10065/1783/1/amicus75_summers.pdf.pdf>; BI Adungo, ‘Will the 
Fraud Act 2006 'Get the Law Right?' A Study of the Effectiveness of Applying Criminal Sanctions to 
Penalise Fraud in the 'Commercial Sphere',’ (Masters Thesis, University of Manchester 2007/08) 
675 S 1 (1)  
676 R v Wellman [2007] EWCA Crim 2874 
677 D Bainbridge, ‘Criminal Law Tackles Computer Fraud and Misuse,’ (2007) 23 (3) CLSR, 276-281, 
277 
678 [2009] EWCA Crim 2298 (appeal dismissed) 




Criminal law, vis a vis the Indian Penal Code 1860 (IPC)680 and the Code of 
Criminal Procedure 1973 (CrPC), provides the bulwark of protection for digital 
identities in India and this is evident in provisions of the IPC like sections 415 
(cheating), 416 (cheating by personation), 417 (punishment for cheating), 419 
(punishment for cheating by personation), 468 (includes electronic forgery), 469 
(forgery to harm reputation), 499 (defamation), 500 (punishment for defamation) and 
section 507 (criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication).681   
 
In addition, the ITA 2000 (as amended by ITAA 2008) encompasses offences in 
relation to digital identity in Chapter XI, specifically sections 65-74,682 and in 
particular section 66.  
 
Section 66 provides that any person who either dishonestly683 or fraudulently684 
indulges in any Section 43 acts (unauthorized access and extraction/use of data, 
hacking, damage or disruption, computer contamination, damages or disrupts a 
computer system, denies access, in a misrepresenting manner tampers or manipulates 
and abets such acts) shall be punishable with imprisonment of up to three years, fine 
extending to five lakh rupees685 or both.  
 
The ITAA 2008 added in sections 66A (punishment for sending offensive messages 
through computer resources or communication devices), 66B (punishment for 
dishonest possession of computer resources or devices), 66C (punishment for identity 
theft), 66D (punishment for computer based cheating by personation), 66E 
                                                 
680 Particularly, ss 420, 463-470 on forgery. 
681 Indo-Asian News Service, ‘Charges Framed Against Student For Threat Mail to Kalam,’ (3 
September 2009) <http://news.in.msn.com/national/article.aspx?cp-documentid=3202934> 
682 S 65 (tampering with computer source documents), S 66 (computer related offences), s 67 
(punishment for publication or transmission of obscene material), s 68 (Power of Controller to give 
directions), S 69 (Directions for interception or monitoring), s 70 (protected systems), s 71 (penalty 
for misrepresentation), s 72 (penalty for breach of confidentiality), s 73 (penalty for publication of 
false electronic signatures), S 74 (publication of electronic signature for fraudulent purposes) 
683 Per s 24, IPC, dishonestly means “with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or 
wrongful loss to another person.” 
684 Per s 25, IPC, fraudulently means “with intent to defraud but not otherwise.” 
685 Approximately £7000. 
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(punishment for privacy violation)686 and Section 66F (punishment for cyber 
terrorism).  
 
Of the above, Section 66C is particularly noteworthy as it prescribes punishment for 
‘identity theft’ (undefined by the Act). According to this section, any person who 
fraudulently or dishonestly makes use of the electronic signature, password of any 
other unique identification feature of any other person shall be punished with 
imprisonment that might extend to three years and fine extending up to one lakh 
rupees.687 This section would bring within its ambit a number of unlawful acts 
committed in relation to digital identity. 
 
The first successful conviction and sentencing in connection to digital identity in 
India under the criminal (and IT law framework) happened in the case of State of 
Tamil Nadu v Suhas Katti688 which concerned the posting of obscene, defamatory 
and annoying messages about a divorcee woman in the Yahoo! message group. This 
was followed by Nasscom v Ajay Sood689 in which the Delhi High Court declared 
phishing on the Internet to be an illegal act entailing an injunction and the recovery 
of damages.  
 
Criminal law vis a vis the IPC has always been used by itself or in conjunction with 
the ITA 2000) to prosecute digital identity crime.690  The ITA 2000, even as 
amended by ITAA 2008, has not been taken as strong enough to provide an effective 
framework for regulating digital identities due to its evolving form and unclear 
scope.691 
                                                 
686 Privacy here has a limited ambit and specifically relates to privacy of “private parts of the body” in 
circumstances of reasonable expectation of privacy. See explanation to section. 
687 Approx £1500  
688 CC No. 4680/2004 5 November 2004 (AMM, Egmore) 
689 2005 (30) PTC 437 
690 See Katti n688. Applicable sections were s 67 of ITA 2000 and ss 469 and 509 IPC  
691 G Sreekala, ‘Much Hyped IT Act Stays a Dead Letter,’ Times News Network (20 July 2006) 
<http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/Business_Law/General_Law/Much_hyped_IT_Act_stay
s_a_dead_letter/articleshow/1783026.cms>; P Duggal, ‘Cyberlaw in India: The Information 
Technology Act 2000 - Some Perspectives,’ (6 September 2001) 
<http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=13430&print=1>; S Basu and R Jones, ‘E-commerce 
and the Law: A  Review of India’s Information Technology Act 2000,’ (2003) 12 (1) Contemporary 
South Asia, 7-24 
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On the whole, both in the UK and India criminal law operates well to regulate digital 
identity. 
 
5.2.2. Fundamental rights and freedoms: Constitutional and human rights 
law  
 
Digital identity regulation also occurs in relation to fundamental rights and freedoms 
principally the following key areas: right to privacy and right to freedom of speech, 
expression and association.692 These fundamental rights and freedoms manifest in 
UK human rights law and Indian constitutional law respectively.693  
 
5.2.2.1.Right to privacy  
 
First, this section analyses the human right respect for private and family life in the 
context of the UK and then it analyses the constitutional right to privacy in India.   
 
5.2.2.1.1. UK: Right to respect for private and family life  
 
The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)694 incorporates the right to 
respect for private and family life in Article 8, which in the European context, is the 
most significant digital identity impacting legal provision. Article 8 states: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence.  
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
 
                                                 
692 There might be other areas of law that might apply, given the complex nature of digital identity eg, 
right to life, equality, cultural and educational rights. 
693 Indian constitutional law is embedded in a single, codified and fairly rigid Constitution which 
functions as the Supreme Lex Loci.  Umeshwar Varma, Law, Legislature and Judiciary (Mittal 
Publications, India 1996), 21; GB Reddy and Mohd Suhaib, Constitution of India and Professional 
Ethics (IKI Publishing, New Delhi 2009), 3. Reiterated in SR Bommai v Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 
1, Vimal CJ Jain v Shri Pradhan 1979 AIR 1501 and Basheshar Nath v Commr of Income Tax 1959 
AIR 149  
694 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. As 
Member of the EU Community obliged to give effect to Community law and signatory to the ECHR, 
the UK is obligated by the ECHR particularly post the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 
which mandates giving effect to the ECHR in the UK. See Section 3, HRA 1998. 
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First and foremost, Article 8 protects and guarantees individual autonomy. This is 
reiterated by the statement of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
Christine Goodwin v The United Kingdom: “Under Article 8 of the Convention in 
particular… the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the 
interpretation of its guarantees.”695  
 
Article 8 includes a right to identity. This is demonstrated by the large number of 
cases adjudicated on various aspects of identity. For instance, Burghartz v 
Switzerland (change of family name),696 Bensaid v the United Kingdom (preservation 
of mental stability),697 Pretty v the United Kingdom (choice to end life),698 Odievre v 
France (birth confidentiality),699 Smirnova v Russia (national identity papers),700 KA 
and AD v Belgium (right to engage in sexual relations),701 Jaggi v Switzerland 
(attempt to establish ancestry),702 Mizzi v Malta (contesting paternity)703 and Evans v 
United Kingdom (withdrawal of consent to IVF treatment).704  
 
Article 8 also protects personal data. This is evidenced by cases like Goodwin, Klass 
v Germany (covert surveillance),705 Leander v Sweden (logging of personal or 
political background on state registers),706 Gaskin v the United Kingdom (refusal of 
public authority to grant access to formative year records),707 Amann v Switzerland 
(interception of telephone call and creation of card with personal information of 
subject in public prosecutor’s office),708 Rotaru v Romania (file on private life by 
Romanian Intelligence Service),709 PG and JH v the United Kingdom (covert 
                                                 
695 ECtHR, App 28957/95 (11 July 2002) 
696 n166 
697 (2001) 33 EHRR 10 
698 (2002) 35 EHRR 1 
699 (2004) 38 EHRR 43 
700 (2004) 39 EHRR 450  
701 ECtHR, Apps 42758/98 and 45558/99 (17 February 2005) 
702 ECtHR, App 58757/00 (13 July 2006) 
703 [2006] 1 FCR 256 354 
704 (2006) 46 EHRR 321 
705 (1978) 2 EHRR 214  
706 (1987) 9 EHRR 433 
707 (1990) 12 EHRR 36 
708 (2000) 30 EHRR 843  
709 ECtHR, App 28341/95 (4 May 2000) 
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surveillance)710 and Segerstedt-Wiberg v Sweden (storage of personal data for 
national security purposes)711 Peck v the United Kingdom (publication of CCTV 
images of person wielding knife in street)712 and S and Marper v the United Kingdom 
(unlimited retention of personal data).713 This further establishes the fused nature of 
the relationship between autonomy, identity, data protection and privacy in Europe, 
which might explain why the digital identity regulatory discourse in Europe has been 
overtly focussed on these aspects. The broad ambit of protection afforded under 
Article 8 makes it clear that any act in respect of an individual’s digital identity that 
breaches private and family life would come within its scope.  
 
The ECHR Article 8 right to respect for private and family life is incorporated into 
UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998), in Article 8 Part I, Schedule 1. 
The HRA 1998 protects this right by making it enforceable. It makes several 
provisions in this respect. First, it guarantees that local primary legislation must 
comply with the Convention right; thus any legislation going contrary to the right 
could be declared incompatible with the right.714 It also makes it unlawful for public 
authorities to act in manners incompatible with the Convention rights. Thus, if a 
public authority is found to be violating the right, proceedings may be brought 
against it for just and appropriate relief or remedy.715 
 
5.2.2.1.2. India: right to privacy  
 
There is no explicit human or constitutional right to privacy in India. But, a 
constitutional right to privacy for persons716 exists through a judicial reading of it 
into Article 21 (right to life or personal liberty)717 of the Constitution of India. Most 
privacy cases under Article 21 relate to invasions of privacy by the 
State/government, as fundamental rights are primarily available against the State and 
                                                 
710 [2000] ECHR 192 
711 [2007] EHRR 2 (CCHR) 
712 (2003) 36 EHRR 41  
713 [2008] ECHR 1581 
714 S 4 
715 S 8(1), HRA 1998 
716 The right to privacy was found not to exist under Article 21 for corporations. Petronet LNG Ltd v 
Indian Petro Group CS (OS) 1102/2006, 22 April 2009 (Delhi High Court) § 38 
717 Article 21 states that “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according 
to procedure established by law.” This is the most important fundamental right that is guaranteed 
against State infringement. 
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its agents. But fundamental rights can also be invoked against private persons as 
demonstrated in the cases of Bodhisattwa Gautam v Subhra Chakraborty718 and Zee 
Telefilms Ltd v Union of India.719  
 
The right to privacy, under Article 21, has been applied in a limited number of cases 
on: unlawful interference through domiciliary visits (Kharak Singh v The State of 
UP),720 police surveillance (Govind v State of MP),721 freedom of the press (R 
Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu)722 telephone tapping (People's Union for Civil 
Liberties v Union of India),723 disclosure of HIV status (Mr ‘X’ v Hospital ‘Z’),724 
search and seizure provisions (District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad v Canara 
Bank)725 and power of the Court to direct a party to undergo a medical examination 
(Sharda v Dharampal).726 In these cases, the right to privacy has manifested as: a 
right to be let alone, and a right to safeguard one’s privacy and the privacy of one’s 
family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education. Though this 
is optimistic and might seem like Article 21 offers extremely good privacy protection 
to individuals, this is hardly the case.  
 
The scope of the right to privacy under Article 21 has been strictly demarcated. The 
right to privacy is not an inviolable or absolute right.727 It is always to be balanced 
against other rights and values as held in Govind.728 In Mr. ‘X,’ 729 it was determined 
that the right to privacy was subject to lawful action taken for the prevention of 
crime, disorder, to protect health, morals or the rights and freedom of others. In the 
case of a conflict between two fundamental rights, it has been determined that the 
one which advances public morality would take precedence.730 Courts in India in 
                                                 
718 AIR 1996 SC 922 
719 AIR 2005 SC 2677 
720 (1964) 1 SCR 332. Privacy as a right to personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, 
motherhood, procreation and child-bearing. 
721 (1975) 2 SCC 148 
722 (1994) 6 SCC 632.  
723 (1997) 1 SCC 301.  
724 (1998) 8 SCC 296 
725 (2005) 1 SCC 496 
726 (2003) 4 SCC 493 
727 KJ Doraisamy v The Asst General Manager, WP 17761/2006 (Chennai High Court) 
728 n721 
729 n724 
730 (2003) 4 SCC 493. Supported in the Swami Nithyanandaji Maharaj case, CS 346/2010, (Chennai 
High Court).  
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privacy litigations have given it extremely limited berth,731 demonstrating a strong 
reluctance to inflate the scope of the private sphere.732 
 
The right to privacy under the Indian Constitution differs in several respects in 
comparison to the right to private life in the ECHR. First, the right to privacy under 
Article 21 is not a tool for the individual to declare or protect his autonomy733 rather 
it exists to protect personal liberty734 and dignity.735 Second, it offers very limited 
theoretical protection to digital identity as there are no cases (except PUCL) in which 
it has been used to protect digital identity. In contrast, Article 8 of the ECHR has 
been used to protect key facets of an individual’s digital identity like personal 
information, database identity, DNA profiles and CCTV images.  
 
Thus, unlike the broad and robust protection offered by Article 8 in Europe and the 
UK, the constitutional right to privacy in India offers weak protection to individuals 
in respect of their digital identity.  
 
 
5.2.2.2.Right to freedom of speech, expression, association and assembly 
 
Speech, expression and association are important elements of digital identity. This 
section analyses what protection the law offers to these elements by virtue of 
fundamental rights and freedoms it provides. 
 
In the UK, the right to freedom of expression and the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and association are two different rights under the human rights framework. 
In India on the other hand, the right to freedoms of speech, expression, assembly and 
association are embodied in a single provision in the Constitution. 
                                                 
731 This was evident in MP Sharma v Satish Chandra AIR 1954 SC 300, where the Supreme Court 
held that “there was no justification to import the right to privacy into our Constitution by a process of 
strained construction.”  
732 In Petronet, only health, personal relationships and finances were brought within the scope of the 
private sphere envisaged under Article 21. 
733 The Indian Constitution does not deny the place of individual autonomy; rather recognises it only 
in a limited role. Govind n721 § 23  
734 See comments of VR Krishna Iyer, LJ (concurring) in Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (1978) 1 
SCC 248. “The spirit of man is at the root of Article 21. Absent liberty, other freedoms are frozen.”  
735 (1975) 2 SCC 148 
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5.2.2.2.1. UK  
 
The right to freedom of expression and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association are now analysed. 
 
5.2.2.2.1.1.Right to freedom of expression 
 
The right to freedoms of expression, as found in Article 10 of the ECHR,736 is 
enshrined in Article 10, Part I, Schedule 1 of HRA 1998 which gives effect to it. 
According to this right, a person is entitled to hold opinions, receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authorities, regardless of 
frontiers subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. For instance, an individual 
has the right to share his opinions on Twitter,737 receive tweets and follow other 
Twitters, subject to reasonable restrictions as imposed by the site or law. 
 
The importance of the freedom of expression in the UK was summed up in Regina v 
Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport:738  
Freedom of thought and expression is an essential condition of an 
intellectually healthy society… These are the values which article 10 exists to 
protect, and their importance gives it a central role in the Convention regime, 
protecting free speech in general and free political speech in particular. 
 
States are obliged to ensure non-interference with the right to freedom of expression 
as well as take positive steps to ensure its availability and enjoyment.739 
 
                                                 
736 Article 10 ECHR states: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the 
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.  
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.  
737 <http://twitter.com/> 
738 [2008] 1 AC 1312, para 27 
739 Özgür Gündem v Turkey, ECtHR, App 23144/93 (16 March 2000), paras 42-46; Fuentes Bobo v 
Spain, ECtHR, App 39293/98 (29 February 2000), para 38 
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5.2.2.2.1.2.Right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association  
 
The right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, as mandated by the 
ECHR, is enshrined in Article 11, Part I, Schedule 1 of the HRA 1998.  This 
provision enables an individual to further socially mediate digital identity. An 
individual may join a group on Facebook or participate in a digital forum. Any 
restrictions on this right can only be such as are prescribed by law and necessary in a 
democratic society. 
 
These provisions are only some of the main provisions that apply regulate digital 
identity under the human rights regime in the UK which illustrate that there is a well 
established mandate for the regulation of digital identity under this regime. 
 
 
5.2.2.2.2. India: Right to freedom of speech, expression, assembly 
and association 
 
Much like the fundamental rights and freedoms enjoyed under the ECHR, the 
fundamental rights of speech, expression, assembly and association are available to 
Indian citizens in respect of their digital identity. 
Article 19 of the Constitution inter alia guarantees to Indian citizens a right to 
freedom of speech and expression, to assemble peaceably and without arms and to 
form associations or unions.740 Indian digital identity subjects, per this Article, are 
able to freely express, develop and propagate their digital identities in any lawful 
form or manner. They are free to associate with other digital identities. This right can 
be enjoyed “untrammelled by unreasonable Governmental restraint,”741 subject to 
reasonable restrictions.742 If any of the freedoms embodied in Article 19 are 
infringed, deprived or curtailed then a holder of the right is entitled to relief in law.743 
 
                                                 
740 Per Art 19(2) these are: sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations 
with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation or incitement to 
an offence. 
741 Lakshmi Ganesh Films v Government of AP 2006 (4) ALD 374 
742 Art 19(2) 
743 See State of Gujarat v Mirzapur Kassab [2005] RD-SC 602, Om Kumar v Union of India (2001) 2 
SCC 386, Romesh Thapar v Madras AIR 1950 SC 124, Express Newspapers v Union of India (1985) 
1 SCC 641, Sakal Newspapers v Union of India AIR 1973 SC 112 and Bennet Coleman and Co. Ltd. v 
Union of India 1973 AIR 106 
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From the above account, it is evident that both UK and India provide fundamental 
rights and freedoms that apply in respect of digital identity. While the right to 
privacy manifests difference in its nature and scope, the right to freedoms of speech, 
expression and association are highly similar.  
 
5.2.3. Law of national identity schemes 
 
One of the most prominent manners in which the law impacts digital identity is 
through the establishment and regulation of national identity schemes. National 
identity schemes are schemes of identity establishment, authentication and 
verification established by a national government, intended to serve as instruments of 
citizenship management and facilitate effective governance. Both the UK744 and 





The Identity Cards Act 2006746 was enacted as an enabling Act to establish a 
National ID cards scheme in the UK.747 It aimed to  
make provision for a national scheme of registration of individuals and for 
the issue of cards capable of being used for identifying registered individuals; 
to make it an offence for a person to be in possession or control of an identity 
document to which he is not entitled, or of apparatus, articles or materials for 
making false identity documents...748 
 
The repealed Act749 made provisions for a National Identity Register (NIR) to 
function as a “secure and reliable record of registrable facts about individuals in the 
UK” that would serve prescribed statutory purposes (provision of a convenient 
method for individuals to prove registrable facts about themselves to others and 
                                                 
744 ie, the National Identity Cards Scheme  
745 ie, the Indian UID Scheme 
746 Obtained Royal Assent on 30 March 2006. 
747 Not entirely a new development, as ID cards schemes were implemented from 1915-1919 and  
1939-1952 (enabled by National Registration Act 1939 and Emergency Registration Act 1939)  
748 Preamble 
749 Repealed by the Identity Documents Act 2010.  
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provision of a secure and reliable method for registrable facts to be ascertained or 
verified where necessary in the public interest).750  
 
Sections 25 (possession of false identity document), 26 (identity documents) and 38 
of the Identity Cards Act 2006 still apply.751 These are incorporated in the Identity 
Documents Act 2010. Section 4 (1) criminalises the possession of a false identity 
document. Section 7 (1) lists what are identity documents: immigration documents, 
UK or international passports, identity documents used instead of passports, UK or 
international driving licences. According to Section 4(1) it is an offence for a person, 
with “improper intention”752 to possess or control a false identity document known or 
believed to be false, an improperly obtained identity document, or an identity 
document relating to another person. Also criminalised are the possession of 
apparatus for making false identity documents (section 5) and possession of false 




The Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules 
2003753 provide for the establishment and maintenance of a national identity register 
of citizens754 containing the following information: name, parents names, sex, date 
and place of birth, residential address (present and permanent), marital status, name 
of the spouse, visible identification mark, date of registration of citizen, serial 
number of registration and National Identity Number (now called the Aadhaar 
Number).755 The Rules also provide for the issue of National Identity Cards by the 
Registrar General of Citizen Registration to every citizen registered on the National 
Register of Indian Citizens.756 
 
                                                 
750 S 1 
751 Identity Documents Act 2010, s 1(2) 
752 S 4(2) 
753 Notified in Government of India Gazette, GSR No. 937(E) (10 December 2003) 
754 Rule 3(1) 
755 Rule 3 (3) 
756 Rule 13  
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Rule 14 imposes obligations in relation to ID Cards. The identity card remains the 
property of the Central Government.757 Rule 14 (2) prescribes that no person shall 
wilfully destroy, alter, transfer or use in any form the National Identity Card, except 
for the lawful purposes. Rule 14(3) prescribes that the identity card of an individual 
must be surrendered in case the following occurs: death, cessation of citizenship, 
revocation of citizenship or discovery of incorrect particulars.   
 
The Rules also prescribe penal consequences (in the form of a fine extending up to 
one thousand rupees)758 for a violations of the following Rules: Rule 5 (preparation 
of database), 7 (initialisation of the Register and registration), 8 (determination of 
citizenship status), 10 (deletion of name and particulars from the Register), 11 
(maintenance and updating of the Register) and 14 (duty to keep ID cards safe).  
 
Under these Rules, India piloted the Multi-purpose National Identity Card (MNIC) 
Scheme, which evolved into the Unique Identity (UID) Scheme. The UID Scheme 
(initially non-compulsory), rolled out in September 2010,759 is targeted at Indian 
residents and seeks to provide them a random unique number of identification. The 
Scheme aims at facilitating the delivery of public sector goods, services and the 
maintenance of national safety and security through providing residents of India with 
an effective means of establishing, authenticating and verifying identity. 
 
The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI),760 to be set up as a statutory 
authority called the National Identification Authority of India (NIDAI), will oversee 
the setting up of the Scheme, the issue of the Aadhaar numbers and the regulation of 
the Scheme. On 24 September 2010, the Cabinet approved a proposal for the 
National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010761 to be introduced in 
                                                 
757 Recall here how an individual’s identity may only be ‘possessed’ or ‘assigned’ Ch 2 (2.5.6) and 
Also Ch 2 (2.5.7) 
758 Rule 17 
759 UIDAI, ‘National Launch of the Aadhaar Project,’ 
<http://uidai.gov.in/images/FrontPageUpdates/pressnotefinal.doc> 
760 <http://uidai.gov.in/> 
761 Draft Bill: <http://uidai.gov.in/documents/NIA%20Draft%20Bill.pdf> 
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Parliament.762 The draft Bill does not define an individual’s identity, rather defines 
“identity information” of an individual as “biometric information, demographic 
information and Aadhaar Number.”763 
 
According to the Bill,764 every resident shall be entitled to obtain an Aadhaar number 
(which will function as proof of identity subject to authentication) on providing his 
demographic information and biometric information, which shall be issued by the 
NIDAI after verifying the information, in prescribed manner. The identity data would 
be stored on the Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR).  
 
The Bill makes provisions for identity related offences like identity impersonation at 
enrolment,765 impersonation of Aadhaar number holder,766 unauthorised collection of 
identity information under the Scheme,767 unauthorised disclosure of identity 
information,768 unauthorised access to the CIDR,769 tampering with data in the 
CIDR770 and the manipulation of biometric information.771 The Bill also seeks to 
impose a general penalty for offences not provided for under the Act and committed 
in relation to it.772  
 





                                                 
762 Press Information Bureau, ‘Approval for Introducing the National Identification Authority of India 
Bill 2010 in Parliament,’ (24 September 2010) 
<http://pib.nic.in/newsite/pmreleases.aspx?mincode=61>.The Bill was available online for public 
consultation in July 2010. 
763 The National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010, s 2(k) 
764 The Bill aims “to provide for the establishment of the National Identification Authority of India for 
the purpose of issuing identification numbers to individuals residing in India and to certain other 
classes of individuals and manner of authentication of such individuals to facilitate access to benefits 
and services to such individuals to which they are entitled and for matters connected therewith or 
incidental thereto.” Preamble. 
765 S 34 
766 S 35 
767 S 36 
768 S 37 
769 S 38 
770 S 39 
771 S 40 
772 S 41 
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5.2.4. Contract law  
 
Contract law represents another potent means of regulating digital identity. Contract 
law regulates digital identity through laws regulating electronic signatures, ID 




One of the most visible and developed form of legal regulation of digital identities is 
manifested in the law relating to electronic signatures. Over fifty countries have 
enacted and others are in the process of enacting laws relating to electronic 
signatures.773 
 
The first international initiative in this respect was the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce774 which provides the terms under which legal requirements 
were met in relation to data messages. Article 7 (1) provides that the legal 
requirement for a signature is met in relation to a data message if (a) a method is 
used to identify that person and to indicate that person’s approval of the information 
contained in the message, and (b) if the method is as appropriately reliable in terms 
of the purpose of the generation and communication of the message and its 
underlying agreement. This was followed by the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Signatures 2001775 which aims to give additional legal certainty to the use 
of electronic signatures and establishes criteria of technical reliability for the 
equivalence between electronic and hand-written signatures.  
 
In the EU, the Electronic Signatures Directive776 paved the way for EU Member 
States to harmonise their national laws in relation to electronic signatures. Here, 
                                                 
773 Lorna Brazell, Electronic Signatures Law and Regulation (Sweet and Maxwell, London 2004)  
774 Adopted 12 June 1996. 
775 This law follows a technology neutral approach. 
776 Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 December 1999 on a 
Community Framework for Electronic Signatures, OJ L 013, 19/01/2000 P 0012 – 0020 
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along with a definition of electronic signatures,777 there is also a definition of 
‘advanced electronic signatures.’778  
 
5.2.4.1.1. UK  
 
In the UK, the relevant legislation governing electronic signatures are the Electronic 
Communications Act 2000 (ECA) and the Electronic Signatures Regulations 2002 
(ESR).779 Section 7 of the ECA speaks of electronic signatures and certificates. 
Section 7 (1) deals with the admissibility of electronic signatures in legal 
proceedings and section 7(2) broadly conceptualises electronic signatures as anything 
in electronic form that   
 (a) is incorporated into or otherwise logically associated with any electronic 
communication or electronic data; and  
(b) purports to be so incorporated or associated for the purpose of being used 
in establishing the authenticity of the communication or data, the integrity of 
the communication or data, or both. 
 
The ESR set out definitions of electronic signatures in conformity with the 
definitions set out in Section 2 of the EU Electronic Signatures Directive. It has been 
argued that the UK adopts a ‘minimalist approach’ to regulating electronic 
signatures.780 The minimalist approach envisages a technologically neutral approach 
with no particular form of technology taking precedence over the other (with market 
determining which technology flourishes and with the intent of enabling 
technological innovation and catering for global differences). 
 
 
5.2.4.1.2. India  
 
In India, the ITA 2000781 limitedly provided for digital signatures and not electronic 
signatures. A digital signature was defined as “authentication of any electronic 
                                                 
777 Defined in Art 2(1) as “data in electronic form which are attached to or logically associated with 
other electronic data and which serve as a method of authentication.” Art 2 (1). 
778 Defined in Art 2(2) as an electronic signature meeting the following requirements: it is uniquely 
linked to the signatory, is capable of identifying the signatory, is created using means that the 
signatory can maintain under his sole control and is linked to the data to which it relates in a manner 
such that any subsequent change in the data is detectable. 
779 Enacted to implement the EU Electronic Signatures Directive. 
780 M Wang, ‘Electronic Signatures,’ (2007) 23 (1) CLSR, 32-41, 33 
781 Ss 2, 4, 5, 14, 15 and Chapter IV. 
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record by a subscriber by means of an electronic method or procedure in accordance 
with the provisions of Section 3.”782 Section 3 provides the means of authenticating 
electronic records: by affixation of digital signature, by the use of an asymmetric 
crypto system and by the use of the subscriber’s public key. Section 5 provides for 
the legal recognition of digital signatures.783  
 
The ITAA 2008 introduced the wider concept of ‘electronic signature’ (based on the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures 2001) to substitute and include 
‘digital signatures.’ 784 Here, an electronic signature is defined as “authentication of 
any electronic record by a subscriber by means of the electronic technique specified 
in the Second Schedule and includes digital signature.”785  
 
An electronic record may be authenticated by an electronic signature or electronic 
authentication technique that is reliable and specified in the Second Schedule.786 An 
electronic signature or electronic authentication technique is considered authentic if: 
the signature creation data or the authentication data are, within the context in which 
they are used, linked to the signatory or, as the case may be, the authenticator and of 
no other person; the signature creation data or the authentication data were, at the 
time of signing, under the control of the signatory or, as the case may be, the 
authenticator and of no other person; any alteration to the electronic signature made 
after affixing such signature is detectable; any alteration to the information made 
after its authentication by electronic signature is detectable; and it fulfils such other 
conditions which may be prescribed.787  
 
                                                 
782 S 2 (1) (p) 
783 S 5 of the Act provides that, “Where any law provides that information or any other matter shall be 
authenticated by affixing the signature, or any document should be signed or bear the signature of any 
person, then, notwithstanding anything contained in such law, such requirement shall be deemed to 
have been satisfied if such information or matter is authenticated by the means of digital signature 
affixed in such manner as may be prescribed by the Central Government.” 
784 D Chansoria and R Asoka, ‘Digital Signature: Strategic Shift from ‘Form’ to ‘Function’’ (2004) 17 
CILQ, 269-280, 276 
785 S 2 (ta) inserted into the principal Act. 
786 Not specified as at 1.12.10 
787 S 3(A). The provision resonates much of the substance of the EU Electronic Signatures Directive, 
Art 2(2) 
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Thus, both in both the UK and India, electronic signatures have legal effect and are 





Law regulates the use of digital ID certificates issued by Certification Authorities. 
Digital ID certificates are largely governed by the contractual relationship between 
the holder and certificate issuer and therefore covered here.788 
 
5.2.4.2.1. UK  
 
At the EU level, the EU Electronic Signatures Directive sets out the requirements 
for digital certificates. Per the Directive, a certificate refers to “an electronic 
attestation which links signature-verification data to a person and confirms the 
identity of that person.”789 It also defines qualified certificates, which are 
certificates that fulfill the conditions set out in Annex I of the Directive and 
provided by a certification-service-provider fulfilling the requirements laid down in 
Annex II.790  
 
The Directive provides that certificates may be used as confirmation of electronic 
signatory’s identity.791 It qualifies the use of pseudonyms in certificates - the use of 
pseudonyms in certificates shall not prevent any Member State from calling for the 
identification of persons in conformity with either Community or national law.792 
Article 3 exhorts EU Member States to establish appropriate certification systems 
both in terms of supervision of certification-service-providers established on its 
territory and for the issue of qualified certificates to the public. There are also 
provisions on liability in Article 6.   
 
                                                 
788 Digital ID certificates may also be subject to consumer protection law and in cases where no 
contract is evident, to tort law especially as regards liability. In respect of tort law see A Michael 
Froomkin, ‘The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce,’ (1996) 75 Ore L 
Rev 49  
789 Art 2(9) 
790 See Art 2 (10) & (11) 
791 Recital 20 
792 Recital 25 
 152 
It is relevant here to note the divergence in the UK regime on Article 6. The ESR 
2002 provide for the liability of certification-service-providers. Regulation 4 states 
that if a person reasonably relies on a guaranteed qualified certificate (either for its 
accuracy, inclusion of Schedule 1 details, signature-creation data, or the ability of 
the signature-creation data and the signature-verification data to be used in a 
complementary manner in cases where the certification-service-provider generates 
them both) and suffers a loss as a result, then the certification-service-provider 
would be liable in damages for any loss if a duty of care is found to exist and the 
certification-service-provider was negligent. This liability arises even if there is no 
proof of the certification-service-provider’s negligence unless the certification-
service-provider can prove no negligence. 
 
The Electronic Signatures Directive also provides that in the case of qualified 
certificates issued by certification-service-provider established in a third country, 
Member States are to ensure that these are given equal status to certificates issued by 
a certification-service-provider established within the Community, on fulfilment of 
one of the prescribed conditions.793 
 
There are also data protection provisions in relation to digital certificates in the 
Directive. For example, Art 8(2) states that certification-service-provider issuing 
certificates may collect personal data only directly from the data subject or after the 
explicit consent of the data subject, and only data necessary for the purposes of 
issuing and maintaining the certificate. Such data cannot be collected or processed 
for any other purposes without the explicit consent of the data subject. More 
importantly, the Directive states that Member States may not prevent certification 
service providers from using pseudonyms instead of signatory’s names in 
certificates.794 
                                                 
793See Art 7 (1). The conditions are (a) the certification-service-provider fulfils the 
requirements laid down in this Directive and has been accredited under a voluntary 
accreditation scheme established in a Member State; or (b) a certification-service-provider 
established within the Community which fulfils the requirements laid down in this Directive 
guarantees the certificate; or (c) the certificate or the certification-service-provider is 
recognised under a bilateral or multilateral agreement between the Community and third 
countries or international organisations. 




There is a strong regulatory mechanism in place for electronic (including 
digital) certificates in India. This is evident in Sections 17-39 of the ITA 2000 
(as amended by ITAA 2008), the Information Technology (Certifying 
Authorities) Rules 2000 and the Information Technology (Certifying 
Authorities) Regulations 2001.  
 
The Controller supervises the Certifying Authorities, lays down their duties, 
certifies their public keys, lays down standards to be followed, specifies the 
qualifications and experience of employees of Certifying Authorities, 
specifies the contents of certificates and keys, monitors accounts, regulates the 
Certifying Authorities’ dealings with subscribers, and resolves disputes 
between them.795 The Act also provides for the recognition of international 
Certifying Authorities by the Controller subject to law by prior approval of 
the Central Government and notification in the Official Gazette.796  
 
Any person can apply for a licence to issue electronic signature certificates i.e. 
to become a Certifying Authority on fulfilment of prescribed conditions. 
Certifying Authorities (and their employees or agents) must ensure 
compliance with the Act and must under Section 30 of the Act use 
appropriate, safe and secure technology and procedures, provide reasonable 
reliability, maintain sufficient secrecy and privacy, and function as 
repositories of the certificates and make suitable notifications of practices and 
certificate statuses. The Act also prescribes duties for subscribers of 
certificates.797 Unlike the UK, there are no data protection provisions. 
Overall, the law regulating ID certificates in UK and India is reasonably similar with 
some differences. In both cases ID certificates function as confirmation of 
signatory’s identity. However, the variances are in the data protection and 
pseudonymity provisions in the UK. 
 
                                                 
795 S 18, ITA 2000 
796 S 19 
797 S 40A, ITAA 2008 
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5.2.4.3.Terms of Service and End User Licence Agreements  
 
The regulation of digital identity is also evident in Terms of Service (TOS) or End 
User License Agreements (EULAs). Most TOS and EULAs are standard form 
contracts. TOS or Terms of Use (TOU) refer to the agreement governing use of a 
service and a EULA sets out the contractual nature between the author/manufacturer 
of software and the user.  
 
Identity service providers have TOS that govern their relationship with their users. 
For instance, ClaimId has Terms of Service that regulates how users conduct 
themselves, use their digital identities, limit ClaimId’s liabilities, provide for conflict 
resolution and proprietary rights.798 Other identity providers have similar policies.799 
 
A conflict arising out of any digital identity matters governed by a legal contract will 
be resolved by the terms of that contract.800 For instance, if an identity provider 
unilaterally deprives a digital identity subject of the use of their digital identity 
without notice or other due cause such that it is in breach of the contract between the 
two, the dispute will be settled in accordance with the contract that governs the 
relationship between them. The aggrieved party may sue the party in breach for 
compensation for the breach or for specific performance. 
 
5.2.4.3.1. UK  
 
The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002,801 applicable to 
information society services, set out the requirements for the electronic contracts in 
                                                 
798 <http://claimid.com/terms> 
799 See Microsoft Service Agreement, <http://explore.live.com/microsoft-service-
agreement?ref=none>; AOL Terms of Use, <http://about.aol.com/aolnetwork/aolcom_terms>; Yahoo! 
‘Terms of Service’ <http://info.yahoo.com/legal/uk/yahoo/utos-173.html>; Google, ‘Terms of 
Service,’ http://www.google.co.uk/accounts/TOS>, University of Cambridge, ‘The Raven/Shibboleth 
Service: Terms and Conditions,’ <http://www.cam.ac.uk/cs/raven/shib-terms.html> 
800 Note that the efficacy of contract law in governing Internet based contracts has come under 
scrutiny on many occasions. See RA Hillman and JJ Rachlinski, ‘Standard-Form Contracting in the 
Electronic Age,’ (2002) 77 NYUL L Rev, 429; Mark Lemley, ‘Terms of Use,’ (2006) 91 Minn L Rev 
459 
801 The Regulations implement Arts. 3, 5, 6, 7(1), 10 to 14, 18(2) and 20 of the Directive on Electronic 
Commerce. Questions relating to information society services are covered by the Data Protection 
Directive, the Telecommunications Data Protection Directive and the Directive on Privacy and 
Electronic Communications and thus excluded from the scope of the Regulations. 
 155 
the UK. As per the Regulations, for an electronic contract to be valid, it must have 
been provided to the digital identity subject by a service provider prior to use of 
services and must in clear, comprehensible and unambiguous manner,802 provide the 
following information:  
(a) The different technical steps to follow to conclude the contract;  
(b) Whether or not the concluded contract will be filed by the service 
provider and whether it will be accessible;  
(c) The technical means for identifying and correcting input errors prior to the 
placing of the order; and  
(d) The languages offered for the conclusion of the contract.  
 
The Regulations also provide that a service provider must indicate the relevant codes 
of conduct he subscribes to and give information on how those codes can be 
consulted electronically.803  Where the service provider makes terms and conditions 
applicable to the contract to the identity subject, the service provider must make 
them available to the identity subject in a manner that allows him to store and 
reproduce them.804 
 
5.2.4.3.2. India  
 
The Indian Contract Act 1872 (subject to the provisions of the ITA 2000, specifically 
sections 10, 12 and 13) regulates TOS and EULAs.805  
 
TOS and EULAs to be enforceable must be valid contracts i.e. they must fulfil the 
following certain conditions. There must be an offer (not just an invitation to offer), 
acceptance of offer, lawful consideration, intention to create legal relations, 
competency to contract, free and genuine consent, lawful object for the contract, and 
the certainty, possibility of performance and not expressly declared to be void.806 If a 
TOS or EULA fulfils these conditions, it would be enforceable in respect of digital 
identity.  
 
                                                 
802 S 9 (1) 
803 S 9 (2)  
804 S 9 (3) 
805 Provisions of general legislation have to be interpreted harmoniously with specific legislation.  
806 S 10, ICA 1872 
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Section 10A of the ITA 2000 (as amended by ITAA 2008) makes electronic 
contracts legally enforceable. Section 12 deals with the acknowledgment of receipt 
of electronic record. Where not stipulated, an electronic record is deemed to be 
received if either its receipt is acknowledged by communication from the addressee 
or the by conduct of the addressee that indicates so.807 Section 12 also provides that 
where stipulated that electronic record would be binding only on receipt of an 
acknowledgment of electronic record, then unless acknowledgment is received, the 
electronic record shall be deemed to have been never sent by the originator.808 
Section 13 deals with the time, place of dispatch and receipt of electronic record.809 
 
Thus, both in the UK and India, any contracts made in respect of digital identity 
services would be regulated by law, either through specific provisions or the general 




Agency is another vital area of contract law that impacts digital identity. The law of 
agency is expressed in the Latin maxim of qui facit per alium, facit per se, i.e. one 
who acts through another, acts in his or her own interest. In the doctrine of agency 
there are two parties – the principal and the agent. The principal is the person on 
whose behalf the agent acts. The agent refers to the person employed or engaged by 
the principal to act on his or her behalf. 
 
Under the law of contract, if a person X makes a contract with person Y on behalf on 
person Z, then the law of contract presumes that a contract exists between Y and Z. 
Here X was an agent of Z and acted on his behalf. The law makes a presumption that 
X and Z are acting as one person, provided that X had due authority to make that 
contract on behalf of Z.810 
                                                 
807 S 12 (1) (a) & (b)  
808 S 12 (2). Vide ITAA 2008 
809 It states that the dispatch of an electronic record occurs when it enters a computer resource outside 
the control of the originator (s 13 (1); An electronic record is deemed to be dispatched at the place 
where the originator has a place of business, and to be received at the place where the addressee has 
its place of business (s 13 (3). 
810 For detailed exposition of UK contract law, see PS Atiyah and S Smith, Introduction to the Law of 
Contract (OUP, Oxford 2006) and HL MacQueen and J Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland 
(Bloomsbury Publishing, Haywards Heath 2007); for the Indian perspective see TR Desai, The Indian 
Contract Act and The Sale of Goods Act (Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur 2009). 
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This can be extended to the digital identity context. A digital identity subject might 
contractually consent to a digital identity management provider making or taking 
certain decisions on its behalf. In such cases, the digital identity subject and the 
digital identity provider could be presumed to be one and the same person, and the 
digital identity subject would incur liability for any actions that its agent (the digital 
identity provider) might have taken. Thus, an agent’s acts would bind the principal.  
 
Some jurisdictions expressly provide for the recognition of electronic agency. For 
instance, The Electronic Transactions Act 1999 of Bermuda;811 the Uniform 
Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (UETA)812 and the Electronic Signatures in Global 
and National Commerce Act (ESIGN)813 in the US. This section now examines the 
position of the law in the UK and India. 
 
5.2.4.4.1. UK  
 
The principles of agency were enumerated in a number of English cases. According 
to Salomons v Pender,814 an agent must not betray the confidence a principal reposes 
in him in respect of his skill, diligence and zeal and to his own advantage. In Boston 
Deep Sea Fishing v Ansell,815 it was held that an agent who misconducts himself in 
respect of his agency gives his principal (whether a company or and individual) the 
power and authority to relieve him of his agency.816 In Andrews v Ramsay,817 it was 
upheld that an agent has a duty to act in good faith towards his principal. 818 An 
agent’s fiduciary duties were examined comprehensively in Imageview Management 
Ltd v Jack.819 
 
                                                 
811 Part I, 2; S 16 (1) 
812 S 2 (6); S 14 
813 Enacted on 30 June 2000, ESIGN provides in S 101(h) that “A contract or other record relating to a 
transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce may not be denied legal effect, validity, or 
enforceability solely because its formation, creation, or delivery involved the action of one or more 
electronic agents so long as the action of any such electronic agent is legally attributable to the person 
to be bound.”   
814 (1865)1 H&C 639 
815 (1888) 39 Ch D 339 
816 Per Cotton LJ, 357 
817 [1903] 2 KB 635 
818 Rhodes v Macalister (1923) 29 Com Cas 19 
819 [2009] EWCA Civ 63 
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Though there is no express legislation governing electronic agency, it has been 
suggested, per Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking,820 that  a contract formed without 
human intervention could be a valid contract and enforceable as such.821 
 
5.2.4.4.2. India  
 
The Indian Contract Act 1872 deals with agency in Chapter X.822 Any person of the 
age of majority and sound mind can be an agent, 823 and any person of the age of 
majority, of sound mind may employ an agent.824 There is no need for any 
consideration to establish the relationship of agency.825 An agent’s authority may be 
expressed or implied.826 It has authority to act lawfully on behalf of the principal.827 
In conducting the principal’s business, the agent must act according to the principal’s 
directions or in the absence of any such directions, according to the common customs 
that prevail in the business or at the place where the business is conducted.828 If the 
agent acts otherwise, and the principal incurs a loss, then the agent must make good 
such loss to the principal. If a profit accrues, it must be accounted for. 
There are several other provisions that govern the principal-agent relationship. An 
agent must act with skill and reasonable diligence or make compensation to his 
principal in respect of the direct consequences of his own neglect, want of skill or 
misconduct, but not in respect of loss or damage which is indirectly or remotely 
caused by such neglect, want of skill or misconduct.829 The agent also has a duty to 
communicate with the principal,830 and act on the principal’s behalf in an 
emergency.831Agency may be terminated either by the principal revoking his 
authority; or by the agent renouncing the business of the agency; or by the business 
                                                 
820 [1971] 2 QB 163 
821 Graham JH Smith, Internet Law and Regulation (Sweet and Maxwell, London 2007), 818 
822 S 182 defines the terms agent and principal. An agent is “a person employed to do any act for 
another or to represent another in dealings with third persons. The principal is “the person for whom 
such act is done, or who is so represented.” S 183 provides that any person of the age of majority, of 
sound mind may employ an agent. 
823 S 184, ICA 1872 
824 S 183 
825 S 185 
826 S 186 
827 S 188 
828 S 211 
829 S 212 
830 S 214 
831 S 189 
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of the agency being completed; or by either the principal or agent dying or becoming 
of unsound mind; or by the principal being adjudicated an insolvent under the 
provisions of any Act for the time being in force for the relief of insolvent debtors.832 
The ICA 1872 also provides for conditions under which a person may expressly or 
implicitly ratify acts done on his behalf.833 
 
There is no express provision or case law on electronic agency in India.  
 
Thus, is evident how closely similar the contractual regimes regulating digital 
identity in the UK and India are.  
 
5.2.5. Intellectual property law  
 
Digital identity is also affected by intellectual property law834 in its various forms: 




A trademark is defined in Article 15(1) of the TRIPS Agreement835 as “any sign, or 
any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one 
undertaking from those of other undertakings.” A trademark can take any form: 
personal names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and combinations of colours as 
well as any combination of such signs. A digital identity of such nature would merit 
protection under trademark law. 
 
Digital personality forms an important aspect of digital identities, for instance, one’s 
digital names, images or likeness. These identities develop reputation, goodwill and 
                                                 
832 S 201 
833 Ss 196-198 
834 Intellectual Property Law in England and Scotland is essentially similar due to the shared nature of 
legislation at EU and UK levels e.g. the Patents Act 1977, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988 and the Trade Marks Act 1994. See DL Carey Miller and MM Combe, ‘The Boundaries of 
Property Rights in Scots Law,’ Report to the XVIIth International Congress of Comparative Law, 
(2006)10 (3) EJCL <www.ejcl.org/103/art103-4.doc>  
835 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 
15 April 1994. 
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economic value becomes attached to them. When the “use of the true identity of an 
individual” is made in the “marketing or advertising of goods or services,”836 it is 
termed as personality merchandising, and the law of trademarks is used to protect it. 
 
Trademark law ensures that trademarks (registered or unregistered) are afforded 
suitable protection to protect the goodwill and reputation attached to them. 
Trademarks grant an unlimited monopoly in their use, as opposed to other forms of 
intellectual property with fixed term (though trademark registration lasts only for a 
specific period of time – ten years in the UK and India). 
 
5.2.5.1.1. UK  
 
In the UK, trademark837 law has been invoked in context of the Internet in cases like 
the 1-800-Flowers Inc v Phonenames Ltd (distinctiveness and illegality in use of 
name),838 Euromarket Designs Incorporated v Peters (infringement through use of 
name in advertisement/ application of own name defence)839 and Speechworks 
Limited v Speechworks International Incorporated (interim interdict for website, 
global effects).840 
 
Personal names used in the course of trade have merited trademark protection.841 In 
Nichols Plc v Registrar of Trademarks,842 it was held that a surname was capable of 
constituting a trademark. Applying this principle, it can be said that a digital name, if 
used in the course of trade and satisfying conditions stipulated, would be protected 
under the law of trademarks.  
 
                                                 
836 JN Adams, Character Merchandising (LexisNexis, UK 1996), xiv 
837 The UK definition of trade marks is similar to the Community definition.  
838 [2001] EWCA Civ 721  
839 [2000] EWHC Ch 179  
840 [2000] ScotCS 200 
841 eg, Marilyn Monroe (TM 1308828), Gucci, Dior, Versace, Naomi Campbell. See also 
International Madrid (UK) Case M706887. 
842 [2005] All ER (EC) 1 
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Images have also been afforded protection,843 as have signatures844 especially in the 
case of famous individuals, if prescribed conditions exist. Digital images would also 
be subject to similar protection. 
 
5.2.5.1.2. India  
 
Trademark law has similarly been brought into play in the digital context in India. 
Courts have ruled that the Internet based goods and services are entitled to trademark 
protection.845 In the case of Mattel Inc and Ors v Jayant Agarwalla,846 relating to the 
infringement of the Scrabble trademark by a company launching the “Scrabulous” 
application on Facebook and promoted on similarly named websites and metatags. It 
was ruled that Scrabble was not a generic term and that the term Scrabulous was too 
phonetically and semantically similar, not original and attracted people looking for 
Scrabble, thereby infringing Scrabble’s trademark. 
 
The ‘Microsoft’ trademark has also been actioned for infringement. One example is 
Microsoft Corporation v Deepak Raval,847 which related to the infringement of the 
Microsoft trademark through counterfeiting and pirating of Microsoft hardware and 
software, where a decree for damages was passed.848 Similarly, in Infosys 
Technologies Limited v Pravarthan Infosys Pvt Ltd 849 the infringing use of the 
“Infosys” brand on a website was stopped. In Yahoo, Inc v Sanjay V Shah,850 the 
malafide use of “Yahoo!” was acknowledged and damages were awarded.  
 
Both in UK and India, a name is not per se registrable as a trademark.  The Indian 
position is that personal names or surnames are not prima facie registrable unless 
                                                 
843 Rowland v Mitchell (1897) 14 RPC 37; Also as done by Eric Cantona (UK TM 2120277), Damon 
Hill (UK TM 2036489) 
844 For instance, Marilyn Monroe (UK TM 2142860), James Dean (UK TM No 1289838); Elvis 
Presley Enterprises Inc v Sid Shaw Elvisly Yours [1999] RPC 567 
845 Tata Sons Ltd v Manu Kosari 2001 PTC 432 (Del) 
846 CS (OS) 344/2008, 17 Sept 2008 (Delhi High Court) 
847 2006 (33) PTC 122 (Del) 
848 In similar vein see Microsoft Corporation v A Jain CS (OS) 967/2007(Del); Microsoft Corporation 
v Kiran 2007 (35) PTC 748 (Del); Microsoft Corporation v K Mayuri 2007 (35) PTC 415 (Del); 
Microsoft Corporation v Yogesh Popat 2005 (30) PTC 245 (Del); Microsoft Corporation v Kamal 
Vahi CS (OS) 817/2004 (Del); Microsoft Corporation v Akram Khan CS (OS) 117/2003(Del); 
Microsoft Corporation v Rajender Pawar CS (OS) 530/2003 (Del); Microsoft Corporation v Rahul 
Pachpore CS (OS) 2428/1999 (Del) 
849 Delhi High Court, 20 Feb 2006 
850 128 (2006) DLT 488 
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distinctiveness can be proved (courts will consider the extent and peculiarity of the 
distinctiveness, the future probability of distinctiveness being maintained, nature of 
use, and extent to which granting the monopoly would restrict the freedom of others 
with the same names to exercise their rights to such).851  
 
Thus, in respect of trademark law, in both UK and India, it has been similarly 
employed to protect goodwill and reputation of commercial digital identity.  
 
 
5.2.5.2.Domain names  
 
The domain name system (DNS) at the international level is administered by 
ICANN.852 ICANN has a Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
(UDRP), assumed by registrars in all generic top level domains (e.g. .asia, .net, .com, 
.biz, etc) and used to deal with disputes arising out of domain name misuse as a 
preferred alternative to court based litigation. Common domain name disputes853 are 
cyber squatting,854 concurrent name disputes855 and gripe sites.856 
 
5.2.5.2.1. UK  
 
In the UK, domain name cases have been dealt with under trademark law i.e. the 
Trademarks Act 1994, sections 10(2)857 and 10(3)858 and the law of passing off; 
evident in the British Telecommunications859 and Global Projects860 cases. In both 
                                                 
851 Per Burford’s Application (1919) 36 RPC 139, 150 
852 See ICANN <http://www.icann.org/>. See PB Gola, ICANN: The Introduction of New Top Level 
Domains (.Info, .Biz, .Name, .Museum, .Aero, .Coop, .Pro) Under the Aspects of Trademark Law And 
Unfair Competition (University of California, Los Angeles 2002) 
853 For comprehensive coverage of domain name disputes, see RA Badgley, Domain Name Disputes 
(Aspen Law & Business Publishers, NY 2002) 
854 Cybersquatting occurs when a domain name is appropriated in bad faith to gain economic 
advantage. 
855 Concurrent name disputes occur when two parties claim rights to the same domain name. 
856 Gripe sites are offending domain names. 
857 Phones4U Ltd v Phone4u.co.uk Ltd [2006] EWHC Civ 244; Ellerman Investments Limited v 
Elizabeth C-Vanci [2006] EWHC 1442 (Ch) 
858 eg, in British Telecommunications Plc v One In A Million Ltd [1999] 1 WLR 903 and Global v 
Citigroup [2005] EWHC 2663 (Ch) 
859 n858; followed in Bonnier Media Ltd v Smith 2002 SCLR 977 
860 n858. Here it was held that mere registration and forceful maintenance of a usurped domain name 
made that domain name a potential instrument of fraud.  
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these cases like others preceding them, courts demonstrate a preference for using 
passing off rather than trademark law to protect domain names.861 
 
5.2.5.2.2. India  
 
The law of trademarks (vis a vis the Trademarks Act 1999, as amended) regulates 
domain names in India. There have been a number of judgments by different high 
courts on the subject862 holding that legitimate domain name holders are entitled to 
protection akin to trademark owners.863  
 
It can be concluded here that the law of trademarks and passing off are both used to 
regulate domain names in the UK and India.  
 
5.2.5.3.Passing off  
 
The law of Passing Off, as already evident in the case of domain names, regulates 
digital identity. This section examines its broader applicability. 
 
5.2.5.3.1. UK  
 
Passing off864 developed in English common law and was adopted by Scotland and 
India. It was defined by the House of Lords in Reckitt and Coleman Products v 
Borden Inc865 in terms of the elements that were necessary for a party to bring a 
successful passing off action: goodwill in goods or services, a misrepresentation 
likely to deceive and damage suffered or likely to be suffered. This was extended 
after Bollinger v Costa Brava Wire Co,866  in Erven Warnink v Townend867  to 
include that fact of misrepresentation was made in the course of trade by a trader to 
                                                 
861 Glaxo v Glaxowellcome Limited [1996] FSR 388; Direct Line Group Limited v Direct Line Estate 
Agency Limited [1997] FSR 374; Easyjet Airline Co v Tim Dainty [2002] FSR 6 
862 Tata Sons Ltd. v Manu Kosuri 2001 PTC 432 (Del), Dr. Reddy's Laboratories Ltd. v Manu Kosuri 
2001 PTC 859 (Del), Acqua Minerals Ltd. v Shailesh Gupta 2002 (24) PTC 35.5 (Del), Microsoft 
Corporation v Deepak Chandwani, Unreported ex parte interim injunction order, Suit 1680/99 (Del) 
863 See Yahoo! Inc v Akash Arora & Anr 1999 PTC (19) 201, Rediff Communication Ltd v Cyberbooth 
1999 (3) All MR 164 (Bom), DM Entertainment v Jhaveri, Case 1147/2001 (Del) 
864 Preferred choice of law in cybersquatting disputes. 
865 [1990] RPC 341 
866 [1960] Ch 262 
867 [1979] AC 731, 742 
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prospective or ultimate consumers, calculated to injure another’s goodwill or 
business and causes actual damage.868 
 
Personal names that acquire secondary meaning through trade or business use may 
be protected under the law of passing off e.g. Johnny Walker,869 John Haigh,870 
Thistle,871 Charles Rennie Macintosh872 and Alan Clark.873 Business names are 
protected if distinctive. For example, Maxim’s,874 Dr Crock and his Crackpots,875 
The Drifters876 etc. Distinctive abbreviations, letters and numerals have also been 
granted protection.877 For instance, CA,878 BMA,879 1001,880 4711.881 It can safely be 
argued that this applies to digital names and numbers as well.   
 
5.2.5.3.2. India  
 
Passing off882 finds statutory basis under Sections 27 (2), 134 (1) (c) and 135 of the 
Trade Marks Act 1999. Section 27 (2) provides that a person might have a right of 
action against another person for passing off goods or services as the goods of 
another person or as services provided by another person, or the remedies in respect 
thereof. Section 134 (1) (c) provides that no suit for passing off arising out of the use 
by the defendant of any trade mark which is identical with or deceptively similar to 
the plaintiffs trade mark, whether registered or unregistered, shall be instituted in any 
                                                 
868 Kean v McGivan [1982] FSR 119 
869 John Walker and Sons Ltd v Henry Ost & Co Ltd [1970] RPC 489 
870 John Haigh and Co Ltd v John DD Haigh Ltd 1957 SLT (Notes) 36 
871 Thistle v Thistle Telecom Ltd 2000 SLT 262 
872 Carrick Jewellery Ltd v Ortak 1989 GWD 35-1624 
873 Clark v Associated Newspapers [1998] RPC 261  
874 Maxim’s Ltd v Dye [1977] FSR 364  
875 Hines v Winnick [1947] Ch 708 
876 Treadwell’s Drifters Inc v RCL Ltd 1996 SLT 1048 
877 Hector MacQueen, Charlotte Waelde, Graeme Laurie, Abbe Brown, Contemporary Intellectual 
Property: Law and Policy (OUP, Oxford 2010), 728 
878 Society of Accountants in Edinburgh v Corporation of Accountants (1893) 20R 750 
879 British Medical Association v Marsh (1931) 48 RPC 565  
880 PC Products v Dalton [1957] RPC 199 
881 Reuter v Muhlens (1953) 70 RPC 235 
882 For detailed analysis, see P Narayanan, Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off (Eastern Law House, 
New Delhi 2004), 520, Justice VA Mohta, Trade Marks, Passing Off and Franchising (All India 
Reporter, India 2004) 
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court inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit. Section 135 deals 
with the reliefs available in passing off suits.883 
 
The crux of passing off, stated in the case of Ellora Industries v Banarsidas Goel,884  
is “a cause of action arising out of confusion about the origin or source of a personal 
name, trade name or mark.885 In NR Dongre v Whirlpool Corporation,886 the 
Supreme Court while upholding an injunction obtained in respect of passing off, held 
that where there goodwill and reputation is acquired in respect with a mark, there 
inheres a right to protect against the invasion of that mark.887  
 
Passing off is available to protect trade names, symbols, signs, devices and 
unregistered trademarks. But passing off actions are not just limited to protecting 
goods and services in the course of trade, and can be extended to other fields of 
activity.888 Thus, it has a wider scope than the law of trademarks. Moreover, it is not 
just national reputation and goodwill that is protected by passing off actions.889  
A digital identity will be protected against harm to its reputation and goodwill if any 
passing off in respect of it is found to exist (what would be required to be proven is 
deceptive similarity and confusion,890 misrepresentation and loss or damage of 
goodwill).891 Passing off has been held to be available to owners of distinctive 
domain names in cases of their infringement. 892 
 
                                                 
883 These are: injunction (subject to such terms, if any, as the court thinks fit) and at the option of the 
plaintiff, either damages or an account of profits, together with or without any order for the delivery-
up of the infringement labels and marks for destruction or erasure - S 135 (1)  
884 AIR 1980 Del 254 
885 Para 33  
886 (1996) 5 SCC 714 
887 Para 10. It further stated that “a man is not to sell his own goods under the pretence that they are 
the goods of another man.” 
888 VV Sople, Managing Intellectual Property: The Strategic Imperative (Prentice-Hall, New Delhi 
2006), 113 
889 Mars Incorporated v Chanda Softy Ice Cream AIR 2001 Madras 237; Intel Corporation v S 
Ramanan 2002 (25) PTC 457 Mad 
890 See Cadila Health Care Ltd  v Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2001) SCL 534; Kishore Zarda 
Factory (P) Ltd v JP Tobacco House AIR 1999 Delhi 172, 175; Kirloskar Proprietary Ltd v Kirloskar 
Dimensions AIR 1997 Karnataka 1; Roshan Lal Oil Mills Ltd v Assam Co Ltd 1996 (16) PTC 699 
891 Hindustan Radiators Co v Hindustan Radiators Ltd AIR 1987 Del 353; Athletes Foot Marketing 
Adm Inc v Cobra Sports Limited 1980 RPC 343 
892 Satyam Infoway Ltd v Sifynet Solutions CA 028/2004 (Supreme Court), Titan Industries Ltd v 
Prashant Koapati, Interloc Interim App 787/1998, CS 179/1998 (Delhi High Court). 
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Again, in both the case of UK and India one finds grounds of similarity in the letter 
of passing off law and the requirements it would impose for digital identity to be 




Copyright law also regulates digital identity. Copyright is defined as “a legal term 
describing rights given to creators for their literary and artistic works.”893 Copyright 
is a bundle of limited term rights in relation to original and expressed works of 
literary or artistic nature (dramatic works, sound recordings). Rights under copyright 
accrue to the copyright holder and are used to prevent certain acts (e.g. reproduction, 
public performance, recording, broadcasting or translation) in respect of copyrighted 
work unless authorised. 
 
Digital identity would qualify for copyright protection if it fell within the scope of 
protected works under copyright law. For instance, copyright might protect original 
email and blog content. It could be used to protect a digital performances (through 
performers’ rights), digital images, paintings, illustrations and photographs, digital 
characters like MMORPG ids and Avatars.  
 
To protect digital identity expression, holders of copyright in such identities often 
resort to the use of technological tools to prevent their digital identities being 
infringed. This is done through the use of tools like digital watermarking, 
fingerprinting, encryption (e.g. content scrambling). The law supports the use of 
these tools and in many cases, outlaws the use of measures that circumvent these 
technologies. 
International copyright law is embodied in treaties like: the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,894 the Brussels Convention Relating to the 
Distribution of Program-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite,895 Convention for 
the Protection of Producers of Phonograms against Unauthorized Duplication of 
                                                 
893 WIPO, ‘Copyright and Related Rights, What is Copyright?’<http://www.wipo.int/about-
ip/en/copyright.html> 
894 In force both in UK and India. 
895 Neither UK nor India is party. 
 167 
Their Phonograms,896 Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers 
of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations.897 Some copyright provisions can 
also be found in the TRIPS Agreement. 898 
 
In addition, the  Internet treaties - the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT)899 and the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT)900- expand the protection of 
copyright to works disseminated over the Internet and other digital technologies. 
Countries, however, have some element of freedom in setting forth what exceptions 
and limitations exist in respect of the rights granted by these treaties. While the UK 
is a contracting party to both treaties,901 India is not.  
 
5.2.5.4.1. UK  
 
The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA 1988), as amended in October 
2003 by the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003,902 forms the current 
framework of copyright law in the UK.903 The basis of copyright protection was 
summed up in LB (Plastics) Ltd v Swish Products Ltd904 which stated that “one man 
must not be able to appropriate the result of another's labour.” 
 
Copyright law in the UK protects literary works (any work, other than a dramatic or 
musical work, which is written, spoken or sung and that includes a table or 
compilation, a computer program,905 preparatory design material for a computer 
program and a database906), dramatic works (work of dance or mime), musical works 
(work consisting of music, exclusive of any words or action intended to be sung, 
                                                 
896 In force both in UK and India. 
897 In force in the UK; only signed by India. 
898 Part II, S 1 of the Agreement deals with copyright and related rights  
899 Adopted in Geneva on 20 December 1996 
900 Adopted in Geneva on 20 December 1996 
901 The WCT and WPPT were signed by the UK on 13 February 1997, ratified on 14 December 2009 
and entered into force from 14 March 2010. 
902 Incorporating the changes mandated by the Information Society Directive. 
903 Copyright law finds its origins in common law in the Statute of Anne and became statutory post the 
Copyright Act 1911. 
904 [1977] FSPLR 87. In line with Walter v Lane (1990) AC 539 and Ravencroft v Herbert (1980) 
RPC 103 
905 Included by the Copyright (Computer Programs) Regulations 1992 
906 Database, per the CDPA 1988 S 3(A), refers to a collection of independent works, data or other 
materials which are arranged in a systematic or methodical way, are individually accessible by 
electronic or other means and is an original intellectual creation of the author. 
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spoken or performed with the music), artistic works (includes graphic work, 
photograph, sculpture or collage, irrespective of artistic quality, works of 
architecture, and works of artistic craftsmanship),907 typographical arrangements of 
publications, sound recordings,908 films and broadcasts (electronic transmission of 
visual images).909 
 
Copyright automatically accrues to the author (or producer or commissioner, 
depending on context) of a work. The duration of copyright varies depending on the 
nature of the work.910 The rights that vest in the holder of a copyright are: right to 
copy the work,911 to issue copies of the work to the public,912 to rent or lend the work 
to the public,913 to perform, show or play the work in public,914 to communicate the 
work to the public,915 to make an adaptation of the work or do any of the above in 
relation to an adaptation916 and a right to do any of the acts restricted by the 
copyright. 
 
Infringement of copyright occurs when works restricted from being copied, are 
copied.917 Copying can take the form of reproducing work in material form or storing 
it on any medium by electronic means, making different dimensional copies, making 
photographs of whole or substantial parts of films, making facsimile copies, or even 
the making of transient or incidental copies.918 Infringement by copying can also 
occur by issue of copies to the public,919 by rental or lending of work to the public,920 
                                                 
907 CDPA 1988, S 4 (1)  
908 S 5A 
909 CDPA 1988, S 1 
910 Duration is prescribed in Ch I, ss 12-14, CDPA 1988, and ranges from 25-70 years. 
911 S 17 
912 S 18 
913 S 18A 
914 S 19 
915 S 20 
916 S 21 
917 S 17 
918 S 17 
919 S 18 
920 S 18A 
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by performance, showing or playing of work in public,921 by communication to the 
public,922 or by making adaptation or act done in relation to adaptation.923 
 
All acts in respect of copyrighted works are not restricted. Certain acts are permitted 
in relation to copyright works:924 fair dealing in respect of research and private 
study,925 fair dealing for criticism, review and news reporting,926 incidental non-
deliberate inclusion of copyright material,927 making of a single accessible copy for 
personal use,928 or multiple copies in relation to visual impairment problems.929  
 
The CDPA 1988 provides various remedies for infringement of copyright930 
actionable by the copyright owner.931 These remedies include damages, injunctions, 
accounts and any such relief as is otherwise available in respect of the infringement 
of any other property right.932 There are also some criminal provisions.933  
 
Thus a digital identity would be protected under copyright law in the UK if copyright 




In India,934 the current legal framework is represented by the Copyright Act 1957935 
(as amended by the Copyright (Amendment) Act 1999).936 Copyright is visualised as 
                                                 
921 S 19 
922 S 20 
923 S 21 
924 Prescribed in Ch III, CDPA 1988 (full list available there) 
925 S 29 
926 S 30 
927 S 31  
928 S 31A 
929 S 31B 
930 Ch VI 
931 S 96 (1) 
932 S 96 (2) 
933 S 107 deals with criminal liability for making or dealing with infringing articles. 
934 India is a party to the Berne Convention for Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) and 
the Universal Copyright Convention.  
935 The 1957 Indian Act was largely influenced by the UK Copyright Act of 1956 and has been 
amended several times (1983, 1984, 1992, 1994 and 1999). The 1994 amendment is the most 
significant because it harmonised the Act with the 1961 Rome Convention by providing protection to 
performers’ rights, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organisations and introduced 
registration of Copyright Societies. 
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a bundle of rights, of economic and moral nature, that accrue to the holder of the 
copyright. 
 
Copyright, under Indian law, exists in the following works: 937 original literary 
works,938 dramatic works,939 musical works940 and artistic works like paintings, 
sculpture, drawing (including diagrams, maps, charts or plans), engravings or 
photographs,941 whether or not any such work possesses artistic quality, work of 
architecture942 and work of artistic craftsmanship,943 cinematograph films944 and 
sound recordings.945  
 
The nature of rights under copyright is clarified by section 14 of the Act. These 
include: rights reproducing, storing, selling or hiring out works, making and issuing 
copies of works, performing or communicating works, making recordings, 
translations or adaptations, or offering commercial rentals.946 The duration of 
copyright is prescribed in Chapter V of the Act.947  
 
Not all acts done in respect of copyright material would constitute an infringement. 
The Copyright Act 1957 provides an extensive list of permitted acts in section 52 e.g. 
fair dealing for private use, research, criticism, review or news reporting, lawful 
making of copies in respect of certain permitted acts, the reproduction of a literary, 
dramatic, musical or artistic work for the purpose of a judicial proceeding or for the 
purpose of a report of a judicial proceeding, educational performances of copyrighted 
works, the licensed (or consent based) making of sound recordings in respect of any 
                                                                                                                                          
936 The Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2010 has been introduced in the Rajya Sabha to further amend 
the Copyright Act 1957.  See 
<http://copyright.gov.in/Documents/CopyrightAmendmentBill2010.pdf> The Bill makes provisions 
for technological protection measures (S 65A) and rights management information (S 65B).  
937 S 13, Copyright Act 1957 
938 S 2 (o) 
939 S 2 (h) 
940 S 2 (p) 
941 S 2 (s) 
942 A building or structure having an artistic character or design, or any model for such building or 
structure. S 2 (b) 
943 S 2(c) 
944 Defined in s 2(f) 
945 Defined in s 2(xx) 
946 See s 14 for details. 
947 Ss 22-29. Generally 60 years. 
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literary dramatic or musical work; public airing of a recording in an enclosed non-
commercial residential room or non-profit club, society or organisation etc.948 
 
The Copyright Act imposes both civil (injunction, damages, accounts)949 and 
criminal remedies (imprisonment and fines)950 in respect of copyright infringement.  
 
Thus, both countries have copyright law that, according to its own mandate, regulate 
the exercise of copyrighted digital identity. 
 
 
5.2.5.5.Law of confidence  
 
The law of confidence has also been used to protect personal information, which is 
an important form of digital identity. Intellectual property texts, both in the UK and 
India, classify the law of confidence as a class of intellectual property law951 and this 
thesis maintains this trend. 
 
The law of confidence would govern the relationship between digital identity 
subjects and digital identity controllers or managers, much in the manner that the 
data controllers or data processors may owe the data subject a duty of maintaining 
the confidentiality of information received in circumstances that obligate a condition 
of confidentiality. 
 
5.2.5.5.1. UK  
 
The precise “legal nature of breach of confidence actions in the UK is unclear”952 
with different arguments being put forth making the case that such actions are 
property actions (bolstered by the ‘information as property’ view) based on contract, 
English equity953 or the Scots actio in iniuriam cause of action.954 Personal 
                                                 
948 For complete list see S 52 (a) - (za) of the Act. 
949 Chapter XII 
950 Chapter XIII 
951 UK: MacQueen,Waelde (2010) n877; Paul Torremans, Hollyoak and Torremans: Intellectual 
Property Law, (2005); India: P Narayanan, Intellectual Property Law (Eastern Law House, India 
2004) 
952 MacQueen, Waelde (2010) n877, 768 
953 Not applicable in Scotland. 
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information embodied in private diaries or sexual activities,955 residential details, 
domestic arrangements, photographs (of exposed bodies956 and weddings957) have 
been actioned under breach of confidence.958  
 
The law of confidence was invoked in the UK to protect the identity of the author of 
a blog in The Author of a Blog v Times Newspapers Ltd.959 The author of the ‘Night 
Jack’ blog unsuccessfully sought an interim injunction to restrain Times Newspapers 
Ltd from publishing information that would identify him as the author of the blog. 
Eady LJ clarified that just the blogger’s desire to maintain his anonymity did not 
signify either that he had a reasonable expectation of  being able to do so or that the 
Times Newspaper was under any legal obligation to him in that respect.960  
 
Eady LJ stated that blogging was a public, not private activity, and because of the 
nature of what the blogger wrote (material that was “political and highly critical of 
central and local policing strategies”), the public was entitled to know his identity so 
as to be able to assess and judge the value of the blog posts. It was concluded, by 
applying Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd,961 that the identity of the blogger had 
“neither the necessary quality of confidence” nor did it qualify as anything that the 
blogger was capable of claming a reasonable expectation of privacy in. This case sets 
the remit of how digital identity might be regulated under the law of confidence in 
respect of the Internet. If a digital identity had the necessary quality of confidence 




                                                                                                                                          
954 See HL MacQueen, ‘Searching for Privacy in a Mixed Jurisdiction,’ (2006) 21 Tulane European 
and Civil Law Forum, 73 
955 Argyll v Argyll [1967] Ch 302; X (HA) v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648 
956 As in the cases of Amanda Holden and Sara Cox. See Nick Higham, ‘Privacy Law Remains 
Confused,’ BBC News (9 June 2003) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2975718.stm>  
957 Douglas v Hello! [2005] EWCA CIV 595, [2005] All ER (D) 280(May) 
958 UK courts assessment of breach of confidence actions takes into account Arts 8 & 10 of the ECHR 
and the HRA 1998. 
959 [2009] EWHC 1358 (QB) 
960 Referring to the comments of Toulson, LJ in Napier v Pressdram Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 443 at 
[42] 
961 [1969] RPC 41. In Coco v Clark, a three step test was laid out: the information had to be 
confidential in nature, communicated in circumstances implying confidence and there had to be 
unauthorized use of the information to the detriment of the person making the confidence. 
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5.2.5.5.2. India  
 
In India too, confidential information is protected from unauthorised use through 
breach of confidence remedies. Breach of confidence actions in India are based on 
the principle of equity (information received in confidence must not be unfairly used 
without consent, such that it prejudices the information giver or puts him at a 
disadvantage).962 However, this tort has largely been used to protect information of 
commercial value and  where some form of contractual relationship exists between 
parties.963 
 
In the digital context, the duty of confidentiality is specifically, although rather 
inadequately embedded in Sections 72 and 72A of the ITA 2000. Section 72 
prescribes a penalty for breach if any person securing access under the Act makes an 
unauthorised disclosure (of any electronic record, book, register, correspondence, 
information, document or other material) without consent.964 The penalty prescribed 
is imprisonment of up to two years or fine extending to one lakh rupees or both.  
 
Section 72A which deals with disclosure of information in breach of lawful contract, 
states,  
any person including an intermediary who, while providing services under the 
terms of lawful contract, has secured access to any material containing 
personal information about another person, with the intent to cause or 
knowing that he is likely to cause wrongful loss or wrongful gain discloses, 
without the consent of the person concerned, or in breach of a lawful contract, 
such  material to any other person shall be punished with imprisonment for a 
term which may extend to  three years, or with a fine which may extend to 
five lakh rupees, or with both. 
 
However, as this provision only applies in cases where there is a lawful contract 
between two parties, it does not cover cases where individuals find the 
confidentiality of their personal information breached by other individuals or entities 
                                                 
962 Equitable obligations exist even out with contract.  
963 Eg, Zee Telefilms v Sundial Communications 2003(5) BomCR 404, Diljeet Titus v Alfred Adebare 
130 (2006) DLT 330, UJ Chiang v Global Broadcast News 2008 (2) BomCR 400, John Richard 
Brady v Chemical Process Equipments AIR 1987 Delhi 372, Michael HN Johnson v Subhash 
Chandra 60 (1995) DLT 757 
964 N Salim, ‘Breach of Privacy and Confidentiality Under Information Technology Act, 2000’ Legal 
Service India (10 January 2009) <http://www.legalserviceindia.com/article/l288-Breach-of-privacy-
&-Confidentiality-.html> 
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that they do not share contractual relations with. Thus, the confidentiality of digital 
identity of individuals is not well protected under this regime; and though it could be 
argued that the general law of confidence could be brought to apply to protect the 
confidentiality of digital identity of individuals, there is no evidence to support that 
this has or will be the future direction that the law will take.  
 
In the case of the law of confidence, a divergence between the UK and Indian legal 
positions is evident. While a trend of protecting personal information is evident in 
the UK context, no such trend is evident in India.  
 
5.2.6. Tort law 
 
Torts are civil wrongs actioned by one person against another in a court of law. The 
principle underlying tort law is ‘ubi jus ibi remedium,’ i.e. where there is right there 
is a remedy.    
 
The Law of Torts relates to digital identities and protects them in cases where such 
identities have been wronged in the manner prescribed by such law. There are many 
examples of digital identity torts, primary among which are: defamation,965 
negligence, malicious falsehood and misuse of private information. Tortum966 or 
jimha967  acts in respect of a digital identity would, all conditions fulfilling, give rise 
actions for remedium (remedy, largely in the form of damages).Tort law has been 
employed to protect facets of digital identity elsewhere in the world e.g. Australia,968 
France969 and the US.970  
                                                 
965 Defamation is probably the most prevalent tort used in the digital identity context, which 
demonstrates the significance attached to reputation and its defense against tarnishment or vilification. 
966 Latin for twisted or crooked. 
967 The Sanskrit term for tort. P Sen, The General Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence (Saraswat 
Library, Calcutta 1918), 211. 
968 See Rindos v Hardwick, Supreme Court of Western Australia, (unreported), 31 March 1994, 
(defamation), The Buddhist Society of Western Australia Inc v Bristile Ltd & Anor [2000] WASCA 
210 (9 August 2000) (defamation), Gutnick v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2001] VSC 305 (28 August 2001) 
(defamation), Cullen v White (2003) WASC 153) (defamation, ID crime), Adam Kaplan v Go Daddy 
Group Inc [2005] NSWSC 636 (tort of injurious falsehood) 
969 Lefebure v Lacambre, 55181/98, No. 1/JP (defamation, privacy and personality rights) 
970 Successfully in some cases, unsuccessfully in others. Cubby, Inc v CompuServe Inc 776 F. Supp. 
135 (SDNY 1991) (defamation); Lunney v Prodigy Servs. Co 683 NYS2d 557, NY App, 2d Div. 1998 
(defamation); Stratton Oakmont v Prodigy NY Sup Ct 1995 (defamation); Barrett v Fonorow 112 Cal 
App 4th 749 (2003) (defamation); Barrett v Rosenthal112 Cal App 4th 749 (2003) (defamation); 
Kremen v Cohen 337 F 3d 1024 (9th Cir 2003) (conversion of Internet domain name); Scheff v Bock 
Case No 3022837, Circuit Court, Broward County, Florida (defamation) 
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England has the law of torts, while Scotland has the Law of Delict (or Delictual 
Liability).971 The Indian Law of Torts was influenced by English law and is adapted 
to suit local conditions.972 It is an uncodified branch of civil law though it has been 
read into/aligned with other branches of law like criminal law973 and constitutional 
law. This section examines elements of tort law that apply digital identity: 




Actions for defamation are commonplace in the protection of digital reputation. This 
section examines how this tort has been invoked in relation to and regulates digital 
identity.  
 
5.2.6.1.1. UK  
 
The law of defamation in the UK finds basis in common law and the Defamation 
Acts of 1952 and 1996. By nature, defamation is a civil tort.  
 
Tort law has been invoked and successfully applied in a number of cases in the UK, 
particularly in relation to Internet based defamation. For example, Godfrey v Demon 
Internet974 Loutchansky v Times Newspapers,975 Totalise Plc v Motley Fool,976 Jim 
Murray v Jonathan Spencer,977 Robertson v Newsquest,978 Keith-Smith v Williams,979 
Applause Store Productions Ltd and Firsht v Raphael980 and Metropolitan 
International Schools Ltd v Designtechnica Corporation and Others.981  
 
                                                 
971 For overview, see DM Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland (Sweet & Maxwell, Edinburgh 1981)   
972 R Ratanlal and KT Dhirajlal, The Law of Torts (Wadhwa, Nagpur 2004),1-2; MC Setalvad, The 
Common Law in India (Hamlyn Trust, 1960), 110; See the opinion of  Justice Krishna Aiyar in on the 
tort of conspiracy in Rohtas Industries Ltd. v Rohtas Industries Staff Union, AIR 1976 SC 425 and 
comments of Justice Bhagwati in MC Mehta v Union of India AIR 1988 SC 1037 
973 Defamatory torts like libel and slander are also criminal offences. See s 499, IPC.  
974 n188 
975 [2001] EWCA Civ 536 (Internet libel) 
976 [2001] EWCA Civ 1897 (Internet libel, Norwich Pharmacol Application) 
977 20 May 2002, Lincoln County Court (Internet libel) 
978 2006 SCLR 792 (repetitive libel)  
979 [2006] EWHC 860 (QB) (successful Internet libel case between two individuals.  
980 [2008] EWHC 1781 (QB) (Internet libel/suit between friends regarding creation of false Facebook 
profile) 





In India, there are few instances of the tort of defamation being used to deal with 
Internet defamation, as evident in the following cases: SMC Pneumatics (India) Pvt. 
Ltd. v Jogesh Kwatra,982 Gremach Infrastructure Equipments & Projects Limited v 
Google India Private Limited983 and Socieadade de Fomento Industrial Pvt Ltd v 
Sebastian (Sebi) Rodrigues.984 All these cases again are cases in which commercial 
reputation has been protected from misuse.  
 
Defamation is both a crime and a tort in India. Criminal law of defamation is more 
widely established and employed  in cases of alleged Internet defamation in relation 
to protection of individual reputation vis a vis other individuals.985 
 
In respect of the law of defamation, are evident vast differences in the law of the UK 
and India.  
 
5.2.6.2.Malicious falsehood  
 
Malicious falsehood implies the making of some malicious false statements or 
allegations or remarks. The tort of malicious falsehood has a wider ambit than the 
tort of defamation and would apply to digital identity. In an action for malicious 
falsehood, there is no need to show loss of reputation for the recovery of damages.  
 
5.2.6.2.1. UK  
 
Malicious falsehood, per Harpwood, is the “publication of disparaging remarks about 
a person’s goods or services.”986 But, this tort987 though largely used to protect 
business interests, may also be used to protect personal reputation.988 There are 
generally three elements required to prove this tort: publication, malice and actual 
                                                 
982 CS 1279/2001 (Del). Unreported. Injunction retraining publication granted.  
983 CS 506/2008, 18 Feb 2008 (Bom). Ad interim order of injunction granted and order for disclosure 
of blogger identity made.  
984 CS 265/2008 (Kol). Interim order of injunction granted on 2 September 2009. 
985 See further Ch 6, 6.3.3 
986 V Harpwood, Principles of Tort Law (Routledge, UK 2000), 401 
987 In England, one can get legal aid for the tort of malicious falsehood, unlike defamation. Damages 
in respect of malicious falsehood are lesser as compared to defamation.  
988 See Joyce v Sengupta [1993] 1 All ER 897 
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loss.989 Malice is inferred if the words used in making the allegation are either 
intended to produce some damage and there was some recklessness on the part of the 




In India, the tort of injurious or malicious falsehood “relates to those statements 
which are false but not defamatory and which do not constitute either slander of 
goods or slander of title. For a successful claim of malicious falsehood, a claimant 
must prove:  
(i) A false statement calculated to cause financial damage was made991 
(ii) The statement was made maliciously with intent to cause injury, 
(iii) The statement has resulted in a special damage unlike in defamation 
in which the falsehood of the statement is presumed, and it is for the 
defendant to prove that the statement is true.992 
 
The tort of malicious falsehood would apply in both UK and India to protect digital 




The tort of negligence is a substantial part of tort law. It occurs if a person breaches a 
duty of care owed to another and the breach causes loss to the person the duty is 
owed to. The nature of the duty was laid down in the famous case of Donoghue v 
Stevenson.993 Lord Atkin stated, “You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or 
omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your 
neighbour.” If a duty of care and its breach is established, a claimant must also show 
that loss has been suffered and quantify that loss.  
 
The tort of negligence applies in the regulation of digital identity. For instance, a 
digital identity could be classed as a product994 and liability would arise in respect of 
a breach of a duty of care owed in respect of it. An identity management or service 
                                                 
989 Where the truth of the claim or malice was not proved, the case failed. Christopher John Quinton v 
Robin H Peirce [2009] EWHC 912 (QB). 
990 Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 (CA) 
991 Manisha Koirala v Shashilal Nair  2003 (2) BomCR 136 
992 Dabur India Ltd v M/S Colortek Meghalaya Pvt Ltd CS(OS) 2029/2009 (Del) 
993 [1932] AC 562,580 
994 S Hedley, Tort (OUP, Oxford 2006), 91 
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provider might owe a duty of care to a digital identity subject. If that duty of care is 
breached, and loss is caused to the digital identity subject, then the digital identity 
subject could make a claim under the tort of negligence against that identity 
management or service provider.  
 
Negligence has been invoked in respect of digital identity in a number of US cases: 
Marsha L Shames-Yeakel v Citizens Financial Bank,995 Jones v Commerce Bancorp, 
Inc., No. 06996 Bell v Mich. Council 25 of Am. Federation of State, County, 
Municipal Employees.997 In these cases, it was recognised that there was a common 
law duty on financial institutions to safeguard members and customers confidential 
information from identity fraud. 
 
5.2.6.3.1. UK  
 
In England, the tort of negligence has three elements: a duty of care,998 a breach in 
respect of a duty owed999 and consequent damage.1000 The nature of tort law here is 
to provide a remedy where an injury or loss results from the failure to maintain a 
legal duty of reasonable care.1001 To understand how this would apply in the digital 
context, let’s take an example. Under the DPA 1998, data controllers are obligated to 
take appropriate technical and organisational measures against unauthorised or 
unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or 
damage to, personal data.1002 Where there is a failure to meet this obligation through 






                                                 
995 USDC, Northern District of Illinois, Case No. 07-c-5387, 21 August 2009 
996 Civ 835, 2006 WL 1409492, at *2 (SDNY, 23 May 2006) 
997 No. 246684, 2005 WL 356306, at *1 (Mich Ct App, 15 February 2005) (per curiam) 
998 For scope of the duty of care see Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92; Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad 
Co (1928) 248 NY 339; Haley v London Electricity Board [1965] AC 778: Urbanski v Patel (1978) 
84 DLR (3rd) 650; Goodwill v British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1996] 2 All ER 161 
999 Blythe v Birmingham Waterworks (1856) 11 Exch 781 
1000 Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co v McMullan [1934] AC 1 at 25 
1001 For comprehensive coverage of the tort of negligence, see Vivienne Harpwood, Modern Tort Law, 
(Cavendish Publishing, London 2005), 19-26 
1002 Seventh Data Protection Principle, Schedule 1, Part I, (7) 
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5.2.6.3.2. India  
 
In India too, the tort of negligence1003 affords action where there is a breach of duty 
of care1004 and injury results.1005 For example, if it can be shown that a company or 
association failed to implement and maintain reasonable security practices and 
procedures in respect of data or information of an individual, and a wrongful loss or 
wrongful gain is caused to that individual, that individual could bring an action for 
negligence.1006  
 
5.2.6.4.Misuse of private information  
 
The misuse of private information (and consequently digital identity constituting 
private information) may also be actioned under tort law.1007  
 
5.2.6.4.1. UK  
 
In Cambell v MGN,1008 Lord Nicholls expressed the independent existence of a 
limited tort1009 of misuse of private information (free from the limiting constraints of 
breach of confidence actions).1010 This tort “affords respect for one aspect of an 
individual’s privacy.”1011 This tort however, only protects private information one 






                                                 
1003 Scope examined by the Supreme Court in Rajkot Municipal Corporation v Manjulben Nakum 
(1997) 9 SCC 552. 
1004 Klaus Mittelbachert v East India Hotels Ltd AIR 1997 Del 201. 
1005 Spring Meadows Hospital v Harjot Ahluwalia (1998) 4 SCC 39, Mrs. Shanta v State of AP AIR 
1998 AP 51, RSEB v Jai Singh AIR 1997 Raj 141; AS Zingthan v State of Manipur AIR 1998 Gau 
102. 
1006 However, no case law was found on tort of negligence being used to protect personal data or 
sensitive personal data.  
1007 For a detailed analysis of why the tort of misuse of information must be treated separately to 
breach of confidence, see John Murphy, Street on Torts (OUP, Oxford 2007), 385-394 
1008 [2004] UKHL 22 
1009 Not all privacy violations are actionable under the tort and they would be judged in the light of 
Arts 8 and 10 of the ECHR. See NJ McBride, R Bagshaw, Tort Law (Pearson Education, Edinburgh 
2008), 319-341 
1010 Paras 12-15 
1011 Lord Nicholls, para 15 




Though the law affords a general and consequential tort remedy (i.e. damages) for 
the unlawful invasion of privacy,1013 it does not offer parallel protection as evidenced 
in the case of the UK to the misuse of private information.  
 
In summary, tort law in the UK would generally apply to digital identity a manner 
not much different from how it would in India. Yet, there are also distinctions in its 
application as evident in the nature and use of the law of defamation and the use of 
tort law to protect private information.  
 
5.2.7. Data protection law 
 
Data protection law affects digital identity immensely, particularly in Europe.1014 The 
EU has a well developed data protection regime embodied in the following 
legislative instruments and provisions: 
1. The ECHR, specifically Article 8. 1015 
2. Treaty on the European Union 1016  
3. The Data Protection Directive.1017 
4. The Telecommunications Data Protection Directive.1018  
5. Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, notably Article 8 
on the protection of personal data.1019 
6. Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications1020 
7. Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection 
with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services 
or of public communications networks and amending Directive 
2002/58/EC1021 
 
In Europe generally, prevalent privacy and data protection culture and regulation has 
resulted in digital identity becoming enmeshed and inextricably linked to personal 
                                                 
1013 Rajagopal n722 § 9 
1014 Data protection here refers to the protection of personal data or information, distinct from privacy.  
1015 Data protection law in Europe is also influenced by international human rights instruments like the 
UDHR and the ICCPR. Lee Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and 
Limits, (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002), 116 
1016 Consolidated version at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF> 
1017 Directive 95/46/EC 
1018 Directive 97/66/EC 
1019 see n579 
1020 Directive 2002/58/EC 
1021 [2006] OJ L 105/54 
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data1022 as demonstrated in Chapter 2.1023 This is of particular importance to us, 
because many of the digital identity manifestations are brought under the purview of 
data protection law and also because data protection law fundamentally exists to 
protect individuals in Europe against the violation of their various fundamental 
rights.1024 It also regulates the behaviour of two important actors in the digital 
identity network - the data controller and the data subject.1025 
 
Contemporary data protection law enables digital identity subjects in Europe to 
control the collection, storage, processing, use and dissemination of their personal 
information. The Data Protection Directive sets out substantial requirements in this 
respect. Forming the crux is Article 6 of the Directive which sets out the data 
protection principles in relation to personal data: fair and lawful processing, purpose 
limitation, data adequacy, accuracy of data, time limitation). Other significant 
elements are: data subject’s right of access to data (Article 12a), integrity of data 
(Article 12b), automated decision making (Article 15), security of data (Article 17) 
and conditions of transfer of data to third countries (Chapter IV). These principles, it 




Data protection law is well established in the UK. Currently, the DPA 1998,1027 
together with other statutory instruments,1028 sets out the legal regime for data 
protection in the UK and aims at regulating the “processing of information relating to 
                                                 
1022 Article 2 (a); Bodil Lindqvist  [2004] 1 CMLR 20 
1023 2.4.3 
1024 See Recitals of the Directive. 
1025 Note this includes protection only for natural persons. Austria, Denmark, Italy and Luxembourg 
have extended their data protection laws to legal persons. D Korff, ‘Study on the Protection of the 
Rights and Interests of Legal Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data Relating to Such 
Persons,’ (February 2001) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/studies/legal_en.htm> 
1026 T Olsen and T Mahler, ‘Identity Management and Data Protection Law: Risk, Responsibility and 
Compliance in ‘Circles of Trust’ Part II,’ (2007) 23 CLSR, 415-426 
1027 Repealed the Data Protection Act 1984. 
1028 Eg, The Data Protection Act 1998 (Commencement) Order 2000, The Data Protection Tribunal 
(National Security Appeals) (Telecommunications) Rules 2000; The Data Protection (Processing of 
Sensitive Personal Data) Order 2000, The Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) 
Regulations 2003, The Information Tribunal (Enforcement Appeals) Rules 2005, The Information 
Tribunal (Enforcement Appeals) (Amendment) Rules 2005, The Information Tribunal (National 
Security Appeals) Rules 2005, The Data Protection (Processing of Sensitive Personal Data) Order 
2006;  The Data Protection (Monetary Penalties) (Maximum Penalty and Notices) Regulations 2010. 
For comprehensive list see Department of Constitutional Affairs, 
<http://www.dca.gov.uk/ccpd/dpsubleg.htm> 
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individuals, including the obtaining, holding, use or disclosure of such 
information.”1029 The DPA 1998 does not operate in isolation but is used in 
conjunction with the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (in Scotland, The Freedom of 
Information (Scotland) Act 2002). 
 
In the UK, data protection law protects digital identities in the form of personal data. 
Personal data is data relating to a living individual who can be identified from that 
data or from data or other information possessed or likely to be possessed by a data 
controller.1030 For instance, a digital name,1031 a CCTV image or a social networking 
profile that can be connected to a living identifiable person. 
 
In Durant v FSA,1032 the Court of Appeal ruled on what comprised “personal data” 
and came up with two elements: one, identifiability of the individual from the 
information, and second, that the information related to the individual such that it 
impacted his/her privacy (in some way or the other). The UK Information 
Commissioner further clarified this and said that an individual’s name was a key 
aspect of identity specifically where it coupled with other personal biographical 




In India, unlike the UK, there is no specific and established data protection legal 
regime. There are no data protection principles (as evident in the European or UK 
regime) for data controllers and processors to follow that set the remit of what is 
permissible behaviour in respect of personal data, and consequently digital identity. 
However, the ITA 2000 (as amended by ITAA 2008) does contain some data 
protection provisions. 
 
                                                 
1029 <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts1998/ukpga_19980029_en_2#pt1-l1g1> 
1030 S 1(1), DPA 1998 
1031 A name by itself may not constitute personal data. But names are rarely used by themselves, and 
often used in conjunction with other data that can lead to identification of a living individual.  
1032 [2003] EWCA Civ 1746 
1033 UK Information Commissioner, ‘The “Durant” Case and its Impact on the Interpretation of the 




The first is the provision for compensation for failure to protect data embodied in 
section 43A.1034 It provides that corporate bodies1035 possessing, dealing or handling 
sensitive personal data1036 or information in any of their owned, operated or 
controlled computer resources and negligently failing to implement and maintain 
reasonable security practices and procedures, which result in wrongful loss or gain, 
will be liable to pay compensatory damages.  
 
The second is the data confidentiality provision in section 72A. It provides that a 
person while providing services under a lawful contract must not disclose personal 
information obtained during that contract. If such a disclosure occurs (without 
consent or in breach) and it causes wrongful gain or loss, a punishment or fine might 
result.  
 
Both the above provisions give digital identity subjects a semblance of control over 
their information or data. But they are very limited in their application and 
effectiveness in protecting and securing digital identity (as also demonstrated in the 
following Chapter1037). Data protection law in India was largely influenced and 
incentivised by Europe’s ‘standard of reciprocity’ under Articles 25 and 26 of the 
DPD.1038 
 
Thus, data protection law in the two jurisdictions is very dissimilar. In the UK, it is 
highly advanced in nature and spirit; in India it is very nascent. Thus it places digital 
identity subjects in the two jurisdictions on unequal footing.  
 
5.2.8. Taking stock  
 
The examination of the law regulating digital identity in the UK and India provides 
unusual results. Given the diverse nature of the UK and Indian jurisdictions, and 
particularly local difference evident in relation to digital identity, it was expected that 
vast differences would emerge. However, there are a number of broad similarities in 
                                                 
1034 Inserted by ITAA 2008 
1035 Includes any company including firm or sole trader or professional associations of individuals. 
1036 S 43A (iii) 
1037 See 6.3.4.1, 6.3.7.2 
1038 See Bharat Vagadia, Outsourcing to India: A Legal Handbook (Springer, Berlin 2007), 123 
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the letter of the law in addition to significant differences. The similarities are evident 
in the context of criminal law, contract law, intellectual property law and some 
principles of tort law (malicious falsehood and negligence). These similarities exist 
because of the nature and manner in which these laws were created in India. 
 
Much of Indian law has foreign origin. As Galanter comments, “contemporary Indian 
law is for the most part, palpably foreign in origin or inspiration and it notoriously 
incongruent with the attitudes and concerns of much of the population which lives 
under it.”1039 Indian law, in large part, is based and borrows heavily from English law 
and legal precedents, due to India’s colonial history. It also borrows from other 
Western jurisdictions like the EU and the US and draws from international laws.  
 
Indian criminal law, for instance, is of British origin. The IPC of 1860 was 
formulated by the British appointed first law commission chaired by Lord Macaulay. 
In its formulation it represented a “foreign system” or a “system formed without the 
slightest reference to India,”1040 However, as previously demonstrated1041 and will 
become clearer in the following chapter,1042 this system of law (in current form), 
works well to regulate digital identity in India.  
 
Indian contract law, as embodied in the Indian Contract Act 1872 is based on English 
common law.1043 Therefore it is not surprising that it is similar to English contract 
law.  
 
Intellectual property law in India has two natures – one, it was influenced by British 
law, and two, its internationally harmonised nature. The British influence is evident 
in the following examples. The Designs Act 1911 was passed under British rule. The 
Indian Patents Act 1970 was modelled on the UK Patents Act of 1949.1044 The Indian 
                                                 
1039 Marc Galanter, ‘The Displacement of Traditional Law in Modern India’ (1968) 24 (4) J of Soc Iss, 
65-91 
1040 Sir George Pollock GCB, ‘Report on the Indian Penal Code’ (1850) 13, The Calcutta Review, 171 
1041 5.2.1.2 
1042 Specifically, 6.3.3 
1043 Other statutes embodying English common law are the Evidence act 1872, the Transfer of 
Property Act 1882 (amended, 1929) and the Succession Act 1865. De Cruz (1999) n281, 175 
1044 Replaced by Patents Act 1977 
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Copyright Act 1957 was influenced by the UK Copyright Act of 1956. Passing Off is 
based upon common law and uses principles of English common law.  India’s 
intellecutal property law’s harmonised nature has come about through India’s acting 
to meet international legal obligations particularly under WTO TRIPS regime.  
 
Indian tort law is also influenced by English law to a certain extent.1045 This is 
evident in the context of law of negligence and malicious falsehood.  
 
Even India’s information technology law, primarily embodied in the ITA 2000 had a 
foreign thrust and influence to it. The Act was inspired and enacted to give effect to 
the UN Model Law on Electronic Commerce.1046 Thus India consciously harmonised 
her law to meet international legal obligations. Though the ITA 2000 has been 
severely criticised,1047 it continues (as amended in 2008) to function as the core basis 
for information technology regulation in India.  
 
Thus, the Indian law regulating digital identity has much in common with the UK 
law and international law. A Westernised approach to digital identity regulation is 
palpable in the similarities. And yet, there are also significant differences. This is 
evident in relation to the regulation of privacy, the application of tort law 
(defamation and tort of misuse of private information) and data protection law.  
 
5.2.9. Conclusion  
 
 
The detailed comparative examination of the law regulating digital identity has 
brought out some significant results: first, digital identities occupy many “regulatory 
spaces.”1048 Second, there are a number of similarities in the law regulating digital 
identity. Third, there are significant differences in the law regulating digital identity. 
                                                 
1045 See 5.2.6 
1046 UN GA/RES/51/162, 30 Jan 1997 
1047 V Rajaraman, Essentials of E-Commerce (PHI, New Delhi 2010), 229; PT Joseph, Ecommerce: 
An Indian Perspective (PHI, India 2006), 28; SR Bhansali, The Information Technology Act 2000: An 
Exhaustive, Critical and Analytical Commentary of Act No. 21 of 2000 (University Book House, 
2003); Vivek Sood, Cyberlaw Simplified (Tata-McGraw Hill, India 2001), 5; Bagga (2005) n290, 145.  
1048 R Brownsword, ‘So What Does the World Need Now? Reflections on Regulating Technologies,’ 
in R Brownsword and K Yeung (eds), Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames 
and Technological Fixes (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2008), 23-48, 30 
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These differences manifest themselves in the following respects: right to privacy, 
defamation, misuse of private information and data protection, some core areas of 
digital identity.  
 
This chapter reveals on a broad and general level how the law regulates digital 
identity in the UK and India. But this is not the entire picture of how the legal 
regulation of digital identity occurs at national levels. How the law actually works in 
regulating digital identity is analysed next, with the help of specially formulated case 




































6. The legal regulation of digital identity: Case studies 
 
 
…the future lies in ‘diversity’ and ‘unity in diversity’ rather than in unity through 
uniformity and standardisation.  
-Esin Örücü1049 
6.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter investigates in greater depth whether and how difference manifests in 
the legal regulation of digital identity in the UK and India from the applicatory 
perspective. This investigation is carried out with the help of case studies on 
principal aspects1050 of digital identity like privacy, sharing, reputation, anonymity, 
pseudonymity, access to Internet resources and control of personal data (identified in 
the previous chapters as areas of local difference.) 
 
6.2. Methodology  
 
Case studies are a respected and potent form of legal education and research;1051 a 
vital part of legal analysis and theory building1052 and an essential demonstrative and 
learning tool. In this chapter, case studies function as an effective means to explore, 
gain insight into and demonstrate how the law operates to regulate digital identity in 
the UK and India.  
 
These case studies examine digital identity regulation from a comparative 
perspective. A similar examination has not been conducted at the international level 
in this manner.1053 In this respect, these case studies hope to become new food for 
thought for the legal and non-legal international and national digital identity 
                                                 
1049 Esin Örücü, ‘Comparatists and Extraordinary Places,’ in Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday 
(eds), Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (CUP, Cambridge 2003), 467-492, 489  
1050 As identified in the preceding chapters.  
1051 RK Yin, Applications of Case Study Research (Sage, Thousand Oaks 2002), xi  
1052 B Glaser and A Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies of Qualitative Research 
(Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, London 1967) 
1053 Case studies are not altogether absent in digital identity discourse, but none of these adopt a 
similar nuanced comparative approach. Vignettes were employed in Kai Rannenberg, D Royer, A 
Deuker (eds), The Future of Identity in the Information Society: Challenges and Opportunities 
(Springer, Berlin 2009); See also FIDIS, ‘Identity Use Cases & Scenarios,’ 
<http://www.fidis.net/resources/identity-use-cases-scenarios/>; U Gasser, JG Palfrey, ‘Case Study: 
Digital Identity Interoperability and eInnovation,’ Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2007-11, 
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interop/pdfs/interop-digital-id.pdf> 
 188 
communities. They1054 will also enable and advance our understanding of the 
complexities at play in the legal regulation of digital identity. One must note 
however, that the analysis carried out here though deeper than that conducted in 
Chapter 5 is not strictly of the nature as would be conducted by a court. Rather, it has 
a socio-legal nature. 
 
6.3. Case studies  
 
The first case study deals with the privacy; the second with sharing; the third with 
reputation; the fourth with anonymity; the fifth with pseudonymity; the sixth with 
access to Internet resources and the seventh with control of personal data. Each of the 
case studies begins with a digital identity problem and examines it from the 
perspectives of UK and Indian law.  
 
6.3.1. Privacy  
 
John photographs Akbar embracing a woman in a street corner and publishes 
the photograph on Facebook. Akbar sees the photograph on Facebook and is 
extremely distressed that his privacy has been violated. Does Akbar have a right 
to privacy? What recourse to law, if any, does Akbar have?  
 
This case study focuses on how the law regulates the privacy of online identity. It 
first examines Akbar’s right to privacy under UK law followed by a similar 




Akbar has two remedies in respect of his right to privacy. The first, relates to a 
remedy under Article 8 of the ECHR as implemented by the HRA 1998 and the 
second, under the tort of misuse of private information. First, Akbar’s right to 
privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR is analysed.  
 
                                                 
1054 Each case study is inspired by different sources, singly or in combination: legal cases (reputation), 
factual reports (anonymity and access) empirical studies (privacy, sharing) and direct observation 
(control). The characters in the case studies are fictional.  
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Akbar has an established right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR, the right to 
respect of private and family life, and can invoke this in a court of law against John 
as the “values embodied in Articles 8 and 10 are as much applicable in disputes 
between individuals or between an individual.”1055 This is confirmed by a number of 
ECtHR and UK cases, some of which are outlined below. 
 
In PG and JH v the United Kingdom, 1056 ECtHR outlined that there was a “zone of 
interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within 
the scope of “private life.”1057 While a person walking down a street may have 
limited privacy stricto sensu, “private life considerations may arise however once 
any systematic or permanent record comes into existence of such material from the 
public domain.” This is evident in Akbar’s case when John uploads the photograph 
of Akbar embracing the woman and creates a permanent record of the event.  
 
In Von Hannover v Germany,1058 relating to the violation of Article 8 of the ECHR 
by Germany through the circumvention of the applicant’s right to private life and 
image, the ECtHR held that there is an obligation to protect private life and the use of 
one’s image.1059 In this case, like Akbar’s, the issue was the publication of images 
taken in a public place during the course of carrying on activities of daily personal 
life. The ECtHR highlighted the “fundamental importance of protecting private life 
from the point of view of the development of every human being’s personality,” even 
such as “extends beyond the private family circle and also includes a social 
dimension.”1060 According to this, everyone, irrespective of whether they are known 
to the public, should be able to enjoy a “legitimate expectation” of the protection and 
respect for their private life. When this is not the case, there is a breach of Article 8. 
According to this reasoning, Akbar, even as a private individual has a right to 
                                                 
1055 Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22; A v B plc [2003] QB 195, 202, para 4 and Gavin Phillipson's 
‘Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under the Human 
Rights Act,’ (2003) 66 MLR, 726-728 
1056 n710 
1057 ibid 
1058 (2005) 40 EHRR 1 
1059 Para 72 
1060 Para 69 
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privacy of his image in a public place and can successfully bring an action to enforce 
the enjoyment of that right. 
 
This is also supported by case law in the UK. In Campbell v MGN,1061 relating 
publication of articles and photographs of a fashion model visiting a Narcotics 
Anonymous meeting in a national newspaper, the House of Lords made some 
important observations in respect of the right to privacy.1062  
 
Lord Nicholls recognised that “a proper degree of privacy is essential for the well-
being and development of an individual”1063 and that photographs of people “contain 
more information than textual description,” are “more vivid” and “worth a thousand 
words.” But photographs to be in breach of a privacy right had to be of “essentially 
private nature,” “show something untoward” or “convey private information,”1064 
which in Akbar’s case they clearly do.  
 
Lord Hoffman in the same case reiterated that there was “no logical ground for 
saying that a person should have less protection against a private individual than he 
would have against the state for the publication of personal information for which 
there is no justification.”1065 Similarly, that the “widespread publication of a 
photograph of someone which reveals him to be in a situation of humiliation or 
severe embarrassment, even if taken in a public place, may be an infringement of the 
privacy of his personal information.”1066  
 
John’s publication of the photograph of Akbar and the woman, according to this 
reasoning, is an infringement of Akbar’s privacy. Though Akbar’s photograph was 
taken in a public place, it contained information of essentially private nature of two 
individuals who (while they had been in a public place when the photograph had 
                                                 
1061 [2004] UKHL 22 
1062 The House of Lords here reversed the Court of Appeal decision by a 3-2 majority. 
1063 Lord Nicholls, dissenting para 12 
1064 Lord Nicholls, dissenting para 31 
1065 Lord Hoffman, dissenting, para 50 
1066 Lord Hoffman, para 75 
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been taken) had not consented to the secondary use of this information, and who had 
no reason, at the time of their actions, to suspect that they were being photographed.  
 
Akbar’s claim to a right to privacy is further strengthened by the ruling of the Court 
of Appeal in Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd.1067 While recognising that the mere 
taking of a photograph of activity in a public place might be unobjectionable,1068 the 
Court adjoined that “publicity of such activities is intrusive and can adversely affect 
the exercise of such social activities.”1069 
 
Thus, in proving that Akbar has a right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR, the 
first element of the tort of wrongful publication of private information, outlined by 
the Court of Appeal in McKennitt v Ash1070 is engaged. The second element of the 
tort relates to the whether in the circumstances Akbar’s interests must yield to John’s 
right to freedom of expression conferred by Article 10 of the ECHR.  
 
John’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 includes the freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by a 
public authority and regardless of frontiers. But this right is not a blanket right that 
trumps the right to privacy in all cases. The circumstances under which it may trump 
the right to privacy are limited as prescribed in Article 10(2), all of which do not 
apply in the instant case.1071 For instance, there was no public interest in the 
publication of the photograph of Akbar embracing the woman. The publication of the 
photograph also did not fall within the sphere of political or public debate.1072 Thus 
Article 10 is not engaged, and Akbar has a strong case against John for the wrongful 
publication of his private information.  
 
In this manner it is evident that UK law affords definite and strong privacy protection 
to Akbar in respect of the publication of his online image.  
                                                 
1067 [2008] EWCA Civ 446 (07 May 2008) 
1068 para 54 
1069 para 55 
1070 [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, per Buxton, LJ; Latham and Longmore LJJ in agreement. 
1071 See n736 




What about Akbar’s rights under Indian law? Does Akbar have a right to privacy as 
evidenced in the case of UK law? Does he have an effective remedy in the instant 
case at all? The answer, to the latter two questions, is no. 
 
Section 66E of the ITA 2000 (as amended by ITAA 2008) might be said to 
specifically apply to Akbar’s case. It prescribes punishment for violation of privacy 
online and reads:   
Whoever, intentionally or knowingly captures, publishes or transmits the 
image of a private area of a person without his or her consent, under 
circumstances violating the privacy of that person, shall be punished with 
imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine not exceeding 
two lakhs rupees, or with both.  
 
John captured (defined as videotaping, photographing, filming or recording by any 
means)1073 transmitted (defined as electronically sending a visual image with the 
intent that it be viewed by other persons)1074 and published (defined as reproducing 
in printed or electronic form and making it available to the public)1075 the image of 
Akbar embracing a woman. So, the first part of the section has clear application.  
 
However, next follow the problems. First, section 66E only applies in cases of 
violation of privacy through publication of images of the ‘private area’ of a person, 
which is restrictively defined by the Act as “the naked or undergarment clad genitals, 
pubic area, buttocks or female breast.”1076 Second, the circumstances violating 
privacy are confined in Section 66E (e) to two circumstances in which a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy: (i) that he or she can disrobe in privacy without 
fear that an image of their private area was being captured1077 and (ii) that any part of 
a person’s private area would not be visible to the public irrespective of where that 
person is.1078  
 
                                                 
1073 S 66E (a) 
1074 S 66E (b) 
1075 S 66E (d) 
1076 S 66E (c). Recall here the cultural dimension of what is considered private in India.Ch 3, 3.2.2.1.3 
1077 S 66E (e) (i). This section is aimed at cases like home and fitting room privacy.   
1078 S 66E (e) (ii). This section is aimed at cases like underskirt filming.  
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Thus, Akbar has no right to privacy under Section 66E for the following reasons: 
first, the image is not an image of a private area of a person; and two, though there 
was no consent, it does not fall within the two circumstances the section explicitly 
provides for.1079 Thus the protection afforded by Section 66E is limited in its scope 
and application. It offers no protection to the privacy of digital identity beyond a 
highly curtailed circumference.1080  
 
What about Akbar’s fundamental right to privacy under Article 21 of the 
Constitution?  Akbar has a constitutional right to privacy against the State and 
private persons,1081 but does this right apply in the instant case?  
 
Under Article 21, the bar for proving a right to privacy exists is quite high, as will 
become evident in the following analysis.  
 
One, it must be proved that there has been a calculated interference in the enjoyment 
of one’s personal life or liberty. In Kharak Singh,1082 relating to domiciliary 
surveillance, it was held that a right to privacy is available when there is a calculated 
interference with the enjoyment of a person’s life or personal liberty. Mere personal 
sensitivity does not lend itself to a privacy right. According to the Court, a calculated 
interference would be one which involved not a single attempt but continuous and 
repetitive measures. In the instant case, there is no evidence of a “calculated 
interference” with Akbar’s right to privacy. 
 
Next, a person must not have voluntarily thrust himself into, invited or raised a 
controversy, such that led to or facilitated the violation of privacy. This is in line with 
                                                 
1079 The section leaves little scope for expansive interpretation.  
1080 This sense of privacy stems from a low personal and social value attributed to privacy as 
substantiated in Ch 3 (3.2.2.1) It is a reminder of how the law mirrors religious connotations of 
privacy. This section in particular accords with the following passage of the Mahabharata: 
Nanagnibhikshte nari na vidvanpurushanapi, maithunam stanta guptmaharn cha samachmit meaning: 
A naked woman ought not to be seen…Cited by the Supreme Court in Phoolan Devi v Shekhar 
Kapoor 57 (1995) DLT 154, § 33 
1081 As demonstrated in Bodhisattwa, n718 and Zee Telefilms, n719 
1082 n720. The Supreme Court confirmed that the “the right of privacy is not a guaranteed right under 
our Constitution.” Contrast this with the UK position where the right to privacy is generally accepted 
as a fundamental right. 
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Rajagopal1083 where it was laid down that a person must not “voluntarily thrust 
himself into controversy or voluntarily invite or raise a controversy.”1084 
 
Akbar has a right to privacy of his own pursuits (in this case meeting and embracing 
the woman). John had no right to publish a photograph of Akbar without his consent. 
But in this case, John has a defence; that Akbar by embracing the woman in a public 
place had voluntarily thrust himself into and invited controversy by not keeping his 
actions private.1085 Courts in India find no favour with privacy litigants who 
demonstrate this kind of behaviour.1086 The legal interpretation of privacy in India is 
largely in terms of it being “a state of being private or in retirement; seclusion, 
secrecy or solitude.”1087 In this, the concept is still primitive in its development (as 
compared to the UK). Nor has it moved to become as pervasive and socially valuable 
concept as it has in the UK.1088 
 
The right to privacy under Article 21 thus, though offering some privacy protection, 
does not translate into effective protection in cases like Akbar’s. This is a very 
serious state of affairs which means that Akbar has no remedy in Indian law for the 
violation of his privacy.1089   
 
At the end of this case study, it is evident that an individual’s right to privacy is 
highly protected in the UK. Under this right an individual in the UK has an effective 
                                                 
1083 n722 
1084 § 26 
1085 Khushwant Singh v Maneka Gandhi AIR 2002 Delhi 58; Phoolan Devi n1080 
1086The Managing Director v Mrs V Muthulakshmi CRP (PD) 3299/2007 (Chennai High Court) §15 
reiterating that “the right to privacy is available as long as the privacy is maintained by the parties. If 
the privacy comes out to public, the question of retaining the privacy does not arise.” Mr KJ 
Doraisamy v The Assistant General Manager WP 17761/2006 (Chennai High Court) §15 (once a 
matter becomes matter of public record, right to privacy in it no longer subsists). Ms X v Mr Z 96 
(2002) DLT 354; Khushwant n1085 § 1 
1087 MK Chandran v Commr of Police, Kochi AIR 1998 Ker 347 § 11; M/s Makkal T  Thodarpu 
Kuzhuman Ltd v Mrs V Muthulakshmi CRP (PD) 3299/2007 (Mad) 
1088 The HRA 1998 makes privacy a socially valuable concept. See Lord Bingham, ‘The Way We 
Live Now: Human Rights in the New Millennium,’ (1999) 1 Web JCLI, penultimate para; ICO, ‘The 
Privacy Dividend: The Business Case for Investing in Proactive Privacy Protection’ (March 2010) 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/privacy
_dividend.pdf> 
1089 Note, the woman might be able to protect her privacy by virtue of S 509 IPC (insult to modesty of 
a woman). This section is largely used in cases of sexual nature and acts have to have constituted 
“indecent behaviour” or been “offensive to morality.” State of Punjab v Major Singh 1966 SCR (2) 
286; Anuradha Kshirsagar v State of Maharashtra 1991 CriLJ 410. 
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remedy in law for the violation of privacy of his or her digital identity. Even in the 
context of a public place, individuals are afforded protection by privacy law in 
respect of their digital images.  
 
However, the case is very different in India. The right to privacy is highly 
constrained and limited. It does not protect or afford significant, leave alone optimal 
levels of protection to individuals in India in respect of their digital images except in 
limited, specific and highly regimented confines. It has also not moved, as has in the 
UK, to include a privacy right in terms of actions in public places. 
 
 
6.3.2. Sharing  
 
Amita, a subscriber of a mobile phone service, lives in a large family comprising 
of her father, mother, siblings and their spouses, all of who persistently use her 
mobile phone for various purposes like making calls, accessing emails and the 
Internet and mobile banking. Her brother Vijay even lends the phone to his 
friend Ram. Amita discovers that Vijay and Ram have been using her phone to 
download material which is the subject of copyright. Is Amita liable?  
 
This case study focuses on sharing of digital identities. Earlier, it was highlighted 
how socio-cultural trends in India, as compared to the UK, favour the sharing of 
digital identity technologies like computers and mobile phones, between a greater 
number of people and to a greater degree.1090 Does the law recognise this and does it 
make allowances for these localised contexts of digital identity use? Does the law 
differentiate in the imposition of liability in respect of devices if they are less of more 





The law in the UK, as currently evident sets the bar of legal liability for shared 
digital identity very high. This is particularly evident in the liability for copyright 
infringement. For example, a pub was fined £8,000 because material subject to 
                                                 
1090 Ch 3 (3.2.1.4) 
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copyright was downloaded over its shared wi-fi hotspot.1091 Amita might be liable 
under sections 23 (possessing or dealing with infringing copy) or 24 (providing 
means for making infringing copies) of the CDPA 1988. 
 
In 2010, the Digital Economy Act 2010 (DEA 2010) was introduced inter alia to deal 
with online infringement of copyright and provide penalties for infringement of 
copyright and performers’ rights. The Act inserts new provisions relating to online 
copyright infringement into the Communications Act 2003. Under section 124A, if a 
copyright owner finds that the subscriber to an Internet access service is infringing 
the owner’s copyright through the service or has allowed another person to use the 
service then the owner may make a copyright infringement report1092 to the ISP. The 
ISP must then notify the subscriber of the report if the initial obligations code1093 
requires the provider to do so. The ISP might also be obliged under Ofcom’s 
directions to take technical measures (like service speed limitation, access prevention 
and control, suspension or other limitation of service) to prevent the infringement of 
copyright.1094 The provisions of this Act go against the open and public sharing of 
access to Internet access.1095 However, this is not a huge problem in the UK given 
that access to the Internet is generally available through personal devices over which 
individuals can exercise relatively good degrees of control.1096 
 
                                                 
1091 D Meyer, ‘Pub 'Fined £8k' for Wi-Fi Copyright Infringement,’ ZDNet UK (27 November 2009) 
<http://news.zdnet.co.uk/communications/0,1000000085,39909136,00.htm>. A German Court has 
also held that owners of open Wi-Fi services are responsible for copyright violations by unauthorised 
third parties if they fail to secure and restrict access. See John Leyden, ‘German Wi-Fi Networks 
Liable for 3rd Party Piracy,’ The Register (13 May 2010) 
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/05/13/open_wifi_fines_germany/> 
1092 A report that (a) states that there appears to have been an infringement of the owner’s copyright; 
(b) includes a description of the apparent infringement; (c) includes evidence of the apparent 
infringement that shows the subscriber’s IP address and the time at which the evidence was gathered; 
(d) is sent to the Internet service provider within the period of 1 month beginning with the day on 
which the evidence was gathered; and (e) complies with any other requirement of the initial 
obligations code. 
1093 For contents, see s 7, DEA 2010 
1094 S 9, DEA 2010 
1095 An argument echoed in David Meyer, ‘Open Wi-Fi 'Outlawed' by Digital Economy Bill,’ ZDNet 
UK (26 February 2010); Matt Brian, ‘Is UK Public WIFI Doomed?’ The Next Web (28 February 
2010); SC, ‘Claims Made that the Digital Economy Bill Will Cause the End of Public WiFi,’ SC 
Magazine (23 March 2010) 
1096 See Ch 3 (3.2.1.4) 
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Under these provisions, Amita might find herself disconnected from the use of her 
mobile services and lose her digital identity, because she would be clearly liable as 
the subscriber of the phone for any shared use of her Internet connection (whether 




Would Amita be liable under Indian law? First and foremost, much like the UK, 
Amita might be held liable, even though is she is not a primary infringer, under the 
Indian Copyright Act 1957, Section 63, if she “knowingly abets”1097 the infringement 
conducted by Vijay and Ram. She could find herself liable to a sentence of 
imprisonment for a term of less than six months or a fine of less than fifty thousand 
rupees. 
 
However, there is another very peculiar aspect to this issue. This relates to the nature 
of Amita’s mobile phone as shared family asset. Amita, the primary digital identity 
subject, lives in a Hindu undivided family (HUF), a very important concept of Hindu 
law and an entity with rights and liabilities. A HUF refers to a family led by a karta 
(head of the family, in this case Amita’s father) that is normally joint in food, 
worship and estate. The property of the HUF may comprise of ancestral property, 
joint acquisitions and/or self acquisitions as part of the common stock. So therefore 
the law regulating digital identity in India should be attuned to these uses which 
might necessitate the rethinking of strict liability terms for use of shared digital 
identities. But it is not. Amita should not be held responsible for the multiple uses of 
her digital identity, particularly as she has no control over them, but she might well 
be. 
 
What if Amita’s phone is used to publish or transmit obscene and sexually explicit 
material or child pornography? Again, she would find herself liable under Sections 
67, 67A and 67B of the ITA 2000 (as amended by ITAA 2008), because she is the 
subscriber of the mobile phone. This implies that Amita has a legal responsibility to 
use her mobile as a personal and private device. But this is impossible, given that 
                                                 
1097 Per Cheria P Joseph v Prabhakarn AIR 1967 Kar 234. Clear and cogent proof of knowledge is 
necessary to establish the commission of offence. 
 198 
digital identity resources like computers and mobile phones are constantly used and 
experienced as shared assets in India; and will be impossible unless such conditions 
are recognised and promoted by society and law. But social norms go against the 
enclosing of digital assets and consequently digital identities.1098 For example, Amita 
is expected to defer to her father and brother, and she is socially conditioned to 
behave that way.1099 
 
But it is not just Amita who might be liable in the instant case. Amita’s father as the 
karta or head of the family might also be held to account for any copyright 
infringement or criminal act committed in relation to Amita’s mobile phone, as her 
phone functions as a common family asset. Though the burden of proof would be 
high in such a case, if mens rea can be proved in respect of the copyright 
infringement1100 any or all of Amita’s family could be held liable for the 
infringement.  
 
For instance, as occurred in Avnish Bajaj v State,1101  where the managing director of 
Bazee.com was criminally prosecuted under sections 292 (sale of obscene material) 
and 294 (punishment for obscene acts) of the IPC and section 67 of the ITA 2000 
(electronic publication of obscene material), after his company’s website listed a 
sexually explicit video clip depicting two school children, for sale. While the court 
discharged the petitioner’s responsibility under sections 292 and 294 IPC,1102 the 
Court found the petitioner responsible under section 67 of the ITA 2000.  
 
In Avnish, the Court made reference to Section 85 of the ITA 2000 which holds that a 
person in charge of or responsible to a company for conduct of its business, may 
incur liability and punishment for any contravention committed during their tenure, 
unless it can be proved that the contravention occurred without their knowledge and 
despite due diligence to prevent it being exercised. The law thus imposes a deemed 
criminal responsibility under this section, and the burden of proof lies with the 
                                                 
1098 Ch 3 (3.1.2.4) 
1099 See empirical evidence in Ch 3, n317-324 
1100 Bhekha Ahir v Emperor AIR 1947 Pat 236 (G) 
1101 Crl MC 3066/2006 (Del) 
1102 Holding that automatic criminal responsibility did not arise for directors of a company. 
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individual charged to prove the discharge of such liability.1103 The Court here relied 
on the Supreme Court’s authorities of Sheo Ratan Agarwal v State of MP,1104 UP 
Pollution Control Board v Messers Modi Distillery1105 and Anil Hada v Indian 
Acrylic Ltd.1106 
 
What is significant here is that while the law imposes a great burden in terms of 
liability on digital identity subjects like Amita in India, it fails to take into account 
that digital identity devices like mobiles and computers function as shared devices, 
making digital identity social and multiple in relation to the number of identity 
subjects with access to it. The law makes no allowance for the vast shared context of 
digital identity in India which is a result of its peculiar digital developmental and 
social conditions. It also fails to recognise socio-cultural factors that put digital 
identity subjects in India on unequal footing with one another (e.g. Amita’s 
deference to her family as a female and junior member). Here is evident a mismatch 
in the expectations and application of the law and the local context of digital identity, 
in India.  
 
6.3.3. Reputation  
 
Brijesh creates a false profile for Jai on Orkut,1107 a social networking site. 
While a few of the entries are true (like name, place of residence, data of birth), 
the substantial part are false e.g. sexual orientation (Jai is a heterosexual but 
according to the profile he is homosexual), political and religious views (Jai is 
alleged to support a banned extremist organisation). Jai’s personal and 
professional life suffers. His fiancée calls off their engagement and he loses his 
job.  
 
This case study is based on two legal cases: Applause1108 and Katti.1109 
                                                 
1103 Para 20.2 
1104 (1984) 4 SCC 352 
1105 (1987) 3 SCC 684 





In Applause, the primary issue was whether Grant Raphael (an ex-friend of Firsht) 
was liable for uploading a false profile and creating a defamatory group in relation to 
Mathew Firsht on Facebook. It was alleged that the material uploaded was 
defamatory of Mathew Firsht and Applause Store and had been created using a 
computer with Grant Raphael’s IP address. The false profile comprised of 
information about Firsht’s sexual orientation, relationship status, date of birth, 
political and religious views (some of which were claimed to be inaccurate). 
 
The Court in dealing with the defamation claim awarded damages for libel to Firsht 
amounting to £15,000 and to Applause Store of £5,000. In relation to the tort of 
misuse of private information, the Court in acceding that Firsht as a private person 
had been caused ‘great shock and upset’ by the misuse of his personal information, 
awarded Firsht a sum of £2000. In making this award, the judgments in McKennitt v 
Ash,1110 Campbell v MGN Ltd1111 and Campbell v MGN Ltd1112 were referred to. 
 
In Katti, obscene, defamatory and annoying messages were posted about a woman in 
a Yahoo! Message group. The perpetrator, a spurned ex-family friend of the woman, 
opened a sham email account in the woman’s name which led to her being harassed 
with phone calls from people who thought she was soliciting. The perpetrator was 
charged under section 469 (forgery for the purpose of harming reputation) and 509 
(act to insult the modesty of women) of the IPC and section 67 of ITA 2000 
(electronic publication of obscene material), convicted and sentenced.  He was 
ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rupees 500 
(for offence under section 469 IPC), one year simple imprisonment and fine of 
Rupees 500 (for offence under section 509 IPC) and two years rigorous 
imprisonment and fine of Rupees 4,000 (for the offence under section 67, ITA 2000), 
all of which were to run concurrently. 
 
Applause and Katti both have very similar facts: conflict arising out of personal 
relationships gone wrong. In both cases, reputation was harmed. The only difference 
                                                 
1110 [2006] EMLR 178 
1111 [2002] EWHC 499 (QB)  
1112 [2004] 2 AC 457  
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is that Firsht was resolved in the private law framework (tort law) and Katti in the 
public law framework (criminal law). Does this suggest that there is a preference for 
digital identity disputes to be settled within the private law framework in England 
while in India, digital identity disputes of such nature are largely a public law matter? 




The offence of common law defamatory libel in England and Wales and Northern 
Ireland was abolished by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.1113 Section 73 of the 
Act provides that the offences of sedition and seditious libel, defamatory libel and 
obscene libel have been abolished. Therefore, Brijesh cannot be criminally 
prosecuted for an offence of defamatory libel under the law of England and Wales 
and Northern Ireland.  
 
But this does not mean that Jai has no remedy in respect of the harm caused to him 
by Brijesh. As evidenced in Chapter 5, Jai has civil law remedies (like damages and 
injunctions) he can avail of. This is also demonstrated by Applause and the case of 
the law student who was awarded damages of £10,000 by the London High Court 
when his private life and public reputation suffered as a result of an ex-friend making 





What would be Jai’s position in India? How would this dispute be resolved? Would 
Brijesh be accountable for his actions?  
 
The principal manner the instant case would be resolved in India, like Katti, is 
through the criminal law framework. Jai’s remedy would lie in Section 469 of the 
IPC dealing with forgery to harm reputation. It states:  
                                                 
1113 E.i.f 12 January 2010 
1114 Telegraph.co.uk, ‘Law Student Wins £10,000 After Being Branded a Paedophile on Facebook,’ 
(28 July 2010) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/7912731/Law-student-wins-10000-
after-being-branded-a-paedophile-on-Facebook.html> 
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Whoever commits forgery1115[intending that the document or Electronic 
Record forged]1116 shall harm the reputation of any party, or knowing that it 
is likely to used for that purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of 
either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also 
be liable to fine. 
 
Brijesh has committed forgery by creating an Orkut profile,1117 for Jai with false 
information in it. This has resulted in repercussions upon Jai’s personal and 
professional reputation and life. Brijesh would also attract the attention of Section 
499 of the IPC dealing with defamation as he has, through the Orkut profile, made 
and published imputations about Jai either intending to cause Jai harm and knowing 
or having reason to believe that it would cause harm to Jai’s reputation. In such a 
case, Brijesh could find himself facing simple imprisonment extending to up to two 
years, a fine or both. 
 
What about civil remedies? Does Jai have any civil remedies in respect of Brijesh’s 
actions? Indeed, he does. In India, a civil suit for defamation under tort law is also 
maintainable either in combination with criminal proceedings, or separately, or 
sequentially.  
 
However, civil suits under the tort for defamation, which can only be filed before the 
High Court of a State, are sparse. Where evident, they run sequentially post criminal 
proceedings for enforcement of damages. To date, there is evidence of only three 
cases filed before High Courts in relation to online defamation (SMC Pneumatics,1118 
Gremach1119 and Socieadade,1120) all of which related to the protection of 
commercial reputation.1121 There is no evidence of civil defamation cases being filed 
by individuals to protect their online reputation.1122   
 
                                                 
1115 Defined in S 463, IPC. 
1116 Substituted by Act 21 of 2000, s 91 and Sch. I, for ‘intending that the document forged.’  
1117 An Orkut profile is an electronic record as defined by s 2 (t), ITA 2000: data, record or data 
generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in and electronic form or microfilm or computer 




1121 Ch 5 (5.2.6.1.2) 
1122 As at 01.12.10 
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There are a number of reasons for this. The foremost relates to the lack of 
codification of the tort law of defamation and its case by case development, with 
wide scale borrowing from the English legal system. Though there has been some 
legislation in the tort field, the lack of assertion of individuals over their legal rights 
in India is attributable to the difficulty of proving claims, high legal expenses and 
court delays in obtaining justice.1123 Compared to this, the criminal defamation 
regime is well established in form, principle and practice, and caters well to cases of 
digital defamation.1124  
 
Delving deep into the matter, one finds the answer to why criminal remedies are the 
preferred digital identity problem solving solution in India. As far back as 1930, 
Walsh stated that “the Indian much prefers, if he can seek assistance, the criminal 
court for the redress of his civil wrongs.”1125 This preference has stayed strong and 
the criminal law system supports this with the help of an elaborate and easily 
accessible framework for the redressal of private complaints.1126 
 
Civil remedies like torts are considered to be remedies of the lower order in India. 
Galanter succinctly summarises the reasons torts are lacking as a remedy: ad valorum 
court fees, continuing lawyer fees, successive delays, interlocutory appeals, low or 
meagre awards of damages (to avoid windfall gains)1127 and pursuant judgment 
execution problems.1128 These remedies are generally inaccessible and necessitate 
                                                 
1123 B Veeraragavan, ‘Torts In India Whether Unnecessary Or Simply Overlooked,’ LegalService 
India (6 December 2007) 
1124 This is also evident in how S 66A, ITA 2000 (as amended by ITAA 2008) might be brought to 
apply to cases of online defamation where it can be proved that a person has sent false information 
through a computer resource or communication device to cause annoyance, inconvenience, deception, 
hatred, ill will, etc that person could be punished with imprisonment for a term extending to three 
years and a fine.  
1125 C Walsh, Crime in India, (Ernest Benn, London 1930), 26 
1126 Upendra Baxi and Thomas Paul, Mass Disasters and Multinational Liability: The Bhopal case, 
(Indian Law Institute, New Delhi 1986), 179; Marc Galanter, ‘Legal Torpor: Why So Little Has 
Happened in India After the Bhopal Tragedy,’ (1985) 20 Texas Intl LJ, 273-294, 275 
1127 As confirmed by the Delhi High Court in Ram Jethmalani v Subramaniam Swamy AIR 2006 
Delhi 300 §104, stating that “Punitive damages in defamation are not awarded in India. Damages 
awarded are recompense to the loss of honour and reputation. Inherently, quantification is a problem, 
as honour and reputation are inherently incapable of being valued in terms of money.” See the low 
awards made in Noor Mohammed v Mohammed Jiajdin 1991 (0) MPLJ 530 (Rs 3000, approx. £ 40); 
GS Walavalkar v PS Rege AIR Bom 224 (Rs 4000, approx. £55)  
1128 Marc Galanter, ‘India’s Tort Deficit: Sketch for a Historical Portrait,’ in DM Engel and M 
McCann (eds), Fault Lines (SUP, Stanford 2009), 47- 65, 54 
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more conscious and active involvement of the litigant. They are also slow and largely 
ineffective in providing relief.1129 The Indian legal system actively discourages 
individual claimants from using torts as a remedy to enforce individual interests.1130 
This has led to huge reliance on and preference for criminal remedies. 
 
Thus, this case study shows how the nature digital identity regulation differs between 
the UK and India in respect of the protection of individual reputation. In the UK, 
protection of reputation is a private law matter, a matter of individuals asserting their 
rights; in India, au contraire, it is a public law matter, the State protecting the 
interests of the individual against other individuals.  
 
6.3.4. Anonymity  
 
X is HIV positive (a fact secret from her family and friends). She goes to a 
cybercafé to find out information about AIDS. She finds out has to register her 
identity to use the services. She is uncomfortable with the idea, but with no 
other means of Internet access, complies and is able to surf the Internet to find 
the information and support required. A week later she is thrown out of her 
family home and is shunned by her friends and acquaintances in her locality. 
The cyber café operator had matched her registered identity with her web 
surfing habits and felt he had the moral duty to warn people about her 
condition. Does X have a right to anonymity and a remedy for its violation?  
 
This case study is centred upon the issue of anonymity which, as evident in Chapter 
2, is one of the most important features of digital identity. This case study examines 
the law’s application in the creation and support of the conditions of identification 
and anonymity in the UK and India. 
 
                                                 
1129 National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, ‘Liability of the State in Tort,’ 
Consultation Paper (New Delhi, 2001) para 6.1; R Ranchhoddas, DK Thakore and GP Singh, Ratanlal 
& Dhirajlal’s the Law of Torts (Wadhwa & Co, 2008); KB Agrawal and V Singh, Private 
International Law in India ( KLI, 2010), 135; Amanda Perry-Kessaris, ‘Access to Environmental 
Justice in India’s Garden City (Bangalore),’ in Andrew Harding (ed), Access to Environmental 
Justice: A Comparative Study (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2007), 59-88, 64  




In Europe and the UK, digital anonymity is perceived as a tool to help the digital 
identity subject protect himself, his personal life and privacy against interference 
from others.1131 It is a vital ingredient of the freedom of expression.1132  The 
recommendations of the Article 29 Working Party on the Protection of Individuals 
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data support this contention in relation to 
Europe.  
 
Recommendation 3/97 on Anonymity on the Internet1133 calls for maintenance of 
choice to remain anonymous while recognising that the need for anonymity in 
respect of online transactions underpins privacy and freedom of expression. In 
Recommendation 2/99 on the respect of privacy in the context of interception of 
telecommunications,1134 the Working Party recognises the need for anonymity in 
respect of use of telecommunications services.  
 
Further, in Opinion 2/2002 on the use of unique identifiers in telecommunication 
terminal equipments: the example of IPv61135 it recommended that “network and 
access providers should offer to any user the option to use the network or to access 
the services anonymously or using a pseudonym.” In Opinion 1/2003 on the Storage 
of Traffic Data for Billing Purposes1136 adopted on 29 January 2003, the Working 
Party supports a regime of anonymised traffic data.   
 
                                                 
1131 D Wright and ors, (eds), Safeguards in a World of Ambient Intelligence (Springer, Dordrecht 
2010), 212 
1132 J Lipschultz, Free Expression in the Age of the Internet: Social and Legal Boundaries (West View 
Press, Oxford 2000) 
1133 Adopted by the Working Party on 3 December 1997 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1997/wp6_en.pdf> 
1134 Adopted on 3 May 1999, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1999/wp18en.pdf> 
1135 Adopted on 30 May 2002, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2002/wp58_en.pdf> 
113612054/02/EN WP 69 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp69_en.pdf> 
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Cybercafés in the UK generally operate under a principle of minimal identification of 
users of their services1137 and mandate low levels of identification in relation to the 
use of such digital services.  
 
In the instant case study, X’s right to anonymity is guaranteed and protected in the 
UK. This is because cybercafés are required to comply with the DPA 1998, as they 
are both data controllers1138 and data processors1139 dealing with personal data under 
the Act and thus are required to comply with the obligations imposed upon them by 
the Act. X’s data that is controlled and processed by the cybercafé operator is a 
combination of personal and sensitive personal data.1140 In further disclosing X’s 
personal and sensitive personal data beyond the remit it had been lawfully obtained 
for, the cybercafé operator failed to meet the obligations imposed by the Act and is 
clearly in breach.  
 
The cybercafé (and the operator) had an obligation to comply with the data 
protection principles set out in Schedule 1 of the DPA 1998. X’s personal data 
should have been fairly and lawfully processed.1141 Here, this is clearly not the case. 
X’s personal and sensitive personal data might have been obtained for a specified 
and lawful purpose, but it was further processed in a manner incompatible with the 
purpose for which it was obtained.1142  
 
The first data protection principle (Para 1 of Schedule 1 of DPA 1998) expressly 
prohibits the processing of sensitive personal data unless one of the conditions in 
                                                 
1137 Cybercafés would be required to comply with the obligations imposed by the Data Retention (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2009 
1138 The cybercafé is a data controller because it determines the purposes and manner in which the 
personal data of the people he relates to is processed. DPA 1998, s 1 (1) 
1139 Processing of personal data refers to, “obtaining, recording or holding the information or data or 
carrying out any operation or set of operations on the information or data, including the organisation, 
adaptation or alteration of the information or data, retrieval, consultation or use of the information or 
data, disclosure of the information or data by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making 
available, or alignment, combination, blocking, erasure or destruction of the information or data. DPA 
1998, s 1(1) 
1140 Sensitive personal data is defined in S 2, DPA 1998 as personal data that consists of information 
about a data subject’s racial or ethnic origins, political opinions, religious or other similar beliefs, 
trade union membership, physical or mental health or condition, sexual life, the commission or alleged 
commission by him of any offence, or any proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to have 
been committed by him, the disposal of such proceedings or the sentence of any court in such 
proceedings. 
1141 First Data Protection principle  
1142 Second Data Protection principle  
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Schedule 3 of the Act is fulfilled. Schedule 3 of the DPA 19981143 prescribes the 
specific conditions under which sensitive personal data may be processed.1144  One of 
these conditions is explicit consent of the data subject,1145 which in this case is 
clearly missing.  
 
Another condition applicable to the processing of sensitive personal data is that the 
processing is carried out (with appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of 
data subjects) in the course of its legitimate activities by a body or association not 
established or conducted for profit, and exists for political, philosophical, religious or 
trade-union purposes and relates only to individuals who either are members of the 
body or association or have regular contact with it in connection with its 
purposes.1146 In these conditions, the UK data protection regime robustly protects 
digital identity manifesting as sensitive personal data.  
 
The cybercafé also failed to meet the obligation under the Sixth data protection 
principle (processing of personal data in accordance with the rights of data subjects). 
This is particularly evident in respect of Section 10 of the DPA 1998 which provides 
data subjects with the right to prevent processing of data such as is likely to cause 
damage or distress.  
 
The cyber café operator can be held liable of an offence under section 55 of the DPA 
19981147 which provides that a person must not knowingly or recklessly, without the 
consent of the data controller either (a) obtain or disclose personal data or the 
information contained in personal data, or (b) procure the disclosure to another 
person of the information contained in personal data.1148 Offences under this section 
                                                 
1143 Schedule 3 prescribes the Conditions relevant to the processing of sensitive personal data. 
1144 In addition to the conditions in Schedule 3, there are regulations setting out conditions for the 
processing of sensitive personal data -The Data Protection (Processing of Sensitive Personal Data) 
Order 2000. 
1145 Schedule 3 (1), DPA 1998 
1146 Schedule 3 (4), DPA 1998 
1147 Up to date details of prosecutions at ICO website <www.ico.gov.uk>  
1148 S 55 (1)  
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are punishable with a fine of up to five thousand pounds in a Magistrates Court; 
unlimited in the Crown Court.1149  
 
The cybercafé operator cannot escape liability under the exceptions because he 
cannot prove that disclosure he made of X’s personal and sensitive personal data to 
the people in the locality was necessary for crime prevention or detection,1150 was 
required or authorised by law,1151 that a legal right to disclose the information existed 
1152 or that the disclosure was justified in the public interest.1153 
 
The cybercafé (and the cybercafé operator) violated the rights of X (as a data subject) 
in keeping her personal and sensitive personal data anonymous. X also has a remedy 
under section 13 of DPA 1998 for any damage and distress she has suffered as a 
result of the violation. Data subjects in the UK are thus supported by law in keeping 





Unlike the UK, it will now be argued that X has no parallel right to anonymity under 
Indian law.  
 
Cybercafés are the primary means of Internet access in India.1155 Under the ITA 
2000, a cybercafé is defined as “any facility from where access to the Internet is 
offered by any person in the ordinary course of business to the members of the 
                                                 
1149 A consultation was held to provide a custodial deterrent to data protection offences. See 
Department for Constitutional Affairs, ‘Increasing Penalties for Deliberate and Wilful Misuse of 
Personal Data,’ Consultation Paper, CP 9/06 (July 2006) 
<http://www.dfpni.gov.uk/consultation_misue_of_personal_data.pdf> 
1150 S 55 (2) (a) (i) 
1151 S 55 (2) (a) (ii) 
1152 S 55 (2) (b)  
1153 S 55 (2) (d) 
1154 X might also have a breach of confidence remedy against the cybercafé operator. See Ch 5 
(5.2.5.5.1) 
1155 See IMRB and IAMAI, ‘Internet in India: 2006,’ Summary Report (6 December 2006) 16 
<http://www.iamai.in/Upload/Research/book.pdf> 
 209 
public.”1156 Cyber cafés are also intermediaries1157 under the ambit of the Act and 
have to comply with the rules laid down in respect of them.  
 
Under section 90 of the ITA 2000 (as amended ITAA 2008), state governments have 
the power to make rules to carry out the provisions of the Act. Under this section or 
under various state Police Acts, many states have made regulations to govern the use 
of cybercafés.  
 
For example, in Maharashtra has special Rules under the Police Act1158 which hold 
that every cyber café user is required to prove their identity prior to use of services 
by producing a photo-identity card e.g. passport, college ID, PAN Card, election 
card, Motor Driving Licence, office identity card, etc. The cyber café user is required 
to enter the user’s details in a log (retained for a year).  
 
Similar is the case in Delhi where according to an Order issued by the Delhi police 
under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973,1159 the identity of a cyber 
café user must be established prior to use of services.  The user’s personal 
information is logged in a register that is maintained with logs of all activity 
conducted online for a prescribed minimum period. 
 
The state of Karnataka also has the Information Technology (Karnataka) Rules 
20041160 which correspondingly provide that no user will be permitted to use a 
cybercafé computer, computer System and/or computer network without their 
identity being established.1161 The cybercafé owner/operator must also obtain and 
                                                 
1156 Section 2 (na)  
1157 Defined in s 2 (w) as “any person who on behalf of another person receives, stores or transmits 
that record or provides any service with respect to that record and includes telecom service providers; 
network service providers, web-hosting service providers, search engines, online payment sites, online 
auction sites, online market places and cyber cafés.”  
1158 See ‘Special Rules for Cyber Café, Computer or Virtual Reality Game,’s 246 in particular. See 
<http://www.mumbaipolice.org/downloads/Notification%20of%20Cyber%20Cafe.pdf> 
1159 No.2, 1974; Read with Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi’s Notification No. U-
11036/1/2008- UTL (26 November 2008) 
1160 Made under the powers conferred by the ITA 2000, s 90; 
<http://www.ccaoi.in/UI/docs/Karnataka%20Cyber%20Cafe%20Regulations.doc> 
1161 Rule 3(2) 
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maintain details of the user (like name, age, sex, present residential address, and 
usage times).1162 
 
Similar rules and regulations exist in other states like Gujarat,1163 Rajasthan,1164 
Sikkim1165 and Tamil Nadu.1166 A strong regime of establishing identity of identity 
subjects prior to Internet use thus exists. The overall legislative policy in India does 
not favour anonymous access to the Internet. There is no automatic right to 
anonymity for cybercafé users in India; rather a trend of identification of users is the 
norm.  
 
What about X’s right to anonymity in relation to the cybercafé operator’s behaviour? 
There is no express data protection legislation that enables digital identity subjects in 
India to protect their identity through promoting conditions of anonymity, as in the 
UK.  
 
Neither does the law in the ITA 2000 (as amended by ITAA 2008) support 
anonymity nor does it effectively protect X’s right to anonymity in respect of her 
medical information or data. The Act fails to cater to situations as in the instant case 
study, and ignores largely the personal interests that individual digital identity 
subjects might have in safeguarding their identities, through the reduced or minimal 
use of identification.   
 
There is a provision for compensation in respect of failure to protect data in the ITA 
2000 (as amended by ITAA 2008) - section 43A. This section provides, in principle, 
that an entity possessing, dealing or handling sensitive personal data or 
                                                 
1162 Rule 4(1) 
1163 The Gujarat Information Technology Rules 2004, 
<http://www.ccaoi.in/UI/docs/Cyber%20Law%20-%20Guj.pdf> (establishment of identity and 
storage of Internet logs and records) 
1164 Rajasthan Cyber Café Rules 2007, 
<http://www.rajasthan.gov.in/rajgovresources/newitems/Raj_Cyber_Cafe_Rules.pdf> 
1165 Sikkim Information Technology Rules 2009 (unavailable online)  
1166 The Browsing Centre (Tamil Nadu) Rules/Conditions, 
<http://www.tnpolice.gov.in/forms/BROWSINGCENTREREGULATIONRULESANDAPPLICATIO
N.pdf> (establishment of identity and retention of activity logs and Internet records) 
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information,1167 found to be negligent in maintaining reasonable security practices 
and procedures1168 and causes wrongful loss or wrongful gain to any person, shall be 
liable to pay damages not exceeding five crore rupees to the affected person. Yet, 
though this section applies in theory to the instant case study, it would be hard to 
apply in practice as ‘sensitive personal data’ under the scope of this Section has not 
yet been prescribed by the Central Government.1169 
 
Thus, the ITA 2000 (as amended by ITAA 2008) makes it extremely unlikely to 
express or protect anonymity through protection of personal data which in the 
digitally advanced West, and the UK, is considered an important facet of digital 
identity.  
 
6.3.5. Pseudonymity  
 
Mohammed Adeel, a devout Muslim, is registered on Twitter as Gansham Das. 
His nasty experience of being flamed in a chat room based on his religious 
identity led him to choose a Hindu name to represent himself thus. Adeel in his 
identity as Gansham Das make some inappropriate comments about religion. 
An irate acquaintance aware of Adeel’s dual identities reports Adeel to the 
police for using a pseudonym. Has Adeel committed a crime?  
 
Pseudonyms are another vital expression of digital identity. This case study explores 
from the criminal law perspective how the law works to promote or curb the use of 





                                                 
1167 Such personal information as prescribed by the Central Government in consultation with such 
professional bodies or associations as it deems fit. S 43A (iii), ITA 2000 (as amended ITAA 2008) 
1168 Practices and procedures designed to protect such information from unauthorised access, damage, 
use, modification, disclosure or impairment, as may be specified in an agreement between the parties 
or as may be specified in any law for the time being in force and in the absence of such agreement or 
any law, such reasonable security practices and procedures, as may be prescribed by the Central 
Government in consultation with such professional bodies or associations as it may deem fit. 




What is Adeel’s position under UK law?  Adeel’s actions of adopting a pseudonym 
are not per se illegal under UK law. This is evident in the examination of the relevant 
law applicable to this case, primarily the criminal law regime.  
 
First, let’s look at the UK Fraud Act 2006 which provides for criminal liability for 
fraud and dishonestly obtaining services. This would include any form of digital 
identity fraud. Section 1 (1) of the Act provides that a person is guilty of fraud if he 
commits: fraud by false representation, fraud by failing to disclose information or 
fraud by abuse of position. All conditions being satisfied, fraud by false 
representation covers activities like phishing, pharming and credit card fraud.1170 
Section 2 clarifies that fraud by false representation occurs when a person 
dishonestly makes a false representation, and intends, by making the representation 
either to make a gain for himself or another, or to cause loss to another or to expose 
another to a risk of loss.  
 
In this case, though Adeel might have made a false representation, there is no 
evidence of dishonesty. Per the Guidance Notes to the Act, dishonesty is to be 
measured according to the two stage test set out in R v Ghosh.1171 The first test is 
whether Adeel behaved dishonestly by the ordinary standards of reasonable and 
honest people. It is unlikely that Adeel would be found guilty of dishonesty if 
reasonable and ordinary people opined (which they do since there are numerous 
examples of people adopting pseudonyms in digital transactions)1172 that Adeel’s 
behaviour was normal or a vital element of the right to freedom of expression. The 
next test to be applied is whether Adeel was aware that his conduct was dishonest 
and would be considered dishonest by reasonable and honest people.1173  
 
                                                 
1170 Bainbridge (2007) n677, 277 
1171 [1982] QB1053 
1172 Ch 2 (2.5.10); A Surveillance Society (2007-08) n630, 45; Steve Wheeler and Helen Keegan, 
‘Imagined Worlds: Emerging Cultures,’ in Steve Wheeler (ed), Connected Minds, Emerging Cultures: 
Cybercultures in Online Learning (Information Age Publishing, USA 2009), 261-276, 269 
1173 Fraud Act 2006, Explanatory Notes. 
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Adeel must have also made the false representation with the intent of making some 
gain or causing loss or risk of loss to another.1174 It is immaterial if the gain or loss 
has occurred. In the instant case, Adeel had no such intent. Therefore, Adeel cannot 
be prosecuted for the use of a pseudonym under the under the Fraud Act 2006.  
 
It can be concluded that in general, UK law, at least in relation to the law of fraud, 
does not proscribe the use of digital pseudonyms, though there may be particular 




What is Adeel’s position in India?  
 
Adeel’s actions may fall within the ambit of section 66A (b) of the ITA 2000 (as 
amended by ITAA 2008). This section prescribes that any person, who persistently 
by means of a computer resource or communications device sends false information 
to cause annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal 
intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will shall be punishable with imprisonment for a 
term which may extend to three years and a fine.1175 Adeel’s pseudonym ‘Gansham 
Das’ is false digital information1176 that has caused annoyance to Adeel’s 
acquaintance. A court might also find it provocative of enmity, ill will or hatred, and 
to protect religious sensitivities and maintain religious harmony might hold him 
responsible for his actions.1177 
 
Adeel’s actions may alternately attract Section 66A (c) of the Act. This section 
applies when a person deceptively or misleadingly sends an email or email message 
that causes annoyance, inconvenience to the addressee or recipient. This act is 
                                                 
1174 S 2 (1) (b) requires that the person must make the representation with the intention of making a 
gain or causing loss or risk of loss to another. 
1175 Inserted by ITAA 2008. 
1176 The IPC uses false in the sense of unrelated to the real.  
1177 Adeel might be in contravention of the constitutional ideal of upholding fraternity amongst 
citizens and the fundamental duty imposed on every Indian citizen to promote harmony and the spirit 
of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional 
or sectional diversities. Part IV A, Article 51A (b), Constitution of India. SR Bommai v Union of India 
CA 3645 of 1989 (SC). Courts have upheld the need protect religious sentiments in Gopal (1969) 72 
Bom LR 871(SB); Ramjilal Modi v State of UP AIR 1957 SC 620. Particularly telling is the judgment 
of Supreme Court in the D Ajith case (unreported). See Dhananjay Mahapatra, ‘Bloggers Can be 
Nailed for Views,’ Times of India (24 February 2009) 
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Bloggers-can-be-nailed-for-slur/articleshow/4178823.cms> 
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punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with 
fine.1178 
 
There is also Section 66D in the ITA 2000 (as amended by ITAA 2008) which 
provides punishment for cheating by personation. It states,  
Whoever, by means of any communication device or computer resource 
cheats by personating, shall be punished with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable 
to fine which may extend to one lakh rupees. 
 
This provision is similar to the offence of cheating by personation under section 416 
of the IPC (which provides that a person cheats by pretending to be some other 
person, or by knowingly substituting one person for another, or representing that he 
or any other person is a person other than he or such other person really is).1179  
 
Thus, in India Adeel’s use of a pseudonymous digital identity is more problematic 
and conducive to attracting penal sanctions. The law in India thus takes a dim view 
of the use of pseudonyms.1180  
 
The analysis of this case study shows an apparent distinction in how digital 
pseudonyms are legally dealt with in two different countries. In the UK, there is no 
general outright legal proscription against the use of digital pseudonyms unrelated to 
the individual (this is somewhat natural given that the use of digital pseudonyms as 
means of concealing identity developed in the West and the widespread adoption of 
false pseudonyms).1181 On the other hand, though there is no general outright 
proscription against pseudonyms, the law as it currently stands in India clearly does 





                                                 
1178 Inserted by ITAA 2008. 
1179 The offence is committed whether the individual personated is a real or imaginary person. 
1180 In sharp contrast to the how the law in Europe actually advocates the use of pseudonymous 
identity. See Ch 5 (5.2.4.1) 
1181 As shown in Ch 4 
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6.3.6. Access to Internet resources  
 
Mahesh has a Google account, which for him represents his principal digital 
identity. He uses his Google account for various purposes like email, chat, 
blogging, photo sharing, social networking, and document storage. One day 
Mahesh finds that he can no longer access his Google id. It has been blocked by 
the government.  
 
This case study is themed on blocking of digital identities by the State. It analyses 
the position of individuals like Mahesh who find access to their digital identities 
curtailed by measures adopted by the State. Does Mahesh’s have better or more 
guaranteed conditions of access to his digital identity in the UK as compared to what 




There are very limited legal provisions that apply in respect of the blocking of 
Internet access in the UK. Blocking is only permitted in exceptional circumstances as 
will become evident in the analysis below.  
 
Explicit provisions permitting blocking in respect of copyright violations are 
provided in the DEA 2010. Section 17 provides the Secretary of the State the power 
to make provision about injunctions preventing access to locations on the Internet. It 
states, 
The Secretary of State may by regulations1182 make provision about the 
granting by a court of a blocking injunction in respect of a location on the 
Internet which the court is satisfied has been, is being or is likely to be used 
for or in connection with an activity that infringes copyright.1183 
 
A blocking injunction, per the Act, refers to “an injunction that requires a service 
provider to prevent its service being used to gain access to the location.”1184 
However, the power under this section is limited by conditions. For instance, 
regulations cannot be made under this section unless the Secretary of the State is 
                                                 
1182 These Regulations must be made by statutory instrument. S 17(10). 
1183 S 17(1) 
1184 S 17(2) 
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satisfied of the following: one, that the use of the Internet for activities that infringe 
copyright is having a serious adverse effect on businesses or consumers; two that 
making the regulations is a proportionate way to address that effect; and three, that 
making the regulations would not prejudice national security or the prevention or 
detection of crime.1185  
 
Any blocking Regulations must prescribe that a Court grant a blocking injunction 
when it is satisfied that the location seeking to be blocked is either a location from 
which a substantial amount of material has been, is being or is likely to be obtained 
in infringement of copyright, is a location at which a substantial amount of material 
has been, is being or is likely to be made available in infringement of copyright, or a 
location which has been, is being or is likely to be used to facilitate access to an 
infringing location.1186 In addition, S 17(5) of the Act provides that the regulations 
must provide that, in determining whether to grant an injunction,1187 the court must 
take account of the following factors:  
(a) any evidence presented of steps taken by the service provider, or by an 
operator of the location, to prevent infringement of copyright in the 
qualifying material,  
(b) any evidence presented of steps taken by the copyright owner, or by a 
licensee of copyright in the qualifying material, to facilitate lawful access to 
the qualifying material,  
(c) any representations made by a Minister of the Crown,  
(d) whether the injunction would be likely to have a disproportionate effect 
on any person’s legitimate interests, and  
(e) the importance of freedom of expression. 
 
More vitally, it is prescribed that the Regulations must provide that a court may not 
grant an injunction unless notice of the application for the injunction has been given, 
in such form and by such means as is specified in the regulations, to the service 
provider1188 and the operators1189 of the location. Mahesh as an affected subscriber 
may make an appeal under Section 124K of the Communications Act 2003.1190   
                                                 
1185 S 17(3) 
1186 S 17(4) 
1187 Interdict, in the case of Scotland. S 17(13), DEA 2010 
1188 “service provider” has the same meaning as in s 97A of the CDPA 1988. See s 12 of Act. 
1189 In relation to a location on the Internet, entities who have editorial control over material available 
at the location (s 12). 
1190 Inserted by DEA 2010. 
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Thus, there is a legal remit on the blocking of Internet access specifically in relation 
to copyright violations.  
 
Blocking of Internet services in the UK beyond this operates under a regime of self-
regulation. The Internet Watch Foundation (IWF),1191 an independent body, was set 
up by the UK Internet industry in 1996 to provide an UK Internet Hotline for the 
reporting and taking down of potentially illegal online content.1192 Though it works 
with the UK government, the IWF is not a legally empowered body.1193  
 
The IWF facilitates1194 the taking of blocking actions as a “short term disruption 
tactic” by the Internet industry (comprising of Internet service providers, mobile 
operators, search providers, filtering companies) in respect of four types of Internet 
content: child sexual abuse content hosted anywhere in the world,1195 criminally 
obscene adult content hosted in the UK,1196 incitement to racial hatred content hosted 
in the UK1197 and non-photographic child sexual abuse images hosted in the UK, 1198 
according to UK law.1199 
 
Blocking, as evident above, is a non-governmental, limited and industry led 
voluntary measure.1200 The UK government, according to itself, is “clear that the use 
of blocking to prevent access to such images is something that Internet service 
                                                 
1191 IWF <http://www.iwf.org.uk/> 
1192 For full list of IWF members, see <http://www.iwf.org.uk/funding/page.64.htm> 
1193 It is an incorporated charity, limited by guarantee. 
1194 Per the IWF, its blocking role is “restricted to the compilation and provision of a list: the blocking 
solution is entirely a matter for the company deploying the list. Our list is designed and provided for 
blocking specific URLs only. Any decision to convert or adapt the list to block whole domains may 
lead to the overblocking of legitimate content and is not supported by the IWF.” 
<http://www.iwf.org.uk/public/page.148.htm> 
1195 Protection of Children Act 1978, Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982, Sexual Offences Act 
2003: Key Changes (England and Wales), Memorandum of Understanding: Section 46 Sexual 
Offences Act 2003, Police and Justice Act 2006 
1196 Obscene Publications Act 1959 and 1964, Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, S 63 
1197 Public Order Act 1986 and the Race Relations Act 1976. 
1198 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
1199 Also Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
Certain Legal Aspects Of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the 
Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce) 
1200 UK policy veers decidedly towards being a “light touch” in access blocking. See DW Vick, 
‘Regulatory Convergence?’ (2006) 26 (1) Legal Studies, 26-64 
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providers should do, and the Government has been very pleased with the response 
from the Internet industry.”1201 
 
If Mahesh’s block was the result of an assessment made by the IWF on illegal 
content and he was prevented from accessing legal content he could appeal to the 
IWF against the denial of his access.1202 
 
Thus, there are only two limited cases in the UK under which the blocking of 
Internet access and digital identity might legally occur: copyright infringement and 
specifically prescribed criminally illegal content. There is no general policy of State 




The Indian law and policy of blocking stands in vast contrast to the law and policy in 
the UK.  
 
The Indian State is the main promoter and facilitator of digital technologies, 
particularly Internet access which is highly State regulated. In this sense, it assumes 
the mantle of gatekeeper of Internet access. It plays a significant role in determining 
access to digital identities, in manners far removed from that evident in the UK. 1203  
 
India has a history of blocking Internet access as a “balanced flow of information 
measure.”1204 This is evident in several examples. For instance, the blocking of 
access to the website of the Dawn newspaper in Pakistan during the Kargill war.1205  
In 2003, blocks were imposed on thousands of Yahoo! users by the Indian Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT-IN)1206 under orders from the Department of 
                                                 
1201 Hansard HC ‘Offences Against Children: Internet,’ col 692W (2 November 2009)  
1202 The Appeal Process is set out at <http://www.iwf.org.uk/corporate/page.49.625.htm> 
1203 A view reiterated by N Shah, ‘Subject to Technology: Internet Pornography, Cyber-Terrorism and 
the Indian State,’ (2007) 8 (3) Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 349 - 366 
1204 Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (DIT), ‘Order: Blocking of Websites,’ 7 
July 2003, New Delhi, Gazette of India, GSR 529(E), Extra, Pt II, S 3(i) 
1205 Farzad Damania, ‘The Internet: Equalizer of Freedom of Speech? A Discussion on Freedom of 
Speech on the Internet in the United States and India,’ (2002) 12 Ind Intl & Comp L Rev, 243 
1206 CERT-IN operates under the auspices of and with authority delegated by the Department of 
Information Technology, Ministry of Communications & Information Technology.  
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Telecommunications.1207 Though the intent was to block a banned organisation from 
access,1208 there was widespread denial of access to and use of Internet identities. 
When this action was taken it was severely criticised as having no legal basis under 
the ITA 2000,1209 but the blocking was justified on the basis that it did not constitute 
a form of censorship, rather was conducive to the “balanced flow of information.”1210 
 
In another case, <www.hinduunity.org> was ordered to be blocked on 28 April 2004 
by the Mumbai police on the grounds that it contained material that was of anti-
Islamic nature.1211 A community on Google’s social networking service Orkut was 
blocked in Pune in June 2006 for “‘objectionable and disparaging’ comments against 
Great Maratha King Shivaji Maharaj.”1212 This action affected not only the Orkut 
community, but also other cybercafé users as police shut down cybercafés where 
users were found accessing Orkut. Similar action was taken again in 2006 - 
seventeen blogs were blocked and many blog services were disrupted for a long 
period of time.1213 
 
The power to block digital identities (Internet based or otherwise) is explicitly 
supported by Section 69A of the ITA 2000 (as amended by ITAA 2008) which deals 
with the power to issue directions for blocking for public access of any information 
through any computer resource.1214 The Central Government or its specially 
authorised Officer may by order direct any agency of the Government or 
                                                 
1207 Vide Gazette Notification No GSR 181 (E) of 27 February 2003 & No GSR 529 (E) of 07 July 
2003 
1208 Department of Telecommunications (LR Cell), ‘Direction to Block Internet Website:  
“Groups.yahoo.com/groups/kynhun,’ No. 820-1/2003-LR (Vol I) 
1209 S Dikshit, ‘Bid to Block Anti-India Website Affects Users,’ The Hindu (23 September 2003) 
<http://www.thehindu.com/2003/09/23/stories/2003092312761100.htm> 
1210 See Gazette Notification GSR 529 (E) of 7 July 2003. 
1211 Priya Ganapati, ‘Mumbai Police Gag Hinduunity.org,’ (May 2004) 
<http://us.rediff.com/news/2004/may/26hindu.htm> 
1212 PTI, ‘Orkut Forum on Shivaji Maharaj Blocked,’ (18 November 2006) 
<http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=77287> 
1213 Department of Telecommunications (LR Cell), ‘Direction to Block Internet Websites,’ No. 820-
1/04-LR, Vol-I <http://photos1.blogger.com/blogger/507/157/1600/Indian_censored_list.jpg> 
1214 While this section might be construed as blocking access to certain sites or resources, access to 
sites and platforms constitutes a means to digital identity and hence must be considered in this light.  
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intermediary1215 to block access by the public to any information generated, 
transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource on the following 
grounds: the sovereignty and integrity of India, defence, security of the State, 
friendly relations with foreign States, public order or for preventing incitement to the 
commission of any cognizable offence1216 relating to above. An intermediary who 
fails to comply with blocking directions can be punished with an imprisonment for a 
term which may extend to seven years and also be liable to fine. The reasons for the 
blocking order must be recorded in writing and the order must be subject to 
prescribed procedure and safeguards.  
 
In this respect, Special Rules called the Information Technology (Procedures and 
Safeguards for Blocking of Access of Information by Public) Rules 20091217 make 
several provisions in respect of the blocking of information. Designated Officers 
(officer of the Central Government not below the rank of a Joint Secretary), may 
issue directions for blocking for access by the public any information generated, 
transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource under sub-section 
(2) of Section 69A of the Act.1218 The Designated Officer, on receipt of any request 
from a Nodal Officer1219 of an organisation or a competent court, may, by order 
direct any Agency of the Government or intermediary to block for access by the 
public any information or part thereof generated, transmitted, received, stored or 
hosted in any computer resource for any of the reasons specified in Section 69A (1) 
of the Act.1220 There are also provisions for emergency blocking as an interim 
measure (in situations where delay is not acceptable).1221 
 
                                                 
1215 An intermediary includes telecom service providers, network service providers, ISPs, web-hosting 
service providers, search engines, online payment sites, online-auction sites, online market places and 
cybercafés. S 2 (w), ITA 2000 (as amended ITAA 2008) 
1216 Defined in the CrPC 1973, S 2 (c) as an offence for which, a police officer may arrest without a 
warrant in accordance with the First Schedule or other in force. 
1217 Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Sec. 3(1) (27 October 2009) 
1218 Rule 3 
1219 Per Rule 4, every organisation must designate one of its officers as a Nodal Officer, notify the 
Department of Information Technology and publish the name of the Nodal Officer on its website. 
1220 Rule 5. For further procedure see Rules 6 (complaints procedure), 7 (examination of request), 8 
(Complaints Committee) and 9 (emergency blocking) 
1221 Rule 9 (2) 
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What are Mahesh’s rights in respect of a block imposed under Section 69A? Can 
Mahesh appeal against such a block imposed against his digital identity? There is no 
provision in the ITA 2000 (as amended by ITAA 2008) which gives Mahesh a right 
as a digital identity subject, to appeal against an order of blocking made by the State 
under Section 69A. Mahesh would have to challenge the block as unconstitutional 
under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution which provides citizens with a right to 
freedom of speech and expression. However, if the State can prove that its actions 
fell within the scope of the exceptions in the Article,1222 Mahesh would not have a 
remedy under the Constitution. 
 
The government in India thus retains and exercises powerful control over access to 
digital identities vide the provisions of the IT Act 2000 (as amended by the ITAA 
2008), as opposed to the UK. This control is perceptible in its ability to exercise 
unrestricted control over digital identity subjects by blocking public access to digital 
identity (and through penal provisions over failure to comply).  
 
Countries thus have varying policies of blocking;1223 States like India have a more 
tolerant policy of blocking,1224 others like the UK, less so.1225 These policies have a 





                                                 
1222 Action taken in respect of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly 
relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, 
defamation or incitement to an offence. Art 19(2) of the Constitution.  
1223 R Deibert, J Palfrey, R Rohozinski and J Zittrain (eds), ‘Access Denied: The Practice and Policy 
of Global Internet Filtering,’ (2009) 52 (4) IEEE Transactions on Professional Communication PC, 
413-415; ‘Internet Censorship Increases: Which Countries Face Political Filters?’ (2007) 258 PC Plus, 
22; Clark Boyd ‘Mapping Censorship,’ (2007) 110 (5) Technology Review, 19 
1224 There is some international agreement about the need for access blocking in respect of child 
pornography. See Yaman Akdeniz, ‘Governing pornography and child pornography on the Internet: 
The UK Approach,’ (2001) 32 University of West Los Angeles L Rev, 247-275 
1225 For a critical analysis of Internet filtering regimes and technologies, see Ian Brown, ‘Internet 
Filtering: Be Careful What You Ask For,’ in S Kirca, L Hanson, (eds.), Freedom and Prejudice: 
Approaches to Media and Culture (Bahcesehir University Press, Istanbul 2008), 74-91; R Deibert, N 
Villeneuve, ‘Firewalls and Power: An Overview of Global State Censorship of the Internet,’ in M 
Klang and A Murray (eds), Human Rights in the Digital Age (GlassHouse, London 2005), 111-124 
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6.3.7. Control of personal data  
 
Aarti Velumurugan is registered on the electoral register of her constituency. 
Her personal information such as her name, parentage, age, sex, home address 
and unique electoral identity number is made freely available in the online 
electoral register for her constituency on the Internet. Anyone may download, 
copy, print or sell this data. Aarti feels aggrieved. 
 
The above case study focuses on digital identities in e-governance. E-governance is 
“a set of technology-mediated processes that are changing both the delivery of public 
services and the broader interactions between citizens and government.”1226  E-
governance is a major generator and propagator of digital identities, in the UK1227 
and more particularly in India.1228 This is because e-governance in India is seen as a 
means of improving delivery of and access to public services1229 to “realise the basic 
needs of the common man.”1230 The State plays an active part in the creation and 
proliferation of e-governance based digital identities. The focus of this case study is 




Is Aarti Velumurugan protected by law in respect of her personal information used 
for electoral purposes (electoral data)? The answer is in the affirmative.  
                                                 
1226 Kate Oakley, ‘What is E-Governance,’ Resource Paper, (Council of Europe, 2003) 
1227 For analysis of e-government in UK see Helen Margetts, ‘E-Government in Britain: A Decade 
On,’ (2006) 59 (2) Parliamentary Affairs, 250-265; P Dunleavy, H Margetts, S Bastow and J Tinkler, 
‘New Public Management Is Dead: Long Live Digital-Era Governance,’ (2006) 16 (3) J Public Adm 
Res Theory, 467-494; P Dunleavy and H Margetts, Government on the Web 2, HC 764, Session 2001-
2002, (TSO, 2002); GM Lamb, Computers in the Public Service (Allen and Unwin, Sydney1973); H 
Margetts, Information Technology in Government: Britain and America (Taylor and Francis, 1999). 
1228 See P Gupta and RK Bagga, Compendium of E-governance Initiatives in India (Universities Press, 
India 2008), RP Sinha, E-Governance in India: Initiatives and Issues (Centre for Public Policy and 
Governance, New Delhi 2006), KN Agarwala and MD Tiwari, IT and e-Governance in India 
(Macmillan, Michigan 2002) 
1229 See Department of Information Technology, ‘Government Notifications for Enabling e-Services’  
<http://mit.gov.in/content/government-notifications-enabling-e-services> E-governance infrastructure 
manifests in the State Wide Area Network (SWAN), State Data Centres (SDCs), National 
eGovernance Service Delivery Gateway (NSDG) and the Common Service Centres (CSC). E-
governance services manifest in a range of services like commerce, pensions, income tax, 
immigration, central excise, elections, UID, e-courts, EDI, e-biz, land records, police, agriculture, e-
districts, India Portal and State Portals. 
1230 Department of Information Technology, ‘The National e-Governance Plan’ 
<http://mit.gov.in/content/national-e-governance-plan> 
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Up to 2001, Electoral Registration Officers (ERO’s) were obliged to disclose all 
electoral data upon payment of appropriate fee.1231 But this position changed after 
(Robertson) v Wakefield Metropolitan Council.1232 In this case, an objection was 
made to the sale of copies of the Electoral Register by ERO’s to commercial 
companies. Kay, J ruled that the selling of electoral data to commercial concerns 
without opportunity for electors to object such uses of their data breached Article 3 
of the First Protocol of the ECHR (right to free elections), Article 8 of the ECHR and 
Article 14(b) of the Data Protection Directive (right of data subject to object to the 
processing of personal data for direct marketing purposes).1233 After Robertson, the 
Representation of the People (England and Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 2002 
were passed which created two separate versions of the Electoral Register– the Full 
Register and the Edited Register.  
 
The Full Register is a public document available for inspection only at registration 
areas in public libraries, council offices or at Electoral Registration Offices.1234 The 
Edited Register is a version of the Full Register that is made available for sale 
excluding the names of electors wishing to protect their personal data and restrict 
junk mail (clear opt out). An electoral data subject in the UK has the choice of 
consenting to their electoral data being included in the edited version of the Electoral 
Register which can be offered for sale. 
 
The Full Register is not available online, though the Edited Register can be obtained 
through online commercial organisations.1235 The Full Register can only be inspected 
under supervision1236 (to prevent unauthorised copying and theft).1237 Copies are only 
supplied to certain specified people or agencies for certain specified purposes such as 
                                                 
1231 Representation of the People Act 1983 (as amended by Representation of the People Act 2000), ss 
9 to 13, as supplemented by Representation of the People (England and Wales) Regulations 2001 (SI 
2001/No.341); Regs 48 and 49 and Representation of the People (England and Wales) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2001 SI 2001/No.1700 
1232 [2001] EHC Admin 915 
1233 S 11, DPA 1998 
1234 ICO Guidance suggests that ERO’s are data controllers under DPA 1998. See ICO, ‘Key 
Definitions of the Data Protection Act,’ 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/data_protection_guide/key_definitions_of_the_dpa.aspx> 
1235 See the Electoral Commission, ‘Can I Search the Electoral Register Online?’ 
<http://www.aboutmyvote.co.uk/faq/registering_to_vote/can_i_search_online.aspx> 
1236 Reg 43, RPR 2001 
1237 Reg 96, RPR 2001; Reg 95 RPR (Scotland) 2001 
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elections,1238 the compilation of statistics,1239 law enforcement1240 and credit 
reference checking.1241  
 
If a register is made available in digital form it has to be strictly protected against any 
copying, printing or transmission and making an allowance therein for a name based 
searches are strictly illegal.1242 Only address based searches are permissible. 
Under the current data protection regime, ERO’s are data controllers1243 and they are 
obliged in the performance of their electoral legal duties (including the drawing up, 
maintaining and publishing of the Electoral Roll) to comply with the obligations 
imposed on them by the DPA 1998.1244 
 
The importance of protecting personal data used for electoral purposes and made 
available online is brought out by enforcement notice served by the UK ICO on B4U 
Business Media Ltd under the DPA 1998 in 2006.1245 The UK ICO had received 
1,600 complaints about a website operated by B4U Business Media Ltd called 
<www.b4usearch.com> which permitted people to make searches of electoral roll 
data1246 free of charge without any subscription or registration. The ICO found the 
company to be in breach of the first data protection principle1247 as its use of the 
personal data was unfair, (since electors had the option since 2002 to opt out of being 
in the more public and accessible Edited Register), unwarranted and prejudicial to 
the rights and freedoms of the data subject’s legitimate interests. The cessation of the 
online availability of the electoral data was ordered.  
                                                 
1238 Regs 98, 100-106 and 108, RPR 2001; Regs 97, 99-105 and 107, RPR (Scotland) 2001; Scottish 
Parliament Order; NAW (RoP) Order 2007 
1239 Reg 99, RPR 2001; Reg 98, RPR (Scotland) 2001 
1240 Regs 107 and 109, RPR 2001; Regs 106 and 108, RPR (Scotland) 2001 
1241 Reg 114, RPR 2001; Reg 113, RPR (Scotland) 2001 
1242 Reg 43(1A), RPR 2001 
1243 A data controller is “a person who (either alone or jointly or in common with other persons) 
determines the purposes for which and the manner in which any personal data are, or are to be, 
processed.” DPA 1998, s 1 (1) 
1244 These include complying with the data protection principles and the other provisions of the Act. 
1245 ICO, ‘Information Commissioner’s Office Finds Website in Data Protection Breach,’ 
 (4 July 2006), 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/corporate/notices/b4u_enforcement_notice_130706
.pdf> 
1246 The company was using pre-2002 electoral register information 
1247  This principle requires that personal data be processed fairly and lawfully and not be processed 
unless (a) at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and (b) in the case of sensitive personal 
data, at least one of the conditions in Schedule 3 is also met. See Sch 1, Part I, (1) DPA 1998 
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This shows that there is a clear mandate that electoral data that is personal data, is of 
highly private nature and not something that is or ordinarily resides within the scope 
of the public domain. The privacy of electoral personal data must be respected and if 
breached may be successfully actioned under law.1248 Aarti can invoke rights under 




Is Aarti Velumurugan protected by law in respect of her electoral personal data in 
India, as in the UK? The answer is no. 
 
Electoral rolls containing the names of registered voters1249 are a crucial part of the 
election process in India and great attention is paid to their preparation and 
publication.1250 These rolls are maintained by constituency and prepared under the 
superintendence, direction and control of the State Election Commission (SEC) by 
ERO’s in accordance with the provisions of The Representation of the People Act 
1950.  
 
Every electoral roll generally has a title page (with year of preparation/revision, 
number, name, reservation status, extent of the constituency and the number of parts 
into which roll is divided), table of contents indicating in serial order the area 
covered by each part of the roll, followed by a constituency map. The roll contains 
individual elector details by household. The roll is published in draft form for 
inspection and copies (hard and soft) are supplied free of cost to every recognised 
political party in the state.1251 After claims (e.g. in respect of omitted names and 
erroneous entries) and objections in respect of roll entries are attended to, 
inaccuracies are eliminated and corrections and revisions are made, the roll is finally 
                                                 
1248 Richard Morgan and Ruth Boardman, Data Protection Strategy: Implementing Data Protection 
Compliance (Sweet and Maxwell, London 2003), 87-89 
1249 Per Art 326 of the Constitution, every Indian citizen, 18 years and above, is (if not disqualified on 
grounds of non-residence, unsoundness of mind, crime or corrupt or illegal practice) is entitled to be 
registered as a voter in India.  
1250 ECI, ‘Handbook for Electoral Registration Officers,’ (2008) 
<http://electionsgoa.nic.in/pdf/handbook_ero.pdf> 
1251 Rule 11 (c), RER 1960 
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re-published. It is distributed free of cost to every recognised political party of the 
state in hard and soft copies.1252 
 
These electoral rolls are routinely published online by the SEC’s in the following 
format:  
 
Fig 6: Electoral Roll Data 
The data in the rolls includes personal information like name, family, address, age 
and sex. In some cases, photographs are also included.1253  
 
As at 7 July 2010, an online search facility for electoral personal data had also been 
made available by the SEC’s. An example of how the search facility displays 
information is extracted below:  
 
Fig 7: Electoral Personal Data Obtained Through Search Request1254 
                                                 
1252 Rule 22 (c), RER 1960 
1253 Merinews, ‘Haryana Publishes Entire Voters Lists With Photo,’ (3 March 2009) 
<http://www.merinews.com/article/haryana-publishes-entire-voters-lists-with-photo/15712414.shtml> 
1254 Retrieved from the online search facility of the Goa SEC (7 July 2010) 
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Electoral personal data, in India, thus resides ordinarily within the public domain, 
whether offline or online. It is easily accessible and there are no limits as to its 
accessibility, use and dissemination. In this sense, Aarti’s electoral data becomes a 
worldwide public digital identity. As it stands, she has no control over the manner in 
which her digital electoral data is exhibited or used. The government and its agencies 
thus have a free rein in respect of the uses of data in e-governance contexts like 
elections. 
 
Unlike the UK, there is no data protection provision under which Aarti can bring a 
claim either to restrict accessibility or the secondary use of her data. The limited data 
protection provisions in the IT Act 2000 (as amended by the ITAA 2008) do not 
apply. For e.g. section 43A (compensation for failure to protect data) does not apply 
because Aarti’s information cannot be classed as sensitive personal information. 
Section 72 (breach of confidentiality and privacy) presupposes the existence of a 
contractual obligation between parties, and thus would necessitate an obligation of 
confidence which the SEC’s under the current regime, seem not to owe to electoral 
data subjects.  
 
Aarti cannot enforce a right to privacy in the data under Article 21 of the 
Constitution, because her electoral data is a matter of public record. This is in line 
with the reasoning in Rajagopal,1255 District Registrar and Collector v Canara 
Bank,1256 Alika Khosla v Thomas Mathew1257 and Khushwant Singh v Maneka 
Gandhi.1258 
 
This case study highlights how differences are clearly evident in how the law 
protects personal electoral data in the UK and India. While the law in the UK 
prevents personal electoral data from being publicly and freely available and thus 
subject to exploitation, the law shows no similar trend in India. This puts digital 
                                                 
1255 n722 
1256 CA 6350-6374/1997 (SC) 
1257 (2002) 62 DRJ 851 
1258 AIR 2002 Del 58 
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identity subjects in the UK and India on unequal footing. While those in the UK have 
control over their electoral data, the digital identity subjects in India do not. 
 
6.4. Analysis  
 
The above exercise highlights how difference manifests itself in the applicatory 
aspects of the legal regulation of digital identity.  
 
In case study 1 on the privacy of digital images, it was demonstrated how an 
individual digital identity subject in the UK has proven effective remedies in law for 
the violation of privacy, particularly in respect of publicly taken digital images. On 
the contrary, in India, an individual digital identity subject does not enjoy similar 
protection.  
 
Case study 2, on sharing, demonstrated how the law in both UK and India imposes 
liabilities for harm resulting through the shared use of digital identities. While in the 
UK this is not so much of an issue, as sharing of digital identity technologies occurs 
to a greatly limited extent; it is a major problem in India, where sharing of 
technologies occurs on much larger and persistent scales. The law in India fails 
miserably to take into account these uses. Thus, is evident a mismatch between the 
law, the local context of digital identity and the Volksgeist.  
 
Case study 3 on reputation highlights an interesting trend. In the UK, action for harm 
to online reputation comes across as individual based, grounded in civil litigation; in 
India, it is envisaged less as an individual’s concern and more of State concern 
(collective interest) in the preference and wider use of criminal law.  
 
Case Study 4 on anonymity demonstrates that the right to anonymity especially in 
respect of digital technologies in the UK is protected and facilitated by law. In India, 
there is no similar right to anonymity. The law in India, on the contrary, curtails and 
proscribes the use of anonymity in digital transactions. This is particularly evident in 
the elaborate legal conditions of identification established for public Internet use.  
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Case Study 5 on pseudonymity establishes how the use of pseudonymous digital 
identities is not per se illegal under the fraud law framework in the UK. 
Comparatively, the use of pseudonyms while technically not per se illegal in India is 
presumptively more conducive to attracting criminal sanctions for fraud. 
 
Case Study 6 focussing on access to Internet resources, illustrates differences in the 
regulation of access to Internet resources in the UK and India. Limited powers and 
provisions exist and are exercised in respect of blocking of access to Internet 
resources in the UK with appropriate safeguards that protect individuals from 
arbitrary exercise of such powers. In India, the State exercises authoritative control 
over access to Internet resources and consequently, the access to and expression of 
Internet based digital identity, with little or no effective means for an individual to 
safeguard his rights. 
 
Case Study 7 on the control of personal data epitomises how the legal treatment of 
personal data used in e-governance contexts (in this case, elections) varies from 
country to country. While digital identity subjects in the UK have established data 
protection rights in respect of their electoral data, digital identity subjects in India, 
have no parallel rights or protection.  
 
There are two main issues arising out of this analysis: first, unequal status of digital 
identity subjects in the UK and India in respect of their digital identity; and two, the 
mismatch of the law, local conditions and the Volksgeist in India.  
 
The Indian digital identity subject, as compared to its Western counterpart in the UK, 
is variantly regulated in relation to its digital identity. In effect, the Indian digital 
identity subject is rather inadequately protected in respect of its digital identity 
(particularly in relation to privacy, data protection) and has a much more constrained 
relationship with its digital identity (evident in access to digital identity, anonymity, 
pseudonymity, control of personal data). Therefore, digital identity subjects in UK 
and India are on unequal footing in respect of the regulation of their digital identity. 
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Most of India’s laws that impact digital identity are of some foreign origin or as 
Watson states “borrowed” or “imitated.”1259 As outlined in Chapter 5, they do work 
well in most cases to regulate digital identity. However, this chapter shows how these 
laws create significant problems in terms of their mismatch with local conditions1260 
and the Volksgeist.  
 
The Volksgeist is Savigny’s “spirit of the people.”1261 Savigny visualised the law as a 
product of the people, their culture, and their daily lives.1262 According to him, the 
law had to reflect the “unique needs and character of the people of each nation.”1263 
Tilak too advocated this stream of legal thought in the context of India in proposing 
that law and legislation should take into account the local context of the people.1264  
 
The failure to take into account local conditions1265 and the Volksgeist is problematic. 
Law turns into a “misfit,” or a “meaningless form of words.”1266 It is then not well 
received or even subject to rejection, particularly when it is not sufficiently localised. 
Law might also gradually breakdown when people being to work around it, making 
its efficacy suffer.1267 Legal compliance is effected and enforcement becomes 
difficult.1268 This is particularly exemplified in the case of the Indian ITA 2000 
                                                 
1259 Watson (1974) n50 
1260 eg, the state of digital technologies (i.e. their operating conditions, penetration, access and use) 
and culture (ie, privacy, information sharing, communal use of personal information, attitudes to 
authentication and verification, anonymity and pseudonymity). See Ch 3. 
1261 Savigny famously stated, “Law . . . is first developed by custom and popular faith, next by judicial 
decisions-everywhere, therefore, by internal, silently operating powers, not by the arbitrary will of a 
law-giver.” Hayward (1975) n56, 30 
1262 See Julius Stone, Social Dimensions of Law and Justice (SUP, 1966), 35-36  
1263 Luis Kutner, ‘Legal Philosophers: Savigny: German Lawgiver,’ (1972) 55 Marq L Rev, 280-296, 
284; J Stone, The Province and Function of Law: A Study in Jurisprudence (HUP, 1946), 421-23  
1264 Sharma (2009) n56 
1265 Specifically substantiated at 6.3.2. The law fails to consider India’s peculiar socio-economic 
conditions in the use of and access to digital identity technologies. Gender, caste and class based 
inequalities in society fuel access, use and expression of digital identities. Also, privacy and 
information sharing norms affect and influence the treatment of digital identity. 
1266 Legrand (1997b) n63, 120  
1267 Take for instance, copyright infringement in India, which is open and widespread despite being 
illegal. People work around copyright law to access information and have a tolerant attitude to 
copyright violations. See Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, ‘Study on 
Copyright Piracy in India,’ (1999) Ch VIII (enforcement & public awareness of copyright); R Vyas, 
‘Perfect Semblance: Imperfect Law,’ The Telegraph (9 January 2009) 
<http://www.telegraphindia.com/1090109/jsp/opinion/story_10356023.jsp>; Rachana Desai, 
‘Copyright Infringement in the Indian Film Industry,’ (2005) 7 Vand J Ent L & Prac, 259-278 
1268 Dalal (2007) n57; Rodrik (2007) n57 
 231 
which though containing a substantial regime for the regulation of information 




The examination of the application of the law with the case studies in respect of key 
digital identity contexts demonstrate how differences exist in the application of the 
law regulating digital identity in the UK and India. These differences put digital 
identity subjects in the UK and India on unequal footing. The very legitimacy of 
many of the laws that exist and are being implemented in India is in doubt. There is 
also a strong mismatch between the law and the needs of Indian digital identity 
subjects. This calls for a looking at the situation afresh. Given that digital identity 
and its regulation have global and local dimensions, how can this challenge best be 


















                                                 
1269 Pavan Duggal, ‘Cyber-crime in India: The Legal Approach,’ in Roderic Broadhurst and Peter 
Grabosky (eds), Cyber-crime: The Challenge in Asia (HKUP, HK 2005), 183-196; PT Joseph, 
Ecommerce: An Indian Perspective (Prentice-Hall, New Delhi 2006), 6 
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7. The regulatory future of digital identity: Examination of proposed legal 
solutions  
 
As soon as something is valuable and persistent, we seek to associate rights and 
duties with it. What will those rights be? 
-Susan P Crawford1270 
 
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
Research on the regulation of digital identity reveals various legal solutions advanced 
in respect of digital identity. These legal solutions can be classed into two broad 
groups: national legal proposals and transnational legal proposals. In the first 
category, fall the constitutional right to virtual personality (Costa Rica), the tort 
based right to identity (USA) and the right to database identity (UK). In the second 
category is a transnational solution - De Hert’s right to identity.  
 
This chapter examines these proposals in the light of the simultaneous globality and 
locality of digital identity and differences in its regulation. Are any, and if so which 
of these solutions best suited to take into account that digital identity and its legal 
regulation is subject to these conditions?  
 
7.2. National legal proposals 
 
This section examines some national proposals (in chronological order) made in 
relation to the legal regulation of digital identity. 1271 These are: the constitutional 
right to virtual personality (Costa Rica), the tort based right to digital identity (USA) 





                                                 
1270 Susan P Crawford, ‘Who’s In Charge of Who I Am? Identity and Law Online,’ (2004) 49 NY L 
Sch L Rev, 211-229, 212 
1271 In addition to these, see NNG de Andrade, ‘Right to Identity: The Foundations for a Renewed 
Legal Conceptualization,’ 3rd International Conference on Computers, Privacy & Data Protection, 
Brussels (29-30 January 2010). Based on EU human rights law and the Italian right to personal 
identity, Andrade re-conceptualises the right to personal identity in the context of AmI with two 
elements: the right to multiple identities and right to be forgotten. 
 233 
7.2.1. The constitutional right to virtual personality (Costa Rica) 
 
The first proposal that came to the forefront in respect of the creation of specific right 
to digital identity was the attempt to create a specific constitutional right to virtual 
personality. In 2005, a Bill was introduced in the Congress of the Republic of Costa 
Rica1272 by Congresswoman Marta Iris Zamora Castillo aimed at the enactment of a 
constitutional fundamental rights provision to protect the virtual personality.1273 The 
Bill proposed the enactment of a new Article 24bis to the Political Constitution: 
 
Article 24 bis: Everyone has the right to have or not have a virtual 
personality, where one’s presence, content and projection is regulated 
by each one of them. It may not be used for discriminatory purposes to 
the detriment of its holder. The State will guarantee that the 
information contained in a virtual personality will enjoy the 
appropriate technical and legal security, excluding non-authorized 
third parties that try to obtain it. The State may use the content of an 
individual’s virtual personality, upon due authorization from the 
individuals themselves, as long as the purpose is for the benefit of the 
said individuals.1274 
 
Virtual personality1275 or Personalidad virtual is defined as the “the ubiquitous 
existence of an entity,”1276 or the “virtual facets of a legal entity.”1277 In these 
respects, Personalidad virtual relates to digital identity and is acknowledged as 
equivalent to it. 
 
                                                 
1272 Costa Rica is a constitutional democracy with a legal system based on the Spanish civil law 
system.  
1273 Congress of the Republic of Costa Rica, Constitutional Reform for the Protection of the Virtual 
Personality as a Fundamental Right, Law Bill, Congresswoman M I Zamora Castillo, Expedient No. 
15890 (9 May 2005). Spanish version at 
<http://virtualrights.org/PROYECTO%20PERSONALIDAD%20VIRTUAL.doc>. As of March 2009, 
the Bill was with the Human Rights Commission.  
1274 Red IberoAmericana de Protection de Datos, Documentación, Republic of Costa Rica, 
<http://www.redipd.org/documentacion/legislacion/costarica-iden-idphp.php>. Alternate 
translation at A Guadamuz Gonzalez, ‘Virtual Rights,’ (14 November 2005) 
<http://technollama.blogspot.com/2005/11/virtual-rights.html> 
1275 The right draws from J Aizenman Leiner, ‘Derecho Ubicuos o Virtuales,’ <http:// 
www.virtualrights.org/ Derechos%20Ubicuos,>, 1 
1276 J Aizenman Leiner, JM Pedersen and Dr JM Rivero, ‘Virtual Rights: Constituting a Global and 
Local Information Society,’  v.0.9i (2003), 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20070221180059/virtualrights.org/files/project_overview_latest.pdf>, 2 
1277FJ Campos Zamora, ‘The Emergence of Virtual Entity as Positive Status Information,’ 
<http://www.virtualrights.org/informaci.doc> 
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The Bill aims to protect the right to have (or not have) a virtual personality, to 
regulate such personality and protect it against third party abuse. It is intended to 
protect aspects of digital identity like presence, content and projection. Presence 
involves digital identity mediated inter alia on the computer/Internet (email, blogs, 
and social networks) telephone, mobile phones (SMS, MMS, voicemail) and other 
technologies like RFID. Content relates to data.  Projection involves the manner of 
assertion of identity.1278  
 
Additionally, the right to virtual personality aims at protecting the right to exist in 
cyberspace,1279 visualised as an inclusionary right enabling freedom of expression 
and engagement in cyberspace. This freedom of expression and engagement 
manifests in the ability to access the Internet, have an email id, website or participate 
in other online activities.1280 
 
The right to virtual personality, intended to be a fundamental constitutional right, 
aims at protecting the virtual presence of an individual. It also aims at protecting the 
right of free development and enjoyment of the virtual personality; evident in its 
intent to accommodate both cases of having and not having a virtual personality. It 
seeks to guard against any discrimination to the virtual personality and its bearer. 
 
The right aims to put the individual, the subject of the virtual personality, in control 
of digital identity; though it does have a proviso that enables State based exploitation 
of the virtual personality provided consent has been obtained and if such use is in the 
interests of the person. In this connection, the State must guarantee that information 
included in the virtual personality has adequate legal and technical security. 1281 
 
                                                 
1278 eg, as occurring through Identity Rights Agreements or Link Contracts. 
1279 J Aizenman Leiner, ‘[OpenID] German Court Defines Fundamental Digital Privacy Right,’ (15 
March 2008) <http://lists.openid.net/pipermail/openid-general/2008-March/013823.html> 
1280 Aizenman Leiner (2003), n1276, 2, 4 
1281 J Aizenman Leiner, ‘Communication to Yadis, IDGang and the VP Symposium’ (3 March 2006) 
<http://lists.danga.com/pipermail/yadis/2006-March/002247.html> 
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The justifications for the proposed right are set out by Chinchilla Sandi.1282 The right 
is deemed necessary to deal with the risks of the Information Society, to enable 
individuals fulfill their role as virtual persons through control over their 
Personalidad virtual. It is also deemed essential to promote e-participation, 
safeguard privacy and facilitate informational self-determination.1283 
 
The right to virtual personality manifests as a constitutional fundamental right. In this 
sense, it seems to represent a powerful means of protecting one’s digital identity 
through a medley of negative prohibitions, positive freedoms and limitations.  
 
However, the right as a legal solution falls short in a number of respects. First, it pre-
supposes that the digital identity subject is an autonomous individual capable of 
exercising free will and choice in the expression and control of his or her digital 
identities. Second, it problematically assumes that individual identity subjects want, 
choose and are able to control their digital identities.1284 Third, it places upon the 
State a huge burden by laying on it the primary and ultimate responsibility for the 
protection of digital identity. The right does not recognise fully that digital identity 
regulation is, as previously demonstrated, a complex mesh of actors (individual, 
private and State). The combined role of these actors has largely been ignored 
(unless of course it is assumed that the State takes the full and final responsibility for 
actions of everybody, including itself). Finally, in totality it remains an individual-
centric right. The right is constrained by these deficiencies. 
 
7.2.2. The tort based right to digital identity (USA) 
 
In 2008, Blackman proposed a tort based right to digital identity based on principles 
of US tort law, confidentiality and criminal law aimed at omniveillance (which per 
Blackman refers to all forms of “pervasive human monitoring” which results in 
                                                 
1282 Carlos Chinchilla Sandi, ‘Virtual Personality: The Need For Constitutional Reform,’ (2005) 082 
AR: Revista de Derecho Informático < http://www.alfa-redi.org/rdi-articulo.shtml?x=948> 
1283 Costa Ricans enjoy the right to informative self-determination (derecho a la autodeterminación 
informativa). See Resolution 14580-2006, Constitutional Court, Sentence 014580-2006; 
Constitutional Court, Sentence 014847-1999 and Constitutional Court, Sentence 754-2002 
1284 A problematic assumption as determined in Ch 4 (4.7.5) 
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threats to reputation, free speech and expression and personal safety) and specifically 
the distribution of personal digital images over the Internet.1285  
 
Blackman weighs up the threat of omniveillance and argues (in the US context)1286 
that existing privacy torts like the public disclosure of private facts,1287 intrusion 
upon seclusion,1288 false light1289 and appropriation1290 are ineffectual in dealing with 
intrusive omniveillance technologies. This is for a number of reasons. First, the 
protections available under such torts are subject to restrictions which limit their 
scope.1291 Second, when these torts were established, contemporary forms and levels 
of digital identity threats did not exist. Therefore, Blackman proposes a tort based 
right to digital identity that would enable a “workable equilibrium” between privacy 
and free speech and provide a remedy for victims of omniveillance.  
 
Blackman’s right to digital identity states, 
The right to your digital identity is violated when an individual or 
organization records and reproduces an image of another without consent 
using a visual or auditory enhancing device while   
(1) the party recorded possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy 
to not be recorded; (2) the matter recorded would be offensive to a 
reasonable person; 
(3) the recording is intentionally widely transferred or disseminated 
through any electronic medium to any electronic format; and 
(4) the recording is not newsworthy, where a newsworthy recording 
(4a) has social value, 
(4b) minimally intrudes into ostensibly private affairs, and  
                                                 
1285 Josh Blackman, ‘Omniveillance, Google, Privacy in Public, and the Right to Your Digital Identity: 
A Tort for Recording and Disseminating an Individual's Image over the Internet,’ (2008) 49 Santa 
Clara L Rev, 313-392 
1286 Per Blackman, there is a strong need for a new legal incentive to protect privacy in America. 
Blackman (2008) n1285, 353 
1287 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977). The tort states: One who gives publicity to a matter 
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if 
the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is 
not of legitimate concern to the public. 
1288 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977). The tort states: [o]ne who intentionally intrudes, 
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is 
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to 
a reasonable person. 
1289 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977) 
1290 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C (1977) 
1291 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D Cmt. H (1977) & § 652B Cmt. C (1977) 
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(4c) the party that is recorded voluntarily acceded to the position of 
public notoriety.1292 
 
The first element of the right is grounded in the tort of intrusion upon seclusion and 
draws from the jurisprudence of criminal law, media law and voyeurism statutes 
which take on nuanced and qualified views of privacy.1293 The right abandons the 
traditional private public property distinction and focuses more on discerning 
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.1294  
 
The second element of the right prescribes that the violation must be “offensive to a 
reasonable person.” Here Blackman departs from the prescription, under both the 
torts of public disclosure of private facts and tort of intrusion upon seclusion, that a 
violation in respect of them must be judged in the light of whether it is “highly 
offensive to a reasonable person,” because these high standards are difficult to 
satisfy.1295 
 
The third element prescribes that there must be wide transfer or dissemination over 
an electronic medium. A simple, purely personal transfer or limited dissemination 
does not come within the scope of the right. It is necessary that there is 
“indiscriminate dissemination to an electronic forum without concern for 
newsworthiness.”1296 Blackman quantifies transfer and dissemination in terms of 
whom the recording is released to and the distance it travels. The transfer and 
dissemination of the recording must be widespread and conducted proactively. The 
transferred recording must also be easily accessible and indefinitely retained. 
 
                                                 
1292 Blackman (2008) n1285, 354-355 
1293 Citing Katz v United States 389 US 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring); Olmstead v United 
States 277 US 438, 464–65 (1928); Sanders v ABC 978 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal 1999)  
1294 What constitutes reasonable expectation of privacy was laid down in Katz. A reasonable 
expectation of privacy may be held to exist if a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation 
of privacy and, second, the expectation is one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. For 
detailed analysis of reasonable expectation of privacy in the US, see Robert Gellman, ‘A General 
Survey of Video Surveillance Law in the United States,’ in Sjaak Nouwt, BR de Vries and C Prins 
(eds), Reasonable Expectations of Privacy? Eleven Country Reports on Camera Surveillance and 
Workplace Privacy (TMC Asser Press, Netherlands 2005), 7-35 
1295 Tucker v Merck & Co  2003 WL 25592785, at *13 (ED Pa 2 May 2003). 
1296 Blackman (2008)  n1285, 365-366 
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The fourth element provides that the recording must not be newsworthy, to accord 
with rights under the First Amendment.1297 Blackman here seeks to balance the social 
values of privacy and publicity. Newsworthiness is based on the three factored 
approach in the case of Kapellas v Kofman,1298 where the California Supreme Court 
identified three important factors of newsworthiness:  
(1) the social value of the facts published  
(2) the depth of the article’s intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and 
(3) the extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to a position of public 
notoriety.” 
 
Blackman’s right is strictly restricted in its remit; it does not include state based 
surveillance and matters under the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution.1299 
 
Blackman makes a lucid case for the creation of a tort based right to digital identity. 
One of the main advantages of his right is its specificity.  It does not try to do too 
many things at one time. This it has achieved through restricting the remit of its 
operation. However, Blackman’s proposal is extremely short sighted and flawed in 
one major respect. This relates to the fundamental grounding of the right in the need 
to protect identity through protecting privacy. 
 
The problems of Blackman’s approach can be gauged from the writings of Peek.1300 
Blackman presumes that there are two parties in the right to digital identity: one, who 
actively engages in privacy violating acts and the other, who has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Peek states that this is a ‘flawed dichotomy’ of privacy law 
because privacy law has and (even in Blackman’s approach) fails to consider the 
fallout of the ‘fluid, modern reality and concept’ of the entities violating privacy and 
the entities having reasonable expectation of privacy ‘mutually’ engaging in such 
actions. Another reason Blackman’s tort becomes hugely irrelevant is due to the 
                                                 
1297 The First Amendment states: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
1298 Kapellas v Kofman 459 P2d 912, 922–24 (Cal 1969) 
1299 The Fourth Amendment relates to the right of persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
1300 Marcy Peek, ‘The Observer and the Observed: Re-imagining Privacy Dichotomies in Information 
Privacy Law,’ (2009) 8 (1) Nw J Tech & Intell Prop, 51-66 
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nature of the progress of technological innovations; technology often erodes into the 
expectations of privacy.1301 
 
Blackman’s right is predominated by the conceptualisation of a person’s interest in 
privacy as a concern over ‘accessibility to others.’1302 But people do not always have 
an equal or universal interest in maintaining their privacy.1303 Blackman 
problematically assumes that people constantly desire, prefer and act to preserve 
privacy. However, people often actively engage in acts that result in the violation of 
their own privacy.1304 This is evident not just in the case of Indian digital identity 
subjects, whose digital identities are often of non-private and routinely shared 
natures, but also in respect of digital identity subjects in the West.  
 
Blackman’s proposal is further affected by its nature. Privacy torts are characterised 
as weak rights. In the US, courts have guardedly and rigidly interpreted these torts 
curtailing their scope as an effective remedy for rights violations.1305 There are other 
reasons that make such torts ineffective. First, torts respond to intangible harms that 
are impossible to measure.1306 Second, the resistance to dignity torts.1307 Third, the 
complexity of pursuing such actions.1308 If one adds to this the nature and lack of 
effectiveness of tort based remedies in India in protecting digital identity, it becomes 
clear that this solution is extremely limited in its effectiveness as an international 
                                                 
1301 Paul M Schwartz, ‘Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation 
in the United States,’ (1995) 80 Iowa L Rev, 553- 618, 573. Also see Chs 3 (3.2.2.1.1) and 4 (4.7.2)  
1302 See Ruth Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of Law,’ (1980) 89 (3) The Yale LJ, 423 
1303 Chs 3 (3.2.2.1), 4 (4.7.6) 
1304 Lessig (2006) n151, 228; Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in 
America (Vintage Books, USA 2001); P Norberg, DR Horne and DA Horne, ‘The Privacy Paradox: 
Personal Information Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviours,’ (2007) 41 (1) J Cons Aff, 100-126; 
Sarah Spiekermann, Jens Grossklags and Bettina Berendt, ‘E-Privacy in 2nd Generation E-
Commerce: Privacy Preferences Versus Actual Behavior,’ in MP Wellman and Y Shoham (eds), 
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM, NY 2001), 38-47; Joseph 
Phelps, Glen Nowak and Elizabeth Ferrell, ‘Privacy Concerns and Consumer Willingness to Provide 
Personal Information,’(2000) 19 J Pub Policy & Mktg, 27-41 
1305 DK Citron, ‘Mainstreaming Privacy Torts’ (2011) 99 California L Rev, 101-189 
1306 DL Zimmerman, ‘Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy 
Tort,’ (1983) 68 Cornell L Rev, 291-367, 362  
1307 LB Lidsky, ‘Prying, Spying and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do 
About It,’ (1998) 73 Tul L Rev, 173-248, 211 
1308 RP Bezanson, G Cranberg and J Soloski, Libel Law and the Press: Myth and Reality (Free Press, 
NY 1987), 116 (success of privacy tort claims) 
 240 
remedy. Therefore, the tort to digital identity, as proposed by Blackman is a highly 
limited solution.  
 
7.2.3. The right to database identity (UK) 
 
The right to database identity is propounded by Sullivan in her analysis of national 
ID schemes legislation (primarily the Identity Cards Act 2006 and the UK National 
Identity Scheme) in line with the “emergent legal concept of identity.” 1309 Unlike 
Blackman, she opines identity is a better ‘lens’ than privacy to view digital identity 
problems.1310  
 
The legal concept of identity, per Sullivan, includes two types of identity under the 
UK National Identity Scheme: database identity and token identity. Database identity 
includes “all the data and information recorded about an individual in the database/s 
accessible under the scheme.”1311 Token identity is “a subset of database identity and 
consists of name, gender, data and place of birth and death, signature, appearance 
(through comparison with a photograph) and biometrics.”1312 
 
Sullivan visualises the right to database identity as founded in the “broader right to 
identity under international law.”1313 She refers to the express declaration of the right 
to identity in Article 8 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC),1314 the indirect references to identity in Articles 6 and 15 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the right to self-determination in Articles 
1(2) and 55 of the UN Charter, Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the right to identity implicit in Article 8 of 
the ECHR. Sullivan finds that the basis of these rights is personal autonomy i.e. self-
                                                 
1309 Clare Sullivan, ‘Privacy or Identity?’ (2008) 2 (3) IJIPM, 289-324  
1310 A specific reference is made to identity theft, defined as “dishonest misuse by a person of another 
person’s registered token identity for a transaction.” See Sullivan (2009) n7 
1311 n1309, 290 
1312 ibid 
1313 Referring to international treaties and EC law.  
1314 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by GA Res 44/25 of 20 November 
1989. E.i.f. 2 September 1990.  
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determination;1315 the basis of which is the ‘protection of the individual sector’ and 
the ‘zone of individual power,’ both of which she argues are crucial for the “healthy 
development and functioning of the individual.”1316  
 
For grounding the right to database identity in ‘identity’ rather than privacy, Sullivan 
puts forth the following reasoning. Identity, she believes, is more essential,1317 
fundamental and absolute in comparison to privacy.1318 It is better equipped to deal 
with identity abuses than privacy or data protection,1319  goes deeper into the issue of 
control and thus, is a better medium to employ.1320 Identity not only enables 
informational self-determination (which Sullivan appreciates as the primary role of 
privacy) but also the right of the individual to be recognised and protected as a 
unique individual.1321 
 
The right to database identity is the right of an individual to:  
1. an accurate, fully functional and registered identity i.e. his/her database 
identity including token identity; 
2. Exclusive use of his/her transactional identity i.e. his/her token identity; 
3. A right to know what information is recorded and to rectify errors 
4. A right to know what information is disclosed and to whom” 
 
The right to database identity highlights the importance of identity and disentangles 
it from privacy. In this sense it does substantiate the rationale that protecting digital 
identity is a not only limited or tied to the protection of privacy.  
 
But there are problems with the arguments supporting the right. Though Sullivan 
prefers to focus and centres the right to database identity on identity rather than 
privacy, there is evidence of reluctance to make an effective leap from privacy to 
identity. This is evident in the manner Sullivan discusses the close relationship 
between the two.1322 One cannot take this as a given, as the relationship between 
                                                 
1315 n1309, 296 
1316 Referring to CA Reich, ‘The Individual Sector,’ (1991) 100 (5) Yale LJ, 1409-1448, 1442 
1317 n1309, 307 
1318 n1309, 299 
1319 n1309, 304, 305 
1320 n1309, 305 
1321 n1309, 307 
1322 n1309, 305 
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identity and privacy is highly contextual. Identity and privacy do not always share an 
intimate or coherent relationship. Moreover, identity and privacy do not share equal 
or similar relationships universally, particularly given local difference.1323 
 
Another problem with the right to database identity is its nature. The right is, at best, 
a data protection right. This is because, the right in its different elements, particularly 
elements (3) and (4), is reflective of the principles of European (mainly, the EU Data 
Protection Directive) and UK data protection law (DPA 1998). For instance, the right 
to know what information is recorded (element 3) is grounded in Recitals 25, 30 of 
the Data Protection Directive and Section 7 (1) (a) of the DPA 1998 (right of access 
to personal data).1324 The rectification of errors (element 4) is mirrored in Articles 10 
(c) and 11 (c) of the Data Protection Directive and Sections 12,1325 12A1326 and 141327 
of the DPA 1998. The right to know what information is disclosed and to whom is 
enshrined in Recitals 30, 39 and Articles 11, 12 (a) of the Directive and Section 7 (1) 
(b) of the DPA 1998. 
 
Even element (1) of the right to database identity is derived from data protection. The 
right to an accurate, fully functional and registered identity finds its roots in Recital 
36 and Article 6 (d) of the Directive and Sections 12A (1)(a), 12A (5), 14(1) and the 
fourth data protection principle1328 in Schedule 1, Part I of the DPA 1998. While data 
protection represents an important means of attaining informational self-
determination, as desired by the right, data protection by itself has not and may not 
represent the best means of dealing with digital identity regulatory challenges.1329 
                                                 
1323 Ch 3 (3.2.2.1); Ch 6 (6.3.1) 
1324 This section states that an individual is entitled to be informed by any data controller whether 
personal data of which that individual is the data subject are being processed by or on behalf of that 
data controller. 
1325 Rights in relation to automated decision-taking. 
1326 Rights of data subjects in relation to exempt manual data. 
1327 Rectification, blocking, erasure and destruction. 
1328 Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. 
1329 For instance, in jurisdictions with no or undeveloped data protection regimes. PM Schwartz, 
‘European Data Protection Law and Restrictions on International Data Flows,’(1995) 80 Iowa L Rev,  
471-496; MD Kirby, ‘Transborder Data Flows and the “Basic Rules” of Data Privacy,’(1980)16 Stan 
J Intl L, 27-66, 29; Hildebrandt (2008) n173, ss 15.5, 15.6; C Raab and Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘Privacy 
Actors, Performances and the Future of Privacy Protection,’ in Gutwirth and ors (2009) n432, 207-
225, 216. For weakness of DPA 1998, see Great Britain Parliament House of Lords Select Committee 
on the Constitution, ‘Surveillance: Citizens and the State,’ 2nd Report of Session 2008-09, Vol 2, 
Evidence, House of Lords papers 18-II (2008-09), 125 (data processing), 396 (weak enforcement), 
433 (surveillance); Aleksandra Kuczerawy, ‘Facebook and its EU Users: Applicability of the EU Data 
Protection Law to US based SNS,’ in M Bezzi and ors (eds), Privacy and Identity, IFIP AICT 300 
(Springer, Germany 2010), 75-85  
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Yet another issue with the right relates to its intent to enable an individual have an 
“an accurate, fully functional and registered identity i.e. his/her database identity 
including token identity.” The right to a registered identity has been in existence for a 
long time. International instruments like the UNCRC Article 71330 and national law 
provide for the right to registration. However, despite this right being guaranteed by 
law, its effectiveness is limited. It works better in countries with high levels of 
economic development and works less effectively or is rendered entirely meaningless 
to people in countries with low levels of economic development (and where civil 
registration infrastructure is either not well developed or fails to draw in the 
numbers). This can be substantiated by WHO figures on the registration of births and 
deaths,1331 as well as UNICEF figures on regional disparities in unregistered 
births.1332  
 
There are several challenges that may affect the right to enjoy “an accurate, fully 
functional and registered identity.” Many of these relate to the structural design, 
application and implementation of the system in relation to which the right to identity 
is sought to be enjoyed. But the main concern relates to whether and how an 
individual will be empowered in the right to enjoy an accurate, fully functional and 
registered identity. An individual needs to be aware of the existence of such a right, 
the existence of inaccuracy or dysfunction in relation to his identity, must choose and 
be able to take actions to enforce the enjoyment of the right. This is an extremely 
difficult task as demonstrated by the case studies on sharing1333 and electoral 
personal data,1334 particularly when personal data is viewed as part of the collective 
commons in countries like India.  
                                                 
1330 It states: “The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth 
to a name [and] the right to acquire a nationality. . .” 
1331 Prasanta Mahapatra and ors, ‘Civil Registration Systems and Vital Statistics: Successes and 
Missed Opportunities,’ (29 October 2007) 
<https://www.who.int/healthinfo/statistics/WhoCounts2.pdf> 
1332 Per UNICEF, the highest number of unregistered births per year were in East/South Asia and 
Pacific, while the lowest number was in Europe and the Americas. UNICEF, ‘Civil Rights 
Commentary,’ <http://www.unicef.org/pon98/06-13.pdf> 
1333 Ch 6 (6.3.2) 
1334 Ch 6 (6.3.7) 
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The right to database identity is grounded in the pre-existence of an individual’s 
fundamental human right to identity and self-determination.1335 In its self-determinist 
nature, it reflects the Western individualistic liberal perception of an individual who 
is or must have full control of identity.1336 But even in Western societies, this 
perception does not hold true for all purposes and accounts, particularly given that 
identity is often an associative and collective construct. It is even more inadequate 
for societies like India that openly reject the individualistic liberal perception of an 
individual’s right to control their identity distanced from collectives of family, caste, 
kinship, religion or the State. 
 
Sullivan visualises the right to identity as ‘absolute,’ one which is not “an individual 
right which is balanced against the public interest,” and “can be never legitimately 
removed or unilaterally changed.”1337  The extent an unqualified, absolute right to 
identity, particularly in relation to database identity, would be accepted is highly 
debatable. To date, absolute rights are highly restricted. Even under the ECHR and 
the UK HRA 1998, few rights are absolute: right to life (Art 2), prohibition of torture 
(Art 3), prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Art 4), no punishment without law 
(Art 7), right to marry (Art 12), right to free elections (Art 3, First Protocol) and the 
right not to be condemned to a death penalty (Art 1, Sixth Protocol). 
 
According to this, it can be concluded that Sullivan’s right to database identity does 
not add much to the regulatory future of digital identity, and like Blackman’s right is 
limited in its applicatory scope, given global implementation and local difference. 
 
7.3. Transnational legal proposals  
 
In addition to the national legal regulatory proposals, there are two international 
initiatives: first, the right to digital identity in the Charter of Human Rights and 
Principles for the Internet and second, the human right to identity proposed by 
Belgian academic Paul de Hert.1338  
                                                 
1335 n1309, 305 
1336 See PM Schwartz, ‘Beyond Lessig's Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace, Privacy Control and 
Fair Information Practices,’ (2000) Wis L Rev 743 
1337 n1309, 309 
1338 De Hert (2007) n76 
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The Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Internet1339 drafted by the 
Internet Rights and Principles Dynamic Coalition (IRP DC) seeks to apply human 
rights standards and principles to the Internet. It is based on the UDHR and UN 
human rights law. It advocates: equal right to access to the Internet, right to freedom 
of expression, right to privacy, right to digital identity and right to data protection. 
The right to digital identity is co-opted under the right to privacy and provides that 
“everyone has a right to digital identity”1340 The Charter is not examined in detail 
here because it in effect, it does not intend to create any new rights rather only 
“intends to layout and explain how existing agreed-upon human rights standards 
apply to the specific context of the Internet.”1341 
 
 
7.3.1. The right to identity  
 
De Hert argues that a new human right to identity,1342 in keeping with the trend of 
recognising individuals as legitimate and globally recognised rights holders and 
claimants in international and regional law and institutions,1343 is necessary to protect 
the individual from technological threats particularly in the light of the resistance and 
lack of efficacy of the right to privacy.  
 
De Hert’s right to identity states,  
States Parties undertake to respect the right of each persons to preserve and 
develop his or her ipse and idem identity without unlawful interference.1344 
 
This right is inspired and modelled on Article 8 of the UNCRC, which is the most 
unequivocal statement of a right to identity, available to children. The identity of a 
                                                 
1339 The Charter is inspired by the Association for Progressive Communications (APC) Internet Rights 
Charter and builds on the WSIS Declaration of Principles of Geneva and the Tunis Agenda for the 
Information Society. <http://Internetrightsandprinciples.org/node/367>. For APC Internet Rights 
Charter, <http://www.apc.org/en/node/5677> 
1340 Charter, Principle 9 (b). Digital identity here refers to personal identification in information 
systems. 
1341 <http://Internetrightsandprinciples.org/node/367> 
1342 Prins similarly calls for a right to identity. JEJ Prins, ‘Een Recht op Identiteit,’ (2007) 82 (14) 
Nederlands Juristenblad, 849. 
1343 TM Franck, The Empowered Self: Law and Society in the Age of Individualism (OUP, Oxford 
1999), 220 
1344 De Hert (2007) n76 
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child was deemed worthy of legal protection1345 because of its ability to be in flux, 
which makes it vulnerable to being compromised or destroyed and international 
agreement was reached by delegates from countries representing different legal 
systems, values, and cultures on a right to identity for children. 1346  Article 8 states:  
 
1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or 
her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized 
by law without unlawful interference. 
 
2. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or 
her identity, States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, 
with a view to re-establishing speedily his or her identity. 
 
This Article was proposed by Argentina in the Working Group drafting the 
Convention with the intent of safeguarding identity interests of children through 
ensuring speedy intervention by the State in cases of violations against identity 
preservation.1347 The background to this was that during the 1970’s and 1980’s when 
the Argentinean military junta was in power, there were a number of enforced and 
involuntary disappearances of people. Babies and children had disappeared, been 
killed or adopted by childless couples without any records and it was felt that 
something had to be done to find and establish the children’s true identity.1348  
 
Article 8 (1) of the UNCRC does not define “identity,”1349 rather only mentions three 
elements of identity: name, nationality and family relations. But, these are not meant 
to be the only aspects of identity protected under this right as is evident by the use of 
                                                 
1345 There is no parallel provision for adults. 
1346 In its Preamble the UNCRC states, “childhood is entitled to special care and assistance” and that 
“the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, 
including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth” in synchrony with the Declaration 
of the Rights of the Child (1959) and asserts that “in all countries in the world, there are children 
living in exceptionally difficult conditions, and that such children need special consideration.” 
1347 See UN Doc E/CN.4/1985/64 Annex II, p 1 at I. New Articles (Argentina) 
1348 E/CN.4/1986/39, 8-10; S Detrick, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A 
Guide to the Travaux Preparatoires (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1992), 292-294; The Declaration on 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance in 1992 (UN GA Res 47/133 of 18 
December 1992) was adopted in this light. 
1349 D Hodgson, ‘The International Legal Protection of the Child's Right to a Legal Identity and the 
Problem of Statelessness,’ (1993) 7 (2) Intl J L and Family, 255-270, 265 
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the word “including” preceding these elements.1350 However, in interpreting the 
elements of the right, the underlying guiding principle is the best interests of the 
child.1351 Various aspects of identity are protected against unlawful interference by 
the Convention, e.g. Articles 2,1352 16,1353 201354 and 30.1355  
 
7.3.1.1.Rational and nature  
 
A right to identity is highly necessary, De Hert, argues for the age of the ‘Internet of 
things.’ The ‘Internet of things’ is the current and future technological age where 
technology is a pervasive and seamless part of life. According to an ITU report and 
Mark Weiser’s vision, it is represented by the increasing availability of processing 
power accompanied by its decreasing visibility; a world of “anytime, any place 
connectivity for anyone,” “connectivity for anything;” where technologies are 
“pervasive, interactive and intelligent.” 1356 
 
In this setting, there arise various challenges to identity because of its play and 
performance at various levels: virtual communities, social networking, mobile 
technologies, RFID, chipped passports, ethnic screening, biomedical implants and 
AmI. Additionally, there is surveillance, identification, control schemes and 
profiling, all of which, according to De Hert, pose significant threats to the individual 
and society.  
 
Examining case law under the ECHR, specifically Article 8, De Hert concludes that 
while certain identity aspects like name, gender and sexual orientation are afforded 
excellent protection in Europe, identity in relation to the Internet of things is not and 
thus there exists a gap in regulation. De Hert finds problematic the protection of 
identity through privacy law; this he opines is neither globally satisfactory nor does it 
                                                 
1350 ibid. Other aspects of the identity subject to protection are the child’s personal history since birth 
and race, culture, religion and language of the child. Rachel Hodgkin and Peter Newell,  
Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNICEF, 2002), 125 
1351 JS Cerda, ‘The Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child: New Rights,’ (1990) 12 HRQ, 115-
119, 117 
1352 Right of child against discrimination. 
1353 Right to protection from interference with privacy, family, home and correspondence. 
1354 Special protection of child temporarily or permanently deprived of family environment. 
1355 Right of children of minority communities and indigenous populations to enjoy their own culture 
and to practice their own religion. 
1356 ITU, Internet Reports 2005: The Internet of Things (ITU, Geneva 2005), 2, 13 
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work well when weighed against interests like national security, public health and 
safety.  
 
Therefore, to eliminate these problems De Hert proposes a new human right to 
identity with universal validity with the following aims and intents:1357 One, to 
promote the enactment and effective implementation of procedural safeguards to 
protect the basic, inviolable rights of an individual to his identity. Two, to limit the 
formal denigration of individual rights and liberties. Three, to protect individuals 
against risks of technology abuse. Four, to protect human rights against widespread 
global technological surveillance and profiling.1358 Five, to deal with the lack of 
human intervention, knowledge and control in identification processes.1359 Six, to 
fulfil the need for “explicitness” and “awareness” of identity rights. Seven, to realise 
the balance between the rights of individuals and the public interest.1360 
 
So, what constitutes De Hert’s right to identity? What are its key elements? What is 
its scope and effect, and how best does De Hert fill the regulatory gap? 
 
 
7.3.1.2.Key elements  
 
The right to identity comprises of the following elements: a positive obligation on 
State Parties, preservation and development of ipse and idem identity and a right 
against unlawful interference.  
 
7.3.1.2.1. Positive obligation on state parties  
 
As opposed to the right to privacy, which is typically understood as a negative 
right,1361 De Hert argues for a positive right to identity.1362  A positive right is a right 
that entitles its holder to be provided with the conditions under which its fulfilment is 
                                                 
1357 De Hert (2007) n76 
1358 Hildebrandt (2008) n173 
1359 ibid 
1360 GJ Walters, Human Rights in an Information Age: A Philosophical Analysis (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto 2001),187 
1361 See Louis Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy,’ (1890) 4 HLR, 193-220, 216; SJ Sucher, The 
Moral Leader: Challenges, Tools and Insights (Routledge, US 2007), 198; BW Schermer, Software 
Agents, Surveillance and the Right to Privacy: A Legislative Framework for Agent-enabled 
Surveillance (Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2007), 118. Also evident in its being 
legislated as a negative right in Art 12 UDHR and the negative liberty approach in Art 8, ECHR. 
1362 Citing Hildebrandt (2008) n173 
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achieved. A negative right on the other hand, merely implies that the right holder is 
entitled to enjoy such a right without interference.1363  
 
De Hert frames the right to identity primarily as a positive obligation upon 
contracting State Parties1364 that requires the taking of appropriate measures to ensure 
that individuals enjoy their rights.1365 As such, States would be required to ensure the 
effective enjoyment of the right. For instance, through amending laws to conform to 
the obligations of the right, or establishing and facilitating the use of and access to 
services such that the right to identity could be enjoyed e.g. not arbitrarily blocking 
public access to Internet services or providing free user accounts to people to use 
crucial services.  
 
Positive obligations under the ECHR entail the following: enabling the creation of a 
legal framework that would deter the infringement of a right,1366 taking measures to 
protect persons at risk from right violations either from the State or third parties,1367 
providing information and advice,1368 establishing effective judicial system for 
redress,1369 investigating claims of violations,1370 and ensuring fairness of procedure 
                                                 
1363 This distinction is rejected by Holmes and Sunstein who state that, “all legal rights are, or aspire to 
be, welfare rights.” (welfare as synonymous with positive rights). Stephen Holmes and CR Sunstein, 
The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (WW Norton & Co, NY 1999), 222 
1364 De Hert’s right while primarily shrouded with a positive nature, desires also to incorporate the 
negative element. He states that “identity needs to be understood in dynamic terms, necessitating a 
mix of negative and positive freedom.” De Hert (2007) n76, 10, 13 
1365 See August v UK (2003) 36 EHRR CD 115, Ivison v UK (2002) 35 EHRR CD 20, Stubbings v UK 
(1996) 23 EHRR 213, Deep Vein Thrombosis (2002) EWCH 2825 (QB),  X & Y v Netherlands (1985) 
8 EHRR 235 
1366 Tarariyeva v Russia, EctHR, App 4353/03 (14 December 2006), para 74 (Article 2); Storck v 
Germany (2005) 43 EHRR 96, paras 149-152 (Article 5); Őneryildiz v. Turkey (2004) 39 EHRR 12, 
paras 89-90; MC v Bulgaria, [2003] ECHR 646, para 149; Edwards v United Kingdom (2002) 35 
EHRR 19, para 54; Osman v United Kingdom, (2000) 29 EHRR 245, para 115; Z v the United 
Kingdom, [2001] 2 FLR 612 paras 73-75 (Article 3); A v United Kingdom, (1999) 27 EHRR 611, para 
22; see also X & Y v Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235, para 27; Airey v Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 305, 
para 32 (Article 8) 
1367 MC case, para 152 (Article 3); Osman, para 115; Keenan v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 913, 
para 90; Edwards, para 54 (Article 2); Menson v UK (2003) 37 EHRR CD 220 
1368 Őneryildiz, para 90; Guerra v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 357 (Article 8, obligation to provide 
information to those at risk of environmental pollution); LCB v United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 212 
(Article 2, obligation to provide information to those affected by nuclear testing) 
1369 X & Y, para 27 (Article 3); Edwards, para 54; Vo v France, paras 90-91; Tarariyeva, para 75 
(Article 2) 
1370 Jordan v United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 2, para 109 (Article 2 case); MC case, para 151; 
Assenov v Bulgaria para 102 (Article 3) Akdeniz v Turkey, EctHR, App 25165/94 (31 May 2001), 
(duty to investigate disappearances). 
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in interferences with qualified rights.1371 Positive obligations are thus, meant to play 
a practical and effective role and not just be ‘theoretical and illusory.’ 1372 
 
While positive obligations bind, States generally enjoy a wide margin of appreciation 
in making a decision on the manner in which they will implement such 
obligations1373 in international human rights law.1374 This factor will determine the 
effectiveness of the right to identity.  
 
7.3.1.2.2. Preservation and development of identity 
 
The right to identity speaks of the preservation and development of identity. To 
preserve one’s identity means taking any of these steps in respect of identity e.g.  
protecting or defending one’s name, sexual identity, maintaining cultural identity, 
image and likeness, nationality, family identity etc. Preserving one’s digital identity 
might mean protecting digital reputation, securing digital identities and controlling 
the processing and sharing of personal data. Developing one’s digital identity might 
mean creating an email id, building up a social networking profile, changing a user 
name or other digital identity attributes or upgrading digital identities.  
 
De Hert does not outline what ‘preserve’ and ‘develop’ under his proposed right to 
identity means. But as discussed in the preceding part, the preservation and 
development of identity could extend to any of the following: protecting and 
maintaining identity; being able to make choices about identity being able to create, 
change, use, propagate, share or destroy; being able to have an identity or a right not 
to be deprived of identity. 
 
                                                 
1371 TP v United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 2, para 72; Hatton v United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 
611 paras 99, 104 
1372 Citing Dodov v Bulgaria, EctHR, App 59548/00 (17 January 2008), para 83; Őneryildiz, para 69; 
Ilhan v Turkey, EctHR, App 22277/93 (18 May 2000), para 91; X and Y v Netherlands (1985) 8 
EHRR 235, para 23; Platform, para 32; Artico v Italy, (1980) 3 EHRR 1; Steel & Morris v United 
Kingdom (2005) 41 EHRR 22  
1373 In the UK, it has been held that a treaty is not part of law unless it is incorporated into the law by 
legislation. R v Lyons (2002) UKHL 44 per Lord Bingham; JH Rayner Ltd. v Dept. of Trade & 
Industry (1990) 2 AC 418 HL at 500C per Lord Oliver of Alymerton.  
1374 Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkandali v UK (1985) 7 EHRR 471, para 67; Winer v UK 48 DR 154 
(1986); Buckley v UK (1996) 23 EHRR 101 
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While no international legal instrument (other than the UNCRC) specifically 
provides a right to preserve and develop identity, some approximating elements can 
be found in some international instruments like the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide1375 and the Declaration on the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.1376 Under the UNCRC, 
“preserve” means non-interference in identity and maintenance of identity records 
and their confidentiality because such records are held to be of great significance in 
enjoying legal rights.  A right to preserve might entail penalties for breaches.  
 
The preservation of diverse aspects of an individual’s identity is a strong premise that 
emerges from the jurisprudence of Article 8 of the ECHR,1377 which has been 
interpreted to protect “a right to identity and personal development.”1378 Under this 
regime, the ECtHR in S and Marper v the United Kingdom,1379 stressed the relevance 
of an individual’s right to preserve his/her identity and confirmed that States were to 
ensure that appropriate safeguards existed under domestic law to enable the 
preservation and development of identity particularly in cases of automatic data 
processing and data with long life duration to prevent misuse and abuse.1380 
 
Under De Hert’s right to identity, States would thus incur a positive obligation to 
promote the preservation and development of digital identities. They would be 
obliged to ensure that digital identity was secured by means of appropriate 






                                                 
1375 Adopted by UN GA Res 260 (III) A on 9 December 1948. The words ‘preserve and develop’ are 
not specifically mentioned, but the spirit of the Convention resolutely promotes the preservation and 
development of identity.  
1376 n1348 
1377 See Ch 5 (5.2.2.1.1) 
1378 Bensaid v UK, ECtHR, App 44599/98 (6 February 2001) 
1379 [2008] ECHR 1581. The case was brought against the UK by the applicants in relation to the 
ongoing retention of their fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles on the England and Wales 
National DNA Database even though they had been acquitted/or criminal proceedings against them 
had been discontinued. 
1380 para 103 
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7.3.1.2.3. Ipse and idem identity 
 
An important aspect of De Hert’s approach is the inclusion of the concepts of ipse 
and idem identity (as developed by Ricoeur1381 and highlighted by Hildebrandt)1382 in 
the right to identity, as a reminder of the complexity of identity. 
 
Ricoeur developed the theory of identity in his book “Oneself as Another,” where he 
identified five essentials - language, history, time, space and body - as the 
determinants of identity. Per Ricoeur, identity is both a stable and unstable concept; 
and it is in this context that his distinction between ipse and idem identity becomes 
important. Ipse identity connotes ‘selfhood;’ idem identity stands for ‘sameness.’  
 
Ricoeur explains ipse identity thus: “identity in the sense of ipse implies no assertion 
concerning some unchanging core of the personality.”1383 It is the dynamic, changing 
element of identity. As for the idem identity, Ricoeur maintains that, 
..identity in the sense of the idem unfolds an entire hierarchy of significations 
(…). In this hierarchy, permanence in time constitutes the highest order, to 
which will be opposed that which differs, in the sense of changing or 
variable.1384  
 
Idem identity is thus the underlying, unchanging reality of identity.  
 
Both concepts are interactive and correlated, may overlap or exist in completely 
different zones. De Hert sums it thus:  
Personal identity is understood as a mix of ipse identity and idem identity. 
Ipse (or self) identity is the irreducible sense of self of a human person. It is 
reflexive consciousness of oneself. Idem (or sameness) identity is the 
objectification of the self that stems from comparative categorisation.1385 




                                                 
1381 Kathleen Blamey (tr), Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another (Chicago U Press, Chicago 1992) 
1382 Hildebrandt (2008) n173 
1383 Blamey (1992) n1381, 2 
1384 Blamey (1992) n1381 
1385 David Pellauer (tr), Paul Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition (HUP, Harvard 2005); Hildebrandt 
(2008) n173 
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Therefore,    
Personal identity  = ipse + idem identity.  
Ipse identity = self identity (irreducible/reflexive consciousness of 
self) 
Idem identity   = objectified (comparative) self identity 
 
Thus, ipse identity is a first person identity construct while idem identity is based on 
ascription by third persons. However, it is important to remember that both are 
intricately linked and only mutually of significance to the individual. 
 
7.3.1.2.4. Right against unlawful interference  
 
The phrase “without unlawful interference” forms the crux of the character of the 
right to identity and qualifies it.1386 However, De Hert does not comment on what 
constitutes an ‘unlawful interference.’  
 
Unlawful interference1387 may signify many things: an interference or intervention 
that is arbitrary, not prescribed by law or contrary to law. It could also mean an 
interference that is not in accordance with law, not proportionate or justified, as 
mandated to be. A number of international legislative instruments provide direction 
on what constitutes an unlawful interference.  
 
In the UDHR, interference is referred to in Article 12,1388 which states that no one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation and that everyone has 
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. Rather than 
unlawful interference, the Declaration mentions arbitrary interference, which is to be 
taken as meaning “not in accordance with well established legal principles.”1389 But 
the arbitrary element in the UDHR was intended to have specific limited range and 
                                                 
1386 The qualification of rights is not unique to the right to identity and is a common occurrence in 
human rights law e.g. Articles 8-10 of the ECHR. See R English and P Havers (QC), An Introduction 
to Human Rights and the Common Law (Hart, Oxford 2000), 19 
1387 Interference, by itself, refers to an act or instance of meddling, prying, intrusion, hindrance, 
intervention, obstruction or impediment. 
1388 Cited here for its relevance to the regulation of digital identity. 
1389 See Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent 
(Uni of Pennsylvania Press, Pennsylvania 2000), 138 
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may not be the best guide to interpret what unlawful interference in the context of De 
Hert’s right to identity. So, we must look to other legal instruments for guidance.  
In the ICCPR, Article 17 guarantees protection of law to privacy family, home, 
correspondence, honour and reputation, from arbitrary and unlawful interference.1390  
The travaux préparatoires of the ICCPR reveal great discussion about the meaning 
and scope of the terms arbitrary and unlawful interference.1391 Issues were raised in 
respect of the applicability of the provision -whether it sought to protect individuals 
solely from the acts of public authorities or also against private persons. It was 
expressed that it should apply to only governmental action with the activities of 
individuals to be left to municipal legislation.1392 
  
The UN General Comment on Article 171393 discussed arbitrary and unlawful 
interference and made several points. One, that interference could arise from state 
authorities, natural or legal persons.1394 Two, that ‘unlawful’ should be interpreted to 
mean there was to be no interference except under circumstances envisaged by the 
law.1395 Three, any interference authorised by States could only take place on the 
basis of law, which itself had to comply with the provisions, aims and objectives of 
the Covenant.1396 Four, ‘arbitrary interference’ could extend to interference provided 
for under the law. Five, interference to escape the scope of the Article had to be 
reasonable under the circumstances.1397  
 
Since, De Hert’s right to identity was inspired by the UNCRC; it might be the most 
appropriate place to get guidance on the term “without unlawful interference.” This 
term was much deliberated in discussions prior to the adoption of the UNCRC. 
                                                 
1390 For interpretation see the Human Rights Committee General Comment 16(1988); UN Doc 
A4625/section 39 
1391 Commission on Human Rights, 9th Session (1953), A/2929 Ch VI, §100-102; Third Committee 
15th Session, (1960), A/4625, § 36 
1392 E/CN.4 SR 374 pp. 4-5 (USA); E/CN.4 SR 375, p 8 (GB & AUS) 
1393 UN General Comment No. 16, ‘Article 17 (Right To Privacy),’ Thirty-Second Session (1988), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted By Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (12 May 2004) 
1394 UN General comment No. 16, para 1 
1395 UN General comment No. 16, para 3; A Conte, ‘Privacy, Honour and Reputation,’ in A Conte, S 
Davidson and R Burchill (eds), Defining Civil and Political Rights: The Jurisprudence of the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee (Ashgate, Aldershot 2004), 145-160, 147 
1396 UN General Comment No. 16, para  3 
1397 UN General Comment No. 16, para 4 
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Guidance on the interpretation of the UNCRC suggests what constitutes unlawful 
interference (in relation to identity aspects like race, culture and religion):1398 
suppression of minority languages in educational system, state information and the 
media; state persecution or proscription of the practice of a religion and failure to 
give adopted, fostered or institutionally placed children the chance to enjoy their 
ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious heritage.  
 
Thus, there can be a broad or limited ambit to unlawful interference depending on the 
context. Unfortunately, De Hert’s right to identity does not make very clear its ambit 
and scope in relation to digital identity, though it is possible that the right could be 
sought to be applied in relation to the case studies discussed earlier. 
 
7.3.1.3. Appraisal of the right  
 
Is De Hert justified in proposing a new human right to identity? To a considerable 
extent the conclusion that this thesis reached is in the affirmative. Especially for 
countries like India, classical rights like privacy cannot fully capture the more 
pressing legal identity issues that beset it e.g. access to, establishment and enjoyment 
of digital identity. 
 
On the other hand, De Hert himself recognises that “a general right to identity may 
not achieve the delicate balancing of interests needed to pay justice to any single, 
specific as well as contingent and contextual claim to identity.”1399 He recognises 
that the right may have undesirable consequences in terms of the “clamour for 
recognition and respect” of various other identity categories, many of which are 
strikingly troublesome and fraught with consequences; that it may “ignite 
sensibilities which are already overstretched”1400 and that it may “heighten the 
tension between personal and collective identities.”1401 
                                                 
1398 Hodgkin (2002) n1350, 125 
1399 De Hert (2007) n76 
1400 Referring to E Balibar & I Wallerstein (eds) Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (Verso, 
London 1991); S Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Simon 
and Schuster, NY 1996)  
1401 De Hert (2007) n76 
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De Hert’s right to identity has been critiqued by Gutwirth who advocates the need to 
move beyond identity in the world of the Internet of things, AmI, profiling and 
control.1402 While Gutwirth views De Hert’s formulation of the right to identity as 
complementary to the development of a right to identity in European jurisprudence 
particularly Article 8 of the ECHR, he outlines a number of problems with it.  
 
Firstly, Gutwirth builds the case that identity is a fundamentally flawed, problematic 
and controversial concept; as evident in clashes between individual and group 
claims. He distinguishes between a right to identity and the need of individuals to be 
protected against group based identities, unless they have made a choice to identify 
themselves with that group (using the opt-in, opt-out example). Here Gutwirth makes 
a broad assumption that “groups do not pre-exist as persistent entities that remain 
identical but on the contrary… are willingly constituted by their individuals, and they 
are permanently in a state of flux;” showing Gutwirth’s predilection for the Western 
individualised concept of identity.1403 However, as the analysis throughout the thesis 
has shown, this conclusion is unwarranted. While identity is a difficult concept, it is 
useful, manageable and can be sufficiently responsive to cultural differences.  
 
 Secondly, Gutwirth believes that identity at the individual level is an ever changing 
absurdity and prefers that identity not be referred to as something that defines a 
person or entity, rather, as a process of “belonging” or “becoming” (in line with 
Deleuze1404and Stengers).1405Again, this is something that does not fundamentally 
affect the right to identity as proposed by De Hert and which our analysis has shown 
can be accommodated within identity discourses.  
 
Gutwirth also raises the issue of technical problems. He believes that the right to 
identity is subjective and open to interpretational difficulties.1406 These difficulties 
relate to how identity is defined or described, what forms of identity are subject to 
                                                 
1402 Serge Gutwirth, ‘Beyond Identity?’ (2009) 1 (1) IDIS, 123-133  
1403 Gutwirth favours a deconstruction that primarily focuses on individuality. 
1404 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Contrôle et Devenir’ and ‘Post-Scriptum sur les Sociétés de Contrôle’ in 
Pourparlers 1972–1990 (Minuit, Paris 2003), Chs 16, 17 
1405 Isabelle Stengers, La Vierge et le Neutrino (Les Empêcheurs de Penser en Rond, Paris 2006) 
1406 Acknowledged by De Hert. 
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protection and what forms are not.  Identity, as demonstrated before, is fraught with 
cross cultural legal, terminological and difference. So is digital identity, as 
demonstrated by the preceding chapters of the thesis. While  De Hert’s analysis does 
not take this explicitly into account or address it effectively, this thesis has argued, 
and substantiates that consistent extensions of his notion that accommodate this 
insight are not only possible, but indeed sympathetic to his core concerns.  
 
Making distinctions in identity might be problematic - as evidenced in the 
discussions and in the travaux preparatoires of the UNCRC. Different countries had 
different ‘identity’ aspects included expressly in the right to identity while others had 
entirely different views.1407  Detrick reports this in great detail.1408 Some countries 
like Canada brought up how their jurisdictions did not recognise the identity concept, 
others raised concerns of its unacceptability.1409 But in our framework, this is only to 
be expected. Paradoxically, identity needs not be identical across all contexts. Just as 
http protocols allow communication between very different computer systems using 
different computer languages; law’s abstract, conceptual framework allows 
translation between different identity conceptions that while distorting, like every 
translation, parts of the local meanings are sufficiently robust to allow 
communication. Here, law and legal solutions score over Lessig’s regulation by 
architecture,1410 as argued in the analysis of identity management. 
 
Gutwirth’s sharpest criticism is encapsulated by the statement that a right to identity 
is “the best way to kill identity as a dynamic, open complex process…”1411 Gutwirth 
seeks rather to maintain the status quo and advocates that identity issues be protected 
by “normative prohibitions of interferences such as foreseen by privacy and some 
aspects of data protection law”1412 and other rights like freedom of conscience, 
speech and physical integrity. This is problematic because privacy and data 
                                                 
1407 Hodgkin (2002) n1350, 384; see positions of Poland, Netherlands, US, Canada and Austria.  
1408 Sharon Detrick, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
(Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1999), 160-161  
1409 See UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/39, paras 37, 44, 46 
1410 Lessig (1999) n655 
1411 Gutwirth (2009) n1402 
1412 Citing De Hert and Gutwirth. 
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protection as demonstrated before are subject to local difference and do not work in 
all circumstances to protect digital identity. 
 
As to identity related claims Gutwirth suggests that these be dealt with under positive 
obligations of the states and judicial interpretations of the right to self-determination 
and autonomy. Where this falls short, legislators could be left to rise to the occasion 
and topically intervene.1413 But this takes one back to square one where the identity is 
wedded to and enamoured with privacy and informational self-determination, which 
as has been shown before is a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs, given that privacy 
and data protection (law and practice) have proved highly inefficient in protecting 
the interests of the digital identity subject, particularly in countries like India that do 
not subscribe in toto to the Western nature of these values. 
 
In the light of this thesis, there are other issues that present themselves in respect of 
the right to identity. These are advanced below. 
 
7.3.1.3.1. The problem of the ipse-idem terminology 
 
Firstly, there is the problem of the ipse/idem terminology. While categorising identity 
into ipse and idem identity lends much to the discourse, it does represent a problem, 
in respect of the international relevance of these terms in jurisdictions beyond which 
they were developed. Not everybody would be able to relate to identity in terms of 
the ipse and the idem.1414 People in different parts of the world conceptualise identity 
differently, and may seek different frameworks for identity, one that is locally 
relevant. But given that digital identity has both global and local natures, the 
challenge is to have a universally valid and yet locally acceptable framework. 
 
7.3.1.3.2. Individualist orientation  
 
Even though the right to identity aims to be a balanced solution (with positive and 
negative elements), at its heart, it retains a strong Western individualist orientation 
                                                 
1413 This presumes that legislators are aware and willing to act on a matter. 
1414 See Ch 2 (2.2) (cross cultural terminological differences in identity) 
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deeply rooted in individual autonomy.1415 This is evident in the manner De Hert 
speaks of “threats to the individual,” “the right to self-determination of the 
individual,” “individual’s claim for freedom in making choices about his or her own 
life,” “reconstruction of one’s identity… is just as we breathe, feel or think.”  
 
Though De Hert acknowledges the relevance of different perspectives to identity, the 
language and rationale for the right seems weighted down in favour of the atomic 
individual or the digital identity subject who seeks at all times to be in control of his 
digital identity. This might lend itself then to the criticism that Marx made of 
individualist rights based approaches: that these were too individualistic, egoistic and 
selfish i.e. an individual with rights was an “isolated nomad…withdrawn behind his 
private interests and whims and separated from the community.”1416 This also does 
not bode well for jurisdictions like India, where society and law does not perceive the 
individual primarily as atomic rather as an individual tied to the collective, be it the 
family, caste, or State and expressing rights primarily in such settings.  
 
Instead, we must not give up on the concept of identity; rather recast it as a relational 
concept. Identity is (also) the sum total of an individual’s relations and connections, 
an approach close to the Indian ‘collectivist’ mentality, and also widely evident in 




                                                 
1415 Of the nature of Dumont’s Homo Aequalis, represented by self-contained, self-interested 
individuals. The analysis in the thesis has highlighted how India’s digital identity subjects do not fit 
into this category, rather fit within the category of Homo Heirarchicus, represented by individuals of 
traditional societies like Indian where “relations between men are more important, more highly 
valued, than the relations between men and things.” Louis Dumont, From Mandeville to Marx: the 
Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago 1977), 5; Louis 
Dumont, Homo Aequalis (Galliamard, Paris 1977); Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus: the Caste 
System and its Implications, (University of Chicago, Chicago 1972); Louis Dumont, Essays on 
Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 1986) 
1416 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question 1844,” in D McLellan (ed), Karl Marx: Selected Writings 
(OUP, Oxford 2000), 46-70;  For similar perspectives, see C Taylor, Philosophy and the Human 
Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (CUP, Cambridge 1985); M Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Perseus, 
NY 1984); A MacIntyre, Against the Self-Images of the Age (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre 
Dame 1978) 
1417 eg, as in Facebook, Bebo, LinkedIn, Friendster, hi5, Orkut. 
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7.3.1.3.3. Negligible stress on duties and responsibilities  
 
De Hert’s right to identity lays little stress on duties and responsibilities. It is not that 
De Hert makes no mention of duties, rather that when he does (in terms of State 
Parties undertaking to respect the right to identity), he fails to acknowledge that 
duties and responsibilities in respect of digital identity are not just limited to that 
high level. In this is further perpetuated what Bobbio called the “great turn of the 
West.”1418 But, what is more relevant and proposed by this thesis is an identity notion 
where the concept of duty is constitutive, and not merely accidental, to identity. 
Identity, in the collective sense, is also achieved by horizontal layers of duty relations 
that go beyond duties of state actors towards individuals to duties between 
individuals.   
 
Duties and responsibilities are incumbent upon every person dealing with digital 
identity and every digital identity subject, not just the State. But the digital identity 
regulatory discourse, as with De Hert’s proposal, has always explicitly and obviously 
focused more in terms of how rights must accrue or be given to individuals, with an 
eerie silence about duties.1419 
 
This is challenging in two respects. First, digital identity problems can be attributed 
to duties in respect of digital identity not being respected. A certain right may exist in 
a digital identity, but unless and until a corresponding duty is performed in respect of 
it, that right has no meaning or significance. For instance, if a digital identity 
provider fails to perform its duty of providing me with a working digital identity, 
then though I may have a right to enjoy my digital identity; it is meaningless if it 
cannot be fulfilled.  
                                                 
1418 Norberto Bobbio, L'Età dei Diritti (Einaudi, Torino 1990), 57. The “great turn of the west” 
occurred when rights as entitlements replaced duties in their primacy. For further discussion see 
Francesco Viola, ‘Personal Identity in the Human Rights Perspective,’ in A Peczenik, MM Karlsson 
(eds), Law, Justice and the State I: Essays on Justice and Rights (Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 
1995), 100-109, 100 
1419 For India, particularly this is problematic given the extreme social and legal importance placed on 
duties. Raimundo Panikkar argues that the Hindu notion of dharma requires that human rights are not 
only the rights of individuals or even humans, and secondly that human rights involve duties and 
relate us to the whole cosmos. R Panikkar, ‘Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept? A 
Hindu/Jain/Buddhist Reflection,’ (1982) 30 Diogenes, 75-102; Also Kana Mitra, ‘Human Rights in 
Hinduism,’(1982) 19 J Ecu Studies 77 
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Second, the right to identity because it does not make significant expression of duties 
might find itself being questioned for relevance by legal collectivist cultures like 
India that demonstrate a higher regard for duties and responsibilities.1420 While the 
right to identity might find deep resonance in legal cultures familiar with rights being 
bold statements of entitlement, other legal cultures would view this approach less 
favourably.1421 They may thus not find much basis for taking it on since duties tend 
to be ranked at higher levels than entitlements1422 and are viewed as highly 
contingent upon one another.1423  
 
7.3.1.3.4. Postpones discussion of the remedial  
 
While the right to identity intends to remedy harm resulting from the abuse of digital 
identity, the remedial element is not explicitly outlined. How is the right to identity 
expected to work in terms of providing an effective remedy in the case that its 
violation is found? 
 
Even Article 8 of the UNCRC (right to identity) includes an explicit remedial 
element. Article 8(2) provides that, “Where a child is illegally deprived of some or 
all of the elements of his or her identity, States Parties shall provide appropriate 
assistance and protection, with a view to speedily re-establishing his or her identity.”  
 
In particular, a decision needs to be made if De Hert’s right to identity is seen as a 
traditional human right that is efficient mainly against the state or the state actors, or 
as something that has direct effects against private parties such as ISPs. The 
argument developed in the previous chapters aims to recast the right to identity, away 
                                                 
1420 HC Triandis, Individualism and Collectivism (Westview Press, Boulder 1995); DA Cai and EL 
Fink, ‘Conflict Style Differences Between Individualists and Collectivists,’ (2002) 69 (1) 
Communication Monographs, 67–87 
1421 Bas Rozemuller, ‘Chinese Assumed Collectivism Revisited: A Study of the Labor Situation in a 
Sino-Western Joint Venture,’ in Heidi Dahles and Harry Wels (eds), Culture, Organization and 
Management in East Asia: Doing Business in China (Nova Science Publishers, NY 2003), 39-84, 50 
1422 See Robert Kreitner, Management (HMH Publishing, Boston 2006), 103 
1423 See SH Nasr, ‘The Concept and Reality of Freedom in Islam and Islamic Civilization,’ in AS 
Rosenbaum (ed) The Philosophy of Human Rights (Greenwood Press, Connecticut 1980), 95-101, 95, 
97; Douglas Hodgson, Individual Duty Within a Human Rights Discourse (Ashgate, Aldershot 2003), 
25-26; John Carman, ‘Duties and Rights in Hindu Society,’ in LS Rouner (ed) Human Rights and the 
World's Religions (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1988), 113-128 
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from a defensive right available against the State only, to a constitutive right against 
everyone, including oneself (the duty aspect again). In this respect too, it is a 
‘collective’ right with similarities to third generation rights, important for countries 
with local conditions similar to India. 
 
7.3.1.3.5. Uncertain future  
 
It remains, however, to be seen whether the right to identity would have the effect 
desired. Going by the success of Article 8 UNCRC in protecting the right to identity, 
the prognosis isn’t good. In the only case reported, Article 8 of the UNCRC was 
refused to be drawn upon in consideration of a child’s right to privacy from media 
photography, in Hosking and Hosking v Runting and Pacific Magazines NZ Ltd1424 
The Court held that “the preservation of identity (Art 8)..” was “directed at serious 
physical and mental abuse of children in situations,” unlike this one. Will De Hert’s 
right to identity have a similar fate? It is highly probable, if implemented in current 
form.  
 
7.3.1.3.6. Application hurdles  
 
The application of the right to identity has not been explored in great detail be De 
Hert. Where will this right fit? How will it be made to work to protect the rights of 
digital identity subjects? De Hert’s approach is to some extent silent on these issues, 
reflecting an approach influenced by the experience of people in the west, where the 
presence of efficient administrative and judicial systems ‘can take care of’ these 
issues further down the line.  
 
7.3.1.3.7. Primarily, a legal solution 
 
Though envisaging the right to identity as a specific legal right, De Hert suggested it 
could be incorporated in the UNESCO’s Code of Ethics for the Information 
                                                 
1424(2005) 1NZLR 1. For commentary and case details see Katrine Evans, ‘Hosking v Runting: 
Balancing Rights in a Privacy Tort,’ [2004] PLPR 28; Katrine Evans, ‘Reverse Gear for NZ's Privacy 
Tort: The Hosking Decision,’ [2003] PLPR 35 
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Society.1425  But, all in all, De Hert’s right to identity, remains for the moment 
limited to a purely legal solution. But, the nature of digital identity makes it highly 
unlikely that a legal solution might be the optimal or most effective solution in all 
cases. The right to identity might be more effective in some cases and less effective 
in others, especially in societies like India where the law and local conditions conflict 
and “there is no widespread positive phenomenon of obedience to law which is 
simply enacted or judicially stated.”1426 In these situations, creation of secondary or 
‘grey’ adjudication methods – a form of regulation by architecture – may after all be 
necessary to supplement legal solutions (here, identity management systems 
discussed in Chapter 4 come to their real strength and prevent a vacuum on 
regulatory protection). 
 
7.4. Conclusion  
 
The examination of the national legal solutions, particularly the Costa Rican right to 
virtual personality, Blackman’s right to digital identity and Sullivan’s right to 
database identity, show that they are rather limited. Most significantly, they make 
assumptions about the universal homogeneity of the digital identity subject and its 
ability to control digital identity. These solutions reflect principles that do not have 
global acceptability.  
 
De Hert’s right to identity is the most promising. Yet, it has several issues: the 
problem of the ipse-idem terminology, an individualist orientation, little stress on 
duties and responsibilities, insufficient emphasis on remedies and application 
hurdles. If these can be worked with, the right to identity might be a stepping stone to 
the next level of identity regulation taking into account the global and local contexts 






                                                 
1425 UNESCO, ‘Code of Ethics for the Information Society,’ (2007) 
<http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/24935/11841676611Code_of_Ethics.pdf/Code%2Bof%2BEthics.
pdf> 
1426 Cruz (1999) n281, 297, 298 
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8. The regulatory future of digital identity: The tri-elemental framework 
 
The tools are now within reach to permit sovereigns with competing rulesets to play 
down their differences whether by countenancing global privatization of some 
Internet governance issues, coming to new international agreements on substance and 
procedure to reduce the friction caused by transborder data flows, or by a “live and 
let live” set of localization technologies to shape the Internet to suit the respective 
societies it touches. 
-Jonathan Zittrain1427 
 
8.1. Introduction  
 
The legal proposals examined in Chapter 7 fall short of presenting a suitable digital 
identity regulatory solution for countries like India that, though subject to 
international influences in digital identity regulation, are conditioned by local 
difference. This chapter aims to remedy this situation. Acknowledging the 
inevitability of the influence of international legal trends, respecting the positive 
elements of De Hert’s proposal for a right to identity and recognising the need to 
account for local difference, this chapter proposes a tri-elemental regulatory 
framework (TeF) for digital identity, based on the concept of dharma. 
 
This framework is particularly addressed at India; the previous chapters (3, 5 and 6) 
reveal there is a pressing need for a terminology in relation to digital identity 
regulatory policy that will provide it legitimacy in the light of both global 
implementation and local difference. This is of particular importance given that 
digital identity regulation in India, as demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6 is in disjoint 
with local realities.1428 
 
8.2. Dharma  
 
Dharma1429 is an innate part of Indian philosophy, and particularly Hinduism (of 
which it is a fundamental concept). Dharma, as old as time and religion itself, is 
embodied with multiple layers of meaning. Its earliest expression is found in the 
                                                 
1427 Zittrain (2003) n43  
1428 See Mary Hiscock, ‘Changing Patterns of Regional Law Making in Asia,’ (1995) 5, Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law, 367–933 
1429 The term dharma is of Sanskrit origin and derives from the root dhr which means to sustain, 
maintain or support. For more detailed analysis of dharma, see Robert Lingat, The Classical Law of 
India (University Presses of California, Columbia and Princeton, 1973) 
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dharmasutras, the ancient Indian authoritative treatises on it.1430 In Hinduism, 
dharma represents,  
ideals and purposes, influences and institutions that shape the character of 
man both as an individual and as a member of society. It is the law of right 
living, the observance of which secures the double object of happiness on 
earth and salvation.1431 For the perfect men, the dharma is an inspiration from 
within; for others it is an external command, what custom and public opinion 
demand.1432   
 
But dharma is not just a religious concept; it is also a secular concept.1433 It has legal 
significance;1434 evident in the conceptualisation of dharma as a “comprehensive 
normative system which seeks to regulate the conduct of man towards all other 
beings and existences so as to preserve and uphold the Universe.”1435  
 
At this point, it must be clarified, as expressed before, that the choice of dharma is 
not an advocation of Hinduism being the ‘right religion’ or because its notions are 
ethically superior to other religions. Rather, the position taken here is a neutral, 
sociological one. The principles of dharma elaborated below are cultural concepts 
common across communities in India and intuitively function as an effective 
communication means to explain certain ideas to people. These are used to inform 
the digital identity regulatory discourse and revitalise it, particularly given the 
analysis of the preceding chapters (ie, 3, 5 and 6). 
 
Dharma can be split into three categories: the right conduct (Sad Achara),1436 
procedure for the enforcement of the right conduct (Vyavahāra) and rituals to make a 
person spiritually, culturally and socially pure (Prayaschitta).1437 This categorisation 
                                                 
1430 The most important are Apastamba, Baudhayana, Gautama and Vasistha. See Patrick Olivelle, 
The Dharmasutras: The Law Codes of Ancient India (OUP, Oxford 2009), xxvi 
1431 S Radhakrishnan, ‘The Hindu Dharma,’ (1922) 33 (1) Intl J Ethics, 1-22, 1-2. Citing Abhyudaya 
and Nihgreyasa. 
1432 Ibid, 4 
1433 SC Banerjee, A Brief History of Dharmasastra (Abhinav Publications, India 1999), 1 
1434 Per CM Lodha, J in Gagan Raj Singh Nagori v Union of India 1979 WLN 634; Justice M Rama 
Jois, Legal and Constitutional History of India Vol I (Universal Law Publishing, India 1984), 1-4 
1435 AD Mathur, Medieval Hindu Law: Historical Evolution and Enlightened Rebellion (OUP, Oxford 
2007), xvii. Dharma is also called the Upanashadic concept of law. See also Shri ASN Deekshitulu v 
State of Andhra Pradesh 1996 AIR 1765 (SC) 
1436 Or ideal behaviour; sometimes transliterated as Sad-ācāra. 
1437 Mathur (2007) n1435, 224 
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is derived from Sage Yājñavalkya’s categorisation of dharmashastra1438 into Achara 
(ritual), Vyavahāra (jurisprudence) and Prayaschitta (reparation), elaborated in the 
Yājñavalkya Smriti.1439 These three categories offer considerable insights into how 
digital identity problems could and might be dealt with and have much to contribute 
to the legal regulatory future of digital identity.  
 
8.2.1. Sad Achara: The right conduct  
 
Sad means good or righteous and Achara means conduct. Aligned together, Sad 
Achara means righteous behaviour or conduct. It is doing the right thing according to 
prescribed or acceptable standards of conduct. The Hari-bhakti Vilasa states that “he 
who does not maintain the standards of conduct is neither noble nor righteous.”1440 
Thus, a person’s adherence or non-adherence to Sad Achara determines their 
character. If a person’s conduct is characterised as Sad Achara, that person is holy, 
noble and virtuous. Dur Achara, or bad or deviant conduct, is the reverse of Sad 
Achara. Sad Achara traditionally manifests in the performance of daily rituals,1441 
sacraments1442 and living life according to the Ashramas.1443 In all that it represents, 
Sad Achara basically entails engaging in the right, acceptable or prescribed conduct.  
 
The ambitions of Sad Achara are reflected in the Ten Commandments in the Old 
Testament,1444 which are prescriptions of right conduct for Jewish and Christian 
believers. In their enunciation, they represent ethical considerations for social life;1445 
“social and moral requirements” of conduct and what is “right and wrong in human 
                                                 
1438 The science of dharma. 
1439 The Yājñavalkya Smriti is one of the most important Smritis (post Manu) comprising of 
approximately 1,010 verses and an important source of Hindu law. Also see M Nath Dutt, 
Yajnavalkyasmrti: Sanskrit Text, English Translation, Notes, Introduction and Index of Verses, 
(Parimal Publications, New Delhi 2005) and P Olivelle, ‘Dharmaśāstra: A Literary History,’ in T 
Lubin and D Davis (eds), Cambridge Handbook of Law and Hinduism (CUP, Cambridge 2010), 28-57 
1440 Hari Bhakti Vilasa, 3, 15-16 
1441 Daily rituals include snana (bathing), japa (prayer, citation of mantras), homa (sacrificial 
offerings) devapuja (worship of God), aathithya (hospitality) and vaisvadev (food offerings to God). 
1442 Sacraments consist of upanayana (sacred thread ceremony), vivaha (marriage) and antyeshthi 
(death ceremonies). 
1443 Ashramas comprise of four life stages: brahmacharya (instructive stage of life), grihastha (the 
householder stage of life), vanaprastha (withdrawal from life and retreat into the forest) and sanyasa 
(renunciation) 
1444 See Deuteronomy, The Bible, Ch 5, verses 6-21. PD Miller, Deuteronomy (John Knox Press: USA 
1990), 71-96. The Islamic equivalent is the Sunnah. 
1445 W Barclay, The Ten Commandments (Westminster John Knox Press, Louisville 1998),  1 
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conduct.”1446 The same is reflected in Sad Achara and Dur Achara. Conduct in 
accordance with the Ten Commandments is Sad Achara and conduct contrary to the 
Ten Commandments is Dur Achara. 
 
However, despite this similarity, there is an important difference. The 
conceptualisation of (religious) duties in the Judeo-Christian tradition is, as 
indicated, as commands. They are an obligation primarily towards a higher authority 
whose commands allow pre-established individuals (as God’s creation) to interact 
with each other. In secular Western philosophy that partly replaced these religious 
terms, the “unencumbered self” that underpins the liberal vision of society predates 
legal order.1447 This translates quite naturally into a picture where free individuals 
interact primarily with a higher level norm-giver, the State, that allocates rights and 
duties through the Constitution and also other primary legislation. It is this norm 
giver towards whom primarily a duty is owed, and who in turn, through law can be 
restricted in the exercise of power.  
 
Sad Achara under dharma is subtly different. Here, the system of obligations is not 
externally imposed on previously free individuals, but constitutes individuals through 
a horizontal system of duties - duties towards others arising from and constituting 
what an individual truly is.  Acting against duties diminishes an individual (by being 
driven by illusions or Maya and thus giving that individual false ideas of what it truly 
is1448) as much as it harms others. The difference is subtle, and allows the Indian 
approach too to be roughly approximated by and where necessary translated into the 
(western) language of legal rights. However, in some contexts this will result in 
equally subtle differences in legal outcomes and emphasis. But it is an approximation 
only, and law, in this picture becomes a “theology of everyday life”1449 revolving 
around the household, family and everyday relationships – the state with its 
institutions and norms is, unlike in the West, not constitutive for these rights and 
duties, but merely facilitative.  
                                                 
1446 JP Hester, The Ten Commandments: A Handbook of Religious, Social and Legal Issues 
(McFarland and Co, North Carolina 2003), 27  
1447 See in particular Michael J Sandel, ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self,’ (Feb 
1984) 12 (1), Political Theory, 81-96 
1448 TVG Sastri, ‘General Concept of Maya and its Applications,’ (1975) 24, J Oriental Inst 343-356 
1449 Davis (2010) n78, 1 
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Digital identity problems can be attributed to a lack or disregard of Sad Achara. The 
unauthorised use or sharing of digital identity, the discriminatory use of digital 
identity, denial of access to digital identity, erasure or obliteration of digital identity 
and digital identity fraud are all examples of Dur Achara. It is because persons 
behave in these discriminatory and unauthorised manners that digital identity 
problems arise.  
 
Sad Achara would therefore necessitate a duty in respect of digital identity.1450 Here 
are some examples. Digital identity subjects have a duty to use their digital identities 
appropriately (generally prescribed in the ToS or EULAs). Digital identity providers 
may incur a duty to ensure that digital identity subjects have accessible use of their 
digital identities and that digital identities are kept secure, up to date and accurate. 
States might be obliged to foster conditions favourable to the enjoyment of digital 
identity and in the case of digital identity breaches or compromises, to provide 
adequate redressal mechanisms.  
 
This duty based element of digital identity, while not entirely ignored, has been an 
underused element in digital identity regulation (see Chapter 7). When duty has been 
a matter of focus, it has been emphasised very broadly and fairly insignificantly. This 
can be attributed in large part to the overt focus, in the digitally advanced West, on 
‘rights’ of the digital identity subject. Compounding this, is how duties are shrouded 
in terms of obligations owed by other stakeholders (like businesses, governments and 
other organisations) to the individual digital identity subject, as explained in the 
diagram below: 
                                                 
1450 The duty element of the proposed right finds substantial grounding in the Indian legal system, both 
ancient and contemporary. Duties had a supremely important place in ancient and medieval India and 
retain their significance in contemporary India. See SP Sharma, Indian Legal System (KMR Mittal, 
Delhi 1991), 21, Justice ES Venkataramiah, Citizenship, Rights and Duties (BV Naga Publishers, 
Bangalore 1988).There has been some movement in the West re-acknowledging the role of duties. See 
David Selbourne, The Principle of Duty: An Essay on the Foundations of the Civic Order (University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1997); Catherine Haire & Michael Manley-Casimir, ‘Restoring ‘Duty’ to the 
Discourse of Rights and Citizenship Education: A Radical Retrenchment?’ Paper presented at the 







Fig 8: Duties as Visualised in Previously Proposed Legal Solutions 
But, in respect of digital identity, Sad Achara is a much more versatile concept that 
encompasses duties on the part of all stakeholders in relation to digital identity - 
whether it is individuals, private entities, organisations or States.  
 
 
Fig 9: Duties per Sad Achara and the TeF  
Every digital identity stakeholder has a duty to another digital identity stakeholder. 
On this basis, 




8.2.2. Vyavahāra: Procedure for enforcement of the right conduct 
 
Vyavahāra was a very important source of ancient Hindu law.1451 It is mentioned 
several times in Indian philosophical literature like the Smritis and commentaries in a 
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 270 
number of senses - as civil law, positive law and legal procedure.1452 Kane’s 
definition puts Vyavahāra into perspective:  
When the ramifications of right conduct, that are together called dharma and 
that can be established with efforts (of various kinds such as truthful speech, 
etc.) have been violated, the dispute (in a court between parties) which 
springs from what is sought to be proved (such as debt), is said to be 
vyavahāra.1453    
 
Sad Achara might not always be maintained in respect of digital identity and digital 
identity conflicts might arise. Then, Vyavahāra becomes important. 
 
Vyavahāra in relation to digital identity supports a procedural framework for the 
resolution of disputes. If digital identity is to be protected and the right conduct is to 
be supported in its existence, application, and enjoyment, then there must be a 
framework (whether legal, technical or policy based) to enable this. 
A digital identity subject must be able to experience digital identity to the best and 
fullest extent possible.1454 But this experience is subject to legal, policy, social and 
technical factors; one, some or all of which might work to promote this end, 
undermine or limit it. It might not always be the case that a duty in respect of digital 
identity is able to be fulfilled. This is another context in which procedure becomes 
very important.  
 
While policy, social and technical procedures are important in resolving and 
alleviating digital identity disputes, law (and legal procedure) must function as the 
definitive safeguard of digital identity. Law must establish or prescribe conditions for 
the enjoyment or curtailment of digital identity. It must set forth, determine and 
apply not just the conditions for the enjoyment of digital identity, but also 
specifically outline the circumstances under which digital identity might be curtailed 
or legitimately interfered with.1455  
 
Vyavahāra thus necessitates that:  
                                                 
1452 Aggarwal (2002) n1451, 58 
1453 PV Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, Vol. 3, (BORI, Pune 1946), 247 
1454 This is one of the aims and purposes of identity management technology and law.  
1455 There will always be occasion for these kinds of situations to arise; however controversial this 
might be, there can never be an absolute right to digital identity. 
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No person shall be deprived of digital identity except according to 
procedure established [prescribed]1456 by law 
 
While this statement seems innocent enough, it encapsulates the most radical (and 
arguably most controversial) aspect of the recasting of the right to identity from an 
individual right to a bundle of duties. First, it creates a burden on the state vis-a-vis 
the citizen. Where the government, under the agenda of economic progress or for 
reasons of security, creates channels of communication with its citizens that require a 
digital identity (from e-government initiatives to biometric passports), it creates a 
burden to provide for the efficient and substantial, not just formal, opportunity for all 
citizens to engage with the State in this way. At the very least, this creates a 
substantial and enforceable ‘due process’ burden when for instance an application for 
a biometric passport is rejected or a digital identity subject is refused access to a 
government run digital platform. 
 
As with the death penalty, mere technical or minor violations of duties by the citizen 
will not normally be sufficient to warrant termination of an identity, especially when 
under the socio-economic realities, the citizen had little choice but to technically 
violate one of these rules (e.g., registers for a government service with a “borrowed” 
ID from a shared email account, or if in the rural community the only access to the 
net is through such informally shared facilities).1457 It also creates a burden on the 
state to provide an appropriate infrastructure, which could entail free email or online 
accounts for citizens otherwise excluded from such services – in line for example 
with the legal requirement, discussed in the UK, to provide minimum banking 
facilities and accounts for poor citizens through the post office, or as a legal duty on 
ISPs. It is acknowledged though that this type of “economic right” as with all third 
generation rights, poses unique difficulties for actual enforcement. 
 
While this type of duty on the state is closest to the way in which de Hert and others 
discuss a right to identity,1458 our framework of a system of vertical and horizontal 
duties does not stop here. The duty also encompasses horizontally the relation 
                                                 
1456 Some jurisdictions like the UK show preference for this term.   
1457 See Ch 6 (6.3.2), case study on Sharing. 
1458 See Ch 7 
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between the digital identity provider, e.g. an ISP and the user. At the every least, it 
requires transparent and fair due process procedures before a digital identity is 
terminated. In addition, as above, not every technical violation of contractual terms 
will normally permit such a termination, even though the demands will be lower than 
in the case of state action, expressing the importance of the reciprocal duties or Sad 
Achara of the user towards the identity provider.  
 
Unlike the Western model with its emphasis on individual autonomy, this protective 
regime cannot always be waived through contractual agreement. Not any more than 
in the offline world can the arbitrary termination or violation of digital identity be 
consented to. This paternalistic approach, which in the context of Western law 
corresponds to a very strong ‘good faith’ interpretation of contractual terms, reflects 
again the different socio-economic realities. There are power differentials between 
identity providers and users, both in terms of the economic ability to defend 
themselves against unfair termination or find feasible alternative providers, and in 
terms of their education and understanding of the legal implications of the contract. 
 
Finally, the protection of identity also accrues to an individual against other 
individuals. We have mentioned several times the social practice of sharing digital 
identities, e.g. through joint use of scare resources like mobile phones.1459 Vyavahāra 
in this case can also create duties on the lender which the law ought to recognize, at 
least in parts. This can entail a requirement to give ‘fair warning’ when such a 
facility is withdrawn, grace periods and other help to permit the person affected to 
migrate his established digital identity to another system etc.  The closest Western 
translation of this idea is the concept of reliance liability when a reasonable 
expectation of continuous use was created on which a person relied. In this case, it 
would operate within a ‘gift relation’, an idea that may be more acceptable to lawyers 
from civilian jurisdictions who think of gifts as contracts that can also create duties 
on the donor, but may be more difficult to communicate to lawyers from the common 
law tradition where contracts require consideration to impose reciprocal duties.  
 
                                                 
1459 Ch 3 (3.2.1.4) 
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8.2.3. Prayaschitta: Reparation  
 
Prayaschitta is the third essential aspect of dharma. The Bhagwadgita alludes to the 
importance of prayaschitta in Chapter 18(5), which states that “Acts of sacrifice, 
charity and penance are not to be given up; they must be performed. Indeed, 
sacrifice, charity and penance purify even the great souls.”1460 Prayaschitta means 
atonement, reparation or expiation for sin (pap) and includes any measures taken to 
make a person pure.  A person who commits any form of wrongdoing must make 
amends in respect of that wrongdoing. Prayaschitta removes and alleviates the 
effects of the wrongdoing. Prayaschitta has two elements: prayas meaning penance 
and chitta meaning knowledge. Thus prayaschitta means “penance performed with 
the knowledge of wiping off sin.”1461 The Dharmashastras visualise various 
categories of sin or wrongdoing and different expiatory rites to deal with these.1462 
They also acknowledge that mitigating circumstances may affect the nature of the 
penance. 
 
The concept of Prayaschitta has legal significance. This is supported by two factors: 
first, its inclusion as an element of law in the ancient Hindu legal texts and second, 
its use and citation in Indian case law. Prayaschitta features as a crucial element of 
law in a number of ancient India legal texts like the Manu Smriti1463 and the 
Mitakhsara1464 (Prayaschitta Adhayaya). Prayaschitta has been referred to in Indian 
legal cases like Parami Ramayya v Mahadevi Shankarappa,1465 Govind Das v 
Bishambhar Das,1466 Vaman Deshpande v Krishnaji Kulkarni,1467 Bai Gulab v 
Jivanlal Harilal,1468 Bhikubai Meher v Hariba Meher,1469 SK Wodeyar v Ganapati 
                                                 
1460 Available online at <http://www.bhagavad-gita.us> 
1461 SC Banerji, A Brief History of Dharmasastra (Abhinav Publications, Delhi 1999), 90 
1462 DC Bhattacharya, ‘Penances and Vows,’ in CPR Aiyar (ed), Itihasas, Puranas, Dharma and 
Other Sastras: The Cultural Heritage of India Vol II, (RMIC, Calcutta 2003), 381-389 
1463 The most ancient and authoritative Hindu smriti. Here, prayaschitta echoes incessantly as a means 
of making amends and source of purification. 
1464 An influential Hindu legal treatise by Vijñāneśvara which is largely a commentary on the 
Yājñavalkya Smriti. 
1465 (1910) 12 BOMLR 196 
1466 (1917) ILR 39 All 561 
1467 (1919) 21 BOMLR 427 
1468 (1922) 24 BOMLR 5 
1469 (1925) 27 BOMLR 13 
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Dixit,1470 Goona Durgaprasada Rao v Goona Sudarsanaswami,1471 Gagan Raj Singh 
Nagori v Union of India1472 and Maruti Shripati Dubal v State of Maharashtra.1473 
 
In respect of digital identity, prayaschitta contributes two things. First, it links the 
abstract duties described above to a system of remedies similar to the remedies 
available under contract and tort (delict) law. When there is a duty (legal or 
otherwise) to respect a digital identity and that duty is not performed or is breached, 
the person responsible for discharging that duty must make suitable amends to the 
person who has been harmed as a result of the non-performance or breach of that 
duty. Let’s take an illustration. Personal data is stolen from the National Identity 
Database and used to the disadvantage of the data subjects causing them financial 
and emotional harm. It is found that there was an internal breach in the maintenance 
of the security of the National Identity Database. The organisation in charge of 
maintaining the database security is found to be negligent. It thus has to make good 
the harm caused to the data subjects. This is prayaschitta.  
 
Thus, prayaschitta necessitates that a digital identity subject deprived of its digital 
identity must be restored to the use of that digital identity, where possible. If 
restoration is frustrated, then other compensatory measures must be taken. Whoever 
is responsible for depriving the digital identity subject of their digital identity shall be 
liable to make amends in respect of that digital identity.  
 
So far, the approach stays within the well known conceptual territory of contract and 
tort law. It ensures that a right to digital identity is not an abstraction, but has real and 
tangible consequences. As seen in chapters 2 and 3, digital identity is a multifaceted 
phenomenon. Furthermore, the ignorance of the legal regulatory framework is one of 
the main reasons why the protection of digital identity and related rights such as 
privacy in real life, as opposed to abstract legal protection ‘in books,’ often lacks on 
the ground.  
                                                 
1470 (1935) 37 BOMLR 584 
1471 (1940) 1 MLJ 800 (Chennai) 
1472 1979 WLN 634 
1473 1987 (1) BomCR 499 
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A legal approach that is equally fragmented and creates new statutory remedies for 
each of the often very technical and technology specific expressions of digital 
identity, or laboriously derives them through analogous application of common law 
cases, would exacerbate this problem. Legislating for a population where access to 
digital resources remains a challenge makes this prohibitive. Instead, prayaschitta 
functions here similarly to the general clause of delict law in the German Civil Code 
that creates a bundle of non-specific remedies under the catch all provision of a 
violation of ‘every other right’ in Article 823.1474 Similarly here, prayaschitta would 
make any violation of someone’s digital identity directly actionable, independent of 
the specific nature of the digital identity in question, or how or by whom it was 
violated. This uniform approach ensures that once an individual understands the 
relevant reciprocal duties in the first and second elements of the TeF, an 
understanding that there is also a remedy available follows immediately.  By 
ensuring that the framework itself is firmly rooted in culturally mediated 
understandings of digital identity, knowledge of available remedies becomes a non-
issue. 
 
Potentially though, prayaschitta can go further than this idea of direct actionable 
protection against violations of digital identity. So far, the general framework is still 
beholden to the Western concept of adversarial litigation that pits one right holder 
against the other. If my right to digital identity is violated by another person, I can 
sue him for appropriate relief. This adversarial approach that reduces a conflict to a 
private issue between two actors only is maybe the most important organising 
principle of Western private law - what Weinrib calls the bi-polar nature of the 
concept of private law.1475  It excludes systematically the interests of the wider 
community from disputes between private parties, negates the values of distributive 
justice and requires an aggressive attitude towards the infringer of rights. 
 
                                                 
1474 See BS Markesinis, Hannes Unberath, The German Law of Torts: A Comparative Treatise (Hart, 
Oregan 2000), ch 2; Also PR Handford, ‘Moral Damage in Germany,’ (1978) 27, ICLQ, 849-875. For 
the relation to privacy see B Markesinis, ‘Privacy, Freedom of Expression and the Horizontal Effect 
of the Human Rights Bill: Lessons From Germany,Wilberforce Lecture 1998, (1999) 115 LQR, 45-
88, 47  
1475 Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (HUP, 1995), 22 
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It is well known that the litigatious culture that this approach fosters is of limited 
suitability for Asian countries, where the communal approach means that even if a 
party wins in this kind of conflict, loss of face and social stigma may outweigh any 
financial compensation. As a result, the under-enforcement of rights is a persistent 
feature of Asian cultures that transplanted a Western approach to private law.1476  
 
At the same time, aggressive enforcement of rights by powerful legal entities such as 
ISP’s against users, even if they are remiss in their duties, can create disproportionate 
hardship (and bad publicity for the ISP). The concept of prayaschitta may have the 
potential to address this deficit to a degree. In addition of its translation and role as 
‘remedy,’ it also carries the connotation of ‘penance’. It is not something done 
necessarily exclusively to the benefit of the wronged party, it is also a public act of 
‘cleansing one’s soul’ by appropriate actions of contrition. These may also benefit 
parties other than those directly wronged, for instance through public giving to 
charity. While this notion can’t be developed in full here, its conceptual potential 
should nonetheless be noted. 
 
It may well be the case that the law should take cognisance of relevant and 
appropriate acts of ‘penance’ performed by a perpetrator before litigation even 
commences, even where the beneficiary is someone else than the person wronged. 
Such acts of contrition were, in traditional Hindu law, considered as a mitigating 
factor when the King imposed punishment for wrongdoing,1477 and in the same way 
could be considered as a mitigating factor in civil litigation - or as a form of punitive 
damage even, that goes beyond restoration of the status quo. This possible Janus face 
of prayaschitta is particularly suitable for a society with huge economic and digital 
inequalities.  
                                                 
1476See eg, Marc Galanter, ‘India's Tort Deficit: Sketch for a Historical Portrait,’ in DM Engel, MW 
McCann (eds), In Fault Lines: Tort law as Cultural Practice (SUP, Stanford 2009), 47-65; Ananyo 
Basu, ‘Torts in India: Dharmic Resignation, Colonial Subjugation, or “Underdevelopment”?’ The 
South Atlantic Quarterly, (Fall 2001), 100 (4), 1053-1070. For other Asian cultures see eg, VH Li, 
Law without Lawyers: A Comparative View of Law in China and the United States (Westview, 1978) 
1477 PV Kane, History of Dharmasastra: Ancient and Medieval Religious and Civil Law in India Vol 4 
(BORI, Pune 1962-1975). This is the most comprehensive and authoritative treatise on the concept. 
For the specific issue and the relation between penance and state sanction see Vol 4, 12 
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In this way, the violation of duty by an impoverished individual (think again of 
unlicensed sharing) may be appropriately remedied by an act of penance towards a 
third party (e.g., an charity nominated by the ISP), while a violation of a user’s right 
to identity by a powerful and rich corporation may attract in addition to the remedial 
element of prayaschitta, a punitive ‘malus’ for the benefit of the wider community. 
In both cases, litigation ceases being a conflict between two private parties locked 
adversely and becomes a process of wider social healing. Not by coincidence, this 
notion aligns with more recent attempts in the West to offer alternative forms of 
dispute resolution that are based on a notion of restorative rather than punitive 
sanctions.1478  
 
In this light,  
Appropriate and effective remedies shall be available to all digital 
identity stakeholders affected by actions against digital identity. 
 
Therefore, a TeF for digital identity (comprising of three elements of right conduct, 
procedure for enforcement of the right conduct and remedy) is proposed to guide and 
constructively encourage the future regulation of digital identity. 
 
This TeF reiterates the importance of identity, because, contrary to Gutwirth’s 
comments about identity being an absurdity,1479 its importance cannot be dismissed, 
particularly given technological identity centricism and dependence; even though 
identity may not have all the solutions to the problems of the technological age. 
 
But it is worthwhile to ask how the elements of the TeF relate to the existing Indian 
legal framework.  
 
The first element, the duty, finds excellent grounding in the Indian legal system, both 
ancient and contemporary, and particularly in the Indian Constitution. The Indian 
                                                 
1478 Cao Pei, ‘The Origins of Mediation in Traditional China,’ (1999) 54 Disp Res J, 32 
1479 n1402 
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Constitution incorporates a chapter1480 on duties for citizens called Fundamental 
Duties, which though not justiciable like fundamental rights, have equal 
importance1481 and obligate people to “develop a scientific temper and humanism,” 
and “strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so 
that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievements.”1482    
 
Even though the section on fundamental duties was only inserted into the 
Constitution in 1976, the debates of the Constituent Assembly in 1949 addressed the 
nature of the relationship between rights and duties in the Indian context: that every 
right implied and included a duty, that these went hand in hand and were two sides of 
the same coin - the obverse and the reverse.1483  The importance of duties was further 
reiterated in landmark cases like MC Mehta v Union of India & Others,1484 Union of 
India v Naveen Jindal & Anr,1485 Dr. PR Ramanujam v Indira Gandhi National Open 
University1486 and Rameshkumar Sumersingh Barolia v Commandant.1487 
 
The second element of the framework, is a negative obligation, that no person shall 
be deprived of digital identity except according to procedure established (or 
prescribed) by law mirrors the text of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution 
(protection of life and personal liberty), on the right to life, which of all the rights is 
the most basic and deep seated and dynamic. It states that no person shall be 
                                                 
1480 Chapter IV-A, Art 51-A (a-j) inserted into the Constitution by the Constitution (Forty-Second) 
Amendment Act 1976,  s 11 (w.e.f 03/01/1977); and (k) inserted by the Constitution (Eighty sixth) 
Amendment Act 2002, s 4  
1481Justice ES Venkataramiah, ‘Citizenship Rights and Duties,’ CILQ, (18 August 2009), 
<http://indiankanoon.org/cached/1796518/> 
1482 AIIMS Students' Union v AIMS, SC CA 7366 of 1996 
1483 Constituent Assembly Debate on the Government of India Act (Amendment) Bill, 25 November, 
1949. See <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1473869/> 
1484 1988 AIR 1115 
1485 SC CA 2920 of 1996 (every right is coupled with a duty) 
1486 Delhi High Court, Judgment of 25/9/2006, <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/355555/> 
1487 Gujarat High Court, SRP, 10 February 1999 <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1566221/. Duties and 
rights are “two facets of the same coin.” 
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deprived1488 of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established 
by law.1489 
 
The third element, appropriate and effective remedy, is a basic element of law 
(constitutional or otherwise). Remedies for violation of fundamental rights are 
enshrined in Articles 32 and 226 (writ issuing powers) of the Indian Constitution.  
 
Thus, the elements of the TeF have good basis under core Indian law. 
 
 
Next, one must note the paradox presented before us – in terms of the high standards 
suggested here and those characteristic of the Indian system described in Chapters 5 
and 6. The law regulating digital identity in India is particularly influenced in its 
spirit and letter by external norms due to its borrowed nature. Though it overtly 
seems to regulate digital identity in theory, in practice there are also adverse effects, 
such that the Indian digital identity subject is at a disadvantage as compared to its 
Western (particularly European) counterpart. The high standards,1490 presented here 
in the TeF, are a reminder and call to the Indian State (the legislature, judiciary and 
executive) to re-work and adapt its regulatory perspective more holistically taking 
into account the local conditions of digital identity subjects and simultaneously the 
global nature of digital identity. 
 
8.3. Evaluation of the TeF 
 
The TeF represents a significant step forward for the regulatory future of digital 
identity. However, this attempt (at presenting a solution inspired by Indian religion 
and law) does not in any manner claim the ethical or religious superiority of a 
particular religion or jurisdiction over others; it simply uses a concept that is 
                                                 
1488 For the scope and an illustration of what constitutes deprivation see: Francis Coralie Mullin v The 
Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Ors; Olga Tellis & Ors v Bombay Municipal Corporation 
1986 AIR 180, 1985 SCR Supl. (2) 51; Maneka Gandhi n734 
1489 ‘Procedure established by law’ was adopted from Article 31 of the Japanese Constitution. For 
intrepretation see  AK Gopalan v The State of Madras 1950 SCR 88; Maneka Gandhi n734; MH 
Hoskot v State of Maharashtra AIR 1978 SC 1548; Francis Coralie Mullin v the Administrator, UT of 
Delhi and others [1981] 2 SCR 516; Olga Tellis n1488 
1490 These high standards are in accord with the life and culture of the Indian digital identity subject as 
revealed in Chs 3, 5 and 6, particularly the norms that reveal that the individual is not considered as 
compared to the West, the ‘final end of existence.’ 
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instantaneously intelligible across Indian (given its internal cultural fragmentation) 
and other international communities to advance the future regulation of digital 
identity. 
 
This section outlines the value added the TeF brings to the regulation of digital 
identity. 
 
8.3.1. Participatory  
 
The previous rights based solutions1491 proposed for regulating digital identity fell 
short in respect of the participatory element. The solutions did not adequately or 
equally involve the digital identity stakeholders in terms of making them realise their 
contribution in performing their mutual duties. If all stakeholders are made aware of 
this and act upon this then they would become more drawn into the process of the 
regulation of digital identity. This is what the TeF seeks to promote. It acknowledges 
the positive and active role of all digital identity stakeholders and calls for their 
galvanising together, particularly through the first element – the duty of all persons 
towards each other in respect of digital identity. 
 
8.3.2. Holistic  
 
The TeF represents a complementary combination of elements in the regulatory 
context: duty, procedure and remedy. If a duty is evident, then there must be 
procedure to enforce it; if a violation is found, there must be an effective remedy. 
The combination of elements makes the framework highly relevant and applicatory.  
 
For instance, an identity provider has a general duty to provide a digital identity 
subject with reasonable access to its digital identity. If the digital identity subject 
cannot access its digital identity, it must be able to complain to the identity provider 
and get the identity provider to take such actions as would restore access. If the 
digital identity subject cannot have access to its original identity, then alternative 
                                                 
1491 Outlined in Ch 7 
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identity and access arrangements must be made by the identity provider. This 
solution is already evident in the manner how usernames and passwords work. 
8.3.3. Balanced  
 
Balance is one of the under-focussed elements in the digital identity discourse.1492 
The new TeF would achieve the delicate and controversial balancing of different 
digital identity stakeholder interests. It does not, like previous approaches, seek to 
place one digital identity stakeholder in priority over another. For instance, the TeF 
does not promote that an individual is entitled to absolute digital identity rights, as 
Sullivan does.1493 In reality, there are very few absolute rights,1494 all of which are 
only available to human persons. 1495 It is highly unlikely a right to identity would be 
accepted and achieve its full potential as an absolute right against which no 
limitations or derogations apply.1496  
 
Any right to digital identity, unlike as presumed before, does not operate in isolation 
to social,1497 technical1498 and legal1499 contexts. Digital identity stakeholders and 
subjects in particular, come from different social and legal jurisdictions. The TeF 
recognises this and aims to achieve the best balance in these settings. 
 
8.3.4. Dynamic  
 
The TeF, in addition to being legally relevant, is also of significance to the policy 
and technical aspects of digital identity. The framework could be used to guide 
digital identity policy. For example, in developing ToS and EULAs. These 
                                                 
1492 Recognised by De Hert.  
1493 A highly utopian vision.  
1494 An absolute right is defined as a “right set out in the European Convention on Human Rights that 
cannot lawfully be interfered with, no matter how important the public interest in doing so might be,” 
Oxford Dictionary of Law (OUP, Oxford 2009), 3. Absolute rights under the ECHR include: 
prohibition on torture (Art 3), prohibition on slavery and forced labour (Art 4) and right to fair trial 
(Art 6). It has been contended that there is no such thing as absolute rights, see discussion in Alan 
Gewirth, ‘Are There Any Absolute Rights?’ (1981) 31 (122) The Philosophical Quarterly, 1-16 
1495 But a digital identity subject is not always a human being. For instance, AI agents, robots, other 
non-human legal persons.  
1496 This is because digital identity is still evolving in its relationship with the person. There is also a 
difference, as seen in Chs 2 & 3 of the importance of digital identity to the individual in different 
jurisdictions. 
1497 Ch 3 
1498 Ch 4 
1499 Chs 5, 6 & 7 
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agreements incorporate strong terms of conduct, prohibitions and procedure and 
consequences for non-compliance. They weigh heavily in favour of the drafter of the 
agreement (e.g. the identity service provider). These agreements could learn from the 
TeF. Agreements could be made more balanced (in terms of incorporating duties and 
rights for both parties as well as appropriate and effective remedies in the event that 
either party to the agreement violates the same.) 
 
The framework could also be used as a technical principle like the Laws of Identity. 
Technologists could build systems grounded on the elements of the framework. 
Systems might thus aim to facilitate the right conduct (Sad Achara), ensure that all 
actions in respect of digital identity have legal basis (Vyavahāra) and if digital 
identity is harmed or affected, make available appropriate and effective remedies 
(Prayaschitta). 
 
8.3.5. Evaluatory mechanism 
 
The framework could be used a guide in implementing laws and regulations 
concerning digital identity, and to evaluate existing laws and regulations concerning 
digital identity. In this respect, the framework could function as a macro or micro 
level tool. At the macro level, it could help evaluate the overall efficacy of the law 
and at the micro level, individual provisions of legislation. If the law, at the macro or 
micro level is found to be deficient, then measures could be taken to increase 
efficiency. In similar manner, it could be used as a digital identity policy evaluatory 
tool or a technical evaluatory guide.  
 
8.3.6. Universally relevant  
 
One of the key challenges for the regulatory future of digital identity is to find a 
solution with universal appeal and simultaneous local relevance. Earlier in the thesis, 
it was evidenced that though digital identity and identity management are global 
phenomena,1500 the legal regulation1501 and local conditionality1502 of digital identity 
are not.  
                                                 
1500 Chs 2 & 4 
1501 Chs 5 & 6 
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The TeF is more globally relevant that any other solution. Its three elements are 
recognised, in some form or the other, in most legal systems of the world,1503 albeit 
to different degrees depending on the contexts (which is not necessarily a 
debilitating, but rather positive feature). Though it finds inspiration in dharma, its 
elements find basis in most law and have universal significance. 
 
Its departure from the accepted position of ‘individual as the holder of a definite 
right,’ the TeF (with a collective, collaborative dimension) is well suited to societies 
and legal cultures that do not subscribe to this principle,1504 and yet which are key 
players in the regulatory future of digital identity. Each digital identity subject must 
perform their duty to respect digital identity, whatever the digital identity context. 
There is to be no denial of the right except through well established legal procedure 
and recourse to remedy in cases of digital identity abuses. This is something that has 
universal validity and concurrent local applicability. 
 
8.3.7. Resource based solution 
 
One of the key factors highlighted in Chapter 3 was local difference in terms of how 
the state of digital identity technologies between countries differed.1505 This affects 
the experience and must be taken into account in the regulation of digital identity. 
The TeF in presenting itself thus, is versatile enough to be adopted either as a 
legal,1506 technical or policy measure; whichever best suits local conditions and 
priorities.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
1502 Ch 3 
1503 English Common Law recognises duties, legal process and remedy. See Sir William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol I (Collins, NY 1832), 60, 88, 176, 394. Islamic law 
recognises the place of duty of the right conduct to God and man, adherence to prescribed religious 
tenets equal to law, and reparation in the form of punishment. See RM Savory, ‘Law and Traditional 
Society,’ in RM Savory (ed) Introduction to Islamic Civilisation (CUP, Cambridge 1976), 54 
1504 Note for example in India and particularly Hindu thought, that rights are not seen in terms of 
individual powers. See A Sharma, Hinduism and Human Rights: A Conceptual Approach (OUP, New 
Delhi 2004), 14, 19, 32, 34. Sharma states, “Hinduism tends to accord greater recognition to the rights 
others have in relation to us as compared to the rights we have in relation to them.”  
1505 See Ch 3 (3.2.1) 
1506 The translation of the TeF into a legal right is a prospect for building on the work in this thesis, 
particularly in the Indian context. 
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8.3.8. Anchored in the Volksgeist 
 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the TeF is its ability to accord with the 
Volksgeist.1507 While representing itself a solution capable of universal application, 
in the Indian context, in its grounding in dharma, enables it to have cultural meaning 
and validity. Thus it aims to rectify the problems identified in Chapter 6, in 
according with the legal mentalité, and being directly a product of Indian people, 
their culture and daily lives. For the first time, Indian digital identity could be 
regulated through a locally matched solution that could lead to improved compliance 
and efficacy.   
 
8.4. Conclusion  
 
This chapter makes a significant contribution to the discourse on the regulation of 
digital identity, taking into account global implementation and local difference. The 
proposed holistic framework for the regulation of digital identity brings together a 
critical trinity of elements that represents a useful way forward for the future 
regulation of digital identity. As proposed, the framework is dynamic enough to fit 
the Indian1508 and international contexts in different manners demonstrating its 









                                                 
1507 See Ch 1 (1.3) and Ch 6 (6.4) 
1508 The thesis has identified in Chs 5 & 6 a glaring gap particularly in terms of the explicit expression 
of the protection of a digital identity subject’s rights in India, though there are a few sectoral legal 
provisions that limitedly promote that effect. A right to identity based on the TeF could fill that gap. It 
could be incorporated in toto into the Indian Constitution or it could be used as a vital and dynamic 
guiding principle in the implementation of digital identity law. This would not only make all digital 






This thesis focussed on determining how the legal regulation of digital identity could 
mirror the global nature of digital identity and simultaneously be compatible with 
national local difference.  
 
To this end, the thesis first extensively examined the concept of digital identity.1509 
Here, it was determined that digital identity is a complex concept encompassing a 
range of forms and features, all sharing multiple subjective relationships with the 
individual.  
 
Then, it analysed how local difference1510 (which had thus far been sidelined in the 
digital identity regulatory discourse) affects digital identity using the UK and India 
as key jurisdictions in respect of the state of digital technologies and culture. Vast 
differences are evident between the UK and India in relation to the operating 
conditions, penetration, access and use of digital identity. Vast differences are also 
evident in how culture (i.e. attitudes, social values, norms and practices) impacts and 
affects digital identity. Culture influences how individuals relate to, express, use and 
protect their digital identities. This was established in the contexts like privacy, 
information sharing, communal use of personal information, authentication and 
verification, openness and transparency, anonymity and pseudonymity. 
 
The thesis reviewed digital identity management,1511 the industry self-regulatory 
solution for the creation, control and management of digital identities, which is 
globally marketed as a means of enabling digital identity subjects control their digital 
identities. Digital identity management emerges as a limited and incomplete tool for 
controlling digital identity. Additionally, in its core Western influences, assumptions 
and nature of development, it fails to account for the place of local difference. 
 
                                                 
1509 Ch 2 
1510 Ch 3 
1511 Ch 4 
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Subsequently the thesis turned to the law. 1512  A comprehensive and contemporary 
comparative study of the law regulating digital identities in the UK and India was 
carried out. This substantiated that digital identity occupies diverse regulatory 
spaces. More vitally, this chapter provides evidence of how digital identity regulation 
in the UK and India shares both similarities and differences. (Recall, at the outset, 
vast differences were expected to emerge given the dissimilar nature of the two 
jurisdictions).  
 
Specially designed case studies1513 analysed the application of the law regulating 
digital identity in greater detail in relation to key digital identity aspects like privacy, 
sharing, reputation, anonymity, pseudonymity, access to Internet resources and 
control of personal data. These explicitly illustrate how difference manifests in the 
regulation of digital identity. Digital identity subjects in UK and India were shown to 
be on unequal footing in regards to the protection of their digital identity.1514 The 
case studies also highlight the mismatch of digital identity law, local conditions and 
the Volksgeist in India. 
 
Next the thesis, examined key national and international legal solutions proposed in 
respect of digital identity.1515 The national legal proposals (Costa Rican right to 
virtual personality,1516 Blackman’s right to digital identity1517 and Sullivan’s right to 
database identity)1518 were limited in scope and made problematic assumptions about 
the universality of the digital identity subject and its ability to control digital identity; 
something that the thesis has proved does not have global veracity.1519 Thus they do 
not provide good models for regulation of digital identity in jurisdictions like India. 
                                                 
1512 Ch 5 
1513 Ch 6 
1514 Here, the TeF can be used as a focal point of reference to expand consciousness of the role, duties 
and rights of digital identity stakeholders. The TeF can be used to facilitate the protection of the 
digital identity subject, give it explicit need based rights in and to its digital identity. 
1515 Ch 7 
1516 Ch 7 (7.2.1) 
1517 Ch 7 (7.2.2) 
1518 Ch 7 (7.2.3) 
1519 Nearly all of the legal solutions proposed are highly centred on the concept of the autonomous and 
private digital identity subject, who chooses, is able and willing to control its digital identity. They 
also presume that digital identity is privately zoned. They thus, fall short of proving to be useful to 
countries like India, due to their inflexibility in this respect.  
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Only De Hert’s right to identity was found most appropriate in the context of the 
global implementation of digital identity and local difference. 
 
In the final part,1520 the thesis proposed the TeF as the solution to the central question 
of the thesis i.e. how the legal regulation of digital identity could mirror the global 
nature of digital identity and simultaneously be compatible with local difference. The 
TeF, recognising both the inevitability of international influences in the legal 
regulation of digital identity and the place of local difference, provides the answer. 
Finally, here is a solution that is internationally viable; grounded in local difference 
and particularly in the context of India, in its Volksgeist.  
 
9.1. Broader significance  
 
The broader significance of the thesis lies in three major respects: local embedding of 
law; significance of the TeF as a cultural communications framework and its 
international relevance. 
 
9.1.1. Local Embedding of Law  
 
While the law must take cognisance of international obligations in a globalised and 
interconnected world,1521 it must also recognise that its relevance and impact lies at 
the core grassroots, local level. The law must, to be effectual, have local acceptance 
and validity. It must reflect inclusivity and integration of all digital identity 
stakeholders.1522 This acceptance and validity comes more easily when law 
(whatever its origin) is grounded in the local. Law, that is a reflection of cultural and 
moral values of a community, is better received. In the digital identity context, this is 
particularly relevant because identity has a locally “constructed, relative and 
contingent character,”1523 and digital identity is subject to local difference. 
                                                 
1520 Ch 8 
1521 A key feature of which is permanence of nature. See AK Sahoo, Sociological Perspectives on 
Globalisation (Kalpaz, Delhi 2006), 238 
1522 It has been argued that law that has customary basis tends to have greater inclusivity. T Hanstad, 
RL Prosterman and R Mitchell, ‘Poverty, Law and Land Tenure Reform,’ in RL Prosterman, R 
Mitchell, T Hanstad (eds), One Billion Rising: Law, Land and the Alleviation of Global Poverty 
(Leiden University Press, Dordrecht 2009), 17- 56, 27 
1523 Jiri Priban, Legal Symbolism: On Law, Time and European Identity (Ashgate, Aldershot 2007), xi 
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This thesis is a call for greater recognition of the need to balance the reception of law 
in a legal community with a local tempering that makes the law effective and enables 
it to meet local needs. As stated, “there must be maintained a delicate and 
continuously adjusted equilibrium between law and cultural values of society, the 
one not lagging too far behind the other.”1524 This is one lesson India in particular 
would do well to take on board.  
 
9.1.2. TeF as a Cultural Communications Framework  
 
In its core, the TeF represents a vital conceptual framework that is rooted in the 
culture, history and spirit of the Indian people. It has great potential to be used by the 
Indian State to ground digital regulatory policy, revitalise it1525 and provide it 
legitimacy in the light of local difference. Though several calls have been made for 
the localisation of digital law,1526 the TeF is the first attempt to provide the 
terminology for this purpose. This is vital in the Indian context because though much 
of Indian law is a “hybrid conglomerate,”1527 it is well accepted and evident that 
indigenous principles of law tend to find greater receptivity, acceptance and 
respect.1528  
 
In this case the TeF could function as the swadeshi1529 element in digital identity 
regulation. It could be employed by the Indian State to generate increased respect for 
official digital policies in a language that Indian digital identity subjects are familiar 
                                                 
1524 MC Setalvad, ‘Culture and Law,’ in Raj Kumar (ed) Essays on Legal Systems in India (Discovery 
Publishing House, New Delhi 2003), 73-97, 80 
1525 JDM Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India (OUP, Oxford 1999) 
1526 See S Akhtar and P Arinto (eds), Digital Review of Asia Pacific 2009-2010 (Sage Publications, 
Delhi 2007), 277 
1527 Menski (2006) n42, 264 
1528 Menski (2006) n42, 265. Note also the comments of Kelly and Jones that “just as culturally 
inappropriate graphics, layout, design and rhetoric can confuse and repel target audiences, so can 
culturally inappropriate legal gaffes.” Kendall Kelly and Jennifer Jones, ‘Websites and the Law: An 
Avenue for Localization,’ in Kirk St Amant (ed), Linguistic and Cultural Online Communication 
Issues in the Global Age (IGI Global, Hershey 2007), 202-211, 211 
1529 Meaning indigenous or home-grown. The Swadeshi Movement was popularised by MK Gandhi in 
the 1930’s and still has contemporary relevance. See AT Hingorani (ed) The Gospel of Swadeshi by 
MK Gandhi (BVB, Mumbai 1967); V Sankaran Nair, Swadeshi Movement (Mittal Publishers, Delhi 
1985). See also comments of Justice Krishna Iyer who calls for greater regard for “own legal 
ancestry.” Justice VR Krishna Iyer, The Indian Law: Dynamic Dimensions of the Abstract (Universal 
Law Publishing, Delhi 2009), 10 
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with. This would lead to an increased affiliation to the law for digital identity 
stakeholders and for the Indian State a better ability to maintain law and order.  
At the same time, the TeF being of universal validity and accord with international 
legal principles would neatly avoid the tension that often results when local values 
and international values and law come up against each other. 1530 
 
9.1.3. The TeF and other jurisdictions 
 
The TeF has relevance not only for India,1531 but also for other jurisdictions1532 like 
itself that ascribe greater value to duties over rights of the individual. For example, 
Confucian societies (e.g. China, Korea, Japan, Vietnam and Singapore) in East 
Asia1533 and Islamic societies.1534 Thus the placement of the duty element as the 
principal tenet of the TeF has great international appeal and might see countries other 
than those dominating the digital identity discourse (i.e. the digitally advanced West) 




                                                 
1530 Nahid Islam, The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (Wolters Kluwer, 
Netherlands 2010), 38; Helen Stacy, Human Rights for the 21st Century: Sovereignty, Civil Society, 
Culture (SUP, Palo Alto 2009), 32 
1531 Hindu law over the ages and law in contemporary India recognise the ascendance of duties over 
rights. Aggarwal (2002) n1451, 58 
1532 The place of duties in Western legal jurisprudence is supported by theorists like Austin, Hart, 
MacCormick, Raz and Wellman. HLA Hart, ‘Are There any Natural Rights?’ (1955) 64 Philosophical 
Review, 175-191; Neil MacCormick, ‘Children's Rights: A Test-Case for Theories of Rights,’ in N 
MacCormick (ed) Legal Right and Social Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 1982),154 -166; Neil MacCormick, ‘Rights in Legislation,’ in PMS Hacker 
and J Raz (eds), Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honour of HLA Hart (Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1977), 189. Joseph Raz, ‘The Nature of Rights,’ (1984) 93 Mind, 194-214; Joseph Raz, ‘Legal 
Rights,’ (1984) 4 OJLS, 1-21; Joseph Raz, ‘Rights and Politics,’ in J Tasioulas (ed), Law, Values and 
Social Practices (Aldershot, Dartmouth 1997), 75. Raz postulated that one's interests were protected 
by duty. Carl Wellman, A Theory of Rights (Rowman and Allanheld, NJ 1985); Carl Wellman, Real 
Rights (OUP, NY 1995); Carl Wellman, The Proliferation of Rights: Moral Progress or Empty 
Rhetoric? (Westview Press, Colorado 1999). Wellman believed that the essence of a right was to have 
choice or control over the corresponding duty.  
1533 Hidetoshi Hashimoto, The Prospects for a Regional Human Rights Mechanism in  East Asia 
(Taylor and Francis, London 2003), 50; Lee Manwoo, ‘North Korea and the Western Notion of 
Human Rights,’ in JC Hsiung (ed) Human Rights in East Asia: A Cultural Perspective (Paragon, NY 
1985), 129-151 
1534 AM Mutahari, ‘Primary Principles of Law in Islam,’ in OICC, Islamic Views on Human Rights: 
Viewpoints of Iranian Scholars (Alhoda, Tehran 2001), 179-190, 186 
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9.2. Future directions  
 
This thesis and its results are particularly significant for India and will continue to be 
as digital identity implementation grows and pervades every aspect of life.  
Specifically, the TeF presents a basis for critical analysis of the Indian UID 
scheme.1535 To date, no framework has been developed for the critical analysis of a 
scheme that will affect the lives of over a billion of the world’s population and be the 
largest of its kind in the world.1536 The TeF in its three elements represents a good 
framework to evaluate the scheme and its effects.  
 
The evaluatory exercise could ask the following questions on the basis of the core 
aspects of the TeF. First, does the Scheme promote a duty to respect digital identity 
by all stakeholders? Next, does the Scheme establish and sufficiently prescribe the 
conditions and circumstances under which digital identity under the Scheme might 
be enjoyed and legitimately restricted? Does it prescribe lawful procedure in this 
respect? Finally, if a person is denied a digital identity under the Scheme, does it 
provide recourse to an appropriate and effective remedy? This exercise would be in 
the best interests of not just Indian digital identity subjects but all stakeholders of the 
Scheme.  
 
Given that the Indian digital identity subject has no effective right to digital identity, 
unlike digital identity subjects in the EU and the UK, it might be worthwhile to 
explore further how the TeF might be incorporated as a legal right into the Indian 
legal system. A step in this direction might be to examine whether the TeF could be 
framed as a constitutional right in India. All three elements of the TeF fit well into 
the Indian constitutional setting. First, the role of duties is explicitly recognised 
under the Constitution. The second element (non-deprivation of digital identity 
except according to procedure established by law also finds substantial support, 
particularly as reflected in the language of Article 21 (the right to life). There is also 
                                                 
1535 Ch 4 (4.3, para 7); Ch 5 (5.2.3.2) 
1536 J Joseph, ‘How the UID Project Can Be a Cause for Concern,’ CNN-IBN (5 October 2010) 
<http://ibnlive.in.com/news/how-the-uid-project-can-be-a-cause-for-concern/132375-3.html>; S 
Sharma, ‘Crisis for Identity or Identity Crisis?’ D-sector.org (12 October 2010) <http://www.d-
sector.org/article-det.asp?id=1396> 
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strong constitutional support for the place of remedies, the final element of the TeF, 
as in Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. 
 
9.3. Closing thought  
 
 
Tagore1537 commented, “You can’t cross the sea merely by standing and staring at 
the water.” This thesis has taken on this exhortation and attempted in its comparative 
legal exercise to cross a choppy digital identity regulatory sea and has come out, on 
the other side, in tow with perhaps not the ‘ultimate’ model for digital identity 
regulation but a viable and useful basis on which the legal regulation of digital 





















                                                 
1537 R Tagore, Indian Poet, Playwright and Essayist. Nobel Laureate (Literature) (1913) 
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